To the Faculty of Washington State University:

The members of the Committee appointed to examine the dissertation of HAYDEN JOSIAH SMITH find it satisfactory and recommend that it be accepted.

__________________________________
Martha L. Cottam, Ph.D., Chair

__________________________________
J. Tom Preston, Ph.D.

__________________________________
Ashly A. Townsen, Ph.D.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to thank everyone who has supported me through my educational journey. First, a big thanks to my parents Faye Smith and Wayne Smith who have supported me in all of my endeavors. My interest in the study of international relations is owed to Darrick Bowman for running Model United Nations in high school. I would not have started down this career path without him. Niall Michelsen has been a wonderful friend and mentor since my first visit to Western Carolina University, where I began my undergraduate study of International Relations. I believe that teachers are the most influential people in our lives and I was lucky enough to have the best ones.

Through five years at Washington State University, Martha Cottam has been the best mentor anyone could hope for. She allowed me to explore many different ideas, but was always there to provide guidance when I got off track. This project certainly would not have been possible without her. Tom Preston has also made invaluable contribution to my career in graduate school. His passion for encouraging critical thinking as well as the practical application of research has helped to shape my work. In addition, I would like to thank him for assigning ridiculously large amounts of reading in his classes. Without having learned the ability to process that amount of information writing chapters 2 through 6 in three months would have been impossible. Ashly Townsen's thorough reading of several drafts of this dissertation as well as other papers has been invaluable during the writing process. I look forward to continuing to work with you all throughout my career.

Last, but certainly not least, I would like to thank my beautiful fiancé Julia Pusateri for supporting me through the dissertation process. There were many late nights, more days of frustration, and several weeks of travel that would have been worse without her. Thank you for being there through the highs and lows.
REALIST AND IDEALIST BELIEF SYSTEMS IN FOREIGN POLICY

Abstract

by Hayden Josiah Smith, Ph.D.
Washington State University
May 2016

Chair: Martha L. Cottam

Realism has most commonly been treated as a systemic theory in International Relations since the late 1970s and systemic theory has remained separate from theories of foreign policy and decision-making at the individual level of analysis. Returning to classical realism, I bridge the levels of analysis by utilizing assumptions from the philosophical traditions of realism and idealism to create a categorical typology of four belief systems: offensive realists, defensive realists, expansionist idealists, and non-expansionist idealists. The typology builds on the foundational works of operational code. In addition, I incorporate image theory to the analysis, to provide a more nuanced perception of specific actors, which is lost in the generality of the modern VICS operational code. The case studies of presidents Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter provide a depiction of the realist and idealist belief systems respectively.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgement ........................................................................................................ iii

Abstract ........................................................................................................................ iv

List of Tables .................................................................................................................. vi

List of Figures ................................................................................................................ vii

Chapter

1. Introduction ................................................................................................................ 1

2. Theory and Methodology ....................................................................................... 5

3. Case Study Background .......................................................................................... 49

4. Richard Nixon: The Realist .................................................................................. 84

5. Jimmy Carter: The Idealist .................................................................................... 120

6. Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 150

Bibliography .................................................................................................................. 154

1. Jimmy Carter Speeches and Interviews ................................................................. 160

2. Documents from Jimmy Carter Presidential Library ........................................... 166

3. Richard Nixon Conferences, Speeches, and Interviews ....................................... 168

4. Documents from Richard Nixon Presidential Library ........................................... 173
LIST OF TABLES

1. Operational Code Questions ......................................................................................... 26
2. Holsti (1977) realist/idealist typology ............................................................................. 27
4. New realist/idealist typology ............................................................................................ 39
5. Image Theory ..................................................................................................................... 43
6. Nixon VICS SALT ............................................................................................................. 89
7. Nixon VICS Middle East .................................................................................................. 105
8. Carter VICS SALT ............................................................................................................ 122
9. Carter VICS Middle East ................................................................................................. 131
LIST OF FIGURES

1. Steps in VICS ........................................................................................................................................... 32
2. VICS coding scale ................................................................................................................................... 33
DEDICATION

For Ole Holsti, who’s work in operational went unnoticed for far too long.
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The most predominant form of realism in International Relations is Waltz’s (1979) structural realism. His theory explains the outcome of interactions between states trapped within an anarchic system that is immune to the effects of beliefs and ideology. However, this differs significantly from classical realist thought. Scholars embracing the classical conceptualization of realism treat it as a belief system (Herz, 1951; Claude, 1981, Kertzer and McGraw, 2012) or a prescriptive foreign policy (Carr, 1939; Barkin, 2010; Mearsheimer, 2014). The most recent branch of realist scholarship, known as neoclassical realism, attempts to bridge the gap of levels of analysis by applying realist principles to the individual, state, and systemic level of analysis (Feaver et al., 2000; Zakaria, 1998; Schweller, 1998; Toje and Kunz, 2012; Christensen, 1996; Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaferro, 2009). While this work speaks to foreign policy there is no recent work employing a cognitive approach.

Foreign Policy Decision-Making has been analyzed from many different theoretical perspectives. Some scholars, such as John Mearsheimer (2001), posit that the rational actor model is best suited to explaining decision-making in international politics, while cognitive models (Jervis, 1976; Cottam, 1986) reject the microeconomic decision-making structure of the rational choice model in favor of more complex psychological processes. Other theories of personality profiling, such as Leadership Trait Analysis (Preston, 2001) and operational code (Leites 1953; Leites, 1954; Holsti 1977; Walker 1986; Walker, Shafer, and Young 2005; Renshon 2008; O’Reiley, 2015) provide insight into how elite decision-makers process information, structure their advisory system, and other key factors that influence how and what decisions are made. While foreign policy decision-making is a robust and informative literature, it has traditionally remained entirely separate from the concepts used in systemic theories of International Relations.
Focusing on individual decision makers generally involves an analysis of ideology and belief systems. Using a broad definition, political ideology describes “the ways in which people organize their political attitudes and beliefs” (Feldman, 2015 pp. 591). Belief systems are more stable structure of interdependent “ideas and attitudes” that becomes the lens through which individuals perceive phenomena (Converse, 1964; Holsti, 1977).

The purpose of this study is to bridge the knowledge of systemic theory with profiling methodologies used to understand foreign policy decision-making by creating a theoretical framework of belief system typology based on the philosophical assumptions of realism and idealism. A theory explains the relationship between variables (Waltz, 1979 p. 1-6) and then can help to explain and understand phenomena (Hollis and Smith, 1990). The intention of the study at hand is to explain and understand how the perceptions and belief systems of Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter influenced their policy preferences. The framework developed can be applied to other individuals for further analysis and theory testing.

Similar typologies have been attempted previously (Holsti, 1977; Crichlow, 1998; Walker and Schafer, 2007), but fail to accurately account for the philosophical assumptions, particularly the perceptions of the international environment rather than their actions. Categorizing realist and idealist behavior based on actions is problematic, because similar actions can be carried out for vastly different reasons.

The best attempt at a realist/idealist typology is Holsti (1977) utilizing operational code and the “images” depicted by Waltz (1954), which include perceived sources of

---

1 Idealism is used instead of liberalism, because it is the philosophical opposite of realism. Idealism is the philosophical foundations of much of what we know as liberalism, but not all theories of liberalism are incompatible with realism, thus idealism is a more appropriate term for the philosophical opposite of realism, even though liberalism is often the theoretical opposite. A complete explanation of this is in chapter 2.
conflict. Unfortunately, Walker (1986) used flawed assumptions of realism to simplify the typology by removing the source of conflict from the operational code analysis. That is the methodological starting point for this study. Chapter 2 provides a thorough explanation of realist and idealist philosophical assumptions that translate to individual beliefs. Then, the profiling methodologies operational code and image theory are outlined and used to create a realist/idealist typology belief system typology.

Chapter 3 introduces the two case studies used to depict the realist and idealist typology created in chapter 2. American Presidents Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter are used to personify the realist and idealist typology respectively. These individuals were selected, because they both held office during the Cold War, were active in SALT negotiations, and were involved in attempts to make peace agreements between Israel and the Arab states. In addition, it is well known that the strong self-proclaimed realist, Henry Kissinger, had a significant impact on the way Nixon viewed and operated foreign policy. Jimmy Carter, alternatively, is well known for his fervent support of human rights and reluctance to use military force, which is more in line with idealist thought. These areas of direct comparison make Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter ideal candidates for this analysis. The chapter includes short biographies, including some personality analysis, for each President. Then, the development of SALT agreements and Middle East peace agreements are provided.

Chapters 4 and 5 provide the analysis of public statements, interviews, and archival material for Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter respectively. The results from operational code and the images they hold of other actors are used to categorize them realist/idealist typology. Richard Nixon represents the Defensive Realist and Jimmy Carter represents the Non-Expansionist Idealist.
This typology is beneficial for progressing the neoclassical realist scholarship, but also has applications for the intelligence community. An understanding of how individual leaders perceive the international environment and approach conflict resolution suggests how they are likely to behave and how they approach negotiations. The better an individual is understood the easier they will be to negotiate with. As an example, if we know that a leader must perceive that they are receiving the best part of the deal it will be beneficial to present compromises in that way. In addition, the Operational Code analysis suggests the leader’s approach to resolving conflict, such as offering rewards or issuing threats. Understanding their tactics and perceptions of their control of the situation will suggest to what extent they are willing to make compromises.

Future expansions of this project will examine how realist and idealist ideologies held by leaders of different states with varying degrees of power and capabilities shape the international system. By understanding how belief driven behavior interacts to form a system, we can better understand how the system is likely to respond to certain goals. If this can be accomplished then it will be possible to create a new systemic theory of International Relations that incorporates and has the ability to explain the lower levels of analysis.
CHAPTER 2: THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

Returning to the origins of realism and idealism, the goal of this chapter is to understand how they influence foreign policy decision-making at the elite level, as ideologies and foreign policy prescriptions. This is a first step and the purpose of this chapter is to construct a foreign policy decision-making theoretical framework based on Realist and Idealist ideologies. The chapter proceeds in four sections. First, I provide an overview of neorealist and neoclassical realist scholarship. Second, I turn to classical realism and idealism to describe each respective set of thoughts and beliefs as ideologies. In the third section of the paper I develop a framework for categorizing leaders as realists or idealists using operational code and image theory. Note that the italicized “realism” and “idealism” refer to ideologies and belief systems and “realism” and “liberalism” will refer to the theories. Finally, I outline a coding methodology for analyzing realist and idealist ideology.

Background

In this section I provide an overview of the development of the progression of realist scholarship, from neorealism, also referred to as structural realism, to neoclassical realism, which incorporates both systemic and individual levels of analysis.

Neorealism

Waltz (1959) clearly defined three “images” of IR. The first image is that of man. He takes a Hobbsian view of human nature and describes how it is human decisions that ultimately lead us to war. The second image depicts the domestic and bureaucratic politics of the State. While Waltz claims the second image is useful for understanding foreign policy, his third image is a view of the international system. In “Theory of International Politics” Waltz (1979) builds on the third image and describes world politics within a structural system, creating the foundation of neorealism. Waltz (1979) describes the international system based
on “deep structure”, which is comprised of the defining elements that drive world politics. The two key elements are the balance of power and anarchy. There are many different ways to apply realism, but it remains a cohesive theory with a consistent body of research and scholars that have progressed over time, connected by a distinct set of assumptions and views regarding the international system (Gilpin, 1986).

According to Waltz (1979), conflict occurs when there is a shift in the polarity of the system causing states to compete for a position of influence within the system. However, he believes that, in most cases, states attempt to maintain the status quo rather than seek more power; this is known as defensive realism. Using Waltz (1979) as a foundation, Mearsheimer (2001), alternatively, posits a theory of offensive realism. According to Mearsheimer, states constantly seek to expand their power, which results in more conflict and situations, such as an arms race. The important distinction is that Waltz is more concerned with relative power, while Mearshimer is more concerned about growing absolute power.

Beyond the expectations of the desires of states, Waltz and Mearsheimer’s theories are based on two fundamentally different principles. First, Waltz’s theory does not directly rely upon the rational actor model of states, because he posits that intentions are often misperceived. Alternatively, Mearsheimer’s theory relies heavily on the rational actor model. Secondly, Waltz (1979; 1996) asserts that a theory of foreign policy is not a theory of International Relations. He posits that a theory of international politics must stay at the systemic level of analysis (Waltz, 1979), whereas a theory of foreign policy examines domestic influences and explains specific foreign policy decisions (Waltz, 1967). Mearsheimer, on the other hand, sees no difference between theories of foreign policy and international politics, which is more consistent with classical realism.
These differences are significant for how the theories are used and what they are capable of analyzing. For Waltz, cases that are not predicted by his theory, such as US involvement in the Vietnam War, are unproblematic, because of the broader balance of power; because Mearsheimer’s theory is based upon the rational actor model and is intended to explain foreign policy as well as the system, cases not explained by his theory are problematic. For both Waltz (1979) and Mearsheimer (2001) the structure of the system is the most important variable that determines the actions and outcomes of state-to-state interactions.

Neorealism has made many long lasting contributions to the field of International Relations. The utility of neorealism, however, is limited. Waltz’s (1979) neorealism is very parsimonious and does not seek to explain state behavior, but rather attempts to describe international systemic outcomes. Mearshimer’s (2001) theory is better equipped to explain state behavior, but both theoretical frameworks are stuck at the systemic level with only states as the unit of analysis. This limits the utility of the theories explanatory power. This should not be interpreted as a criticism of the theories themselves, because they were not intended to explain more than they do. A different analysis, however, is needed for expanding our understanding of how the lower levels of analysis affect the systemic level and how the system affects the individual decision makers and the state. More recent scholarship, neoclassical realism, utilizes what we have learned about systemic constraints from neorealism to develop a new realist theory that has greater explanatory power for state behavior.

Neoclassical Realism

Realism has remained at the systemic level of analysis, because Waltz (1979; 1996) claims that only systemic factors are applicable to the IR system and domestic politics should
remain only with the study of foreign policy (Waltz, 1967). A new line of research, referred to as neoclassical realism, is helpful in bridging the levels of analysis debate that has plagued and divided scholars of structural realism and neoliberalism from those that examine the internal characteristics of states and the individual level of analysis. Realist scholarship does not have to be constrained to the systemic level. Realist behavior can be measured in the context of realist expectations, resulting in midrange theories, which has been the goal of neoclassical realism (Feaver et al., 2000). Neoclassical realists, such as Fareed Zakaria (1998), Randy Schweller (1998), Toje and Kunz (2012), Christensen (1996), and Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaferro (2009) all begin with the basic assumptions of realism, that states seek security and power, but in a more nuanced way that allows them to examine the internal forces within states that drive their behavior within the international system. Christensen (1996) posits that the public makes foreign policy decisions as an interaction between the goals of the policy makers and the level of acceptance of those policies in the general public. In specific, “If the political hurdles to mobilization are relatively low, then we should expect policies that are consistent with the expectations of black-box realists. If the hurdles are high or prohibitively high, we should expect policies that would be considered by realists to be either overreactions or underreactions to the international environment facing the nation” (Christensen, 1996 p. 13).

The challenge then, is for policy makers to sell their policy to the general public and reach a compromise, so that the long term goals and interests of the policy makers are equal to the long-term interests and goals of the public (Christensen, 1996). His theory makes a strong case for the merging of area studies and general theory, to better understand specific cases. This is beneficial for theory, because different populations interact with their
government in different ways, and thus the nuances are important in understanding the
Grand Strategy of a state.

Zakaria (1998) begins by not treating offensive realism and defensive realism as
either or options, but rather asking when states choose to pursue expansion and when they
exercise restraint. He posits that, the goal of states is to have influence within the
international system. Thus, they expand when the opportunity to increase influence arises
(Zakaria, 1998). This is dependent not only on state capabilities, but on the ability of the
state to employ those capabilities in the appropriate manner, which is dependent upon the
domestic political environment and their fungibility of the resources.

Schweller (2004) investigates the neorealist claim that states’ “balance” against one
another in the system. He finds that states often do not respond in ways that neorealists
would predict or prescribe, mostly by underbalancing. But, he fails to explain when and why
states are most likely to underbalance.

While the current neoclassical realist literature has provided a foundation for a
multilevel analysis of international politics, there are many gaps left to fill. Rose (1998)
asserts that neoclassical scholars have focused on area studies and specific cases, but have
made no significant contributions to systemic theory.

Realism and Idealism as Ideology

If we step outside of neorealism’s black box and view realism and idealism as
philosophical ways of perceiving the world around us (Herz, 1951; Kertzer and McGraw,
2012) and ways of managing Foreign Policy (Barkin, 2010), then we can understand how the
two philosophies affect foreign policy decision-making. In brief, realism is a set of
assumptions held by those that view the international system as being characterized by
conflict, which cannot be altered through cooperation, but the absence of conflict can be
maintained with the use or threat of force. Alternatively, idealists believe that a more permanent peace is possible within the system; this does not mean they believe the system is currently peaceful, but that it may be achieved by various means including international organizations and cooperation of individuals. It is important to understand that modern realism came about as push against idealism and the development of both has relied on their opposition to the other.

Gideon Rose (1998) asserts that neorealists have created two theories of foreign policy, offensive realism and defensive realism, by applying Realist principles to individual states’ foreign policies. The same could be said of liberalism, the theory that in many ways grew out of idealism. A recent example of realism being applied to policy decisions is John Mearsheimer’s (2014) argument that Vladimir Putin’s realist foreign policy moves in Crimea and the Liberal foreign policy of the United States and its NATO allies. This treatment of realism and idealism is based upon the foundations of classical realist thought. John Herz (1951) begins his analysis of realist and idealist thought by positing that both philosophies are founded in individual psychology and are how one perceives the world. Several authors exemplify this characterization of realism and idealism. Feng (2005) discusses Mao Zedong’s polices in terms of defensive and offensive realism. Walker, Schafer, and Young (1998) discuss the Operational Code of Jimmy Carter and his shift towards realism. More recently, Kertzer and McGraw (2012) conducted a study of college students to determine that college students hold realist and idealist ideologies.

Further emphasizing that there are differences in how individuals perceive foreign policy, I will turn to studies of American politics to discuss the divide that exists among liberals and conservatives. Some studies show that there is virtually no difference in the foreign policy preferences between conservatives and liberals, but this is incorrect. This
misperception comes from Morris Fiorina’s (2011) argument that American voters are not deeply divided by political party lines. “On domestic politics, he asserts that ‘there is little evidence that the country is polarized even on ‘hot button’ issues like abortion”. On foreign policy, Fiorina claims that “Red and blue state voters have similar views on diplomacy vs. force in international affairs” (Gries, 2014 p. 41). Peter Gries (2014) asserts that Fiorina’s findings are based on poor methodology. He demonstrates how there are not only divides between conservatives and liberals over foreign policy issues, but how there are divides within the parties among different types of conservatives and liberals respectively. This shows that foreign policy preferences are divided by ideology. He views composite ideologies with the aid of subideologies of culture, social, economics, and politics, with the most important being economic and social. His findings suggest that, in general, conservatives feel more loyal to their government and state, whereas liberals tend to feel more like citizens of the world. This results in conservatives supporting a more isolationist foreign policy, whereas liberals favor a foreign policy that provides humanitarian aid and betters humankind around the world. However, when conservatives are not in the mindset of isolationism, they prefer a stronger foreign policy than liberals, because they place value on having authority and dominance over other groups. This demonstrates that ideology plays a key role in foreign policy perceptions.

Juxtaposed to realism is idealism, which is the philosophical set of ideals that was the catalyst for forming the theory of realism. Political idealism is not so much a theory of “what is” in the international system, but rather a set of philosophical propositions of “what ought to be”. The idea was put forward by theorists of International Law, primarily in conjunction with the League of Nations (Herz, 1951). Even the authors of theses theories, however, find that there are many exceptions to states actual behavior verses what they “should do”
According to international law, international law is based on “norms” (Herz, 1951). Essentially, political *idealism* is philosophically based on the new international system of nation-states. Political philosophers such as Herder, Fichte, and Mazzini discuss nationalism as a right and a way to bring peace to the international system (Herz, 1951). Political *idealism* was indoctrinated into the works of theories of international law, through scholars, such as Hans Kelsen (Herz, 1951). Realist thought was promoted to counter *idealism* and personified into a theory is intended to show a more accurate presentation of the world, rather than an idealistic one. Osiander (1998) posits that the early 20th century idealists have been, in part, misrepresented by realists, namely E.H. Carr (1939). He argues that the idealists, like realists, conduct a historical analysis to reach their conclusions and simply interpret history differently than the realists. Further, he posits that they are not as “utopian” as claimed by Carr (1939). While there may be some truth to this, Osiander (1998) does not consider the fundamental differences in the assumptions held by realists and idealists. The idealists, as depicted by Osiander (1998), do not change the current frame they are placed in by realists. He is correct that not all idealists believe in a “utopian” world community of individuals, but they do have a belief that cooperation is achievable and have a more optimistic view of the intentions of other actors. It is the general optimism and trust of others that sets them apart from realists.

More modern *idealist* scholarship has taken the form in liberalism, specifically liberal institutionalism (Rosato and Schuessler, 2011). This idea of “liberalism” has grown out of the ideas of Woodrow Wilson and there are now different varieties of “Wilsonians”. This philosophy is based in the American idea of liberalism (for a review of American liberalism see Hartz 1955 and Kloppenberg 2001). Scholars of democratic peace theory posit that the global system will be more peaceful with the spread of democracy. They believe that if
individuals have control over their own system of government they will be less willing to go
to war against other nations that have similar democratic beliefs (Babst, 1964; Maoz and
Russett, 1993). For these scholars it is the internal characteristics of the state that lead to
peace or conflict. Other liberal institutionalists promote the strengthening of international
institutions, as to provide a peaceful venue for resolving conflict (Deutsch et al, 1957). The
overarching viewpoint of these scholars is that the international system can be shaped into a
world of peace due to the creation of shared ideologies and understanding among one
another. Stated succinctly, “…the…liberal version of foreign policy…emphasizes
democracy, institutions, and interdependence rather than the balance of power, and that
holds out the prospect of peace rather than stability” (Rosato and Schuessler, 2011 p. 808).
The end goals and general perception of the international political environment are what
separates realists and idealists. This means that two individuals could pursue the same policy
objectives, but be categorized as an idealist or realist based on their perceptions and
intentions.

This liberal policy has personified itself in the murky and loosely used term
“neoconservatives”. True neoconservatives support the welfare state and liberal domestic
policies, but take a hard line approach to foreign policy. The term, however, has been
misused by the American political left to unfavorably label all foreign policy hawks on the
right (Lipset, 1988). Max Boot (2004) posits that neoconservatives are Wilsonian idealists,
but is careful to note that not all who subscribe to the Wilsonian idea of spreading
democracy are the same. He states, “Liberal ‘soft Wilsonians,’ such as former U.S. president
Jimmy Carter and, previously, U.S. president Woodrow Wilson himself, share a faith that
multilateral organizations such as the League of Nations or the United Nations should be the
main venues through which the United States promotes its ideals, and that international law
should be in the United States’ main policy tool. They are willing to use force, but preferably only when (as in Haiti or Kosovo) the intervention is untainted by any hint of national interest. The neocons have scant regard for Wilson himself, whom they regard as hopelessly naïve. Instead, they are ‘hard Wilsonians,’ who place their faith not in pieces of paper but in power, specifically U.S. power. Their heroes are Theodore Roosevelt, Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, and Ronald Reagan – all U.S. presidents who successfully wielded power in the service of a higher purpose. Neocons believe the United States should use force when necessary to champion its ideals as well as its interests, not only out of sheer humanitarianism but also because the spread of liberal democracy improves U.S. security, while crimes against humanity inevitably make the world a more dangerous place” (Boot, 2004 pp. 24). In short, the difference in their policy preferences is those Boot (2004) refers to as “soft Wilsonians” are more isolationist than “hard Wilsonians”.

To further understand how these beliefs influence policy preferences I return to a comparison of U.S. liberals and conservatives. Gries (2014) discusses the difference in support for different versions of idealism within the American electorate. In this section liberal and conservative refer to the domestic political ideologies in the United States, not IR theory. The differences in policy preferences not only help to validate that different worldviews lead to different foreign policy preferences, but this discussion will aid in describing modern idealism and who is likely to subscribe to it. Liberals tend to support foreign aid and humanitarian intervention more than conservatives, who subscribe to the idea of “self help”, meaning that individuals should have the freedom to help themselves, but the end result is dependent upon their own actions (Greis, 2014 pp. 95; 109-10). Conservatives favor a stronger military than liberals, due to a belief in power through dominance (Greis, 2014 pp. 109). This emphasis is what divides the idealists. Liberal idealists
fit Boot’s (2004) definition of “soft Wilsonians”, whereas as conservative idealists fit the definition of “hard Wilsonians”.

One of the defining characteristics of idealists and realists is how they treat policy ends and means. “Unilateralism versus multilateralism and diplomacy versus military force address the questions of means: How should the United States conduct its foreign policy? Realism versus idealism, by contrast, addresses the issue of ends: What foreign policy goals should the United States pursue? (Gries, 2014 pp. 109 emphasis in original).

Interestingly, beliefs about domestic issues directly correspond to foreign policy preferences regarding the humanitarian intervention. The difference in beliefs regarding sexual education, family planning, and contraceptive use accounted for ninety percent of the relationship between liberals and conservatives views on humanitarian intervention (Gries, 2014 pp. 112). Political idealism has been used in American Foreign Policy to justify intervention to spread “freedom and democracy”, such as George W. Bush’s invasion of Iraq and Barak Obama’s actions in Libya (Gries, 2014 pp. 112). As another example, justifying entrance into WWI, Woodrow Wilson said, “the world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty” (quoted in Gries, 2014 pp. 113). In short, ideological liberals tend to favor the humanitarian idealism more than conservatives. Religion is also a key variable in support for idealist foreign policy. Cultural conservatives support political idealism, due to religious belief, but it seems that libertarianism rejects political idealism (Gries, 2014). Both liberals and conservatives care about promoting religious freedom, but conservatives are specifically motivated by persecution of Christians (Greis, 2014 pp. 114-5). Progressive thought, however, is not confined to idealists as one may assume.
It is important to understand that realists do not entirely reject “what ought to be” in international politics. John Herz (1951) posits that in order to achieve “what ought to be” we must operate within the constraints of “what is”. Essentially, the push against Idealism came about to push against the idea that peace will be achieved by cooperation (see Carr, 1939). The roots of realism lie in the philosophical works of Thomas Hobbs and Nicolai Machiavelli. Both scholars posited that human nature is self-serving and power is what holds order within society.

Carr (1939) sought to describe international relations in terms of the real world based on the conflictual nature and self-interest behavior of humans. The goal was to push against the idealists of the day, including Woodrow Wilson, who were seeking world peace through the formation of organizations, such as the League of Nations. Carr saw this endeavor as fruitless. The theories or ideologies, however, are not at war with one another, as many scholars today make them out to be. Rather, when treated as ideologies and foreign policy prescriptions they are well suited to work together. This is depicted by two quotes, one from a scholar and one from a policy maker. Inis Claude Jr. (1981) commented to John Herz, “Realism avoids expecting too much; idealism avoids attempting too little” (p. 200). How the two ideologies work together in policy is further depicted by Hillary Clinton’s statement, “I’ve never understood the division between so-called realists and so-called idealists. I don’t know how you get up in the world every day, doing what I do, if you don’t have some sense of idealism, because you have to believe that as hard as it is, you’re going to help to stop the war, you’re going to figure out a way to get clean water to thirsty people and cure kids of disease. And at the same time, I don’t know how you go through the day and expect to be successful without being very hardheaded and realistic. So for me, it’s not an either/or”. (Hillary Clinton, quoted in Gries, p. 121). The point here is that the ideologies interact with
One another to form policy preferences and outcomes and scholars of classical realism and classical idealism were aware of this.

One of the most significant differences between realists and idealists is their treatment of morality in foreign policy. Carr posits that foreign policy and morality are on separate planes that never intersect (Smith, 1986), while idealists insist that morality and policy must go together. This dichotomy, however, depicts a narrow view of the two ideologies that must be further investigated. Morality will always be ingrained in foreign policy decision-making for an idealist, but realists must not always be divorced from morality. In the majority of cases foreign policy and morality, for a realist, must remain separate, but occasionally they can, and do, intersect. They intersect when the impact on security and potential gains or losses are murky and debatable. An example is the case of the Rwandan genocide and the call for international intervention. The U.S. refused to provide direct support to the intervention efforts and this can be viewed in multiple ways: 1) Realists may posit that there was no benefit to the US and any use of resources, although physically negligible, would not be prudent (DEFENSIVE REALISM); 2) a realist could posit that it was prudent to intervene and stabilize the country to prevent it create a new ally in the area that presents an opportunity for trade, resource acquisition, etc. (OFFENSIVE REALISM); 3) or a realist could agree with the idealists and support intervention based strictly on morality, because there was no impact on U.S. security or power, thus making it a non-issue. The third example requires further explanation. Waltz (1967), Krasner (1976), and Zakaria (1998) posit that sometimes states pursue objectives other than security, when they are secure enough and have enough power. So, morality and foreign policy can intersect when the decision-makers feel that their state is secure enough and the action will not affect their relative power.
The point of the discussion above is that to understand if a foreign policy preference is realist or idealist is dependent upon how the issue is perceived and framed by the individual decision-maker and can be easily confused if one does not fully understand realism and idealism. Realists do not always have to agree on a foreign policy decision, and at times may seem at odds, for two reasons. First, there is a difference between the foreign policy prescriptions of offensive and defensive realists. An offensive realist is more likely to be a hawk and advocate eliminating potential or rising threats, while a defensive realist is likely to be more reserved in their direct use of military force and favor the buildup of arms, making war a less appealing option for other actors. The second difference can simply come from a difference in perception; the perception of threat can vary between individuals. This means that what makes someone realist is larger and more philosophical than individual foreign policy goals and decisions.

The first connection among realists is that they all accept that the international system is anarchic and that results in a perpetually conflictual system, if not managed. For realists managing the constant threat of other actors within the system sometimes requires aggressive foreign policy and at other times called for peaceful diplomacy. Which option is most pragmatic depends upon the power relationship between the two actors and the issue at hand. Either way, to be realist the policy maker must advocate their policy in terms of national-interest, rather than morality as the end-goal, in most cases.

To conclude this part of the discussion, the difference between realists and idealists is not that realists advocate the unrestrained use of military force and seek to perpetuate conflict, while idealists simply promote peace. Realists as well as idealists seek peace not war, although realists and some idealists may advocate the use of force to achieve peace. Waltz (1981) advocated nuclear proliferation to increase stability and prevent future conflict. This
directly and obviously increases the military and destructive capabilities that we acknowledge can pose a threat. But, that is simply the tactic, not the goal. The goal is peace. Thus, it is possible, and probable, for an individual to be philosophically idealistic in their goals, while being a pragmatic realist willing to use immoral and brutal foreign policy to achieve it. Henry Kissinger is a prime example. He argues that foreign policy decisions are most often a choice between two evils (Kissinger, 1956).

To further explore how and when realists are, or appear to be, optimists we must reassess the claims of some structural realists, particularly the “offensive realism” of John Mearsheimer (2001). Realists, all too often, claim that states engage in competition rather than cooperation because cooperation comes with too much risk. With realist research focusing on conflict, realist scholarship has not contributed much to our understanding of cooperation. Charles Glasser (1994/95) reclaims this ground for realists, by explaining when states benefit the most from conflict and when they benefit more from cooperation all in terms of security and power, thus making the theory definitively realist. His theory is called “contingent realism”. Glasser (1994/95) reduces the concept of “power” to “military capability” and uses the security dilemma as the contextual frame. He posits that a country is concerned about relative gains in security if cooperation would increase its adversary’s security more than its own, and if this relative loss in security would in turn reduce its own security…following security-dilemma logic, all else being equal, increases in the adversary’s security often increase one’s own security because a more secure adversary has smaller incentives for pursuing an expansionist foreign policy, and therefore will pose a smaller threat.

Contingent realism, then, argues that whether engaging in cooperation or conflict is the most prudent is dependent upon the balance of relative power between the actors in
question. If an adversary is stronger, then it may be most prudent for the state to cooperate, or conflict may be the most prudent if there is much to gain and the adversary is weaker. The same logic applies to arms races. An increase in defensive buildup can decrease one’s own security by signaling an increased security threat to adversaries that may have more power and find it most prudent to attack preemptively. Mearshimer (2001) argues that Glasser’s theory is flawed because it is simply prescriptive, telling states how they should act, rather than explaining how they do act. This is problematic, because “…great powers often behave in ways that the defensive realists consider reckless rather than rational” (Mearsheimer, 2011 p. 425). He also posits that Waltz’s theory of defensive realism is also a prescriptive theory that state’s behavior often does not fit. Mearshimer (2011) goes on to say that Glasser needs a two part theory explaining when states are more likely to select cooperation over conflict. The methodology outlined below will be able to depict this, by demonstrating the role of ideology. The pursuit of a policy of conflict or cooperation is dependent not only upon the security and position of the state, but also the will and desires of the policy makers.

The discussion above shows that the most common argument against realism is that states do not behave as expected by the theory, which results in a debate over what realist behavior really is. Rosato and Schusseler (2011) correctly posit that, when considered historically, realist policy prescription was not followed in WWI, WWII, Vietnam, or the 2003 invasion of Iraq and that policy that is explained by liberal theory policy prescription is partially at fault for, at a minimum, the magnitude of the conflicts. In short, they are correct that policies of balancing and containment, as thought of by realism, were not followed. But,

---

2 Mearshimer does not reject the utility of prescriptive theory. See Reckless States and Realism.
because the authors so clearly show the points of departure from realism and the real world policy, it is far too easy to glance over the flaws in their argument. Alternatively, Adam Quinn (2014) posits that states do not behave as realists expect due to their goals and perceptions of other actors; this does not necessarily mean they did not behave as realists, but that the theory of realism, as is, is inadequate at predicting or explaining their decisions. What Rosato and Schusseler (2011) failed to take into consideration was the perception of the decision-makers and as Jervis (1976) points out, perception and misperception are key to the success or failure of policy. Rosato and Schusseler (2011) are correct that the 2003 invasion of Iraq was initiated and a blunder, due to the liberal policy prescriptions followed by the George W. Bush administration and they make a strong argument for liberal policy constraints greatly contributing to Britain’s failure to balance against Germany in WWI. Their arguments, however, for WWII and Vietnam being caused and driven by liberal policy respectively, is much less convincing. In the lead up to WWII they criticize the policy of appeasement as liberal and not in line with realist policy prescription. This is problematic and potentially incorrect, because it could also be argued that a policy of appeasement was intended to be a policy of containment. The leaders of the time incorrectly perceived that Hitler’s goals were limited and had this been true engaging in a military conflict would have not aligned with realist policy prescription. In regards to Vietnam, Rosato and Schusseler (2011) posit that the war was liberal because it was fighting against communist ideology, rather than balancing against a true military threat. As with WWII, this is true in hindsight and we know that “domino theory” was deeply flawed. Nonetheless, the perception at the time was that communist ideology would spread and materialize into a true physical threat to the United States and its allies. It may also be true that Henry Kissinger and others believed in the right
of the people of Vietnam to control themselves, but this was secondary to the realist policy of containment against communist ideology, which was believed to be the threat.

The discussion above shows that realist and idealist thinking is not only held in the context of how an individual views the world, but how they frame foreign policy, and at what point they give consideration to morality. Realists will always view the world as more inherently conflictual and be less trusting of other actors than idealists. Idealists will always treat morality as an end unto itself and give morality consideration in the means, whereas a realist, if they consider morality at all, will only do so as a secondary end after security, or when security is of no concern to the states relative power.

The best methodology to begin an analysis of realism and idealism is Operational Code, because it depicts the general worldview of a leader and knowing how an individual perceives the system is the first step in labeling them as a realist or idealist. However, from the discussion above we know that it is not simply how an individual views the system that makes them idealist or realist. We must also examine how they perceive the actors they are interacting with. For this, I employ Image Theory, which provides a more nuanced view of individual actors than Operational Code. Together, these two methodologies will allow us to correctly categorize individuals and their foreign policy preferences and decision-making as realist or idealist. It should be understood that “decision-making” is a term that groups several cognitive processes, which are not independently analyzed, into a parsimonious concept (Holsti, 1977).

**Methodology**

*Operational Code*

Assessing the role of cognition by various means has proven fruitful for International Relations (see Young and Schafer, 1998). One approach, operational code
provides a general worldview of an individual's cognitive belief system and is used to analyze and predict an individual's behavior and policy preferences. A belief system is "a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence (Converse, 1964 p. 207). The interconnectedness of individual beliefs is significant, because it allows us to form a typology of expected behavior based upon clusters of beliefs, which then comprise a system. Hostli (1977) states, “…the concept of a belief system implies that one’s beliefs about history and politics are more than an unconnected set of ideas in which the relationship between components is a random one. Rather, they are assumed to form more or less patterned ways of thinking about history and politics (p. 151, emphasis in original). The set of beliefs are joined by “core beliefs”, which “are those which affect or constrain the range of responses to other questions that compose the operational code”; these are the most stable beliefs (Holsti, 1977 p. 151) Individual cognitive processes in policy, however, are minimized because of bureaucratic processes and domestic political factors (Holsti, 1977). With this in consideration, Ole Holsti (1977) states, “Attention should therefore be directed to the linkages between beliefs and certain decision-making tasks that precede a decision, including the definition of the situation, analysis, prescription, and the like” (p. 25). The study of leaders’ perceptions gives insight into narrowing their policy options.

Operational code has been used extensively to understand political leaders (see Leites 1951; 1953; O. Holsti, 1970; O. Holsti, 1977; Walker, 1977; Starr, 1980; Walker, Schafer, and Young, 1998; Marfleet, 2000; Schafer and Walker, 2006; Walker and Schafer, 2007; Renshon, 2009; O’Reilly, 2015). The method was created to understand how belief systems influence the decisions of policy elites (Leites, 1951, 1953; O. Holsti, 1977). Alexander George (1969) operationalized the concepts of Leites’ studies to construct the operational code framework.
used today. This framework focuses on the philosophical beliefs of leaders, which guide the thought processes in context, as well as instrumental beliefs, which focus on the strategies and tactics used by the leader. Because Leites study was very complex and did not have a patterned methodology, which other scholars could build on, George (1969) developed five philosophical questions and five instrumental questions that would give insight into leaders’ worldview (see Table 1). This Table, however, only shows the master questions. The original operational code analysis relied on the questions presented here, which were then placed into greater context with many sub-questions (See Holsti, 1977 p. 47-49); the importance of this will become more apparent in the discussion below as I critique the progress of operational code analysis within the discipline, but for now it is sufficient to say that the breadth of the analysis was simply descriptive and was in need of theoretical parsimony. Parsimony in recent operational code scholarship, however, has been exchanged for the nuanced findings of the original methodology.

A central question for testing the validity of operational code is, is the operational code a true belief system, or is it simply a reflection of ones environment? While learning can alter ones operational code, certain beliefs should remain relatively stable over time and there should be a clear connection between the beliefs, if they are autonomous from the external environment. While developing the standardized operational code questions, George (1969) validated the beliefs by showing how the beliefs identified by Leites (1951, 1953) of the Bolsheviks are interconnected, creating the belief system. We should also find some connection between beliefs and behavior, which is useful for forecasting the behavior of leaders (Walker and Murphy 1982, 24-60). Because of the complication of many intervening and moderating variables in foreign policy behavior examining the link between beliefs and behavior requires careful examination. As stated by Holsti (1976), “it is not very fruitful to
assume direct linkages between beliefs and foreign policy action…[and]…it is important to recognize the distinction between decisions and foreign policy actions. The bureaucratic politics literature has illustrated the many potential sources of slippage between executive decisions and implementation of policy in the form of foreign policy actions” (pp. 18-19, qtd. in Walker and Murphy, 1982 pp. 28). But, Holsti also understands the importance of beliefs and perceptions in policy action. He states, “It is generally recognized that our behavior is in large part shaped by the manner in which we perceive and interpret our physical and social environment. Our perceptions, in turn, are moulded by clusters of beliefs about what has been, what is, what will be, and what ought to be. Thus our beliefs provide us with a more or sell coherent code by which we can organize and make sense out of what would otherwise be a confusing array of signals picked up from the environment by our senses” (Holsti, 1970 pp. 123). The point he makes is that, although complicated, we cannot fully understand behavior without understanding beliefs, perceptions, and misperceptions. “The operational code can be viewed as one of several clusters of independent variables that explain policy making behavior” (Holsti, 1970 pp. 153). Walker and Murphy (1982) argue that if the decision maker also executes the policy or if the belief system of those executing the policy is similar to the decision maker a link can be examined. Context also matters in analyzing or predicting behavior. Walker and Murphy (1982) state, “If we know the decision maker’s situation and operational code, then we can forecast the decision maker’s diagnosis and response to the situation. The authors used existing operational code studies and found support for a link between beliefs and behavior (Walker and Murphy, 1982). Although not perfectly aligned, Walker (1977) finds evidence that Henry Kissinger’s operational code significantly influenced the foreign policy behavior in Vietnam. Another study finds that presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush respond to similar situations from external
actors differently and convincingly posit that this is explained by differences in their operational code (Walker, Schafer, and Young, 1999).

Cognitive consistency (see Fiske and Taylor, 1991 p.10-11) is a foundational assumption of operational code for both George (1969) and Holsti (1977). Furthermore, cognitive consistency is the reason that operational code is generally stable over time. That is, individuals will be consistent in how they view and process similar information. Due to this, consistency specific questions can be analyzed to understand the “master belief” of the individual’s world-view (Walker, Schafer, and Young, 2005).

**Table 1 (George, 1969)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Philosophical Beliefs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P-1 What is the “essential” nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one’s political opponents?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-2 What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one’s fundamental values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on this score; and in what respects the one and/or the other?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-3 Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-4 How much “control” or “mastery” can one have over historical development? What is one’s role in “moving” and “shaping” history in the desired direction?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-5 What is the role of “chance” in human affairs and in historical development?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instrumental Beliefs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I-1 What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-2 How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-3 How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-4 What is the best “timing” of action to advance one’s interests?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-5 What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one’s interest?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An individuals’ philosophical belief regarding the nature of the political universe (P-1) is the master belief that influences the remaining philosophical and instrumental beliefs (Holsti, 1977). Holsti (1977) sought to create a typology of operational code to identify the core beliefs from the peripheral beliefs and to generate parsimony. He posited that verifying that there is a connection between the beliefs, which create a belief system, will bolster the validity of the ideology by demonstrating that there are combinations of beliefs rather than
simply being independent and random. To achieve this Holsti (1977) considers P-1, “What is the nature of political life?”, and sub-question P-1b, “What is the source of conflict?” P-1b is categorized as human nature, domestic characteristics of states, or the international system, which are the three “images” of international politics as defined by Waltz (1954). The reason that P-1b is attribution theory, from psychology, which posits that the source of conflict will lead to different policy preferences (Holsti, 1977 p. 161). This led to the development of six ideal typologies (See Table 2). Type A believes that conflict is temporary and is resolved by addressing domestic social issues, better communication, institutional reform, and other individual based issues.

**Table 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What are the fundamental sources of conflict?</th>
<th>Harmonious [conflict is temporary]</th>
<th>Conflictual [Conflict is Permanent]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human Nature</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attributes of Nations</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International System</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Type B believes that conflict is temporary and that conflict is derived from the characteristics of states. They believe that conflict is reduced by altering the characteristics of the state. Holsti’s (1977) examples of this are Marx’s goal of eliminating capitalists states and Wilson’s goal of spreading democracy. Type C believes that conflict is temporary and that the conflict is derived from the anarchic characteristic of the international system. Thus, conflict, for a Type C, is only ended by the elimination of anarchy though some form of world government. Type D believes that conflict is permanent and that it is derived from human nature. They prefer a balance of power strategy and believe that engaging in conflict to create peace will result in more conflict. Type E believes that conflict is permanent and
that it is derived from the characteristics of states. Like Type D, they believe that engaging in conflict to alter the characteristics of other actors will result in greater conflict; thus they prefer to balance. Type E believes conflict is permanent and that it is derived from the anarchic characteristics of the international system. Unlike any of the other typologies they believe that engaging in behavior that will inevitably result in conflict with others is necessary for survival. This typology is based upon International Relations theory and each type has distinct characteristics that should be appreciated. Walker (1990) states, “Holsti’s formulation of an operational code typology has the following characteristics as a social-psychological theory of cognitive consistency. The basic unit of analysis is individual behavior constrained by the decision maker’s belief system. The key concepts are philosophical and instrumental beliefs, belief system, and foreign policy strategies and tactics. The dominant inference pattern is the principle of cognitive consistency, from which are derived two general propositions: (a) beliefs tend to reinforce one another for form a coherent belief system; (b) under specified conditions beliefs constrain the range of alternative choices and thereby influence the final decision” (pp. 409). The Holsti typology is theoretically sound and has utility as a cognitive theory as well as applications for International Relations.

Walker (1983) consolidated types D, E, and F into one ideal typology as they only vary in minor ways, agreeing on 11 of 13 shared beliefs (Walker, 1983). See Table 3 for a representation of these typologies. The three types that believe in the possibility of peace (types A, B, and C) remain and the types that believe conflict is permanent (types D, E, and F) were condensed into one Type DEF, because Walker (1983) found that the types agreed on almost all categories. Stated more clearly, “while [types D, E, F] differ regarding what are the sources of conflict…they share common beliefs about its permanence and
corresponding implications for the remaining philosophical and instrumental beliefs” (Walker, 2004 pp. 81). Types A, B, and C also disagree over the source of conflict, but Walker (1983, 2004) by ignoring this classification system for the realists is implicitly assuming that the sources of conflict matters for the policy preferences of idealists, but not realist. This is not justified by any theoretical explanation. While Walker (1983) is correct that the types are very similar, each characteristic considered should not be given equal weight; this creates a theoretical problem and greatly reduces the explanatory and predictive power of the typology. Types D and E prefer a defensive realist policy of balancing, whereas Type E prefers an offensive realist policy. This nuance is crucial for understanding the perceptions and policy preferences of a leader. It may still be possible to condense the six-category typology by policy preference. Type C’s policy preferences are more in line with the defensive realists (Types D and E) than the other idealists (Types A and B).

The philosophical beliefs are plotted as P-1 on the vertical axis and P-4b (other) on the horizontal axis. The instrumental beliefs are plotted as I-1 on the vertical axis and P-4a (self) on the horizontal axis. Walker and Falkowski (1984 a, b) found that leaders do not fit into the six category typology (Holsti, 1977) or the condensed four category typology (Walker, 1983), but rather form some combination of the typologies differing in philosophical and instrumental beliefs. The problem is that this typology relies on both the philosophical and instrumental beliefs, whereas the Holsti (1977) typology was based only the philosophical master belief. This is problematic, because instrumental beliefs should not be used to categorize an individual’s beliefs about the international system. In other words, realists and idealists may share the same policy preferences, but the way they go about forming those preferences is a significant difference.
### Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type A</th>
<th>Type C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conflict is temporary, caused by human misunderstanding and miscommunication. A “conflict spiral” based upon misperception and impulsive responses, is the major danger of war. Opponents are often influenced by nonrational conditions, but tend to respond in kind to conciliation and firmness. Optimism is warranted, based upon a leader’s ability and willingness to shape historical development. The future is relatively predictable, and control over it is possible. <strong>Establish goals within a framework that emphasizes shared interests. Pursue broadly international goals incrementally with flexible strategies that control risks by avoiding escalation and acting quickly when conciliation opportunities arise.</strong> Emphasize resources that establish a climate for negotiation and compromise and avoid the early use of force. <strong>Preference Order: Settle&gt; Deadlock&gt; Dominate&gt; Submit</strong> Nuclear</td>
<td>Conflict is temporary; it is possible to restructure the state system to reflect the latent harmony of interests. The source of conflict is the anarchical state system, which permits a variety of causes to produce war. Opponents vary in nature, goals, and responses to conciliation and firmness. One should be pessimistic about goals unless the state system is changed, because predictability and control over historical development is low under anarchy. <strong>Establish optimal goals vigorously within a comprehensive framework.</strong> Pursue shared goals, but control risks by limiting means rather than ends. Act quickly when conciliation opportunities arise and delay escalatory actions whenever possible; other resources than military capabilities are useful. <strong>Preference Order: Settle&gt; Dominate&gt; Deadlock&gt; Submit</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Self</th>
<th>Type DEF</th>
<th>Type B</th>
<th>(Ideals)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preference Order: Dominate&gt; Settle&gt; Deadlock&gt; Submit</td>
<td>Conflict is permanent, caused by human nature (D), nationalism (E), or international anarchy (F). Power disequilibria are major dangers of war. Opponents may vary, and responses to conciliation or firmness are uncertain. Optimism declines over the long run and in the short run depends upon the quality of leadership and a power equilibrium. Predictability is limited, as is control over historical development. <strong>Seek limited goals flexibility with moderate means. Use military force if the opponent and circumstances require it, but only as a final resource.</strong></td>
<td>Preference Order: Dominate&gt; Deadlock&gt; Settle&gt; Submit</td>
<td>Conflict is temporary, caused by warlike states; miscalculation and appeasement are the major causes of war. Opponents are rational and deterrable. Optimism is warranted regarding realization of goals. The political future is relatively predictable, and control over historical development is possible. <strong>One should seek optimal goals vigorously within a comprehensive framework.</strong> Control risks by limiting means rather than ends. Any tactic and resource may be appropriate, including the use of force when it offers prospects for large gains with limited risk.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Borrowed from Schafer and Walker (2006); originally adapted from Holsti (1977)
As stated above, operational code analysis is based on the concept of cognitive consistency. The worldview of leaders does, however, occasionally shift. When an event, such as the terrorist attacks of 9/11, shocks the belief system of the leader the philosophical beliefs are subject to change (Renshon, 2008:827). When beliefs do change, individuals first alter the means to reach the end and only alter their goals after the altered methods fail (McGuire, 1985; Tetlock, 1998). In other words, fundamental attitudes and perceptions only change after they are challenged repeatedly (Tetlock, 1991). Thus, it is more common that the philosophical beliefs remain stable and tactical beliefs are altered to accomplish the desired goals; the philosophical beliefs are then subject to change if the change in tactics failed to achieve the desired goals (Tetlock, 1991). In addition, the role of the individual will often change their worldview, because they have an increase or decrease in influence over a specific policy area depending upon their position in government (Holsti 1970). The position of power also matters. U.S. President George W. Bush, whose beliefs were bolstered upon entering the presidency (Renshon, 2008). Differing from the findings of analysis of Jimmy Carter, who’s philosophical world view shifted to more conflictual after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (Walker, Schafer, and Young, 1998) the operational codes of presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush have been found to be relatively stable (Walker, Schafer, and Young, 1999). Jimmy Carter’s tactical beliefs and overall beliefs regarding human rights did not shift (Walker, Schafer, and Young, 1998).

Operational Code methodology has become more consistent and reduced coder bias by employing the Verbs in Context System (VICS) through the computer software system

---

3 This differs from assertions by Walker, Shafer, and Young (2005), which posit that instrumental beliefs are more stable than philosophical beliefs. Their assertion, however, is not supported by systematic research. Thus, I expect philosophical beliefs to remain more stable than tactical beliefs based on psychological research.
Profiler Plus (Young, 2001). The operational code is comprised of 1) diagnostic propensities, 2) choice propensities, and 3) shift propensities, which are exhibited through

**Figure 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Steps in the Verbs In Context System</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Identify The Subject As</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self</td>
<td>Or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Identify The Tense of the Transitive Verb As</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>And Identify The Category of the Verb As</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive (+)</td>
<td>Or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Words</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appeal (+1)</td>
<td>Oppose, Resist (-1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OR</td>
<td>OR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promise Benefits (+2)</td>
<td>Threaten Costs (-2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deeds</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rewards (+3)</td>
<td>Punishments (-3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Identify The Domain As</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>Or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Identify Target And Place In Context</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**An Example**

A quote taken from Jimmy Carter’s January 4, 1980, address to the nation: “Massive Soviet military forces have invaded the small, non-aligned, sovereign nation of Afghanistan....”

1. **Subject.** The subject is “Massive Soviet military forces” which is coded as other, that is, the speaker is not referring to his or her self or his or her state.

2. **Tense and Category.** The verb phrase “have invaded” is in the past tense and is a negative deed coded, therefore, as punish.

3. **Domain.** The action involves an actor (Soviet military forces) external to the speaker’s state (The United States); therefore, the domain is foreign.

4. **Target and Context.** The action is directed toward Afghanistan; therefore, the target is coded as Afghanistan. In addition, we designate a context: Soviet-Afghanistan-conflict-1979-88.

The complete data line for this statement is: other -3 foreign past Afghanistan soviet-afghanistan-conflict-1979-88

Fig. 1 Borrowed from Walker et al, 1998
Figure 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VICS Coding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>P-1: Nature of the Political Universe</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostile Extremely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **P-2: Realization of Political Values** |
| Pessimistic Extremely | Very | Definitely | Somewhat | Mixed | Somewhat | Definitely | Very | Optimistic Extremely |
| -1.0 | -.75 | -.50 | -.25 | 0.0 | +.25 | +.50 | +.75 | +1.0 |

| **P-3: Predictability of Political Future** |
| Very Low | Low | Medium | High | Very High |
| 0.0 | .25 | .50 | .75 | 1.0 |

| **P-4: Control Over Historical Development** |
| Very Low | Low | Medium | High | Very High |
| 0.0 | .25 | .50 | .75 | 1.0 |

| **P-5: Role of Chance** |
| Very Low | Low | Medium | High | Very High |
| 0.0 | .25 | .50 | .75 | 1.0 |

| **I-1: Direction of Strategy** |
| Conflict Extremely | Very | Definitely | Somewhat | Mixed | Somewhat | Definitely | Very | Cooperation Extremely |
| -1.0 | -.75 | -.50 | -.25 | 0.0 | +.25 | +.50 | +.75 | +1.0 |

| **I-2: Intensity of Tactics** |
| Conflict Extremely | Very | Definitely | Somewhat | Mixed | Somewhat | Definitely | Very | Cooperation Extremely |
| -1.0 | -.75 | -.50 | -.25 | 0.0 | +.25 | +.50 | +.75 | +1.0 |

| **I-3: Risk Orientation** |
| Very Low | Low | Medium | High | Very High |
| 0.0 | .25 | .50 | .75 | 1.0 |

| **I-4a: Flexibility of Tactics** (between Cooperation and Conflict) |
| Very Low | Low | Medium | High | Very High |
| 0.0 | .25 | .50 | .75 | 1.0 |

| **I-4b: Flexibility of Tactics** (between Words and Deeds) |
| Very Low | Low | Medium | High | Very High |
| 0.0 | .25 | .50 | .75 | 1.0 |

| **I-5: Utility of Means** (Appeal/Support, Promise, Reward, Oppose/Resist, Threaten, Punish) |
| Very Low | Low | Medium | High | Very High |
| 0.0 | .25 | .50 | .75 | 1.0 |

The verbal descriptor categories are borrowed from Walker et al, 2003. Figure 2 borrowed from Renshon (2008).

positive and negative attributes of self and other (Walker, Schafer, and Young, 1998).

To determine the scores for each operational code question, VICS first determines values for each of the following: subject, verb category, domain of politics, tense of the verb, intended
target, and the context of each unit. The score is then determined by multiplying the verb categories by their frequency and intensity of positive and negative context. Also factored into the scores, is whether the individual refers to herself or himself, or another individual as having influence (Walker et al., 2005). For a more detailed description of VICS coding see Figure 1 and for more detail on interpreting the range of scores see Figure 2. While VICS does analyze the context, the context is not evident to the researcher simply from analyzing the output.

Operational Code is criticized for not being founded solidly in psychology or theory and the questions that comprise the code seem to be random; the foundational assumptions of cognitive consistency and cognitive dissonance are debated within the discipline of psychology (Cottam, 1986). Additionally, Operational Code, on its own, does not consider the context in which policy makers are operating (Cottam, 1986). Cottam (1986), states “In the long run the Operational Code is most useful as a guideline for describing some of the political beliefs of policy makers. Using the code to generate testable hypotheses concerning political decision making remains problematic. It does not employ cognitive psychology beyond its founding assumptions and it asks about a very small part of the policy makers overall political worldview (p. 17). These criticisms are fair when considering how operational code evolved. Holsti (1977), however, employed psychology and IR theory to develop his typology, but the nuance and theory lost out in the pursuit of more rigorous methodology and parsimony. George (1969) asserted that operational code was intended to be supported by and contribute to theories employing cognitive psychology; it is not a stand-alone cognitive theory.

---

4 The scores produced by VICS are standardized in comparison to 30 world leaders (Walker, Schafer, and Young, 1998).
Realist/Idealist typology

I am not the first to attempt to use Operational Code to categorize leaders as realists or idealists. Walker and Schafer (2007) created a realist/idealist typology relying only on the modified Holsti (1977) typology. They labeled types A and C, which view conflict as temporary and lean towards cooperative strategies, as idealists and types DEF and B, which view the world as more hostile and lean towards conflictual strategies, as realists. These broad categorizations are then analyzed into more nuanced descriptions of what makes each type realist or idealist. “...the Type B leader...is associated with the Revolutionary who blends a mix of utopian goals with Realist conceptions of strategies and tactics and a definition of the political universe as a dangerous place” (Walker and Schafer, 2007 p. 753). The opposite of the Type B leader is the Type C leader who is a “utopian Reformer” that believes change is possible with control over historical context, but will not use violent tactics to achieve the goals. With feelings of lower control over historical context Walker and Schafer (2007) label Type DEF the moderate Realist and Type A the moderate Idealist. This is a useful starting point, but provides an overly simplified definition of Realists and Idealists, due to incomplete information used to define the ideologies. The most significant error made by Walker and Schafer (2007) is that they do not clearly differentiate between offensive and defensive realism and idealism. In addition their inclusion of tactical preferences in their realist/idealist typology is problematic. From the discussion above we know that it is the frame associated with a decision that makes it realist or idealist, not the tactic employed.

Crichlow (1998) also attempted to construct a typology of realism and idealism based on operational code. He analyzed the codes of Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, particularly in the context of Arab-Israeli peace agreements. He creates the following typology of idealists and realists: idealists, pragmatic idealists, pragmatists, pragmatic realist, and realists (Crichlow,
1998 pp. 701). This typology is based on the general worldview of the individuals, but primarily focuses on their tactical beliefs. He categorized Rabin as an idealist, because he always preferred compromise and peaceful tactics, whereas Peres is labeled a pragmatic idealist, for adapting to the changing nature of the political environment. Crichlow’s (1998) typology is not based on any literature and his choice to focus on tactics rather that philosophical beliefs is the incorrect way to build a realist/idealist typology.

Analyzing the American political electorate Gries (2014) develops three categories of foreign policy preferences: idealistic doves, idealistic hawks, and unilateralist hawks. Idealistic doves, representing about 41% of the population, have low support for military force and have low levels of nationalism. Idealistic hawks, representing about 34% of the population, are have the strongest support for all three idealisms, are the most nationalistic, the most willing to use military force, and the least isolationist. The unilateralist hawks, representing about 25% of the population, are the least idealist, most realist, and most isolationist. This analysis suggests that the majority of Americans are idealists, which is contrary to the findings of Drezner (2008), who posits the majority of American’s are accepting of realist policy while the policy elites promote a policy of liberal internationalism. The problem with both studies is that neither Gries (2014) nor Drezner (2008) clearly differentiate offensive and defensive realists and isolationist and imperialist idealists. This is problematic it is categorizing individuals into an aggregate that may hold very different ideologies and policy preferences. Where policy preferences are similar there could be vast differences in the reasons the individuals support those policies. The mass grouping of realists and idealists is similar to categorizing all liberals (democratic candidate supporters) and conservatives (republican candidate supporters) as distinct groups in the 2016 American presidential primary elections. The democrats are divided by Bernie Sanders and Hilary Clinton
supporters. Considering them as one group would be incorrect, because there are many Sanders supporters that have spoken out against Hilary Clinton and have pledged not to support her (Roth, 2016). In addition, there are Sanders supports that also like Donald Trump as a candidate (Spodak, 2016). A similar division exists with the current Republican Party. The point is that grouping ideologies on a broad category gives a false sense of cohesion.

Worldviews of leaders shift when an event, such as the terrorist attacks of 9/11, shocks the belief system of the leader the philosophical beliefs are subject to change (Renshon, 2008 p. 827). When beliefs do change, individuals first alter the means to reach the end and only alter their goals after the altered methods fail (McGuire, 1985; Tetlock, 1998). In other words, fundamental attitudes and perceptions only change after they are challenged repeatedly (Tetlock, 1991). Thus, it is more common that the philosophical beliefs remain stable and tactical beliefs are altered to accomplish the desired goals; the philosophical beliefs are then subject to change if the change in tactics failed to achieve the desired goals (Tetlock, 1991). In addition, the role of the individual will often change their worldview, because they have an increase or decrease in influence over a specific policy area depending upon their position in government (Holsti 1970). The point is that a leader, regardless of their ideology, may change their tactics depending upon the situation. In the context of realist decision-making this is most parsimoniously by Glasser’s (1994/95) contingent realism.

Taking a more complete and nuanced approach to realist and idealist ideology I have developed four ideal typologies, which are depicted in Table 4. Realist typologies include Offensive Realist and Defensive Realists. The Offensive Realist believes that nature of the political universe is very hostile and that conflict is permanent. This leader feels that they
have a high level of control over historical events and they seek the acquisition of more absolute power regardless of the current distribution of relative power. The Defensive Realist views the nature of the political universe as hostile, but less so than the Offensive Realist, and believes that conflict is temporary. This leader feels that they have less control over historical events than the Offensive Realist and are more concerned with maintaining the status quo balance of power. Defensive realists, however, may behave offensively to maintain the status quo; the difference in the defensive and offensive realists is that the offensive realist wants to shift the balance of power in their favor or acquire more absolute power if they are already at the top. Idealist ideology also has two forms, the expansionist and the isolationist. Both are more optimistic about the nature of the political universe than the Realists and believe that conflict is temporary, but the Expansionist Idealist is the more pessimistic of the two. The Expansionist Idealist has the goal of reforming the international system, though ideas such as the spread of democracy, with the goal of creating a more utopian system. In this way their policy preferences may resemble the offensive realist. The Non-Expansionist Idealist views the nature of the political universe as the least hostile of any of the typologies. The Isolationist Idealist does not necessarily stay out of all conflict, but their role is more restrained and limited than other leaders. In other words, Isolationist Idealists prefer to refrain from involvement in conflict with other nations whenever possible.
Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Offensive Realist</td>
<td>P-1 Nature of the political universe is hostile and conflict is permanent. Peace is only achievable through the use of force and domination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defensive Realist</td>
<td>P-1 Nature of political universe somewhat hostile and conflict is permanent. They perceive the intentions of others to be less hostile than offensive realists. Peace is achievable by maintaining the status quo of states within the system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expansionist Idealist</td>
<td>P-1 Nature of the political universe is somewhat hostile to hostile Peace is achievable through the use of force, to change the characteristics of states.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Expansionist Idealist</td>
<td>P-1 Nature of political universe is optimistic to somewhat hostile. Peace is achievable by cooperating and negotiating. The use of force is not an optimal way to bring about peace.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Both Woodrow Wilson and George W. Bush depict the Imperialist Idealist typology. Wilson’s war in Mexico and Bush’s war in Iraq were, at least in part, for the purpose of spreading democracy with the hopes of bringing about more peace to the world system (Quinn, 2014). Jimmy Carter depicts the Non-Expansionist Idealist. His pursuit of humanitarian foreign policy and avoidance of aggression is why he is best suited to represent this typology, although other factors pushed him to use limited military force to achieve limited objectives. Richard Nixon depicts the Defensive Realist. His aggressive foreign policy may appear to have been an attempt shift the balance of power over the Soviet Union, but his intentions were to maintain balance; he perceived a high level of threat and fear of the USSR. George H. W. Bush is a more obvious example of the Defensive Realist. His military actions in Iraq sought to achieve a limited military objective that would maintain the existing balance of power. A good example of Offensive Realism is Israel’s land acquisition of Arab territory. Their intention was to increase their power and security, thus altering the balance of power with their neighbors.
Image Theory

Image theory is a qualitative methodology that provides a more nuanced measure of how specific actors are perceived. Thus, using image theory along with operational code will bolster the internal and external validity of the findings from the operational code analysis by allowing us to move from a general analysis to a more specified analysis. In other words, where operational code provides us with a general world-view of the leader, image theory allows us to apply that analysis to more specific actors or policy contexts. Additionally, understanding the perception of other actors is crucial to interpreting operational code in context. As stated by George (1969), “In the classical Bolshevik belief system the ‘image of the opponent’ was perhaps the cornerstone on which much of the rest of their approach was based” (pp. 202). It is important to consider, however, that the ‘image of the opponent’ may be less important for those that do not see the world as conflictual (George, 1969 pp. 221). The nuance lost from the Holsti (1977) methodology can be regained by incorporating image theory.

Psychological research on cognitive stimuli shows that perceptions are categorical and formed, in part, by psychological scripts, or memory of past experiences (Cottam, 1986). Thus, images are stereotype like perceptions that are created by an interaction of emotions as well as facts about another actor (Cottam, 1994) and are associated with expected behavior (Cottam, 1986). The perceptual categories are persistent over time and resistant to change because they are used as cognitive frames (Cottam, 1986). It is important to note, however, that the images employed by policy makers are not overtly cognitive and the individuals are generally unaware of them (Cottam, 1986).

Many International Relations scholars have discussed images as influential in foreign policy decision-making (R. Cottam, 1977; Elwarfally, 1988; Jervis, 1989; Shimko, 1991; M.
Cottam 1994; Cottam and Huseby, 2016). Images are significantly influential to the study of Foreign Policy, because perceptions can be more relevant than reality (Jervis, 1976). Simply stated scholarship should recognize that the people whose decisions determine the policies and actions of nations do not respond to the “objective” facts of the situation, whatever they may mean, but to their “image” of the situation. It is a leader’s perception of the world, not reality, which determines behavior (Boulding, 1969:423). Thus, it is the stereotypical beliefs that matter (Cottam, 1977) because they are appropriate for analysis since individuals categorize beliefs through schemata (Jervis, 1976).  

The most significant challenge to image theory is that the analysis, if done incorrectly can become tautological, as it is difficult to determine if the image leads to the policy or if the policy leads to the image. In a large overview of the development of image theory, Richard Herrmann (2003) posits that this was the case for early studies. This dilemma can be overcome, however, by determining the image prior to the timeframe of the policy being analyzed (Cottam, 1994). Of course, when analyzing a decision process over a long period of time decisions and interactions may impact the image; this is manageable by the coder taking care to notice any shifts in the image.

Another challenge for image theory is to understand which images matter. Boulding (1959) specified a model of hypothesized relationships based on the interaction self and other perceptions of hostility or friendliness with self and other perceptions of strength and weakness. As these concepts have been operationalized more concretely, the underlying assumptions of other theories within the discipline have not been ignored. For example, K. J. Holsti (1970) related perceptions of the self and other regarding states within the system,

---

5 A full description of schema is outside the scope of this study. For a concise review, see Herrmann (2003, 290-292).
in individual policy makers, to “role conceptions” of the state within the system; the perceptions and decision outcomes are interrelated to the role of the state within the system. Perceptions are also important for power-based theories. Relative power is a central concept of realism (Morgenthau, 1973) and perceived threat is key to neorealism (Waltz, 1979). Thus, which images matter is dependent upon the question, or foreign policy objective, at hand.

Operative images of individuals are best determined by examining their oral statements as well as their actions. As Cottam (1994:188) states, “Images are composed of (1) perceptions of a country’s capability, culture, and intention (2) event scripts, reflecting lessons from history that policy makers use to understand the behavior of a country or to predict its behavior; and (3) response alternatives that were consistently considered appropriate for use vis-à-vis a country. The attributes of capability, culture, and intention could not be operationalized at those levels of abstraction and were therefore broken down into smaller components.” The measure of capability disaggregates into “military strength and capability”, “domestic policy” and “economic characteristics”. Culture disaggregates into “comparison of culture to U.S. culture” and “cultural sophistication”. Intention is disaggregated into “goals and motives” and “flexibility”. Event scripts are derived from statements about historical experience. Response alternatives are derived from statements about instruments used for conflict and bargaining with a country (Cottam, 1994). Each of these elements is then disaggregated into more precise coding guidelines.6

The ideal images are depicted in the Table 5 below. These images are used as a guideline, but the image of an actor can fall between the ideal images. In addition, for some actors one category used to form an image may carry more weight than others and thus the assessment of an image must be adjusted accordingly.

---

6 Refer to the appendix for full coding guidelines from Cottam (1994).
Table 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Image</th>
<th>Capability</th>
<th>Culture</th>
<th>Intentions</th>
<th>Decision Makers</th>
<th>Threat or Opportunity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enemy</td>
<td>Equal</td>
<td>Equal</td>
<td>Harmful</td>
<td>Small Elite</td>
<td>Threat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbarian</td>
<td>Superior</td>
<td>Inferior</td>
<td>Harmful</td>
<td>Small Elite</td>
<td>Threat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imperialist</td>
<td>Superior</td>
<td>Superior</td>
<td>Exploitative</td>
<td>A few groups</td>
<td>Threat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent</td>
<td>Inferior</td>
<td>Inferior</td>
<td>Benign</td>
<td>Small elite</td>
<td>Opportunity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degenerate</td>
<td>Superior or Equal</td>
<td>Weak-willed</td>
<td>Harmful</td>
<td>Confused, differentiated</td>
<td>Opportunity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rogue</td>
<td>Inferior</td>
<td>Inferior</td>
<td>Harmful</td>
<td>Small elite</td>
<td>Threat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ally</td>
<td>Equal</td>
<td>Equal</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Many groups</td>
<td>Threat</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each image is comprised of specific combinations of each category. The ideal enemy image is that held by both the U.S. and the Soviet Union of one another, during the Cold War. Both states saw one another as having equal capabilities, an equally sophisticated culture, harmful intentions, led by a small group of decision makers, and as posing a threat.

For another example, U.S. policy makers held the dependent image of Latin American states during the Cold War, meaning that policy makers in the U.S. viewed their capabilities and culture as inferior, their intentions as benign, (Cottam, 1994). The barbarian image is characterized by a perception of superior capability, but with an inferior culture, harmful intentions, a small decision-making elite, that poses a threat. An example of this may be South Korea’s perception of North Korea. The imperialist image is similar to that of the barbarian, but the perception of their intentions is exploitative rather than harmful and the decisions are made by a few small groups rather than a small elite. An example of this Image may be Iran’s perception of the U.S. prior to Khomeini’s revolution. The dependent image is characterized by a perception of inferior capabilities, inferior culture, having benign intentions, a small decision-making elite, and presents an opportunity. This image is depicted by Iran’s perception of Palestine. The degenerate image is characterized by a perception of
superior or equal capabilities, a weak-willed culture, harmful intentions, a confused or differentiated decision making group, that presents an opportunity. This perception is depicted by Iran’s current perception of the U.S. after the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. The rogue image is similar to that of the barbarian, with the only difference being in the perception of capabilities. Where the barbarian has superior capabilities the rogue has inferior capabilities, but still has an inferior culture, harmful intentions, a small decision-making elite, and poses a threat. This may be depicted by the U.S. perception of North Korea. The Ally image is characterized by a perception of equal capabilities and culture, good intentions, many groups involved in decision-making, but poses a potential threat. The U.S. image of the UK may depict this image. It should be noted that because Image Theory is a method of qualitative analysis, the researcher might find nuances that affect the overall image. This could mean that specific categories, such as whether or not an actor poses a threat or an opportunity, could be more important than other categories that affect the image. Additionally, all actors may not fit neatly into the defined categories and more appropriately fit between them, such as a degenerate imperialist.

Image theory can be used to define whether foreign policy behavior and perceptions are realist or idealist, because it can depict the perceived balance of relative power between actors. This is key, because conflict or cooperation can be realist or idealist, based on this perception (Glasser, 1994/95). Of particular interest to this study is the perception of enemies. Cottam (1994) states, “The enemy, at its prototypical extreme, is a country approximately as powerful as our own country, different in domestic polity and culture, evil in motivation, inflexible, and completely incompatible with the goals of our own country” (p. 20). I posit that realists are more likely to hold an ideal type enemy image of an actor.
within the system than *idealists*, because they associate the international environment as more conflictual.

**Linking Image Theory to the Operational Code Typology**

Operational code reveals the broad worldview of an individual, which allows us to categorize them as *realist* or *idealist* in general terms, but as discussed above, determining if specific policy positions are *realist* or *idealist* is dependent upon how they perceive actors within individual cases. I turn to Cottam (1986) to bolster the coding of perceptions about intentions, since this is key to policy makers perceptions being coded as *realist* or *idealist*. Cottam (1986) codes for an actors goals as aggressive or passive and compatible or incompatible with one's own state. This will be built into the analysis as the goals of self and other. Below are a set of categorical hypotheses connected to both the operational code results and image theory.

**Offensive Realist** – The Offensive Realist views the system as the most conflictual and is the most wary of other actors. This individual is more likely to hold an “enemy” or “Barbarian” image than the other typologies, which leads them to more aggressive balancing behavior. They can hold an ally image, but it will be weaker than the ally image held by a defensive realist.

**Defensive Realist** – This typology is more likely to hold “ally” images than the Offensive Realist, because they can trust other actors, under specific conditions; the ally image will also be stronger than if an ally image is held by an offensive realist. They will also hold the same images as the Offensive Realist, but they are more likely to balance domestically with defensive systems and strengthen alliances than to be overtly aggressive.
**Imperialist Idealist** – This typology is the most likely to hold “dependent” images of other actors, which leads them to intervene in the affairs of other actors more frequently. The policies of the Imperial Idealist may resemble that of the Offensive Realist. The difference lies in their intentions. The Imperialist Idealist will pursue humanitarian oriented goals, while the Offensive Realist will pursue goals with goals oriented at balancing against a threat or otherwise gaining power.

**Non-Expansionist Idealist** – Like the Imperialist Idealist this typology will view many actors as a “dependent”, but their responses will be less overtly aggressive than the Imperialist. Their policies may resemble that of the Defensive Realists, but they will likely hold images of actors as less threatening and take less aggressive defensive measures than the Defensive Realist.

Together, operational code and image theory create the typological theoretical framework above. A typological theory is, a theory that specifies independent variables [delineated] into the categories for which the researcher [measures] the cases and their outcomes, and provides not only hypotheses on how these variables operate individually, but also contingent generalizations on how and under what conditions they behave in specified conjunctions or configurations to produce effects on specified independent variables (George and Bennett, 2005 pp. 235). This typology is used in Chapter 4 to analyze the belief systems of Presidents Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter.

**Data**

Both operational code and image theory typically rely on public speeches for data and are considered the “states” worldview (Walker and Schafer, 2000). Some may be concerned that using public speeches fail to reveal the true beliefs of leaders, so I will briefly address this issue. First, the use of speeches by researches using at-a-distance profiling
methodology, because we often lack access to the leaders we are analyzing and some, such as Ali Khamenei, do not frequently grant interviews (Smith, under review). Aside from the availability of data, speeches may be theoretically prudent, because “a leader’s public behavior is constrained by his public image and that, over time, his public actions will consistently match his public beliefs” (Walker et al., 2003:223).

Some readers may be concerned about the influence of speechwriters, but this is not problematic for operational code analysis for two reasons, one pragmatic and one methodological. Pragmatically, speech writers are unlikely to write something that is contrary to the leaders own policy position on an issue and the content is entirely transparent (Schafer and Walker, 2006:46-47) and “speech writers…know how to craft words, phrases, and images to fit the style and personalities of their clients” (Winter, 2005:174). Methodologically, speeches are unproblematic because operational code analyzes elements from transparent cognitive processes, which differs from other profiling techniques that analyze more unconscious personality characteristics, such as an individuals need for power (Schafer and Walker, 2006:47).

The issue of spontaneous verses prepared remarks has been investigated by several studies. Dille (2000) analyzed both prepared and spontaneous remarks by former Presidents H. W. Bush and Ronald Reagan, finding that there can be systematic differences between prepared and spontaneous remarks, but that there is no difference between the source material if the leader is involved in the speech writing. Schafer and Crichlow (2000) found some differences in the operational code of Bill Clinton’s prepared speeches versus his spontaneous remarks and posit that spontaneous material is preferable. Alternatively,

---

7 Leadership Trait Analysis is one such methodology that looks for more unconscious characteristics of individuals, utilizing spontaneous rather than prepared speeches (see Hermann, 2005; Preston, 2001).
Marfleet (2000) and Renshon (2009), using VICS (see below), found no significant difference between the public and private statements of John F. Kennedy. At the time of this writing, there has not been a sufficient amount of studies conducted to determine if spontaneous remarks are greatly preferable to prepared speeches for operational code analysis, but both will be used and the results will be compared. This will be discussed further below in the context of how cases will be coded.

Both operational code and image theory must be interpreted within the context of the decision-making environment, thus a thorough document analysis will be conducted. Documents much be analyzed carefully and checked against one another because they may contain bias. The bias could come from being incomplete. Documents may be incomplete for many reasons, including content intentionally left out, redacted passages, classified information, or some documents may simply be lost; multiple versions of the same document may also exist and should be compared as different information may be declassified. If bias can be identified it can be managed correctly, by drawing conclusions based upon the known bias (Tratchenberg, 2006).

**Coding Cases**

The two cases that will be analyzed with the theoretical framework developed above are the administrations of Presidents Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter. These cases were selected for two reasons. Individually they were selected for their expected philosophical differences to depict a realist and idealist worldview. The administration of Richard Nixon is expected to depict the realist worldview; this is presumable due to the known significance of Henry Kissinger, a self-proclaimed realist. Opposite Nixon, the administration of Jimmy Carter is expected to depict an idealist worldview; this is presumable due to Carter’s strong promotion of human rights policy.
CHAPTER 3: CASE STUDY BACKGROUND

This chapter provides the background information and context for the analysis in Chapter 4. The chapter proceeds in three sections. First, the respective leaders will be introduced with a short biography, outlining their path to the White House and the major events that influenced their view of foreign policy. Second, the two areas on which the leaders will be compared, SALT negotiations and involvement in the conflict between Israel and the Arab states, will be described to provide context for the analysis.

Who are Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter?

Richard Nixon

Richard Milhous Nixon was born on January 9th, 1913 in Yorba Linda, California. There he grew up on a small subsistence farm and as a child dreamed of being a railroad engineer (Nixon, 1978 p. 3-4). Seeking more opportunity the family moved to Whittier, California where his father worked in the oil fields and then eventually opened a gas station and convenience store. He describes his mother, a Quaker, and father as “deeply religious” (Nixon, 1978 p. 5). Nixon did his best to avoid personal confrontation, which he believes is a trait he developed in response to his father’s temper (Nixon, 1978 p. 6). Although strict, Nixon had a good relationship with his father, who was very interested in politics, which sparked Nixon’s own interest (Nixon, 1978).

After high school Nixon attended Whittier College and then went on to Duke Law School, in North Carolina. After graduation he worked for a law firm back in Whittier until he was offered a position in Washington, DC with the Office of Price Administration, where he served as an “assistant attorney for the rationing coordination section, which dealt primarily with rationing rubber and automobile tires” (Nixon, 1978 p. 26). Not satisfied with the work he was doing with the OPA he signed up to be a commissioned officer in the Navy
and began his tenure in the service in August of 1942 (Nixon, 1978 p. 27). The experience was not quite what he expected. Instead of being sent to a battleship he was sent the Naval Air Station in Ottumwa, Iowa, which was still under construction (Nixon, 1978 p. 27). After beginning his career in the Navy, Nixon was sent to serve overseas. For this assignment he was shipped out of San Francisco, so at this time he moved his family from Iowa back to the family home in Whittier, California.

WWII had a significant impact on Nixon’s view of the world and warfare. Never as religious as his parents, he became more conflicted about the pacifism of Quakers. He stated, “the problem with Quaker pacifism, it seemed to me, was that it could only work if one were fighting a civilized, compassionate enemy” (Nixon, 1978 p. 27). This characterization of enemies and the aggressive stance he took would be influential throughout his time in politics.

In 1946 Richard Nixon took his first real shot at national politics and ran for congress. He ran on a platform of “practical liberalism” and campaigned against his opponent Jerry Voorhis’ “New Deal Idealism” (Nixon, 1978 p. 35). From the beginning of his involvement in politics he was very much concerned with foreign policy. The Hitler-Stalin pact was influential in the perceptions he formed of the Soviets. He developed a dislike of Stalin, due to his hatred of Hitler. Although he believed that pacifism was not always a good decision, he was not immediately supportive of military conflict; he preferred to first exhaust diplomacy. Coincidently, he supported Woodrow Wilson and believed it a mistake for the US to not join the League of Nations; he thought the United Nations had great promise (Nixon, 1978 p. 45). The next event that formed Nixon’s image of the Soviet’s was Winston Churchill’s Iron Curtain speech. At this point he developed a hatred of both communism and the Soviets (Nixon, 1978).
While in Congress he sat on the Committee on Un-American Activities. Although he despised communism, he believed in protecting the rights and beliefs of all Americans as long as there was no illegal activity or support of foreign governments. This first bill he sponsored was the Mundt-Nixon bill, which would have required the registration of all communist party members along with a full disclosure of funding for broadcast activities; this bill passed in the house but failed in the Senate. Although he was supportive of monitoring all potential communist activity within the United States, he did not go as far as Senator Joe McCarthy, whom Nixon thought was too wild and unfair in his accusations (Nixon, 1978).

Building on his foreign policy expertise, Nixon was on the special committee for foreign aid plan in Europe. He developed the opinion that anyone who identified as a communist would be loyal to Russia. He states, “…communists throughout the world owe their loyalty not to the countries in which they live, but to Russia” (Nixon, 1978 p. 50). Nixon’s national notoriety came from his involvement with the trial of Alger Hiss, who was a spy for the Soviet Union. This perception of threat from the ideology, communism, is key to understanding the type of threat he perceived later when he was in the Oval Office.

In the 1952 election, Dwight D. Eisenhower chose Richard Nixon as his running mate. This was a defining moment for his political career, as he would develop a very close personal and professional relationship with the much-loved former general and President of the United States (Nixon, 1978). During the campaign he gave a speech responding to accusations of using campaign contributions for personal expenses, which provides insight into how he dealt with criticism and accusations. His response is very defensive in nature and he portrays himself as less wealthy than his peers in public service and details his personal finances including life insurance policies. In addition, he alludes that he is more
moral with the way he operates his senatorial office because he did not, as opposed to his opponent, employ his wife. He was careful to include that he receives gifts from supporters, including the new family pet dog Checkers, but does not accept donations from those that cannot afford it, as demonstrated by his announcement that he would not be cashing a ten dollar check from an army wife. This coupled with his claim of a lack of funding to adequately visit his constituency; he felt the press was unfairly criticizing him.  

Eisenhower and Nixon won the election and over the course of the next eight years, Nixon gained substantial experience in foreign policy. In late 1953 he was assigned by Eisenhower to go on a diplomacy trip across Asia and the Far East, which was his first experience with communist China and Vietnam. During this trip he met with individuals from all walks of life, including farmers and businessmen, along with politicians (Nixon, 1978). This trip served to enhance Nixon’s interest in international affairs and he formed opinions about the conflict in Vietnam. After the Dien Bien Phu attack on the French forces in Vietnam, there was much discussion of direct US involvement. Eisenhower did not want to take unilateral action, but was willing to participate with allies. Nixon also had reservations about sending troops to Vietnam, but was willing to do so to stop the spread of communism (Nixon, 1978 p. 151).

Despite Eisenhower’s great popularity with the nation he was not much of a politician. For this reason, Nixon did much of the campaign work. In the 1954 midterm election Eisenhower sent Nixon across the nation to endorse candidates and give speeches. In short, in this capacity, Richard Nixon was the political front man of the Republican Party. In addition, with Eisenhower being less conservative, Nixon served as the unifier of the

---

party throughout the administration. This campaign tour was exhausting and was not the work Nixon enjoyed doing and he claims it made him consider leaving politics (Nixon, 1978).

With Nixon’s growing national notoriety there was much discussion of preparing him for a presidential run in the future. Both Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, suggested to Nixon that he take a senior cabinet position, such as Secretary of State or Defense, in Eisenhower’s second term, instead of being on the ticket for VP (Nixon, 1978). Their intention was to give Nixon more administrative experience, which would be helpful for taking control of the Oval Office. This, however, was not how Nixon immediately took the advice and his reservations and hesitations about others’ intentions showed through. He was worried that Eisenhower was trying to undermine him. Ultimately Nixon realized that both Eisenhower and Dulles were only thinking of his best interest, and a move from a cabinet position to the presidency has worked better for some than those that served as Vice President. Nixon, however, decided the best political decision for himself, and for the party, was to stay on the presidential ticket, in part due to how the media had discussed him being pushed out of the administration (Nixon, 1978 p. 168-170).

Eisenhower and Nixon won the national election again in 1956. In the second term, Nixon’s foreign policy experience expanded and bolstered his fervent hatred of communism. After the Soviets crushed a political uprising in Hungary thousands of refugees fled to Austria. To provide assistance Eisenhower wanted to increase the amount of refugees brought to the US. This was called “Operation Mercy” and Nixon was charged with working the domestic politics side through Congress (Nixon, 1978). This bolstered Nixon’s idea that individuals needed to be saved from communism.
In addition, Nixon was sent on a diplomacy tour through Latin America. He expected some pro-communist demonstrations, but the events that unfolded eliminated any remaining tolerance of communists he may have had. While in Peru, communist activists threw rocks at him and before arriving in Venezuela the CIA informed him that there was an assassination planned for him; when he arrived he was greeted with flying rocks and one protestor spit in his face. Then, he narrowly avoided a mob, armed with Moltov cocktails, who were waiting for him at a wreath laying ceremony he was supposed to attend (Nixon, 1978).

He was then sent as the US representative to Moscow to meet with Kruchev, who was very angry over the passage of the Captive Nations Resolution. This resolution came very close to important scheduled negotiations and became the focus of the meetings and the interactions showed the deft of Nixon’s diplomacy. He very much knew whom he was dealing with and used knowledge of Kruchev’s personal life to his advantage. According to Nixon (1978) Kruchev said “I…cannot understand why your Congress would adopt such a resolution on the eve of such an important state visit…people should not go to the toilet where they eat…This resolution stinks. It stinks like fresh horse shit, and nothing smells worse than that!” (p. 207). From his briefing materials Nixon recalled that Kruchev had worked as a pig herder and a neighbor once used pig manure instead of horse manure for fertilizer, and Kruchev had said the smell was overpowering. With this knowledge, Nixon responded, “I am afraid the Chairman is mistaken. There is something that smells worse than horse shit – and that is pig shit” (Nixon, 1978 p. 207). This subtle comment was enough to break the tension and allowed the meeting to continue with less aggression. This type of personal relationship building with the Soviets would prove to be key in his future presidency.
In 1960 Nixon received the nomination for candidacy for the presidency and ran against John F. Kennedy. The election was very close and there was much accusation of corruption in the vote counting process. Nonetheless, he lost the election. Defeated, he temporarily left government service and joined a law firm in Los Angles (Nixon, 1978). At the end of Eisenhower’s term Nixon gave one final speech. At the end of the speech he says, “You won’t have Nixon to kick around anymore”. This is telling of how Nixon felt like he was personally attacked and reminiscent of his 1956 “Checkers” speech. Nonetheless, he and his family were happy to not be involved with politics for a while, but the leadership of the Republican Party pushed him to run for governor of California in 1962. Against his own personal judgment he ran and lost to Pat Brown (Nixon, 1978).

After the blow of a second election ending in defeat, Nixon decided to take his family on a vacation through Europe and the Middle East. During this travel he met with many of the contacts he had made while Vice President. In this way he was able to maintain visibility and influence in foreign policy with the Republican Party. One of the most important meetings of this trip was with President Nasser of Egypt. It is at this time that Nixon developed an unfavorable opinion of Nasser and his relationship with the Soviets. This in turn strengthened his positive image of Israel and their need of American assistance for security (Nixon, 1978 p. 249).

Upon returning to the US, Nixon moved his family to New York and joined a law firm that had many international clients. Through this job he was able to create new contacts and maintain his relations with those that were already friends (Nixon, 1978). Although Nixon speaks of being tired of politics and exhausted from the process, throughout his

---

memoir he indicates that every move he made while in government service or out had a political intention. While working as a lawyer he strategically campaigned in the 1966 midterm election, with the goal of bolstering his national notoriety, which was needed for the planned 1968 presidential campaign (Nixon, 1978).

In 1968 Nixon won the nomination for President of the United States from the Republican Party. This was an interesting election, because he was running against, not only Hubert Humphry the Democratic nominee, but also George Wallace, the governor of Alabama, who was running as an independent with a segregationist platform. Wallace was a particularly strong candidate in the south, making him an unusually strong third party candidate. Nixon was confident that he could defeat Humphry, but with Wallace it would be possible for neither candidate to win the needed votes from the Electoral College. This would have resulted in the Democratic controlled Congress determining the outcome (Nixon, 1978).

During this campaign is when Nixon was first introduced to Henry Kissinger, a Harvard political science professor who was the foreign policy adviser for his opponent in the primary, Nelson Rockefeller. Vietnam was a central issue during the campaign and the most pressing concern was that President Johnson might halt the bombing campaign in North Vietnam. With Kissinger’s connections in the Johnson administration he was able to pass secret information to the Nixon campaign (Nixon, 1978). It is important to note that in his memoir, Nixon indicates that Kissinger’s information was more of hints than direct, explicit, information. Nixon believed this to be intentional on the part of Kissinger to protect his identity and reputation. Nixon liked this trait of Kissinger and the secrecy of policy actions would carry through his administration (Nixon, 1978).
Nixon successfully won the election and took control of the White House. The structure of his administration was intentionally very different from Eisenhower, who scheduled many meetings and interacted with his full cabinet for decisions. Nixon, alternatively, instructed his Chief of Staff, Bob Haldeman, to act as a “funnel” for information. Rather than having conversations Nixon preferred to read a variety of information. In addition, he wanted to give his cabinet power to make decisions and reserve his time for the most important issues (Nixon, 1978). Nixon, after making a decision, however, does not like disagreement. This is demonstrated by his withholding the appointment of the vice president of Cornell University, Dr. Franklin Long, as head of the National Science Foundation, because of his opposition to Anti-Ballistic Missile defense system (ABM).\(^\text{10}\)

Among the most important issues for Nixon were concerned with foreign policy. Where foreign policy is traditionally ran from the State Department he decided to run it out of the White House. To do this he placed emphasis on the National Security Adviser (Nixon, 1978). This position would be filled by arguably the most influential person in his administration, Henry Kissinger. The secretiveness of Nixon’s foreign policy actions are depicted by his relations with the press and with the public was also very different from Jimmy Carter. Nixon was reserved with and avoided direct contact with the public. At a news conference he said, “…I consider a press conference as going to the country. I find that these conference are rather well covered by the country, both by television, as they are

today, and also by members of the press”. Emphasizing the secretiveness of the negotiations he states, “We think we are on the right track but we are not going to raise false hopes. We are not going to tell you what is going on in private talks. What we are going to do is to do our job and then a few months from now, I think you will look back and say we did what was right. If we did what was wrong then it doesn't make any difference, the headline that we have made today. So, this will be our policy in that respect. Again, I think that you as negotiators will recognize the validity of that position. Much as we want an open administration, there are times when it is necessary to have those quiet conversations without publicity in which each side can explore the areas of difference and eventually reach an agreement which then, of course, publicly will be announced”. This is a stark contrast to Jimmy Carter, who at the beginning of his presidency attempted to hold two press conferences a month and appeared on many television and radio programs for interviews.

While Jimmy Carter was a socially progressive politician who promoted racial equality, Nixon did not support policies that singled out assistance for minority groups. As he stated, “My Task Force on Education pointed up that I was not considered – I think the words they used – as a friend by many of our black citizens in America”. He went on to

---


explain that in his view the President’s goal is to help all Americans and not just one group.\textsuperscript{14} But, it is apparent that he did not place much emphasis on the issue of racial equality. In response to being asked about how long school segregation should continue he stated, “Only as long as is absolutely necessary to achieve two goals – to achieve the goal of desegregated schools without, at the same time, irreparably damaging the goal of education now for the hundreds of thousands of black and white students who otherwise would be harmed if the move towards desegregation closes their schools”.\textsuperscript{15} He is careful to not talk about black or white, but always black and white. In this way he attempting to suggest that he promotes equality, but his complete statements about policy suggest otherwise. Again speaking in reference to his policy on school desegregation, Nixon states, “Our approach is one of recognizing this terribly difficult problem of cooperating with the educational leaders and other leaders in the South in brining them into compliance with the law of the land as it has been interpreted by the Supreme Court. Our policy, in other words, is cooperation rather than coercion”.\textsuperscript{16} This treatment of the black community in the United States provides insight into how he would treat humanitarian concerns in foreign policy. He placed emphasis


on security and conflict, rather than providing aid to individuals. These perceptions and policy prescriptions are suggestive of a realist belief system.

**Jimmy Carter**

James Earl Carter – “Jimmy” – was born on October 1, 1924 in Plains (Bourne, 1997 p. 20). His mother was a nurse, who worked at the local hospital and paid “an undue concern for the health needs of the black population” in the area (Bourne, 1997 p. 21). His father was a landowner, who employed many black workers to farm the land. Jimmy was a close friend of many of the children of the black farm hands, which was unusual for the time. His father was fair to his employees and generous to those in need, but was an astute businessman that made a profit wherever he saw the opportunity; this contributed to Jimmy’s fiscal conservatism (Bourne, 1997). Where Lillian was socially progressive, particularly with race, “[Earl] shared the racist views of others in the community, but was tolerant if not supportive of Lillian’s views” (Bourne, 1997 p. 26). Earl was a very strict disciplinarian and Jimmy grew to resent his father as much as he loved him. His mother’s compassion for all had a long lasting more profound impact on his life. She, along with the local doctor Sam Wise, would offer medical services for free to anyone that could not pay, mostly blacks. Earl discreetly covered the cost of any medicine or other direct costs (Bourne, 1997 p. 28). As a child Jimmy sold boiled peanuts he cultivated, harvested, cleaned, and prepared himself and, although not particularly religious as a child, took his role in the church seriously (Bourne, 1997). These childhood events set the stage for Jimmy’s future.

Jimmy was a good student and became an avid reader like his mother. For college, he was dead set on attending the U.S. Naval Academy (Bourne, 1997). His desire to join the Navy came from his uncle who served during WWII and sent Jimmy postcards and gifts from around the world (Bourne, 1997, p. 44). He first attended Georgia Tech where he was
in the Naval ROTC and then the Academy (Bourne, 1997). The experience in the Navy is another similarity Carter shares; the experience had a strong impact on them both.

Jimmy dated several different women, but instantly fell in love when he was introduced to his sister Ruth’s friend, Rosalynn Smith; after their first date he told his mother, “She’s the girl I want to marry” (Bourne, 1997 p. 52). They kept in touch while he was away with the Navy and were married in Plains on July 7, 1946 (Bourne, 1997 p. 54). While in the Navy, they had three children, Jack, Chip, and Jeff (Bourne, 1997).

He went through elite training to be a submarine officer and graduated third in his class of fifty-two (Bourne, 1997 p. 65). Always a hard worker, Jimmy quickly rose through the ranks. For Carter, “Pleasure was derived not from relaxation and well-earned lethargy but from a sense of constant accomplishment, whether it involved self-improvement or contribution to the welfare of others” (Bourne, 1997 p. 65). When his father passed away Jimmy no longer felt the need to stay in the Navy to please his father and with the strong need to help his mother, along with a sundry of other personal and practical reasons, after a little over seven years he resigned from the Navy and returned to Plains, Georgia (Bourne, 1997). There he operated his father’s farm, which had shifted from primarily cotton to peanuts. His brother Billy was always supposed to take over the farm, but he was too young when his father passed away. This caused some resentment between the brothers (Bourne, 1997).

Unlike Richard Nixon, whose political roots were in Washington, Carter began at the state level and thought of himself as a Washington outsider (Carter, 1982; Bourne, 1997). Getting his feet wet in politics, Jimmy was a member of the Lions Club and helped take up efforts for the Georgia Better Hometowns Project, which was a program designed to beautify small towns. He applied to have the roads paved and was able to get enough
volunteers to construct a town swimming pool at nearly no cost (Bourne, 1997 p. 89). In addition, he served on the library board and was able to bring a physician back to Plains.

Stepping into politics Carter became a member of the school board in 1956 (Bourne, 1997 p. 115). Getting deeper into politics, Jimmy Carter decided to run for the state senate. The issue of racial integration, however, led to opposition and defeat, due to election corruption. As a man of principle he challenged the results and successfully won the senate seat (Bourne, 1997). While in the state senate he became very well respected and received great recognition. He was voted as one of the five most effective senators in Georgia and one of the top thirty-five legislators nationwide (Bourne, 1997 p. 148). Then, in 1966 he decided to run for Congress (Bourne, 1997). Early in the congressional election cycle his strong Republican opponent, Bo Callaway, dropped out and opted to run for Governor. Jimmy could have run virtually unopposed and easily won the Senate seat, but decided instead to run against Callaway for governor. There was a full field of candidates in the Democratic primary and Carter came in third, which resulted in a runoff election and Lester Maddox, a strong segregationist, winning the nomination (Bourne, 1997). By running against Callaway for governor instead of claiming the senate seat is telling of Carter’s personality. He ran for office based on principles and refused to take the easy road. Hard work and an unwavering devotion to his values was how he lived his life in business, his personal life, and politics.

After losing the election, Jimmy embraced his faith and became much more religious through the encouragement of his sister Ruth (Bourne, 1997). Although he felt defeated he became determined and began working hard to prepare for the 1970 election. His family, however, was always important to him and he had his fourth child, Amy Lynn, in October of 1967 (Bourne, 1997 p. 173).
In 1970 Carter again ran for governor of Georgia with a campaign largely emphasizing racial equality and integration. This was not a popular position for a southern Democrat to hold, but he walked a fine line with supporters on many issues and won the election. Carter’s promises to combat racial inequality were not empty. As stated by Bourne (1997), “At the start of his administration there were only three blacks serving on major state boards and commissions. When he left, there were fifty-three. At this instigation the number of black state employees increased form 4,850 to 6,684” (p. 212). The fight for racial equality was a domestic issue, but these same values would carry over to his human rights based foreign policy, which is very different from Nixon’s treatment of racial issues.

In 1972 Carter toyed with national politics in an unsuccessful attempt at joining the Democratic presidential ticket with George McGovern. He was, however, encouraged to start considering his own run for the presidency in 1976 (Bourne, 1997). Specifically, he was approached by Dean Rusk, former Secretary of State (Bourne, 1997 p. 237). This is significant for Carter, because as a state level politician his weakness was in the area of foreign policy. To start building his credentials he led two trade commissions from Georgia to foreign states. The first delegation, In April of 1972, traveled to Mexico, Costa Rica, Colombia, Brazil, and Argentina. Then, in May of 1973 he led a trade mission to London, Brussels, West Germany, and Israel (Bourne, 1997 p. 239). Perhaps the most significant foreign policy experience for Carter was being appointed to the Trilateral Commission, which was created to bring political, business, and academic leaders from Western Europe, Japan, and North America together (Bourne, 1997 p. 240).

Throughout his time as Governor, Jimmy Carter built a network of contacts and gained national notoriety. In 1976 he secured the nomination for President of the United States. His primary and national campaigns were much more grassroots efforts than Nixon’s.
His supporters went door to door and were called the Peanut Brigade (Bourne, 1997). Carter worked very hard to make everyone feel like they had a personal connection to him and wanted to be a president that common people could identify with. His accent and mannerisms led the press to characterize him as a hillbilly, but Carter was less concerned about that and more concerned about losing touch with the common people (Bourne, 1997). As stated by Bourne (1997), “Carter campaigned more on his personality and his character than on the issues, relying on his warm smile, his charm and, as he had done in his two gubernatorial races, on the sense of sincerity and integrity that he emanated” (p. 264). Most telling about Carter’s character and strong beliefs can be found in his compassion for those that are not treated as equals in society. He worked hard on racial integration, but also focused on the racial bias of the judicial system. While governor, the nanny for Carter’s children was a convicted murderer who he believed was falsely convicted because she was black; he commuted her sentence to work at the governor’s mansion and then made special arrangements to bring her with him to the White house (Carter, 1982 p. 32).

Carter truly sought to surround himself with the best advisers, based on their qualification, rather than any political debt he owed them (Carter, 1982; Bourne, 1997). One of his most important connections was to Andrew Young. Young was a close aid to Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., thus providing a strong connection to the black community to give Carter legitimacy. In the area of foreign policy his connection to Zbignew Brzezinski was key (Bourne, 1997). Brzezinski was a close and trusted adviser, but a controversial choice. He was described as “aggressive and ambitious, and that on controversial subjects he might be inclined to speak too forcefully” and it was thought that he “might not be adequately deferential to a Secretary of State (Carter, 1982 p. 42). On this subject Carter (1982) states, “Knowing Zbig, I realized that some of these assessments were accurate, but they were in
accord with what I wanted: the final decision on basic foreign policy would be made by me
in the Oval Office, not the State Department” (p. 52). In many ways the selection of
Brzezinski was comparable to Nixon’s selection of Kissinger. Carter found Brzezinski
particularly useful, because he often offered a different perspective. Often Carter and
Brzezinski would argue, “disagreeing strongly and fundamentally” (Carter, 1982 p. 54). This
exchange of information depicts the differences in how he and Nixon use information.
Nixon was far more averse to opposing views than Carter.

Finally, his selection for Vice President was done carefully. He wanted someone that
was in the Senate, because they could offer the knowledge of Washington that he lacked and
someone that was not from the south. Moreover, Carter wanted someone that would be
qualified to fill his place as President, if ever needed. Many southerners sill carried
resentment of the North from the Civil War. Carter was seen as the southern president to
region the south with the north (Carter, 1982 p. 22). Walter “Fritz” Mondale was selected to
join the ticket (Bourne, 1997). His personal and professional relationship with Mondale was
very important while he was in the White House. Unlike most of the Presidents before him,
Carter treated his Vice President as “second in command” and included Mondale in all
security briefings and nuclear launch procedures. In addition, he set up Mondale’s office in
the West Wing and integrated the staffs (Carter, 1982).

The way Carter utilized his staff was also very different from Nixon. He wanted to
have open communication with all of his senior advisers and initially had very little
management structure for his administration. Where Nixon wanted his Chief of Staff to be
the gatekeeper of information that flowed to the Oval Office, Carter wanted Hamilton
Jordan to coordinate the staff. Carter self-describes his leadership style with his advisers as
“collegial” and wanted them to be able to speak as equals (Carter, 1982 p. 54). In fact,
Jordan’s title was “chief staff aid” for the first two and a half years. Carter’s staff and
advisers asked for more structure and he was eventually given the title of “Chief of Staff”
(Carter, 1982 p. 42-44).

On foreign policy Carter was committed to the advancement of and protection of human rights. Where Brzezinski is a hard lined academic realist, Carter saw an opportunity for humanitarian actions. Concisely outlining his position on foreign affairs, Carter (1982) states, “I was familiar with the widely accepted arguments that we had to choose between idealism and realism, or between morality and the exertion of power; but I rejected those claims. To me, the demonstration of American idealism was a practical and realistic approach to foreign affairs, and moral principles were the best foundation for the exertion of American Power and influence” (Carter, 1982 p. 143). Stated a bit differently, Carter (1982) says, “I was determined to combine support for our more authoritarian allies and friends with the effective promotion of human rights within their countries” (p. 143). This basic set of goals describes Carter’s approach to foreign policy. He was much more optimistic about reaching compromises and did not view other actors as enemies.

**SALT I Nixon**

The overarching security issue for Nixon was the nuclear arms race with the Soviet Union. The arms, however, were not the source of conflict, in the eyes of Nixon. In his first press conference he states, “It would be a mistake…for us to fail to recognize that simply reducing arms through mutual agreement failing to recognize that reduction will not, in itself, assure peace. The war which occurred in the Mideast in 1967 was a clear indication of that” (PC1). On February 16, 1969 Nixon had his first meeting with the Soviet ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Dobrynin. During this meeting he established a secret communication channel between Dobrynin and Kissinger (Nixon, 1978 p. 369). This secret
channel of communication would stay open throughout the negotiations and was where the bulk of the work was done. The chief negotiator that was in the public eye was Gerard Smith (Nixon, 1978). The secret channels were very important for both sides, because they were negotiating around domestic constituencies and each countries’ respective allies. As Brezhnev said, “You have my commitment that privately or publicly I will take no steps directed against the Soviet Union. But you should rely on what I say in the private channel, not what anyone else tells you. There are not only certain forces in the world, but also representatives of the press, who are not interested in better relations between us” (Nixon, 1978 p. 617). These external pressures were real and decisions made by either legislature could have compromised the talks several times. For this reason public statements must be analyzed with caution and it is necessary to also analyze private statements and conversations. The Nixon administration was not transparent, especially in the area of foreign policy.

On November 17, 1969 representatives from the United States and the Soviet Union met for a month in Helsinki, Finland, followed by several secret meetings in both Helsinki and Vienna, “to establish firm controls over nuclear weapons” (Dupuy and Dupuy, 1993 p. 1370). These negotiations would be known as the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT).

Nixon was very much aware of connections between different areas of policy, or concern and wanted his foreign policy to work in multiple areas at once. Thus, he was not simply concerned about arms control during the SALT negotiations, but rather wanted to address the underlying political problems. He called his policy “linkage” (Nixon, 1978 p. 369-70). Although skeptical of the Soviets intentions, Nixon was excited to begin

---

18 One example of this is at the beginning of Summit II, Nixon pushed the Soviet Union to allow more émigrés to Israel (Nixon, 1978 p. 876).
negotiations when Dobrynin passed along a letter from Moscow, which indicated they were prepared to begin negotiations on a wide range of topics, including the Middle East, Central Europe, Vietnam, and arms control (Nixon, 1978 p. 370). For Nixon all conflict was interconnected and best thought of in layers. The top layer, the main conflict, was between the United States and the Soviet Union, derived from opposing ideologies. The bottom layers are conflicts in which the U.S. and USSR were involved, including Vietnam, and the Middle East.

The SALT negotiations were much more complicated than simply trying to match numbers of warheads and launches. The security needs and technological capabilities differed greatly between the United States and the Soviet Union. Nixon (1978) states, “It was clear to me by 1969 that there could never be absolute parity between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in the area of nuclear and conventional armaments. For one thing, the Soviets are a land power and we are a sea power. For another, while our nuclear weapons were better, theirs were bigger. Furthermore, absolute superiority in every area of armaments would have been meaningless, because there is a point in arms development at which each nation has the capacity to destroy the other. Beyond that point the most important consideration is not continued escalation of the number of arms but maintenance of the strategic equilibrium while making it clear to the adversary that a nuclear attack, even if successful, would be suicidal. Consequently, at the beginning of the administration I began to talk in terms of *sufficiency* rather than *superiority*...” (p. 415). His definition of “sufficiency”, however, is in actuality “superiority”. In other words he believes that unless the capabilities of the U.S. are superior to the U.S.S.R. then the capabilities are not sufficient. Nixon was aware of the destructive capability of the Soviets and conceded equality in the sense that a both states could deliver an attack of unacceptable consequences, but the United States retained
technological superiority. In his first press conference he states, “…our objective is to be sure that the United States has sufficient military power to defend our interests and to maintain the commitments which this administration determines are in the interest of the United States around the world”.\(^{19}\) Nixon was willing to compromise with the Soviets on arms limits, but he carefully set up the “compromises” in favor of the United States. This is best demonstrated by the strong push for ABM, because Nixon wanted to add to the capabilities of the U.S. so that he could make a concession and not actually degrade the existing status quo of military defenses. ABM was sold to the public as a safeguard against potential future threats from Chinese Communists and to balance against the Soviets, who had increased their defenses.\(^{20}\) In other words Nixon waned to make sure the United States was never second in capabilities and his uncertainty of Soviet, or Chinese, intentions led to his push for increased capabilities. Specifically referencing the Soviets he states, “I don’t know what their intentions are. But, we have to base our policy on their capabilities and when we project their SS-9 plans to 1972 or 1973, if we allow those plans to go forward without taking any action on our part, either offensively or defensively, to counteract them, they will be substantially ahead of the United States in overall nuclear capability. We cannot allow that to happen.”\(^{21}\) Nixon wanted to prepare for the worse case scenario.


Nixon’s goal in the negotiations was to place the Anti-Ballistic Missile defense system in the best position possible. This was a controversial position that many thought would compromise the negotiations, but Nixon believed it was necessary for leverage (Nixon, 1978). He dismissed the concern of ABM adding to insecurity by provoking the Soviets, by claiming that the Soviets understand that it is defensive posture (Nixon, 1978). He dismissed the concern of ABM adding to insecurity by provoking the Soviets, by claiming that the Soviets understand that it is defensive posture, and that a strong defensive system is necessary for the deterrent effects of the offensive weapons.\(^\text{22}\)

Nixon faced the possibility of a series of bills in Congress being passed that would have halted ABM construction. It was so close that there was a tie in the Senate and Vice President Agnew had to break the tie in favor of the administration’s position (Nixon, 1978 p. 415-8). Nixon felt this was extremely important. He states, “I am absolutely convinced that had we lost the ABM battle in the Senate, we would not have been able to negotiate the first nuclear arms control agreement in Moscow in 1972” (Nixon, 1978 p. 418). It is probable that the ABM was necessary for leverage when negotiating with the Soviets, because they wanted SALT to only address defensive weapons systems, while the U.S. wanted to place limits on offensive weapons. Nixon saw a link between defensive and offensive capabilities (Nixon, 1978). Eventually Nixon and Kissinger were able to get the Soviets to agree to a summit where they would only discuss ABM, but would place a freeze on offensive weapons (Nixon, 1978 p. 523).

---


The talks were nearly compromised several times due to the conflict in Vietnam. When the North Vietnamese army crossed the DMZ in March of 1972 the U.S. responded by increasing bombing missions on supply lines. At one point a several Soviet merchant ships were accidentally hit, causing increased tensions between the two super powers. Despite these complications both sides wanted the talks to move forward and Brezhnev offered more favorable compromises than Nixon or Kissinger expected (Nixon, 1978).

Then on May 26, 1972 two major agreements were signed. First, the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles established limits on ABM defenses to each respective states capital and one ICMB site, although there was no protocol for verification of compliance. Second, the Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons placed a five-year freeze on the number of ICBM deployments to current levels (Nixon, 1978; Dupuy and Dupuy, 1993 p. 1371). Nixon felt that real progress had been made with this treaty. He states, “The major achievement of Summit I was the agreement covering the limitation of strategic arms. The ABM treaty stopped what inevitably would have become a defensive arms race, with untold billions of dollars being spent on each side for more and more ABM coverage. The other major effect of the ABM treaty was to make permanent the concept of deterrence through ‘mutual terror’: by giving up missile defenses, each side was leaving its population and territory hostage to strategic missile attack. Each side therefore had an ultimate interest in preventing a war that could only be mutually destructive” (Nixon, 1978 p. 615-16).

---

24 The U.S. had 1,056 launches and the USSR had 1,618 launches at the time of the agreement.

25 Interestingly the ABM treaty did not affect current U.S. programs, but the Soviets had operations underway that were halted (Nixon, 1978 p. 618).
The first agreement that came from the SALT negotiations was the U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Accidents Agreement on September 30, 1971. The intention of this agreement was to prevent accidental nuclear conflict. It required both parties to inform the other of “(a) an accident that might cause detonation of a nuclear weapon; (b) detection of suspicious activity by either nation’s security warning system; or (c) planned missile launches in the direction of the other (Dupuy and Dupuy, 1993 p. 1371).

After this agreement they moved ahead with Summit II. Brezhnev, however, told Nixon that they were not ready to accept limitations on multiple warhead missile development, so they would not be moving forward with SALT, as planned. Instead, they discussed European security, NATO, and Warsaw. In exchange the deadline for the next SALT agreement was moved from 1975 to the end of 1974 (Nixon, 1978 p. 879). This, however, was to be complicated by the Watergate scandal and left for a future administration.

Another issue that was complicating the negotiations was the developing relationship between China and the United States. In particular, Brezhnev was concerned about a mutual defense treaty with China. He assured Nixon that the Soviet Union had no interest in attacking China, but that if they made an agreement with the U.S. it would “confuse the issue” (Nixon, 1978 p. 883).

One of the most significant factors of the SALT I negotiations was Nixon’s personal relationship with Brezhnev. The two world leaders became close personal friends. In fact, Brezhnev, on one of his visits to the U.S. during summit II, traveled to California with the Nixon’s and stayed in their daughter’s bedroom (Nixon, 1978 p. 881-82). This personal relationship did not eliminate Nixon’s perception of threat from the Soviets, but it strongly
moderated any idea that the U.S. would face a nuclear attack indiscriminately and increased his trust in the negotiations.

Summit II was largely unproductive, but two more agreements were signed on June 21, 1973. The first made some progress on replacing the Interim Agreement from the first round of talks, called the Basic Principles of Negotiations on Further Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons. The next agreement signed was the Agreement on Prevention of Nuclear War, which provided that each state would avoid situations that could potentially escalate to nuclear war (Nixon, 1978; Dupuy and Dupuy, 1993 p. 1371). With Nixon’s resignation due to Watergate the SALT negotiations stalled until the Carter administration took over.

Salt II Carter

President Ford unsuccessfully negotiated the SALT II treaty before leaving office and instead of picking up where Ford left off, Carter changed the tune of the negotiations. He switched the goals from “limitation” to “reduction” (Carter, 1982 p. 216). Carter’s goal was to use SALT II to set the stage for SALT III, which would include more reductions in long-range missiles and unlike SALT I and II would include short-range missiles (Carter, 1982 p. 216-17). Further complicating the negotiations was the fact that the Soviets had developed a professional and personal relationship with the Nixon administration negotiators and were now faced with a new administration. Developing trust would prove difficult and Carter never built the personal relationship with the Soviets that Nixon did (Carter, 1982).

Clearly depicting Carter’s sentiments about the importance of the SALT agreements is an excerpt from a speech given to the American Newspaper Publishers on April 25, 1979. He states, “The possibility of mutual annihilation makes a strategy of peace the only rational
choice for both sides…. We have a common interest in survival, and we share a common recognition that our survival depends, in a real sense, on each other…. This effort by two great nations to limit vital security forces is unique in human history; none has ever done this before…. SALT II is not a favor we are doing for the Soviet Union. It’s an agreement carefully negotiated in the national security interests of the United States of America…. The issue is whether we will move ahead with strategic arms control or resume a relentless nuclear weapons competition. That is the choice we face – between an imperfect world with a SALT agreement, or an imperfect and more dangerous world without a SALT agreement” (Carter, 1982, p. 239). This speech was also an appeal for support from the American public, who were afraid the SALT agreement would reduce the capabilities and security of the United States.

Carter’s commitment to human rights was not deterred by the Soviet Union and would not be compromised even for SALT negotiations. Carter wanted deeper cuts in nuclear arms agreements and pressured the Soviets on human rights. He went as far as sending a personal letter to a Soviet citizen who was a human rights activist and labeled as an “enemy” of the Soviet state. This action increased tensions during negotiations (Carter, 1982 p. 146).

Similar to Nixon, Carter believed that building relations with China would be beneficial for the SALT negotiations (Carter, 1982 p. 194). The thought was that by increasing pressure on the Soviets, they would be more willing to compromise.

The lack of trust between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. complicated SALT agreements. Carter (1982) states, “One complication from this distrust is that every item in a SALT treaty would have to be verifiable, each country using its independent capabilities to assure that all
the terms were honored. If compliance could not be confirmed, the item could not be included” (p. 213). Nonetheless, negotiations continued and some progress was made.

On June 18, 1979 President Carter and Leonid Brezhnev signed the SALT II agreement, which closed loopholes regarding verification of compliance in SALT I and prohibited the deployment of mobile ICBMs or SLCMs (air launched cruise missiles), flight testing of mobile ICBMs and established limits on the number of warheads, launches, and new deployment systems (Dupuy and Dupuy, 1993 p. 1485). Specifically, the agreement required the Soviet Union to reduce their launchers by ten percent, prohibited the encoding of missile test data, and established that a “five percent modification of major characteristics would constitute a ‘new’ type of weapon” (Carter, 1982 p. 238). The progress made in SALT II was a noble achievement, but Carter was not able to successfully negotiate SALT III before leaving office.

**Nixon Middle East**

The conflict between Israel and the Arab states was on going and the U.S. had promised support to Israel and the Soviets exerted their influence on the Arab states. Prior to Nixon taking office Presidents Kennedy and Johnson successfully aided Israeli defense by supplying arms and money (Nixon, 1978 p. 476). Nixon was very concerned about the influence of the Soviets in the Middle East, as he saw their intentions as aggressive. He states, “The difference between our goal and the Soviet goal in the Middle East is very simple but fundamental. *We* want peace. *They* want the Middle East (Nixon, 1978 p. 477 emphasis in original). One of Nixon’s major goals for his second term was to make an interim Arab-Israeli peace agreement (Nixon, 1978).

For the Middle East policy Nixon placed his Secretary of State, Bill Rogers, and his assistant for Near Eastern and Southern Asian Affairs, Joseph Sisco, in charge. This was a
change from Henry Kissinger, being the main foreign policy adviser. This difference in task delegation occurred for two reasons. One was Kissinger’s heritage. Nixon (1978) states, “I felt that Kissinger’s Jewish background would put him at a disadvantage during the delicate initial negotiations for the reopening of diplomatic relations with the Arab states” (p. 477).

Second, Nixon wanted Kissinger to devote his attention to Vietnam and SALT (Nixon, 1978).

Nixon was strong in his support for Israel, but he also wanted to build a relationship with the Arab states. The State Department came up with what became known as the “Rogers Plan”. The basic form of the plan was for Israel to return the Arab territories in exchange for state recognition by the Arab states. The plan earned Rogers the title, “the most unpopular man in Israel” (Nixon, 1978 p. 479).

Tensions with the Soviets in the region increased when Nixon received a letter from Premier Kosygin on January 30, 1970. The letter stated, “We would like to tell you in all frankness that if Israel continues its adventurism, to bomb the territory of U.A.R. and of other Arab states, the Soviet Union will be forced to see to it that the Arab states have means at their disposal, with the help of which a due rebuff to the arrogant aggressor could be made”. To relieve tensions Nixon suggested that supplies to the region be limited (Nixon, 1978 p. 479). Tensions, however, rose again when the Soviets provided direct support, including troops, to Egypt and Syria and in September Syria invaded Jordan, which resulted in Nixon increasing support for Israel (Nixon, 1978).

During Brezhnev’s 1973 visit to the U.S. he was staying with the Nixon’s in their personal home and had Kissinger wake Nixon up for a late night meeting on the Middle East (Nixon, 1978 p. 884-5). Describing the meeting, Nixon (1978) states, “He kept hammering at what he described as the need for the two of us to agree, even if only
privately, on a set of ‘principles’ to govern a Middle East settlement” (p. 885). These proposed “principles” included the withdrawal of Israeli troops from occupied territories, recognition of national boundaries, free passage of ships through the Suez Canal, all supported by international guarantees (Nixon, 1978 p. 885).

Differing from Brezhnev on this issue, Nixon wanted to encourage direct Israeli/Arab negotiations and believed that the “principles” outlined by Brezhnev would prevent dialogue. In hindsight Nixon wonders if the Soviets had already pledged their support to the Arab states with the coming attack on Israel (Nixon, 1978 p. 885).

In October of 1973, the CIA saw large troop movements by Syria and Egypt on the borders of Israel, but they dismissed the actions as annual military maneuvers. Or, they believed these moves, for Syria, could have been precautionary, since Israel had recently shot down three of their fighter jets (Nixon, 1978 p. 920). Then, on October 6, 1973, which was Yom Kippur, or “the Day of Atonement”, which is the holiest day in the Jewish faith, Egypt and Syria commenced attacks on Israel. This was the day of the year that Israel was the least prepared to defend itself (Nixon, 1978 p. 921). Nixon quickly called a Security Council meeting, but soon realized that the U.S. was the only state with uniquely close ties to Israel. His greatest concern was the involvement of the Soviets and he feared that they might have directed the attack. He, however, did not want to intervene, as he believed that a military stalemate between the competing powers was the only way to begin negotiations, because neither side wanted a cease-fire. In addition, he did not want to compromise the progress made in building relations with the Arab states (Nixon, 1978 p. 921).

The conflict, however, was not going in Israel’s favor. In the early days of the war they suffered heavy casualties and their supplies were running dangerously low. By the fourth day of the conflict Nixon directed promised to provide military aid directed Kissinger
to figure out the logistics. The Secretary of Defense, James Schlesinger, who was concerned about offending the Arab states, complicated this and Nixon agreed, at least temporarily. They had a plan in place to send supplies via private airlines with the tail marking blacked out to prevent identification, but no insurance companies would assume the risk (Nixon, 1978 p. 920-6). A second complication, was that Jordan, an ally of the U.S., had sent troops to fight against Israel with Syria. Kissinger’s deputy, General Brent Scrowcroft, called the Israeli’s to express his hope that they would not carry the conflict into Jordan (Nixon, 1978 p. 924).

With the needs of the Israelis growing by the day and the complications of logistics preventing aid being delivered, Nixon got because impatient and ordered the immediate use of military planes (Nixon, 1978 p. 297). The Pentagon continued to debate over the number and type of aircraft to use. Finally fed up with the dilemmas and no longer caring about the political consequences from the Arabs, Nixon told Kissinger, “Goddamn it, use every one we have. Tell them to send everything that can fly” (Nixon, 1978 p. 927). The U.S. began sending approximately one thousand tons of supplies a day. Around this time, the Soviets sent a letter informing Nixon that they knew of the military aid being sent to Israel (Nixon, 1978 p. 927). Then, on October 17, Nixon met with four Arab leaders and the Soviets, who backed his proposal that the Israelis retreat to the 1967 borders (Nixon, 1978 p. 930-1). At the same time OPEC voted to reduce oil production, thus raising prices and, in addition, several Arab states placed an oil embargo on the United States. Despite these economic blows, Nixon sent a 2.2 billion dollar aid package to Israel (Nixon, 1978 p. 931-2).

This conflict, with the U.S providing military aid to Israel and the Soviets providing aid to the Arabs, could have seriously compromised the relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Fortunately, the personal relationship between Nixon and Brezhnev likely
alleviated the tensions. Nixon expressed to Brezhnev that he would not let the actions
deteriorate their personal relationship or the détente, if they were serious about working on
peace efforts (Nixon, 1978 p. 933). Then, on October 21 Kissinger met with Brezhnev to
work out a cease-fire agreement. The agreement had three parts: “1) a cease-fire in place; 2) a
general call for the implementation of UN resolution 242 after the cease-fire; and 3) Negotiation between the concerned parties aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in
the Mideast” (Nixon, 1978 p. 936). The agreement was presented to each side of the conflict
separately. Brezhnev presented the agreement to the Syrians and Kissinger presented it to the Israelis. At this time, the Egyptians also became interested in a cease-fire (Nixon, 1978 p. 936-7).

The cease-fire officially took place on October 24, 1973, but a large number of
Soviet troops remained on alert in the Mediterranean. The Soviets urged the nonaligned states to propose a Security Council resolution that would place Soviet and U.S. troops in
the region to keep the cease-fire. Nixon was adamant that he would veto any such
resolution, as this would place the two super powers in a dangerous position (Nixon, 1978 p.
937). The Soviets, however, escalated the situation by threatening to take unilateral action if
the U.S. would not support a joint action (Nixon, 1978 p. 938). Nixon, then, escalated the
situation exponentially by placing all U.S. conventional and nuclear forces on alert (Nixon,
1978 p. 939). The situation ended without incident and no major diplomatic relations were
compromised (Nixon, 1978). It should be noted that Nixon’s involvement in the conflict of
the Middle East was always in relation to the actions of the Soviets in the region. In other
words, he viewed the conflict between Israel and the Arabs and an extension of the conflict
between the United States and the Soviets rather than a separate issue with humanitarian concerns.
**Carter Camp David**

Carter’s first trip to Israel was in 1973, while governor of Georgia, by the invitation of then Prime Minister Golda Meir. During this trip Carter embraced the opportunity to explore the religious sites, but also to learn about the conflict that plagued the region. He studied the Middle East from a perspective of history and politics, as well as from a biblical perspective (Carter, 1982 p. 273-4). He believed in the United State’s commitment to supporting Israel and stemming, in part, from his belief that the Jewish survivors of the Holocaust had the right to a sovereign nation, in which they could live in peace. He states, “I considered this homeland for the Jews to be compatible with the teachings of the Bible, hence ordained by God. These moral and religious beliefs made my commitment to the security of Israel unshakable” (Carter, 1982 p. 274). His commitment to equal rights, however, shined through and he equally believed in the right of non-Christians to have access to the religious sites (Carter, 1982). In addition to supporting Israel on religious grounds, Carter supported the Israeli government as the only democracy in the region and he did not want increased communist influence from the Soviets. It is important to note that Carter, at this time, had not visited any of the Arab states and had very little knowledge of them (Carter, 1982).

Carter was advised to stay out of the Middle East, but he was committed to exploring new solutions to peace between Israel and her Arab neighbors (Carter, 1982). It is important to understand that the context of the situation was different from that of Nixon, because “Anwar Sadat determined that cooperation with the United States offered greater rewards than collusion with the Soviet Union, and on 15 March 1976, he unilaterally terminated the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the USSR and Egypt” (Nogee
and Donaldson, 1982 p. 315 qtd. from Carter, 1982). Although Carter viewed the Soviets as less of a threat than Nixon, in general, the absence of their involvement is significant.

Carter (1982) describes his first meeting with Prime Minister Rabin, however, as “a particularly unpleasant surprise” (p. 280). Carter assumed that the Israelis would be most interested in finding solutions to the conflict and was shocked at how inflexible they were. Balancing the relationship with Israel by ensuring support for their security, while making a commitment to help the Palestinians, ad demonstrated by negotiating with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), was a precarious situation (Carter, 1982).

Where his experience with the Israeli leaders was a disappointment, his first meeting with an Arab leader was a rejuvenating experience that gave him hope for finding a solution. Carter (1982) stated, “Then, on April 4, 1977, a shining light burst on the Middle East scene for me. I had my first meetings with President Anwar Sadat of Egypt, a man who would change history and whom I would come to admire more than any other leader” (p. 282). As Nixon formed a close personal bond with Soviet leader Brezhnev, Anwar Sadat, the President of Egypt, became one of Jimmy Carter’s best friends. Like Carter, Sadat was eager to find a solution to peace in the region, which would make him unpopular with other Arabs (Carter, 1982).

Carter had a meeting with all of the Arab leaders, in order to understand all sides of the disagreements. The main negotiations, however, were between Israel and Egypt. Sadat began directly negotiating with Begin, but any hope for progress was put to an end. When Sadat accepted compromises proposed by Israel Begin backtracked and became more hard-

---

26 Rabin was replaced by Begin after Rabin was forced to resign from office for holding a U.S. bank account.
lined (Carter, 1982). With the negotiations deadlocked Carter proposed to act as the arbitrator and host the meeting at Camp David (Carter, 1982).

The Camp David Talks and Accords took place from September seventh through seventeenth, 1978 (Dupuy and Dupuy, 1993). The issue was complicated because of the religious nature of the conflict and all three leaders were very religious. The talks did not start with optimism. Sadat expected Begin to block progress, which was true. Prime Minister Begin came to the meeting with the goal of creating general agreement and leaving the details for a future meeting; this was unacceptable for Carter (Carter, 1982). The negotiations were deadlocked on the first day by Begin. Sadat came prepared to offer many compromises, including converting one of the Israeli airstrips in the Sinai into an American military base. The issue was over what granting autonomy to the Palestinians would mean (Carter, 1982).

On the second day Sadat wanted to push Begin to compromise and negotiate. To do this he made a proposal that he knew would be seen as unacceptable. The issue here was over the Israeli borders and settlements. Sadat wanted all Israeli settlements to be removed from the Sinai and return to the 1967 borders (Carter, 1982). Begin, of course, believed the settlements should be allowed to stay in place. Carter was able to persuade Begin to deem Sadat’s proposal “unacceptable” rather than demand he withdraw it (Carter, 1982). The progress made at this point was that both leaders acknowledged their most favored position was unacceptable to the other.

Begin continued to be hard-lined on all of the settlements and on the fourth day, Sadat’s advisers met with Brzezinski and told him they were considering leaving, because of Begin’s unwillingness to compromise. Carter was able to ease tensions, but quickly became annoyed at Begin, himself, when he began making demands that violated UN resolution 242, which established Israel as a state (Carter, 1982).
Carter desperately wanted to make a peace agreement and frequently cited statistics showing support from the Israeli people for peace and their willingness to compromise on the issue of settlements. Sadat was more in line with the American position than the Israelis and on day 10 the talks officially ended (Carter, 1982). Then, a surprise came on Day 13, right before the leaders were to depart. Begin called Carter and said that he would accept the letter he had drafted on an agreement regarding Jerusalem (Carter, 1982 p. 399). After Camp David the treaty still had to officially be signed. Begin was predictably difficult up until the end and the agreement almost fell through, but was ultimately signed (Carter, 1982).

The achievement was a milestone in the Middle Eastern conflict. Carter says, “Henry Kissinger telephoned to congratulate me, saying that I was working him out of his career criticizing the government by not leaving him much to criticize” (Carter, 1982 p. 426). With the Camp David Accords, Jimmy Carter achieved what was thought to be impossible; he got the leaders of Israel and Egypt to speak with one another and agree on compromises for peace.
CHAPTER 4: NIXON THE REALIST

This chapter analyzes the public and private statements of Richard Nixon on the issues of nuclear negotiations with the Soviet Union and the conflict between Israel and the Arabs. Two types of data are used for the analysis. Public statements, which include press conferences, interviews, speeches, and statements by the President were analyzed first.\textsuperscript{27}

\textsuperscript{26}Then archival material, such as intelligence reports, the President’s notes, memos, and records of conversation were analyzed and compared to the results from the public statements. In general, the archival information was useful for bolstering and supporting the analysis of the public statements. No significant differences were found.

Images in Nuclear Talks Public Statements - Nixon

On the category of capabilities Nixon asserts many times that the United States does and must maintain superiority over the Soviets and all other actors.\textsuperscript{29} Examples of statements

\textsuperscript{27}For Operational Code analysis long quotes that were not the words of the President, statements by reporters, and speech formalities (introductions, traditional closing statements, etc.) were removed. The data includes both prepared and spontaneous remarks.

\textsuperscript{28}Operational Code analysis only used data from the public speeches, statements, and interviews. Archival material was not structured appropriately for this analysis.


indicating this are: (1) “The defense capabilities of the United States are second to none in the world today” (197); and (2) “Today, no nation on earth is more powerful than the United States. Not only are our nuclear deterrent forces fully sufficient for their role in keeping the peace, our conventional forces also are modern, strong, prepared, and credible to any adversary”. Recall from chapter 3 that Nixon believed that sufficiency in military capabilities meant maintaining the lead in weapons technology, although he recognized the destructive capability of the Soviets weapons systems. The defense budget was reduced during the Nixon administration, but he cautioned strongly against weakening U.S. capabilities. Cautioning about weakening defenses in the 1972 election he states, “But now in this campaign our opponents have proposed massive new cuts in military spending--cuts which would drastically slash away not just the fat but the very muscle of our defense”.


31 Ibid.
Supporting this goal, he refused to make any concessions in the SALT agreement unilaterally. He states, “Let me emphasize that in SALT, both sides are asked to make an agreement which limits [vital interests]. This is not unilateral. We, on our part, will be having very severe limitations with regard to our defensive capability, with ABM. They, on their part, will have limitations on their offensive capability, their buildup of offensive missiles”  

This clearly represents a policy of balancing. But, he continued to push for new defensive programs, namely ABM, to increase the capabilities of the U.S. for the goal of superiority, but at least maintaining balance. He states, “In the event that the United States does not have ongoing programs, however, there will be no chance that the Soviet Union will negotiate phase two of an arms limitation agreement. I can say to the members of the press here that had we not had an ABM program in the beginning there would be no SALT agreement today, because there would have been no incentive for the Soviet Union to stop us from doing something that we were doing and, thereby, agree to stop something they were doing”.  

Nixon believed that maintaining superiority was the only way that the Soviets would negotiate.

Although, at least publicly, he maintained the image of the Soviets as having weaker capabilities, he spoke often of balancing with Soviet capabilities and Soviet increased

---


It seems that Nixon was concerned about Soviet capabilities catching up to U.S. capabilities and thus supported a strong defense budget along with continued development in order to maintain the capability superiority. In addition to military capability, Nixon was aware of the significance of economic power. He states, “…in this period we must keep our economy vigorous and competitive if the opening for greater East-West trade is to mean anything at all, and if we do not wish to be shouldered aside in world markets by the growing potential of the economies of Japan, Western Europe, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China. For America to continue its role of helping to build a more peaceful world, we must keep America number one economically in the world” (188). This indicates that he does not believe military capability is the only important form of power.

At times Nixon professes fear of the Soviet Union and their nuclear capabilities and at other times he seems certain that they will do whatever necessary to avoid direct conflict with the United States. This dichotomy is likely derived from the true nuclear capability, which did present a potential threat and that he was convinced the leaders on both sides understood that any nuclear exchange would be mutually catastrophic. The threat, however, could not be fully dismissed, because Nixon was uncertain of the Soviet’s intentions.

As the SALT negotiations progressed Nixon became more optimistic about working with the Soviets. At the start of the talks the Soviets only posed a threat to the United States, but as the negotiations continued Nixon saw that there was also an opportunity. In his letter to chief negotiator, Gerard Smith, sending him to the second round of SALT talks he states, “In my letter to you three years ago I observed that no one could foresee the outcome of the negotiations, but I also expressed my conviction that arms control was in the mutual interest of our country and of the Soviet Union. We have learned in the last three years that such mutual interests do, in fact, exist.\(^ {35}\) The achievement of the SALT agreements, as well as the Basic Principles governing our relations with the USSR, lead me to believe that your current efforts will meet with new success”.\(^ {36}\) With this perspective the threat of the Soviets’ capabilities had not gone away, but were at least moderately decreased, because mutual interest was identified.

The beauty and magnificence of the Soviet architecture and culture were well respected. Making site-seeing suggestions to the press for their trip to Moscow he states, “Well naturally, you want to see the Kremlin. You ought to see the university; you ought to see certainly one of the greatest industrial plants in Moscow, the magnificence of the gardens and the former Czar’s Palace in Leningrad, and so forth”.\(^ {37}\) The palaces of the Czar’s were


much larger and more extravagant than American Presidents’ homes. Speaking of the time that Brezhnev stayed at the Nixon’s California home he states, “Although our house in San Clemente is very beautiful, it is very small by the standards of the Soviet leaders, who are used to dachas and villas of Czart nobles, and it is not at all equipped to accommodate state visitors” (Nixon, 1978 p. 881).

**Source of Conflict**

For Nixon the source of conflict is, at least in part, the individual. He states, “we find within the last third of a century that sometimes decisions by great powers, as well as small, are not made by rational men. Hitler was not a particularly rational man in some of his military decisions. So it is the responsibility of the President of the United States not only to plan against the expected, and against what normal and rational men will do, but within a certain area of contingency to plan against the possibility of an irrational attack”. In other words, Nixon believed that he had to be prepared to defend against irrational behavior. He also understands that conflict arises out of state interests. He states, “I am also conscious of the historical fact that wars and crises between nations can arise not simply from the existence of arms but from clashing interests or the ambitious pursuit of unilateral interests. That is why we seek progress toward the solution of the dangerous political issues of our day.” Further, for Nixon, communist and anti-communist ideologies were important in

---


39 Richard Nixon: "Message to Ambassador Gerard C. Smith at the Opening of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks in Helsinki.,” November 17, 1969. Online by Gerhard Peters and
defining the international system. He states, “…there has never been a greater need for a sense of common purpose among the non-Communist nations”. Thus, for Nixon there are multiple sources of conflict. The belief in the power and influence of individual actors is demonstrated by his desire to maintain close relationship and be in constant communication with his Soviet counterparts. Excited by progress in the SALT agreements he states, “we agreed on a more reliable ‘hot line’ between Washington and Moscow, and found new ways to consult each other in emergencies which will reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war”. Thus, conflict is exemplified and dealt with in the international system by “balancing”, but the system is created by the motivations and actions of individual leaders.

**Other Images**

Another important image that is significant for understanding both the SALT negotiations and the conflict in the Middle East is that of both Eastern and Western Europe. Because Western Europe was strategically located to defend against the Soviets from the east, the capabilities of European allies were calculated into the balance of power analysis. While Europe was still recovering from WWII and rebuilding their military capabilities, Nixon viewed them as substantially weaker than the U.S. and thus requiring our support to maintain the balance. Thus, he held a “dependent” image of the Western European powers.

---


41 Ibid
along with many elements of the ally image; so it is best defined as a dependent-ally image.\textsuperscript{42} As an example of this, Nixon states, “The gravest responsibility which I bear as President of the United States is for the security of the nation. Our nuclear forces defend not only ourselves but our allies as well”.\textsuperscript{43}

Later, as the capabilities of Western Europe increased, the image began to transition from dependent-ally to a more robust ally image.\textsuperscript{44} Referring to both Europe’s strengthening military capability and growing economy, Nixon states, “Our former dependents have become our competitors”.\textsuperscript{45} This clearly shows that there was a shift in the perception of power, both military and economic, held by the European allies. The increase of capability and transition to potentially posing a threat makes the categorization fit the ally image.


After the strength of Western Europe grew, the stronger dependent image was projected onto the citizens of countries Nixon felt were oppressive. This image grew out of his perception of how those citizens viewed the United States. He states, “Everywhere we went – to Austria, the Soviet Union, Iran, Poland – we could feel the quickening pace of change in old international relationships and the peoples’ genuine desire for friendship for the American people”. His determination to proactively shape the world in his vision of “freedom” is specifically exemplified by his statement of Polish people. He states, “No country in the world has suffered; more from war than Poland--and no country has more to gain from peace. The faces of the people who gave us such a heartwarming welcome in Warsaw yesterday, and then again this morning and this afternoon, told an eloquent story of suffering from war in the past and of trope for peace in the future. One could see it in their faces. It made me more determined than ever that America must do all in its power to help that hope for peace come true for all people in the world”. In Nixon’s mind, these people were dependent upon the American government to break away from the oppressive regimes, which governed them.

---


The scores calculated by VICS above in Table 6 represent the Operational Code of Richard Nixon in the context of nuclear agreements involving the Soviet Union using press conferences and public statements. The scores suggest that Nixon views the world as somewhat to definitely friendly (P-1) and believes the Soviet leaders he is negotiating with are definitely cooperative (I-1). What this means, is that Nixon, at least publicly, expressed his belief that cooperation and a reduction in conflict was possible by way of negotiations.

He is somewhat optimistic in realizing his political goals (P-2), does not believe the future is predictable (P-3) or that he has much control over historical development, and believes that the outcome of decisions involved a very high degree of chance (P-5). This
explains his plea to the American public to not decrease defense spending, because he is uncertain of future threats. If he had felt that he could successfully decrease threats, his outlook may have been be very different. With statements such as “Nothing would have happened unless we made it happen”, one may presume that these results are flawed and that Nixon believed that American influence did lead to specific outcomes. But, the scores make more sense when we understand where Nixon believed conflict was derived from. As indicated in the discussion above, he placed substantial emphasis on the individual in conflict and cooperation. This suggests that, although Nixon may believe he or the United States generally has influence in negotiations and, the final outcome is dependent upon many factors that create the international system. So, the statement above should be interpreted as Nixon believed that the influence of the United States had a significant impact, but the impact of the other actors should not be minimized. It is also important to remember that these statements were public during the SALT negotiations, but the majority of work was done in secret (Nixon, 1978). It is possible that these scores indicate more cooperation than will be revealed in the analysis of private statements. Nonetheless, this contrasts with his approach to domestic policy, where he has more unilateral power. In response to being asked what the federal government would do in the case of a postal worker strike he stated, I will answer that question only by saying that we have the means to deliver the mail. We will use those means. But I do not want to indicate what they would be because I think that might put a disturbing element into the very delicate situation of negotiation going on in local unions throughout the country. I am not threatening, I am simply stating as a matter of

---

fact that the President of the United States, among his [sic] many responsibilities, has a responsibility to see that the mail is delivered, And I shall meet that responsibility and meet it effectively beginning Monday in the event that the postal workers in any area decide that they are not going to meet their constitutional responsibilities to deliver mail.49 This suggests that when Nixon has superior power and is not reliant on other actors, he is far more controlling.

The scores also suggest that Nixon was cooperative in his pursuit of goals (I-2), had a low acceptance of risk (I-3), and was moderately flexible in tactics (I-4). These scores are expected, as they moderate the high level of uncertainty in the philosophical beliefs. Because Nixon is uncertain about achieving his goals unilaterally and is dependent upon other actors he must be cooperative and flexible. The evidence of behavior supports these scores, but does not tell the full story. Nixon is cooperative and willing to compromise, as evidenced by making limitations on ABM, to reach a nuclear agreement. Remember, however, that Nixon always intended for ABM to be a bargaining chip. So, Nixon is cooperative and makes compromises, but most often the cooperation is planned and initiated by him.

The utility of means (I-5) demonstrate Nixon’s belief in the success of specific tactics. With an extremely high score of 0.54 for statements of appeal and support, this is his preferred tactic. This means that Nixon believes that making appeals for reaching a SALT agreement and making statements supporting the progress on the part of the Soviet Union, the goal is more likely to be achieved. Promises, opposition, and threats, for Nixon, are unlikely to be effective as indicated by their low scores. Although unlikely to be effective he

still believes promises are almost twice as effective as threats, which is in line with the other scores indicating his high level of cooperation. He believes offering rewards or threatening punishment have nearly twice the utility as statements of opposition. This is also indicative of cooperation and flexibility of tactics, because the threat of punishment or offer of reward may be effective at different points in negotiation.

**Middle East conflict – Nixon**

The perceptions of the conflict in the Middle East, for the Nixon administration, were defined by the relationship with Israel and the Soviet Union’s involvement with the Arabs, particularly Egypt. The perceptions that direct interests of the United States were at risk was a proxy of perceptions from the Israeli leadership, who Nixon believed the US has a “special relationship” with. Although Nixon recognized the different approaches by Israel and the United States to resolving conflict in the region he emphasized the common bond between the two nations. He states, “I have spoken with many leaders of other governments now, and many times we have spoken together in English. But today, I believe, is the first time the leader of another nation and I have spoken together in purely American English. I say this not because it matters one bit whether people speak in one accent or another but because this experience brought home to me one point: Our guest tonight has spoken of the profound common values the people of the United States and Israel share, and it is her very experience which explains why the United States and Israel share, and it is her very experience which explains why the United States and Israel are close. It has little to do with just religion or politics or things of that nature. It has much to do with the simple
fact that many of us share – in broad terms – some kind of common experience.”

This suggests that Nixon feels there is a connection to Israel beyond what is obvious. In many ways Israel is representative of America in the Middle East. Further emphasizing this he states, “Even the more modest Israeli goals add up to a ‘special relationship’ with the US that Israeli officials have occasionally called a ‘tacit alliance.’ In addition to Israel’s specific need for support in security and foreign policy matters, many Israelis, especially some of the more militant right-wingers, see Israel as the guardian of US interests in the Middle East. Israel aspires to be a kind of special representative of Western democracy in an area where authoritarianism is the most common form of government, and a bridge between the developed and developing worlds that can communicate with both”.

Israelis also emphasize that there is a ‘special relationship’ with the US because the US is home to the largest Israeli population outside of Israel. The above shows that the perception was that Israel represented American values and American interests in the Middle East. This image is particularly significant during the Cold War, because the conflict was derived by the perceived threat of communist ideology as must, if not more so, than the military capabilities of the Soviets.

Nixon’s support of Israel, however, did not come without something in return. He expected acknowledgement and appreciation from the Jewish community for his support of Israel. A memo from the President to Henry Kissinger states, “What, if anything, did Garment report to you on the absolute failure of the American Jewish community to express

---

50 Toast; Dinner for Prime Minister Golda Meir; 9/25/69; folder 1; NSC box 604; Richard Nixon Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.

51 Memo; security the constant problem; 1969, folder 2; NSC box 604; Richard Nixon Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California; p. 4-5.

52 Ibid p. 5-6
any appreciation by letter, calls or otherwise for RN’s over-ruling both State and Defense in sending phantom jets to Israel?"  

This suggests that he is not only concerned about the physical security of Israel, but he is concerned about his perception as the protector of Israel. This shows he holds a dependent image of Israel and feels the need for Israel to validate this role.

The strong perception of shared culture and Israel’s need of protection, from the Soviet backed Arabs, is key to understanding the perception of threat in the region. The images, overall, held by Nixon in the context of the Israeli’s conflict with the Arabs are similar to those analyzed in the nuclear negotiations. This is to be expected, because Nixon did not compartmentalize or fully differentiate between small-scale conflicts involving both the United States and the Soviet Union around the world. Rather, the ideological conflict with the Soviet Union was at the center of a foreign policy web of proxy conflicts in which the great powers balanced against one another.

The escalation of tensions in the Middle East and focus on balancing between the two superpowers, however, was blamed on the Soviets. In a memo to the President, Kissinger states, “Before Kosygin’s message to you, the conflict was viewed as primarily an Arab-Israeli conflict slipping toward a subordinate role of a tool in that larger context”. One of Kissinger’s concerns was that the Soviets would take direct responsibility for

---

53 Memo, memo from President Nixon; 9/22/69, folder 2, NSC box 604; Richard Nixon Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.
54 Leonard Garment held a variety of positions throughout Nixon’s tenure in the White House, including “counselor to the President”.
55 Memo, memo to President Carter “Escalation in the Mid-East; folder 2; NSC box 605; Richard Nixon Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.
56 The letter from Kosygin has been unable to be located at the time of this writing. The context, however, is provided from other documents. It is at the time of this letter that the Nixon administration learns of the strong military support to the Arabs and direct involvement in the peace process on the part of the Soviet Union.
Egyptian air defenses. If this occurred, he believed not responding would signal “superior Soviet power”, yet responding would “confirm the elevation of the conflict to the US-Soviet level”.\(^{57}\) Although I have been unable to locate the exact message from Kosygin, this suggests that Kissinger and Nixon believed the balance of power was shifted in favor of the Arabs, due to Soviet influence. The influence of the Soviets is key to understanding the subsequent policy in the region, because it is not obvious that the same policies would have been followed if the Arabs gained power without the aid of the Soviets.

In addition to Soviet actions being a catalyst for elevated tensions, the Israelis also stoked the fire under the two super powers. Ambassador Rabin communicated that Soviet pilots were operating in the region since April 18.\(^{58}\) The administration was concerned about Israel provoking the Soviets with false accusations. Referring to one such document distributed by Israel it is noted that, “The document contains two admissions: (a) It dates the Soviet decision to introduce SA-3s into the U.A.R. in January 1970, instead of November 1969, as earlier claimed by the Israelis – i.e., after the Israelis had undertaken their deep penetration raids, and (b) It acknowledges that Israel’s dismemberment and destruction have not been a Soviet goal”.\(^{59}\) This refers to a document from the Embassy of Israel titled “The Soviet Union Assumes Combat Role Against Israel.”\(^{60}\) The claims were untrue, as the closest Soviet aircraft came to Israeli attack aircraft is 10 miles. They were not directly interfering in Israeli missions, but were “scrambling”.\(^{61}\) The balance between the real actions of the Soviets

---

57 Ibid
58 Memo of conversation; Rabin, Argov, Kissinger, Sanders; 4/25/70; folder 1; NSC box 606; Richard Nixon Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.
59 Memo, to Kissinger – Israeli comments; 5/7/70; folder 1; NSC box 606; Richard Nixon Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.
60 Document, Soviet Combat Role – Israeli Embassy 4/29/70; folder 1, NSC box 606.
61 Memo, to President–Soviet Pilots, folder 1; NSC box 606; Richard Nixon Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.
and the perceptions of the Israelis without losing the trust of the Israelis was a constant battle for the Nixon administration.

Although the balance of power had shifted, Nixon believed that the US maintained superior capability and could successfully support Israel's defense against the Arabs.62 Maintaining this superiority was very important to Nixon. He states, “Frankly, I do not believe the United States should go into any talks where the deck might be stacked against us”.63 The need to maintain dominance was, in part, due to the perception that Israeli defenses are dependent upon the strength of the United States along with its direct support of Israel.64 These images and Nixon’s ideas for the role of the U.S. in the peace talks is depicted in his statement, “I believe we need new initiatives and new leadership on the part of the United States in order to cool off the situation in the Mideast. I consider it a powder keg, very explosive. It needs to be defused. I am open to any suggestions that may cool it off and reduce the possibility of another explosion, because the next explosion in the Mideast, I think, could involve very well a confrontation between the nuclear powers, which we want to avoid”.65 This statement contains two images. The first is that Israel is dependent upon


65 Ibid
the United States to maintain security against the Arabs.\textsuperscript{66} The second image is the threat posed by the Soviet Union. In Nixon’s view the conflict in the Middle East had a significant and direct impact on the tensions with the Soviets.\textsuperscript{67}

Out of the belief that the conflict was directly connected to Soviet relations Nixon wanted to include the Soviets in the peace negotiations and also expressed some support for the Arabs. He stated, “We believe that the initiative here is one that cannot be simply unilateral. It must be multilateral. And it must not be in one direction. We are going to pursue every possible avenue to peace in the Mideast we can”.\textsuperscript{66} These statements suggest a stronger interest in the Soviet Union than in Israel and humanitarian concerns appear to be at the bottom of the list of concerns. As stated by Nixon, “I have noted several recent stories indicating that the United States one day is pro-Arab and the next day is pro-Israel. We are neither pro-Arab nor pro-Israel. We are pro-peace. We are for security for all the nations in that area. As we look at this situation, we will consider the Israeli arms request based on the threats to them from states in the area and we will honor those requests to the extent that we see--we determine that they need additional arms in order to meet that

\textsuperscript{66} Ibid


threat". This indicates that Nixon’s actions in the Middle East were solely in the interest of the United States and not that of Israel or the Arabs.

More indicative of this sentiment is his reluctance to send arms at Israel’s request, but rather made decisions based on the assessment of their needs. Nixon’s goal, then, was to balance against the capabilities of the Soviet Union. A part of the tensions were due to the direct involvement of the Soviets on the side of the Arabs. Nixon was concerned about increased Arab power through a treaty between Egypt and the Soviets. Even when the Soviets left Egypt Nixon seems unsure of the threat level. Nixon believed that the power balance was still in favor of the United States because the countries of the Middle East were economically dependent upon the U.S. through oil sales, but that the U.S. had leverage


because they were not dependent upon the Middle East for oil.  

He was, however, concerned for the European allies that were dependent upon the region’s oil. These public statements prevailed and were due to Nixon’s strong personal feelings about Israel. It is important, however, to understand the various opinions throughout the administration that influenced the final images.

Some in the administration took a strong stance in support of Israel and their hawkish policies towards the Arab states. Growing military capability of Arabs, through the Soviets, is a concern of Israel. Advocating such a response, CIA director Richard Helms posits, “There is no limit to military action the Israelis can take against Egypt. The only restraints are of a political nature. It is difficult to justify these restraints; if the Egyptian leadership cannot defend its own people, it cannot expect to survive. The Israeli course of action should be encouraged, since it benefits the West as well as Israel”.

Others balanced the concern of Israeli security with their own concerns of increased tensions with the Soviets. Nobody in the administration was willing to allow Israeli power to weaken, but several key advisers, including Kissinger, held the opinion that that Israeli perception of insecurity was exaggerated. In specific, Kissinger believed that Israel was aggressive beyond what was required to protect their security, which jeopardized an increase

---


76 Report; situation in the Middle East background; 9/24/69; folder 2; NSC box 604; Richard Nixon Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California. p. 5.
in USSR and US involvement.\textsuperscript{77} The Israelis, however, believed any unilateral ceasefire on their part would be a sign of weakness.\textsuperscript{78} The context of this was over a request from Israel for replacing aircraft that had been lost in recent combat. Balancing the risk of provoking the Soviets, Nixon decided to not immediately increase aircraft sales to Israel, as he believed the perception of increased direct support would be destabilizing. Kissinger cautioned that the decision could have the additional side effect of this decision was appearing to be “bowing to Soviet pressure”. Then, to have the cake and eat it too, Kissinger proposed amending previous aircraft sale contracts to include the replacement of actual attrition rates. The intention was then to not escalate involvement while simultaneously maintaining Israel’s current level of aircraft capabilities.\textsuperscript{79} What this shows is an unwillingness to let Israel’s status quo power diminish, but also refrain from escalating tensions by trying to strengthen the power of Israel over the status quo.

Because the Nixon administration did not simply acquiesce to every request for aid, Israel often appears unconfident in the commitment of support from the United States. Exemplifying this is a summary of statements made by Israeli Prime Minister Rabin, “[Prime Minister Rabin] believes that the US has ‘made a great mistake’ and has ‘undermined’ Israel’s position in future negotiations with her neighbors whenever they come about…Ambassador Rabin stressed that the US approach to the Soviets was ‘basically wrong.’ If the real purpose was to find out if the Soviets want compromise we should not ‘give in’ without concessions from them. ‘You should know better than we’ that the US can ‘only move as they move

\textsuperscript{77} Memo, to president – escalation in mid-east; folder 2; NSC box 605; Richard Nixon Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California. p. 2.
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid p. 3
\textsuperscript{79} Memo; to president – assistance to Israel; folder 1; NSC box 606; Richard Nixon Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.
The Nixon administration did want Israel as an ally in the region and was willing to provide all assistance necessary to prevent the Soviets, thus the Arabs, from gaining power in the region, as would later be demonstrated by the support after the Yom Kippur attack.

The support, however, was primarily to prevent the increased power and influence of the Soviets more so than absolute support for Israel. As stated by ElWarfally (1988), “Libya’s antagonism toward communism in general and the USSR in particular was used by some U.S. officials to convince President Nixon and his top officials to recognize the [new revolutionary led regime]” (pp. 76). This perception held firm, even through an arms deal with the Soviet Union conducted through Egypt. The support Libya could provide to other Arab states in the fight against Israel and their roll in revolutions in other Arab states was minimized (ElWarfally, 1988 p. 75-84). This demonstrates that anti-communist ideology and anti-Soviet policy is more important for the Nixon administration that Israel.

It is important to note that Israel never expressed empathy for the position of American interests and the Nixon administration recognized the legitimate grievances by the Arabs. Melvin Laird, Secretary of Defense, posited that a substantial source of conflict is the issue of Palestinian refugees. He believes that the United States has a vested interest in the protection of human rights. Nonetheless, Laird emphasizes that the threat to U.S. interests is real. He stated, “There are those who insist that the present situation between the Arabs and the Israelis is not to be solved by us, because the issues go beyond the scope of American power. It is easy to succumb to this pessimism. Yet ‘American power’ has many

---

80 Memo of conversation; Rabin, Kissinger, Hoskinson; 11/17/69; folder 2; NSC box 605; Richard Nixon Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.
81 Memo, from Laird to President 8/22/69; folder 2; NSC box 604; Richard Nixon Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California. p. 1.
dimensions: some cultural, some economic, some political, some military. It is the multifaceted nature of American society which makes for American power. Where one area might be closed, another area of endeavor, such as economic cooperation might be opened. In any event, loss of the Middle East to some new form of Leninism or Maoism in the Arab world is a possibility which could very well develop after years of humiliation and defeat. Present Arab leadership does not represent this extreme form of politics, but Soviet and Chinese plans for the area are clearly envisage something along these lines. Before this disaster occurs, it is worth considering alternatives in American policy toward the Middle East which can guide political change and prevent these extreme developments”. \(^{82}\) This shows the perception of threat from another culture.

Strength was also strongly emphasized in the talks. Harold Saunders stated, “The tone of your response, I suggest, should convey the notion that we are no babes in the woods vis-à-vis the Soviets and have no intention of jeopardizing Israel’s security or our interests. As the President told Eban, he has been accused of a lot of things – but not of being naïve about the Russians”. “One of our purposes in talking with the Russians is to probe what price they are willing to pay for peace. They and their clients got themselves into their current mess, and we intend that they – not we – should pay the price for getting out. But the only way to find out what price Moscow and Cairo will pay is to put a specific proposition on the table – less than they want – and see what they’ll pay to improve it”. \(^{83}\) In many cases the Americans tried very hard to convince the Israelis that they were not in a

---

\(^{82}\) Memo; from Laird to President 8/22/69; folder 2; NSC box 604; Richard Nixon Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California; p. 4

\(^{83}\) Memo; to Kissinger “your talk with Rabin 5:30; 5/8/69; folder 1; NSC Box 604; Richard Nixon Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.
weaker position and would not be allowed to fall to a weaker position, but the Israelis were resistant to this belief.

Recognizing that the US would have to be the ones to pressure Israel, David Packard, Secretary of Defense, argued aircraft sales to Israel should be stopped until Israel made concessions in the peace negotiations. Harold Saunders, speaking of this memo, said “The tone of this memo is unfortunate – openly anti-Israel.” David Packard, however, also believed that a stop in aircraft sales to Israel would improve the US position with North African countries, namely Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria. The position of withholding aircraft until Israel made concessions was also supported by Ambassador Yost. This shows two things about the perceptions of Israel. First, the less emotional perception is that Israel’s actions could jeopardize the security of the US and Soviet relationship, thus Israeli interests should be put second and they should be pressured to make concessions. This, however, was seen as “anti-Israel” and the emotional support of Israel ultimately prevailed.

The primary objective throughout the Nixon administration was to preserve the stable relationship with the USSR, in order to progress the SALT agreements. The Middle East conflict and possibility of Israel going nuclear was viewed as a direct threat to SALT agreements and stability. Israel publicly stated that it had no intentions to be the first

84 Memo; for Kissinger – Packard Memo on assistance; 2/25/70; folder 2; NSC box 605; Richard Nixon Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.
85 Memo, consequences in North Africa; 2/14/70; folder 2; NSC box 605; Richard Nixon Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.
86 Memo; to Kissinger - Yost on Eban; 5/21/70; folder 1; NSC box 606; Richard Nixon Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.
87 Memo; Israel/Mid-East/SALT; 10/27/70; folder 1; NSC box 608; Richard Nixon Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.
Talking paper; folder 1; NSC box 608; Richard Nixon Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.
nuclear state in the Middle East, but intelligence observed that they were rapidly developing the capability to produce and deploy a nuclear weapon within a short timeframe (NSC 604-1). Several officials within the administration were concerned that Israel had not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and that a nuclear-armed Israel would inspire others in the region to pursue the technology. The real fear was that a nuclear Israel would then increase the risk of confrontation between the US and USSR, and hold up peace talks.

The primary negotiations for a Middle East peace agreement did not come from meetings between the Israelis and the Arabs, but rather the Four Power Talks, which consisted of the US, UK, France, and USSR. The goal was to create an agreement to settle the territorial dispute following the 1967 war. All of the Four Powers, with small variances, believed Israel should withdraw to the 1967 borders. Publicly emphasizing the significance and power of both the United States and the Soviet Union in this conflict, Nixon states, “…the four-power conference can become an absolute essential to any kind of peaceful settlement in the Mideast, and that is a major-power guarantee of the settlement, because we cannot expect the Nation of Israel or the other nations in the area who think their major interests might be involved--we cannot expect them to agree to a settlement unless they think there is a better chance that it will be guaranteed in the future than has been the case in the past”. The significance placed on the Four Power Talks further suggests that the real

---

88 Memo; Israel’s Nuclear Policy, From NEA Joseph Sisco; folder 1; NSC box 604. Memo; Stopping introduction; 3/17/69; folder 1; NSC box 604; Richard Nixon Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.
89 Memo; Positions of Parties and Four Powers; folder 1; NSC box 648; Richard Nixon Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.
interests for the international system are between parties outside of the region and the region is a proxy for balancing power between the United States and the Soviet Union. If the conflict were truly attributed to the Israelis and Arabs with only regional consequences we would expect to see emphasis placed on direct negotiations.

The conflict escalated when the power balance in the region was altered by the Soviets. One memo states, “Since President Nasser opened his country’s gates to Soviet penetration, the Soviets have entered the region as a force active in all developments of the area…The Soviet Union fostered and exploited the sense of Arab frustration towards Israel, and Egypt’s ambition to establish its hegemony within the Arab world through the elimination of Israel, Israel serving as a geographical barrier between it and the major centers of the Arab world (p.1).” The USSR provided multiple levels of support for the Arabs, both politically in the international community and on the battlefield with military aid. It was posited that the USSR and Egypt were waging a “war of attrition” by prolonging any agreed upon settlement. Although there were attempts to build relations with the Arabs, Arab power was derived through Soviets, so the US has no influence on Arab position directly. The closest Arab ally directly involved in the conflict would have been Jordan. However, the CIA reported that King Hussein was weak and could not hold up to terrorists, Egypt, or the Russians, thus their weak capabilities did not make them strategically advantageous.

---

91 Memo; Situation in Middle East Background; 9/24/69; folder 2; NSC box 604; Richard Nixon Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California. p. 1.
92 Ibid p. 2
93 Ibid p. 9
94 Memo; to Kissinger - Yost on Eban; 5/21/70; folder 1; NSC box 606; Richard Nixon Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.
95 Memo; CIA to President; 9/24/69; folder 2; NSC 604; Richard Nixon Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.
Thus, Nixon views Israel as dependent upon the United States, the Arabs dependent upon the Soviets, and the United States and the Soviet Union dependent upon one another to avoid direct confrontation. Stated by Nixon, “In the Mideast, without what the Soviet Union has done in rearming Israel's neighbors, there would be no crisis there that would require our concern. On the other hand, at the same time that the Soviet Union had gone forward in providing arms for potential belligerents—potential belligerents in the one area and actual belligerents in another—the Soviet Union recognizes that if these peripheral areas get out of control, the result could be a confrontation with the United States. And the Soviet Union does not want a confrontation with the United States, any more than we want one with them, because each of us knows what a confrontation would mean.” 96 In other words, the Soviets are the source of conflict and the key to peace. 97 He compared the conflict to that of Vietnam. 98 What he really means is that peace between the United States and Soviet Union is dependent upon peace in the smaller areas of conflict.


97 Ibid

Although tensions were high, Nixon, as we saw in the analysis of nuclear agreements, believed the Soviets would not escalate.\textsuperscript{99} Nixon essentially believed the Soviets held the same position he did, that he did not want to escalate the situation by becoming further involved. He believes in the necessary influence of the United States, but was reluctant to actively encourage either side to make concessions.\textsuperscript{100} He stated, “But for the United States publicly to move in and indicate what we think ought to be done while these delicate negotiations go on would not help”.\textsuperscript{101} The level of involvement changed when the Soviets expressed interest in actively assisting in a peace agreement between Israel and the Arabs and requested that Henry Kissinger come to Moscow to begin negotiations.\textsuperscript{102} A joint


\textsuperscript{103} This included a possibility of sending observers to monitor the cease-fire at the request of the United Nations Secretary General.
communication following discussions with the Soviets states, “Both sides believe that the removal of the danger of war and tension in the Middle East is a task of paramount importance and urgency, and therefore, the only alternative is the achievement, on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 338, of a just and lasting peace settlement in which should be taken into account the legitimate interests of all peoples in the Middle East, including the Palestinian people, and the right to existence of all states in the area”. This depicts the mutual feelings of required cooperation and potential for conflict escalation on the Middle East issue.

**Operational code – Middle East**

The Operational Code results are depicted below in Table 7. As with the images, the operational code analysis for Richard Nixon using data related the conflict between Israel and the Arabs is very similar to that of the analysis of the SALT negotiations. This further supports the idea that Nixon did not separate the conflict issues. There are some minor shifts in Nixon’s code shown in the table below. These shifts likely reflect a small shift in Nixon’s goals. The overall goal of improving relations with the Soviets and increasing the security of the United States did not change and Nixon had less interest in the consequences of the final outcome of the Israeli conflict, as long as it did not increase Soviet capabilities. Thus he was likely willing to make more compromises.

What is immediately noticeable about this analysis is that the philosophical beliefs, although there were some slight shifts in value, retained the same descriptors. This indicates

that he held the same image of the international system in the context of both the SALT negotiations and the conflict in the Middle East. Although there were only minor shifts there are some changes in descriptors, which allow us to better understand the small differences in how Nixon perceived smaller scale conflicts.

Table 7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Belief</th>
<th>Diagnostic Propensities</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P-1</td>
<td>Nature of Political Universe</td>
<td>0.47 (Somewhat/Definitely Friendly)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-2</td>
<td>Realization of Political Values</td>
<td>0.26 (Somewhat optimistic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-3</td>
<td>Predictability of Political Future</td>
<td>0.11 (Very Low)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-4</td>
<td>Control over Historical Development</td>
<td>0.33 (Low Control)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-5</td>
<td>Role of Chance</td>
<td>0.96 (Very High)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-1</td>
<td>Strategic Approach to Goals</td>
<td>0.75 (very Cooperative)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-2</td>
<td>Tactical Pursuit of Goals</td>
<td>0.38 (Somewhat Cooperative)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-3</td>
<td>Risk Orientation</td>
<td>0.29 (low)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-4</td>
<td>Flexibility of Tactics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Cooperation/Conflict</td>
<td>0.25 (low)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Words/Deeds</td>
<td>0.56 (Medium)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-5</td>
<td>Utility of Means</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Reward</td>
<td>0.23 (low)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Promise</td>
<td>0.06 (Low)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Appeal/Support</td>
<td>0.59 (Very High)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Oppose/Resist</td>
<td>0.07 (low)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Threaten</td>
<td>0.01 (Very Low)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Punish</td>
<td>0.05 (very low)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first noticeable shift is in the instrumental master belief (I-1), which shifts from definitely cooperative to very cooperative. This is most likely reflective of his desire to stay out of direct conflict in the region. He was willing to compromise more on Israel than on issues involving direct U.S. capabilities in the SALT negotiations. Depicting the nature of
compromise in the administration, in a memo to the President, referring to a settlement proposal by the Soviets, the Secretary of State says, “We have prepared a counterproposal which includes sufficient hints of movement and changes on our part to assure the continuation of the bilateral dialogue, while remaining firm on the fundamentals which we believe are essential if we are to have any chance of bringing the Israelis along at some stage”.\textsuperscript{105} This shows the willingness to compromise, to the extent possible. The lack of movement is due, in part, to the unbending perceptions of Israel. The Secretary states, “Israel has already characterized the Soviet reply as retrograde and a confirmation that Nasser has no intention to make peace at this time”.\textsuperscript{106} This is a sentiment expressed over time, across the administration, and is reflected in the president's operational code.

It is also important to understand the nature of the negotiations and the position from which they were starting. Henry Kissinger expressed that in the negotiations with the Soviets regarding peace in the Middle East, that Israel had the advantage, because they had a superior military to the Arabs and had won the previous conflict. He, however, provided the caveat that the U.S. would avoid confrontation with the USSR at all costs and that it is possible the USSR would not allow Israel to retain all of the Arab territory acquired in 1967. Dr. Kissinger said there are two types of situations resulting from peace negotiations: “(1) a situation which would reduce the will of the parties to fight each other; (2) a situation which would reduce the ability of the parties to ‘get at each other’.”\textsuperscript{107} Showing the inflexibility of the Israeli position, “Mr. Argov noted on this second point that the Israeli concept was exactly the opposite – that peace should not keep Arabs and Israelis from ‘getting at each

\textsuperscript{105} Memo; President to Secretary of State; 6/30/69; folder 4; NSC box 649; Richard Nixon Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California. 2.
\textsuperscript{106} Ibid p. 1
\textsuperscript{107} Memo, Memo of conversation with Kissinger; 5/13/69; folder 1; NSC box 604; Richard Nixon Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.
other,’ but should, to the contrary, enable them to get at each other on a massive scale. Israel believes that there should be open borders and the free flow of people and commerce, although Argov acknowledged that perhaps that is unattainable now, ‘in which case Israeli withdrawal is unattainable now’.” The same basic arguments are made by both sides in the State department with Rogers representing the United States and Abba Eban representing Israel. The Israelis were persuading the Nixon administration to not include the Soviets in negotiations and allow the negotiations to be only between the Israelis and the Arabs. The Israelis viewed this as antagonist to their goals, reflected by the willingness of the Nixon administration to include Israeli concessions in the negotiations. Thus, they compromised with the Soviets, not the Israelis.

The hold up in negotiations was that the Soviets were not as concerned about the situation as Israel and consequently the US. In a memo speaking of the Soviets position on the Middle East talks, Joe Sisco states, “they gave no serious signs of concern over the present status quo in the area and seemed prepared to live with it as manageable”. Speaking of their tactics, he argues that they will not put significant pressure on Egypt to reach an agreement and will use the public negotiations of the four powers and through the UN to “chip away at the US position”. This is important because what may be viewed as a lack of willingness to compromise on part of the U.S. is a lack of compromise on the part of the Soviets.

Further supporting this, instrumental belief 4a shifts from medium to low. This suggests that he is less flexible in his propensity to shift between cooperation and conflict in

---

108 Memo, Eban’s talks in State; 3/13/69; folder 1; NSC box 604; Richard Nixon Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.
109 Memo; to President – report of Moscow talks on Middle East; 7/14-18/69; folder 1; NSC box 650; Richard Nixon Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California. p. 1.
110 Ibid p. 2

115
the Middle East conflict. In the context of the documents analyzed and the images, this is most likely a reflection of his decreased willingness to use direct force. Moreover there were small shifts in the utility of means for punishment and reward. His belief in the utility of punishments shifted from low to very low and his belief in the utility of rewards slightly increased. This is further support that Nixon was more willing to make compromises and less willing to engage in confrontation with the Arabs and Soviets. Depicting this he states, “What I am simply saying is this: that insofar as the military portion of the decision is concerned, that portion is based on the fact [that the] [sic] situation as we see it at this time, and that will be constantly reappraised as the fact situation changes”.111 This suggests that he was not going to provide arms to Israel blindly, because he did not want to risk increasing tensions with the Soviets. This could also be correctly interpreted as a lack of support for Israel, because the primary interest in the conflict was American interests.

Nixon was unconfident in his ability to achieve lasting peace in the Middle East.112 Depicting the source of conflict and his reliance on compromise to reach a peace agreement, he states, at a signing of a cooperation agreement between the United States and Egypt, “there is one important rule which governs statements or agreements or treaties or whatever documents are signed by heads of government, and that is this: that the statement, the treaty, the agreement, is only as good as the will and the determination of the parties concerned to


keep that agreement”. This shows that he believes individual states and their leaders are responsible for conflict and peace.

**Nixon the Offensive/Defensive Realist**

Nixon believed that the source of conflict was in individuals and their use of their state’s capabilities defined and shaped the international system. He states, “That term, "a structure of peace," speaks an important truth about the nature of peace in today’s world. Peace cannot be wished into being. It has to be carefully and painstakingly built in many ways and on many fronts, through networks of alliances, through respect for commitments, through patient negotiations, through balancing military forces and expanding economic interdependence, through reaching one agreement that opens the way to others, through developing patterns of international behavior that will be accepted by other powers. Most important of all, the structure of peace has to be built in such a way that all those who might be tempted to destroy it will instead have a stake in preserving it”. This depicts Nixon’s belief that a forceful foreign policy is, at least sometimes, required to lead to achieving goals, including peace. This means that he will fit into an offensive category in the typology created in chapter 2, but from other perspectives Nixon is more representative of a Defensive Realist, because of his intentions.

---


Nixon is clearly a realist. He stated, “Those who scoff at balance of power diplomacy should recognize that the only alternative to a balance of power is an imbalance of power, and history shows that nothing so drastically escalates the danger of war as such an imbalance. It is precisely the fact that the elements of balance now exist that gives us a rare opportunity to create a system of stability that can maintain the peace…” This quote perfectly depicts Richard Nixon as a realist, but are his intentions compatible with offensive or defensive realism? He pursued a goal of balancing against the Soviets, thus at times behaving more aggressively. In addition, the statement “create a system of stability” tells us that Nixon believed that stability was possible to “maintain peace”. Maintaining peace indicates he is a realist because he does not suggest the threats have been eliminated, but rather stabilized. The fact that this stability was “created” by his actions would immediately suggest that he represents the Offensive Realist. The confusion comes in when you consider the point at which his administration started and the existing balance of power. The USSR also behaved aggressively during the time period of the Nixon administration. Thus, Nixon’s actions could be seen as consistent with Defensive Realism, because his policies were intended to balance against the Soviets and maintain the status quo. If this were truly Offensive Realist policy the intention would have been to shift the balance of power in favor of the United States. Nixon even pushed against idealism stating, “We will be told that all the things we want to do at home could be painlessly financed if we slashed our military spending. We will be told that we can have peace merely by asking for it, that if we simply demonstrate good will and good faith, our adversaries will do likewise, and that we need do

115 Ibid, emphasis not in original
no more. This is dangerous nonsense.” At times the emphasis Nixon placed on defensive arms and reluctance to engage in new conflicts where the Soviets were also involved would suggest to some that he is a Defensive Realist. When analyzing further what is revealed is that Nixon does not believe he can achieve his goals unilaterally, when the Soviets are involved. This is because they were an equal power that posed a threat. Thus, his willingness to compromise expressed as defensive measures are what is said publicly, but when push comes to shove Nixon was going to take whatever actions necessary to prevent the Soviets from gaining power. The context of the administrations policies, goals, and intentions will require further analysis to determine if they are more representative of Offensive or Defensive Realism.

---

CHAPTER 5: CARTER THE IDEALIST

This chapter analyzes the press conferences, speeches, interviews, as well as archival documents, including but not limited to letters, telegrams, memos, records of conversations, and intelligence reports collected from the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, for analysis of the SALT II negotiations and the role the administration played in peace negotiations between Israel and her Arab neighbors. At many points the analysis will show similarities to the images and operational code of Richard Nixon. The key differences, however, are in the intentions and motivations of the policies he invoked, making him a non-expansionist idealist.

Source of Conflict

Like Nixon, Carter viewed the source of conflict and the path to peace as dependent upon individual decision makers. He wrote to Brezhnev, “I am very pleased that our initial exchange of letters has led us immediately into an examination of the central issues of world peace. Our two great countries share a special responsibility to do what we can, not just to reduce tensions but to create a series of understandings that can lead to a more secure and less dangerous world political climate”. This shows the emphasis placed on the actions of individual countries, which he attributes to the leaders.

Brezhnev felt the same way. In a memorandum of conversation, Carter said, “In this private meeting Brezhnev wanted to present some additional thoughts. It was his view that

117 The operational code analysis was conducted using only speeches and interviews. The material collected at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library was not appropriate for this analysis. Those documents were used as supportive information and for image theory analysis.
118 Draft letter, Jimmy Carter to General Secretary Brezhnev, 2/14/77, folder USSR Brezhnev drafts letters 2-3 ’77, Box 4, Plains, Jimmy Carter Library.
119 It is unclear whether or not his text was included in the final letter sent to Brezhnev, but these notes from Carter, nonetheless, help to show the emphasis he placed on the individual.
the most important element that should determine the relations between the two countries, the ultimate objective here, as it were, was to establish the kind of level of mutual understanding and confidence that would completely rule out the possibility of war breaking out between the Soviet Union and the United States; and, even more, to create the kind of relationship that would bring about an understanding that in the event of attack on either of the two countries by a third nuclear power, or in the event of the threat of such an attack, the Soviet Union and the United States would join forces in repelling the aggressor”. This is important, because it could signal that the perception of peace and path to conflict for Nixon and Carter could have been, at least to some degree, a response or building on the perceptions of the Soviets.

This perception is not limited to relations with the Soviets. Carter attributes improving understanding and relations to Sadat and Begin. Thus, the source of conflict in the Arab-Israeli conflict was also the individuals in power.

Carter was certainly aware of constraints on all nations from their domestic political systems, namely the legislatures. He was also very much aware of the role of the United States and others in the context of the international system. It was, however, for Carter and Nixon, individuals that determined the effects of these other influences.

**Images in Nuclear Talks**

Carter wanted to move “rapidly – aggressively – on arms control issues with the Soviet Union”. Like Nixon, Carter believed that the United States was in many respects

---

120 Memo of conversation, meeting between President Carter and General Secretary Brezhnev 6/18/79, folder USSR SALT II summit president’s personal notes, Box 5, Presidents personal affairs files, p. 1.

121 Letter, President Carter to President Sadat, 8/3/78, folder Egypt 11/77 to 11/81, Box 1, Plains.
superior in total capability in comparison to the Soviets, but for all intents and purposes the Soviets were perceived as equal due to their nuclear second strike systems capability.\textsuperscript{123} Carter stated, “At the present time, my judgment is that we have superior nuclear capability…I think that we are roughly equivalent, even though I think we are superior, in that either the Soviet Union or we could destroy a major part of the other nation if a major attack was made with losses in the neighborhood of 50 to 100 million people if a large exchange was initiated”.\textsuperscript{124} In other words, the absolute power capabilities had reached a point of diminishing returns, because both states had the capability to launch attacks that would inevitably result in greater losses than any leader would deep an acceptable risk. Perhaps due to this level of extreme destructive capability, he did not believe the Soviets were developing any new technology that would increase the level of threat.\textsuperscript{125}

\textsuperscript{122} Memo of conversation, Carter and SALT advisers 2/1/77, folder SALT chronology 1/24/77 to 5/9/77, p. 1.


believed that the economic power of the United States was a sign of greater strength than the Soviet Union.\(^{126}\)

The acknowledgement of relatively equal capability was significant for the progress of the SALT II agreements. Carter’s goal was to have a reduction in arms, but not at the expense of United States military power. Carter truly wanted equality, not superiority.\(^{127}\) For Brezhnev, this meant equal security.\(^{128}\) The problem was balancing the differences in capabilities to reach parity.

Clearly depicting the difference in capability of the two states, Carter said, “…we are ahead in warheads, accuracy, ASW and aerial surveillance; and [the Soviets] are ahead in throw weight”.\(^{129}\) “The President asked whether the Soviets would consider reducing their throw-weight advantage if we would forego escalating our quality advantage. Dobrynin responded that this might be considered after SALT II. To include this equation in SALT II would make it more complicated, he said”.\(^{130}\) One of the biggest problems with negotiating to maintain parity was that US had difficulty telling the difference between the Soviet


\(^{127}\) Memo of meeting, Muskie and Gromyko 5/16/80, folder USSR General 9/77 to 12/80, Box 5, Plains — presidents personal affairs files, Jimmy Carter Library.

\(^{128}\) Letter, letter from Brezhnev to Carter, folder Molink 10/78 to 9/80, Plains — presidents personal affairs files, Box 5, Jimmy Carter Library.

\(^{129}\) Memo of meeting, NSC staff 3/22/77, folder SALT Chronology 1/24/77 to 5/9/77, p. 2

\(^{130}\) Memo of conversation, Carter and Dobrynin 2/1/77, folder SALT Chronology 1/24/77 to 5/9/77, p. 3.
medium range mobile missiles, which were intended for defense against China, and the ICBM launches that were capable of hitting the United States.\textsuperscript{131}

Carter was willing to negotiate and compromise, stating, “We are not going to negotiate in such a way that we leave ourselves vulnerable. But if the Soviet Union is willing to meet us halfway in searching for peace and disarmament, we will meet them halfway”;\textsuperscript{132} this parity of capability, he believed, was essential for maintaining peace and falling to an inferior status to the Soviets would have been dangerous and destabilizing.\textsuperscript{133, 134} Thus, Carter was committed to not unilaterally reducing nuclear weapons, but wanted the weapons stocks of both nations to remain balanced while reductions were made.\textsuperscript{135, 136} In fact, Carter asserted that he “set as our committed long-range goal complete elimination of nuclear weapons

\textsuperscript{131} Ibid


from the earth”.\(^{137}\) In addition to reducing the level of threat between the US and USSR, Carter believed SALT would lead other states reduce and eliminate their nuclear weapons capabilities.\(^{138}\) It was important though for the two superpowers to take the first step. Carter said, “we can't ask the Chinese to do much until we [the Soviet Union and the U.S.] do”.\(^{139}\)

Carter’s initial goals were far reaching and would have had immediate and profound effects. He did not want small reductions, he wanted “drastic reductions” and “strict limitations”.\(^{140}\) This is where his idealism shines through. The end goal of eliminating nuclear weapons would represent a substantial reduction in absolute power, a policy, which a realist would not encourage. Speaking of the SALT treaty proposals, Brzezinski said, “If accepted, this proposal would halt the strategic arms race, eliminate insecurity, and make it impossible for either side to seek strategic superiority over the other. It would thus be a driving wedge for a potentially much more cooperative American-Soviet relationship”.\(^{141}\) The takeaway here is that where Nixon was seeking an agreement to maintain equal capabilities without ending the arms race, Carter wanted to reach parity through reversing the arms race.

The allies in Europe were also important for Carter’s perception of balance of power. He stated, “My guess is and my belief is that without the use of atomic weapons, we

---


\(^{138}\) Ibid

\(^{139}\) memo of conversation, carter and SALT team 2/1/77, folder SALT Chronology 1/24/77 to 5/9/77, p. 7.


\(^{141}\) Memo, memo to Carter – suggested talking points 3/30/77, folder SALT Chronology 1/24/77 to 5/9/77.
have adequate force strength in NATO to stop an invasion from the Warsaw Pact forces".\textsuperscript{142} This suggests that Carter believed the conventional military power of the western forces were superior to that of the eastern bloc. Nonetheless, the overall destructive power of the two nations and their allies were perceived as relatively equal, in that both exceeded the capabilities to deliver more damage than would ever be an acceptable risk.\textsuperscript{143} Maintaining parity during SALT negotiations was important for European allies and NATO.\textsuperscript{144}

Another area where it is apparent Carter is an idealist is his commitment to human rights around the world. At many points this was a hindrance on negotiations with the Soviets. In fact, it was estimated that “…by late February [1977], Soviet hopes for quickly restoring the bloom to US-Soviet relations and obtaining a quick SALT agreement probably had begun to fade in the face of the new Administration’s human rights policy and indications of seriously divergent approaches to strategic arms limitations”.\textsuperscript{145}

The Russians did not trust the new Administration, which limited the ability to negotiate from the beginning.\textsuperscript{146} Brezhnev viewed Carter’s push for human rights in USSR as


\textsuperscript{145} Internal document, review of Soviet Internal Affairs Feb – March '77, Box 4, NSA -11, Gates – Chronological 7/77, Jimmy Carter Library.

\textsuperscript{146} Memo of conversation, conversation between Zbig and Dobrynin 4/13/77, SALT Chronology 1-24-77 to 5-9-77, Jimmy Carter Library, p. 1.
meddling in their internal affairs, something which he thought was wrong.\textsuperscript{147} It did not help that the Soviets already viewed Carter as somewhat of a weak leader. As stated in an analysis of Soviet perceptions, “…the Soviets expected Gerald Ford to win the 1976 election, and they were accordingly surprised when he did not. In Moscow’s view Mr. Carter did not project ‘Presidential style’ to the electorate. The Soviets appraised him as lacking support from US big business and in the US Jewish community”. They felt that the Ford administration was a continuation of Nixon policy and they placed a great amount of trust in Henry Kissinger.\textsuperscript{148} Carter’s approach was certainly different and it took time to adapt to the change.

Despite Brezhnev’s pressures to drop the human rights issue, Carter never backed down and maintained the position that human rights and SALT agreements were not directly linked. Rather he saw human rights as the foundation of his foreign policy, stating, “This administration and I personally, have a commitment to express the basic values of our society as an integral part of our foreign policy. In doing so, we have no intention of singling out any one country, nor do we exempt ourselves from the questions that can and must be raised concerning the fulfillment of basic human rights and the respect for human dignity. Nothing of what we have said or what we will say in the future is intended to detract in the slightest from the seriousness of our commitment to reduce international tensions in general, and in particular to improve prospects for substantial progress toward greater cooperation between our two countries in strengthening the peace and improving the conditions of life.

\textsuperscript{147} Letter, letter to Carter from Brezhnev 2/3/77, folder USSR Brezhnev drafts letter 2-3 ’77, Box 4, Plains, Jimmy Carter Library.

\textsuperscript{148} Internal document, Soviet perception, folder 2-77 to 6-78 new release, ZBC donated, Box 19, Jimmy Carter Library, p.2.
for the people of your country and of ours, and of all the world…”  

Carter truly believed this to be a strategic position. He stated, “I think we come out better in dealing with the Soviet Union if I am consistently and completely dedicated to the enhancement of human rights, not only as it deals with the Soviet Union but all other countries… I don’t want the two to be tied together”.  

“The President told Dobrynin that it is not his intention to interfere in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union by making human rights statements. He said he did not want to embarrass the Soviet Union, but that he felt it was necessary for him to express human rights concerns from time to time”. And he further mentioned that it would be helpful with Congress in progressing trade relations if the Soviets would “respond on human rights issues”. In other words, Carter wanted to remain strong on human rights, but I was not intended to be “a precondition to the significant effort we want to undertake to reduce the danger of confrontation and nuclear war.  

The Soviets felt that the human rights issue would make relations worse. As stated later in the memo of conversation, “Dobrynin said that he was concerned that the public debate on this issue would be disadvantageous to both sides. He said he believed that Brezhnev does not want to see the human rights issue become a test of wills between the


150 It is unclear if this letter was sent or was a draft. Nonetheless it provides an insight into Carter’s true perspective.


152 Memo of conversation, conversation between Carter and Dobrynin 2/1/77, folder SALT Chronology 1-24-77 to 5-9-77, p. 7-8.

153 Letter, Carter to Vance 3/24/77, folder SALT Chronology 1-24-77 to 5-9-77, p. 5.
two countries because then Brezhnev would be ‘forced to answer.’ The President said we will try to be reticent and Dobrynin asked for ‘quiet diplomacy’”.\textsuperscript{154}

With Brezhnev’s continued pressure to drop the human rights issue, it appears that the Soviets followed a policy of “linkage”, similar to what we saw during the Nixon administration. Carter remarked, “I can’t certify to you that there is no linkage in the Soviets’ minds between the human rights effort and the SALT limitations. We have no evidence that this was the case”.\textsuperscript{155} However, in a letter to Cy Vance in preparations for a meeting with Brezhnev Carter said, “I want you to preempt [attacks from Brezhnev] by setting SALT in the broad context of our approach to world affairs.\textsuperscript{156} This seems contradictory to a policy of no “linkage”. This could be an indication that Carter did play to the policy of linkage, at least to some degree; this warrants further future exploration.

Carter may have wanted to keep SALT and human rights separate, but the Soviets did not see it that way and he was unwilling to back down. Thus, the issues seem to have been more intertwined than Carter wanted or was willing to admit. He was almost disturbed by the Soviets linking human rights to other negotiations. Carter stated, “I think that the Soviets’ reaction against me personally on the human rights issue is a misplaced aim. I have no hatred for the Soviet people, and I believe that the pressure of world opinion might be making itself felt on them and perhaps I am kind of a scapegoat for that adverse reaction on their part. But I feel very deeply that we ought to pursue aggressively this commitment, and I

\textsuperscript{154} Memo of conversation, conversation between Carter and Dobrynin 2/1/77, folder SALT Chronology 1-24-77 to 5-9-77, p. 8.


\textsuperscript{156} Letter, Carter to Vance 3/24/77, folder SALT Chronology 1-24-77 to 5-9-77, p. 2.
have no second thoughts or hesitation about it”.\textsuperscript{157} Best illustrating the fervor with which he supported human rights is a brief exchange with a reporter:

Q: Mr. Carter, if necessary to achieve any progress, are you willing to modify your human rights statements—

President: No

Q: - or will you continue to speak out?

President: “No. I will not modify my human rights statements. My human rights statements are compatible with the consciousness of this country. I think that there has been repeated recognition in international law that verbal statements or any sort of public expression of a nation’s beliefs is not an intrusion in another nations affairs”.\textsuperscript{158}

The above discussion demonstrates how strongly Carter felt about human rights, which are not directly a security issue. In addition, Carter believed that his position on human rights was consistent with the values of the American people stating, “My stand on human rights is compatible with the strong and proven position taken by almost all Americans. We feel that the right of a human being to be treated fairly in the courts to be removed from the threat of prison, imprisonment without a trial, to have a life to live that’s


free is very precious. In the past this deep commitment of the free democracies has quite often not been widely known or accepted or demonstrated”. 159

In addition, Carter obviously did not consider tensions with the Soviets to be so high that negotiations could potentially provoke conflict, a concern that he did have for Israel and Egypt at Camp David. Carter stated, “The worst that can happen, in my opinion, is a standoff at the present pace of development, which would be very unfortunate. I don’t believe that either the Soviet Union or we want to continue this armaments race which is very costly and also increasingly dangerous”. 160 This shows that Carter’s perception of the Soviets was that they were not an immediate threat and there was no need for too much concern even if the talks became deadlocked. Further depicting the perception of lack of threat, Carter posited that the Russian troops in Cuba in 1979 did not represent the same threat as 1962, but did shift the status quo power balance of the hemisphere and was thus threatening, to some degree and increased security measures in the region. 161 This small balance instead of responding with a nuclear threat shows the lower intensity of the situation, even so close to the United States borders. Recall that Richard Nixon, the realist, went on nuclear alert over a small situation in the Middle East. Carter, alluding to the enhancement of soft power, stated, “I think our absence of desire to control other people around the world gives us a competitive advantage once a new government is established or


160 Ibid.

as they search about for friends. We are better trusted than the Soviet Union”. The Richard Nixon administration would have most certainly been more hands on in the region than Carter was.

Another area that makes it clear Carter felt less of a threat from the Soviets is that the Soviets took a direct role in conflict in Africa while the US participated in a more hands off fashion. Instead of responding with increased arms sales to the hurried acquisition of new allies in the area to perfectly balance the Soviets, Carter, the idealist, showed restraint. This is potentially explained by the strong sense of empathy for the Soviet position. He said, “I have spent some time looking at the globe from the Soviet view, and they would appear to be surrounded by enemies – China and Europe. We have no equivalent threat from Canada or Mexico. We have to picture our own proposals in that framework”. By empathizing with the Soviets Carter was able to have understanding, thus reducing fear of the unknown.

Essentially summarizing the most important perceptions, Carter states, “We try to pursue peace as the overwhelming sense of our goals with the Soviet Union, and I think that’s shared in good faith by President Brezhnev…We want to be friends with the Soviets. We want to improve our relationship with the Soviets. We want to make progress, and I might say we are making progress on a SALT agreement, on a comprehensive test ban


164 Memo, memo of NSC meeting 3/22/77, folder SALT Chronology 1-24-77 to 5-9-77, p. 2.
agreement, the prohibition against attacks on one another’s satellites, the reduction in the level of forces in Eastern and Western Europe, which I’ve already discussed, and so forth. These discussions, these negotiations, are going along very well…I believe that President Brezhnev wants the same thing I do. He wants peace between our country and theirs. We do, however, stay in a state of competition. This is inevitable. I think it’s going to be that way 15, 20 years in the future. We want to have accommodation when we can mutually benefit from that accommodation. We are willing to meet the Soviets in competition of a peaceful nature…There is no present threat to peace”.

In fact, Carter believed that SALT would help build trust between the US and USSR and if SALT failed he believed the Soviet capabilities and subsequent threat would increase.

The takeaway from the discussion above is that Carter certainly held an enemy image of the Soviet Union, viewing them as a potential threat with equal capabilities. This enemy image, however, was much weaker than that held by Nixon. Carter did not believe that the Soviets had bad intentions and he used empathy to better understand their positions. Where Nixon viewed every action by the Soviets as requiring a response, Carter was able to operate in the system with the Soviets without always directly interacting with them.

---


Interpreting Operational Code

The scores calculated by VICS above in Table 8 represent the Operational Code of Jimmy Carter in the context of the SALT agreements with the Soviet Union using press conferences, public broadcasted interviews, and other public statements. Like Nixon, Carter views the nature of the political universe to be friendly (P-1) and that cooperation is possible and the best approach to negotiating with the Soviets (I-1). Carter believed that by the two super powers working together, there would be the best chance at maintaining peace throughout the world.

Operational Code SALT

Table 8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Belief</th>
<th>Diagnostic Propensities</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P-1</td>
<td>Nature of Political Universe</td>
<td>.42 (definitely friendly)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-2</td>
<td>Realization of Political Values</td>
<td>.22 (somewhat optimistic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-3</td>
<td>Predictability of Political Future</td>
<td>.11 (very low)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-4</td>
<td>Control over Historical Development</td>
<td>.28 (low control)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-5</td>
<td>Role of Chance</td>
<td>.97 (very high)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Choice &amp; Shift Propensities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-1</td>
<td>Strategic Approach to Goals</td>
<td>.47 (definitely cooperative)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-2</td>
<td>Tactical Pursuit of Goals</td>
<td>.20 (somewhat cooperative)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-3</td>
<td>Risk Orientation</td>
<td>.20 (low)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-4</td>
<td>Flexibility of Tactics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a. Cooperation/Conflict</td>
<td>.53 (medium)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. Words/Deeds</td>
<td>.49 (medium)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-5</td>
<td>Utility of Means</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a. Reward</td>
<td>.15 (medium)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. Promise</td>
<td>.06 (low)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c. Appeal/Support</td>
<td>.53 (very high)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d. Oppose/Resist</td>
<td>.14 (medium)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>e. Threaten</td>
<td>.03 (very low)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>f. Punish</td>
<td>.10 (low)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In addition, with scores nearly identical to Nixon’s, Carter is somewhat optimistic in realizing his political goals (P-2), does not believe the future is predictable (P-3) or that he has much control over historical development, and believes that the outcome of decisions involved a very high degree of chance (P-5). Carter felt that both the United States and the Soviet Union were negotiating from positions of relatively equal power, at least in respect to nuclear destructive capability, and thus had to rely on one another to make progress in the SALT negotiations. This is depicted by Carter discussing the deadlock in negotiations when neither side agrees with the others position or proposal.\footnote{Jimmy Carter: "SALT Negotiations With the Soviet Union Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session With Reporters.," March 30, 1977. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, \textit{The American Presidency Project}. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7264.}

Also like Nixon, Carter was cooperative in his pursuit of goals (I-2), had a low acceptance of risk (I-3), and was moderately flexible in tactics (I-4). The difference, however, is the intentions of flexibility and compromise. Where Nixon wanted to show compromise and flexibility by first creating things, such as ABM, to negotiate with, Carter saw compromise and flexibility as the path to a successful negotiation. He was happy to negotiate as equals and did not try to undermine the Soviets, but he expected them to meet him equally as well. It is apparent from the discussion in the previous section that Carter felt no immediate threat from the Soviets and believed that they shared the same goal as his administration, but simply had a different perspective.

The utility of means (I-5) demonstrate Carter’s belief in the success of specific tactics. Nearly identical to Nixon, with an extremely high score of 0.53 for statements of
appeal and support, this is his preferred tactic. This means that Carter believes that making appeals for reaching a SALT agreement and making statements supporting the progress on the part of the Soviet Union, the goal is more likely to be achieved.

**Camp David**

The Carter administration did not hold many firm positions on the conflict between Israel and the Arabs. Believing that the issue needed to be settled between the two parties involved and not external forces, namely the United States and the Soviet Union, Carter was flexible in many aspects of the peace agreement. Carter, however, was deeply committed to bringing a peace agreement to fruition. He stated, “Let me say that our determination to bring about progress in the Middle East is as fervent as it has ever been. We’re not going to slacken our effort. I’m convinced that the Congress and the American people can have their commitment to a peaceful settlement aroused even more than has been the case in the past.” In this commitment to finding peace Carter was not only supportive of the Israeli’s, but also the Palestinians. He wanted to see recognition of the Palestinian homeland, but did

---


not advocate for an independent Palestinian state. Further supporting this position, Carter asserted that Israeli settlements were illegal. He stated, “We don’t back any Israeli military settlements in the Gaza strip or on the West Bank. We favor, as you know a Palestinian homeland or entity there. Our preference is that this entity be tied in to Jordan and not be a separate and independent nation. That is merely an expression of preference which we have relayed on numerous occasions to the Arab leaders…”

Because Carter felt that any long lasting settlement would have to be created and agreed upon by the Israelis and Arabs, he saw the role of the United States as simply a mediator and there was a lack of direct US influence. Carter stated, “…we have no control

---


over anyone in the Middle East and do not want any control over anyone in the Middle East”.\textsuperscript{174} This lack of influence, however, was not due to a lack of possibility to influence the actors. Carter stated, “Obviously we could exert pressure on Israel in other ways, but I have no intention to do so”.\textsuperscript{175} Further, “We have no control over any nation in the Middle East…I think it’s much more important to have direct negotiations between Egypt and Israel than to have us acting as a constant, dominant intermediary”.\textsuperscript{176} Thus, Carter’s goal was to balance support for both the Israeli and Arab positions.\textsuperscript{177} It is also important to note

\begin{flushleft}


\end{flushleft}

\begin{flushleft}


\end{flushleft}
that he perceives the negotiations and the involved actors as an opportunity more than a threat.

Carter was adamant that there was no “linkage” between the conflict in the Middle East and negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, but he did recognize that the involvement of the Soviets created a national security interest for the US in the region. Perhaps Carter was able to more or less dismiss the role of the Soviets in the context of the Middle East peace agreements, because this feeling was supported by Egypt and Israel. In a memo to the President, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance says, “Both Egypt and Israel believe that Syria and the Soviet Union can be ignored at present”. Being that Carter felt the negotiations needed to be worked out between Israel and the Arabs, he went along with their position that the Soviets did not need to be involved.

The Soviets, however, certainly did not like being left out. Carter and Brezhnev exchanged a series of letters concerning the Israeli – Egyptian peace negotiations. Brezhnev expresses will and need to work with US on the Middle East and other international issues.


180 Internal document, analysis Sadat-Begin talks, folder Egypt 11-77 to 11-81, Plains – Box 1; Jimmy Carter Library.

181 Letters, USSR Brezhnev drafts letters 4-77 to 9-80, Plains box 4; Jimmy Carter Library.
including European Security. Brezhnev states, “...You undoubtedly have great capabilities in restraining Israel from any sort of action which may lead only to an even greater exacerbation of the situation in Lebanon”. Cooperation between the US and USSR in the Middle East will reduce tensions there.

He, however, did not believe the Soviet influence was all bad and did not necessarily view them as a direct threat. He stated, “Well, I think that we or the Soviets ought to play a constructive role. And I think that both of us will...I don’t think they are trying to be an obstacle to peace. Their perspective is just different from ours. There was even consideration of a US-Soviet settlement for the Palestinians where the Soviets control the Syrians.

This clearly shows that Carter’s perception of threat from the Soviets was far weaker than Nixon’s perspective. But, Carter also obviously believes it is important to have equal relations with nations in the region and not let the Soviets have a monopoly of allies. He stated, “I think it is very good for nations to turn to use for their security needs, instead of having to turn to the Soviet Union as they have in the past. I’m talking specifically about Egypt. And you have to remember that Saudi Arabia has never had any aggression against

---


183 Letter, letter to Carter from Brezhnev 10/6/78, folder USSR Molink 10-78 to 9-80, Plains Box 5; Jimmy Carter Library.


186 Notes, Camp David meeting 2-3-78 to 2-5, folder Egypt 11-77 to 11- 81, Plains box 1; Jimmy Carter Library.
Israel. Saudi Arabia is our ally and friend. Egypt is our ally and friend. Israel is our ally and friend. To maintain security in the region is important. Egypt has other threats against its security. The Soviets are shipping massive quantities of weapons into the Middle Eastern area now, into the Red Sea area – Ethiopia, into Syria, Iraq, Libya – and we cannot abandon our own friends. So, I don’t think that it’s wrong at all to ensure stability or the right to defend themselves, [the Arabs], in the region with arms sales.\(^{187}\) This also shows that Carter feels the Arab states present an opportunity for the United States, rather than a threat.

Arms sales to the Arab nations, particularly Egypt, did not sit well with the Israelis. In an interview President Carter was asked, “a number of Israeli leader’s in private say that you have made drastic changes in America’s attitude toward Israel and that they regard you with considerable trepidation. Are you aware of that feeling, and do you think there is justification for it”. He responded, “Yes, I’m aware of that feeling and also many other feelings. There’s no single attitude among all Jews in the world or all Israeli citizens. To the extent that Israeli leaders genuinely want a peace settlement, I think that they have to agree that there will be an acceptance of genuine peace on the part of the Arabs, an adjustment of boundaries in the Middle East which are secure for the Israelis and also satisfy the minimum requirements of the Arab neighbors and United Nations resolutions, and some solution to the question of the enormous numbers of Palestinian refugees who have been forced out of their homes and who want to have some fair treatment.\(^{188}\)


One of Carter’s reasons for supporting the Arabs militarily is because he recognized the superior power of the Israelis. He stated, “[The proposed arms deal] is a very well balanced package. It emphasizes our interest in military security of the Middle East. It does not change at all the fact that Israel still retains a predominant air capability and military capability. There is no threat to their security. But it also lets the nations involved and the world know that our friendship, our partnership, our sharing of military equipment with the moderate Arab nations is an important permanent factor of our foreign policy.” In specific, he believed that Anwar Sadat had the intention of negotiating to reach peace. This strong support for the Arabs in opposition to Israel’s will was unprecedented and shows Carter’s commitment to advancing human rights, here specifically the Palestinians. He did not view them as a threat and did not allow the Israeli government to convince him otherwise. It should be understood, however, that Carter developed a close personal relationship with Anwar Sadat, which would influence his perception of the conflict.

Depicting this friendship, Sadat addressed letters in the form: “Dear friend Jimmy”.


191 Ibid


193 Letter, Letter from Sadat to Carter, folder Egypt 11-77 to 11- 81, Plains box 1; Jimmy Carter Library.
In addition, the Carter administration believed that Sadat wanted a peace settlement, but were uncertain if Begin did. They were committed to working with Sadat, because the United States needed a settlement in the region.\textsuperscript{194} This appears to have been a correct perception. The brief dialogue below between Israeli Defense Minister Dayan and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat depicts the Israeli position and negotiating method.\textsuperscript{195}

Dayan: “Settlements of no significance”
Sadat: “Can’t afford to have any Settlements on my land”
Dayan: “I understand”

This shows that the Israelis were not at all sympathetic to the Egyptian position or their concerns. Brzezinski believed that Begin could have desired for Carter and Sadat to fail in the Camp David negotiations, to weak the leaders and leave him in the “tolerable status quo”.\textsuperscript{196}

After Camp David, Sadat sent Begin a letter over nine pages long, reaffirming his commitment to peace and asking to bring the negotiated terms to fruition with a set timeline. Begin responded in just over one page of writing, did not answer Sadat’s questions, and requested that the terms be worked out at a lower level.\textsuperscript{197} The page length alone demonstrates the level of commitment and willingness of each leader to work with the other.

\textsuperscript{194} Memo, memo of meeting 1/23/78, folder Egypt 11-77 to 11-81, Plains box 1; Jimmy Carter Library.

\textsuperscript{195} Notes, Notes Camp David meeting 2-3-78 to 2-5, folder Egypt 11-77 to 11-81, Plains box 1; Jimmy Carter Library.

\textsuperscript{196} Memo, strategy for Camp David, folder Middle East negotiations 7-29 ’78 to 9-6 ’78, ZBC donated; Jimmy Carter Library.

\textsuperscript{197} Letters, Dear Begin and Dear Anwar, folder Egypt 11-77 to 11-81, Plains box 1; Jimmy Carter Library.
Sadat fervently tried to reach a successful peace agreement and showed respect to the Israeli leadership. Unfortunately, this sentiment was not reciprocated. This did not sit well with Carter and he was not necessarily quiet about it. In a meeting with Sadat Carter communicated that Begin had been “unpleasant, interrupting”, in an earlier meeting, but that moderates convinced him to “be more accommodating”.  

As an optimist, Carter looked for positive actions and felt that Begin was showed willingness to work with the Egyptians when he visited Cairo and left his car to walk into the crowd of people.

Carter did not see support for Israel and working with the Arabs, with the intention of seeking compromise, to be incompatible. He stated, “And I believe the American people are deeply committed to two things: One is the security of Israel under any circumstance, and secondly, the achievement of comprehensive peace”. He recognized, however, that initiating dialogue between the Israelis and the Egyptians could be the catalyst for renewed conflict if the negotiations failed. He stated, “I pray and hope the whole nation, the whole world will pray that we do not fail, because failure could result in a new conflict in the Middle East which could severely damage the security of our own country”. This demonstrates the risk he felt he was taking by starting the negotiations.

---

198 Memo, Meeting at Cairo Airport, folder Israel 3-79, Plains Box 2; Jimmy Carter Library.

199 Memo of conversation, conversation with Begin 4/3/79, folder Israel 4-79 to 9-80, Plains Box 2; Jimmy Carter Library.


Although Carter believed the Israeli settlements were illegal and supported the rights of the Palestinians, he respected the historical relationship between Israel and the United States. He stated, “The historic friendship that the United States has with Israel is not dependent on domestic politics in either nation; it’s derived from our common respect for human freedom and from a common search for permanent peace”.\textsuperscript{202} In addition, Carter believed that the relationship between the United States and Israel was “founded on public opinion in the broadest sense”.\textsuperscript{203} Further, Carter recognized weight of Zionist lobby.\textsuperscript{204} Thus, for personal and political reasons, Carter did maintain support for Israel, it was just not the unconditional support Israel was used to.

Both the Arab states and Israel, for Carter represent opportunity for a better world community and the opportunity for peace, but also represent a threat that if conflict breaks out again there will be more insecurity in the world. In addition, Carter has much respect for both nations and the best image theory descriptor for both is dependent/ally, and is consistent with his role as a strong mediator in the Camp David Accords.

\textbf{Interpreting OpCode}

The Operational Code for Jimmy Carter in the context of Middle East peace agreements are depicted below in Table 9. As expected the operational code values essentially match the scores of the SALT Operational Code, meaning that Carter’s


\textsuperscript{203} Notes, meeting with Begin 11/13/80, folder Israel 4-79 to 9-80, Plains box 2; Jimmy Carter Library.

\textsuperscript{204} Notes, Notes Camp David meeting 2-3-78 to 2-5, folder Egypt 11-77 to 11-81, Plains box 1; Jimmy Carter Library.
perception of the decision-making framework in the context of SALT and Camp David are similar. Although the Soviets did not actively participate in the Camp David Accords, their influence was recognized within the larger context of the Middle Eastern conflict.

The first significant change in score is “predictability of political future” (P-3), which shifts from very-low to low. This is consistent with Carter’s strategy of only playing the role of mediator in the negotiations between Begin and Sadat. Because of this, the outcome was entirely dependent upon two external parties. In the SALT negotiations, he at least was a major actor, thus providing slightly more influence in the outcome.

**Operational Code – Middle East**

**Table 9**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Belief</th>
<th>Diagnostic Propensities</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P-1</td>
<td>Nature of Political Universe</td>
<td>.57 (definitely friendly)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-2</td>
<td>Realization of Political Values</td>
<td>.25 (somewhat optimistic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-3</td>
<td>Predictability of Political Future</td>
<td>.22 (low)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-4</td>
<td>Control over Historical Development</td>
<td>.29 (low control)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-5</td>
<td>Role of Chance</td>
<td>.94 (very high)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Choice & Shift Propensities**

| I-1          | Strategic Approach to Goals              | .66 (very cooperative)      |
| I-2          | Tactical Pursuit of Goals                | .26 (somewhat cooperative)  |
| I-3          | Risk Orientation                         | .32 (low)                   |
| I-4          | Flexibility of Tactics                   |                             |
| a. Cooperation/Conflict | .34 (medium/low)                |
| b. Words/Deeds          | .31 (medium/low)                   |
| I-5          | Utility of Means                         |                             |
| a. Reward          | .09 (low)                               |
| b. Promise         | .10 (low)                               |
| c. Appeal/Support  | .64 (very high)                        |
| d. Oppose/Resist   | .08 (low)                               |
| e. Threaten       | .03 (very low)                          |
| f. Punish         | .07 (low)                               |
The next significant shift is “strategic approach to goals” (I-1) shifts from definitely to very cooperative. This is consistent with the flexibility and cooperation that he actively encouraged. He stated, “compromises will be mandatory…and flexibility will be the essence of our hopes”. He was willing to compromise on the specifics of the negotiations. He believed that the solution had to come from the Egyptians and Israelis and not an external force, therefore he was even more open than in SALT.

The next significant shift is a change in the utility of “reward”, which shifts from medium (.15) to low (.09). This could be interpreted from multiple perspectives. First, Carter uses a hands off policy in the peace negotiations, thus he has no rewards to offer. Another possible way to interpret this is that Carter does not want to reward the behavior of Israel. He was a strong voice calling the Israeli settlements illegal and advocating they retreat to at least the 1967 borders.

The next significant shift is the utility of “oppose/resist”, which shifts from medium to low. This also coincides with Carter’s hands off policy in Camp David and the subsequent effect of being extremely flexible. His goal was for the Israelis and Egyptians to make the peace treaty on their own. He believed this would have the best chance at a long-term effect. For this reason he was open to any and all suggestions by either party.

Carter the Non-Expansionist Idealist


Carter’s actions on human rights, namely keeping the issue as a priority despite the increased tensions with the Soviets and possibility of harming SALT negotiations, is consistent with Zakaria (1998) who posits that more powerful states can sometimes pursue objectives other than security interests. Perhaps the pursuit of humanitarian rights ceterus parabus would not be enough to label this idealist behavior, but in the context of SALT negotiations, the refusal to back down on human rights to aid negotiations is definitively idealist.

In addition, Carter’s hands off mediating style and reliance on the Israelis and Egyptians to follow through on the peace agreement may have been the reason they were not realized.207 This naïve trust could be attributed to Carter’s Idealism.

Further depicting the difference between Carter and Nixon is their role in developing world conflicts. Carter stated, “…I intend to proceed vigorously in an attempt to reduce the sale or transfer of conventional arms to the third world and home that you will join in this effort. It seems to me that this is a senseless competition and we, as major suppliers, have a particular responsibility to put limits on such transfers. Obviously other suppliers should be involved in such an effort and we will broaden the discussion to include them”.208 Thus, Carter was more concerned with reducing conflict than building additional allies in the global south.

Sounding more like an idealist in the SALT negotiations, “The President asked for an analysis of an ultimate relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union which would

207 Memo, reaction to latest ME difficulty 11/30/78, folder Middle East negotiations 9 ’75 to 12 ’78, ZBC donated, Jimmy Carter Library.

include profound mutual reductions in overall strategic nuclear capability, carefully monitored, which would not be unfavorable to either side. He indicated his desire to go as low as possible while still retaining an adequate deterrent capability. He suggested the possibility of including at a later date France and the PRC in mutual program reeducations. This goal of reducing absolute capabilities sets Carter in the Idealist camp. The reduction of nuclear weapons, to a certain point, could be consistent with defensive realism, but the goal of nuclear weapons elimination is idealist, because of the substantial loss in power it would represent.

Sounding more like a realist, Carter posited, if the Soviets do not “negotiate in good faith” he would “reassess the strategic arms race, which means continuing it with no end in sight”. The power of the negotiations was certainly placed in the individual and indicates that Carter was willing to pursue more realist policy, if necessary. Further examination of Carter’s policy in other areas of interest, such as Afghanistan and Iran, may shed light on what is necessary and sufficient for idealist behavior and when realist behavior is more readily used. This would build on Zakaria (1998).

209 Memo, special meeting 2/3/77, folder SALT Chronology 1-24-77 to 5-9-77, p. 2
210 Memo, NSC meeting 3/22/77, folder SALT Chronology 1-24-77 to 5-9-77, p. 2.
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

By conducting a thorough analysis of the history and evolution of realist and idealist thought and theory, a new model was created to categorize individual decision makers as realist or idealist. Not only does this make a contribution to theory for Foreign Policy Decision-Making, but also attempts to bridge the gap between theories of decision-making and general IR theory. The analysis confirmed that Richard Nixon represents realist ideology and Jimmy Carter represents idealist ideology, although the nuances of what type of realist and idealist each individual is require further examination.

If Waltz (1967), Krasner (1976), and Zakaria (1998) are correct that states, and the individuals leading them, can pursue non-security objectives when their state is in a position of security, idealism may be the dominant belief system because the position of the state within the system allows for it. Because the United States is generally considered to be one of, if not the, strongest states within the system. To better understand the role of realist and idealist belief systems studies should be expanded to leaders in states that do not have the same sense of security as the United States. Nonetheless, the contribution made by the current study is that I demonstrate that it is not sufficient for a state to be in a position to pursue humanitarian goals, the leader must also have the will to do so. Thus, Zakaria (1998) may be correct that states pursue realist and idealist objectives at different points, but he does not explain how the desires and belief systems of the decision makers affect this setting of policy preferences.

In addition, the concept of morality complicates the categorization of realist and idealist policy. On page 18 I state, “So, morality and foreign policy can intersect when the decision-makers feel that their state is secure enough and the action will not affect their
relative power”. Again, just because morality “can” intersect foreign policy does not mean that it must; the decision-maker must allow it to do so.

Operational Code, at least in the modern form, only provides a general and very broad picture of an individual’s worldview. The position of the United States within the international system could explain why the Operational Codes of Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter are so similar. I would have expected that Nixon’s perception of the international environment to be more significantly more conflictual than Carter’s. But, with the position of the United States as having superior technological weapons systems and the similar belief between Nixon and Carter that the Soviets did not want militarized conflict with the U.S., their sense of actual conflict may be accurately reflected in the Operational Code.

Upon closer examination using Image Theory it was revealed that Nixon did in fact hold a stronger enemy image of the Soviets and was more uncertain of their intentions than Carter. This does reveal a flaw in Operational Code. It provides broad categorizations that do require further nuanced examination for accurate interpretation.

To enhance the existing study in future analysis interviews will be conducted with members of both presidential administrations. This will allow for a better understanding and clarification of individual’s perceptions at the time. Interviews, however, must be used with some caution. As stated by Mark Trachtenberg (2006), interviews are valuable sources of information “but you obviously have to be wary of what people say when you are interviewing them. Memories are fallible, and the level of honesty varies from person to person. The interviewees, moreover, often have a real interest in getting you to see things in a certain light. So as a general rule you cannot quite take what people tell you at face value, and what you learn in this way is not quite as solid as what you learn from documents” (pp. 154). Keeping this in mind I believe that interviews will greatly benefit the study of
perceptions, but all interviews will be worked into the analysis with strong consideration given other more concrete data.

What I hope to gain most from interviews is a more accurate understanding of the context in which the decisions were made. Perhaps the most significant area of need for this is clarification on the role of the Soviets in the Middle East peace agreements, both under Nixon and even more so under Carter. While Nixon was working with Israel, the Soviets were directly involved with military actions and provided direct support for the Arabs through Egypt. When Carter came to office the Soviets were no longer in Egypt, but from document analysis it is apparent that there was still relevant Soviet activity in the region. This was discussed with David Aaron briefly through email, but he indicated that this is a complex issue and could better discuss this for a face-to-face interview. The fact that he did not dismiss this issue is indication that it is important and a more accurate understanding of the decision making environment will guide more accurate analysis of the policies that were set in place.

Realism and Idealism are not either or options for policy makers and their perceptions, belief systems, ideology, and final policy preferences work together to shape the international system. Scholars of International Relations should not confine themselves to one level of analysis. The knowledge of the discipline will expand greatly if we bridge the levels of analysis and understand how they work together. Future studies should work to explain how the system is created by the actions of individual policy makers and their perceptions and also explain how the structure of the system creates constraints on the policy makers. The system is created by many moving parts of different shapes and sizes. We can learn something by isolating one part, but we also leave out many other important
variables when we do so. By examining all of the pieces and how they work together we can create a better understanding of the international system we live in.
Bibliography


Lobell, S. E., N. M. Ripsman, & J. W. Taliaferro (2009). Neoclassical realism, the state, and foreign policy: Cambridge University Press.


Roth, S.-J. (2016, 03/02/2016). Don't assume Bernie Sanders supporters will back Hillary Clinton if she's the nominee. *Huffington Post*. Retrieved from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/bernie-sanders-supporters-wont-vote-hillary_us_56d7571ae4b0871f60edb9fe


Smith, H. Khamenei and The Bomb: An inside analysis using operational code and image theory: under review.


**Jimmy Carter – Speeches and Interviews**


http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7495.

http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7550.


http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7751.

http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7786.


**DOCUMENTS FROM THE JIMMY CARTER PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY**

Memo of conversation, Carter and Dobrynin 2/1/77, folder SALT Chronology 1/24/77 to 5/9/77; Jimmy Carter Library.

Memo of conversation, carter and SALT adviser 2/1/77, folder SALT Chronology 1/24/77 to 5/9/77; Jimmy Carter Library.


Notes, Camp David meeting 2-3-78 to 2-5, folder Egypt 11-77 to 11- 81, Plains box 1; Jimmy Carter Library.

Internal document, Soviet perception, folder 2-77 to 6-78 new release, ZBC donated, Box 19, Jimmy Carter Library

Draft letter, Jimmy Carter to General Secretary Brezhnev, 2/14/77, folder USSR Brezhnev drafts letters 2-3 ’77, Box 4, Plains, Jimmy Carter Library.


Internal document, review of Soviet Internal Affairs Feb – March ’77, Box 4, NSA -11, Gates – Chronological 7/77, Jimmy Carter Library.

Memo, special meeting 2/3/77, folder SALT Chronology 1-24-77 to 5-9-77; Jimmy Carter Library


Memo of meeting, NSC staff 3/22/77, folder SALT Chronology 1/24/77 to 5/9/77; Jimmy Carter Library.

Memo, memo of NSC meeting 3/22/77, folder SALT Chronology 1-24-77 to 5-9-77; Jimmy Carter Library.

Memo, memo to Carter – suggested talking points 3/30/77, folder SALT Chronology 1/24/77 to 5/9/77; Jimmy Carter Library.

Memo of conversation, conversation between Zbig and Dobrynin 4/13/77, SALT Chronology 1-24-77 to 5-9-77, Jimmy Carter Library.

Memo, memo of meeting 1/23/78, folder Egypt 11-77 to 11- 81, Plains box 1; Jimmy Carter Library.

Notes, Notes Camp David meeting 2-3-78 to 2-5, folder Egypt 11-77 to 11- 81, Plains box 1; Jimmy Carter Library.

Memo, strategy for Camp David, folder Middle East negotiations 7-29 ’78 to 9-6 ’78, ZBC donated; Jimmy Carter Library.

Memo, reaction to latest ME difficulty 11/30/78, folder Middle East negotiations 9 ’75 to 12 ’78, ZBC donated, Jimmy Carter Library.

Memo, Meeting at Cairo Airport, folder Israel 3-79, Plains Box 2; Jimmy Carter Library.
Memo of conversation, conversation with Begin 4/3/79, folder Israel 4-79 to 9-80, Plains Box 2; Jimmy Carter Library.

Memo of conversation, meeting between President Carter and General Secretary Brezhnev 6/18/79, folder USSR SALT II summit president’s personal notes, Box 5, Presidents personal affairs files; Jimmy Carter Library.

Memo of meeting, Muskie and Gromyko 5/16/80, folder USSR General 9/77 to 12/80, Box 5, Plains - presidents personal affairs files, Box 5, Jimmy Carter Library.


Internal document, analysis Sadat-Begin talks, folder Egypt 11-77 to 11- 81, Plains – Box 1; Jimmy Carter Library.

Letter, Letter from Sadat to Carter, folder Egypt 11-77 to 11- 81, Plains box 1; Jimmy Carter Library

Letters, USSR Brezhnev drafts letters 4-77 to 9-80, Plains box 4; Jimmy Carter Library.

Notes, meeting with Begin 11/13/80, folder Israel 4-79 to 9-80, Plains box 2; Jimmy Carter Library.

**Richard Nixon- Press Conferences, Speeches, and Interviews**


http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2604.


http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3309.

http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3338.

http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3016.

http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3031.


171


**DOCUMENTS FROM THE RICHARD NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY**

Memo; Israel’s Nuclear Policy, From NEA Joseph Sisco; folder 1; NSC box 604.

Memo, Eban’s talks in State; 3/13/69; folder 1; NSC box 604; Richard Nixon Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.

Memo; Stopping introduction; 3/17/69; folder 1; NSC box 604; Richard Nixon Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.

Memo, Memo of conversation with Kissinger; 5/13/69; folder 1; NSC box 604; Richard Nixon Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.

Memo; Positions of Parties and Four Powers; folder 1; NSC box 648; Richard Nixon Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.
Memo; to President – report of Moscow talks on Middle East; 7/14-18/69; folder 1; NSC box 650; Richard Nixon Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.

Memo, from Laird to President 8/22/69; folder 2; NSC box 604; Richard Nixon Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.

Memo, memo from President Nixon; 9/22/69, folder 2, NSC box 604; Richard Nixon Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.

Report; situation in the Middle East background; 9/24/69; folder 2; NSC box 604; Richard Nixon Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.

Memo; CIA to President; 9/24/69; folder 2; NSC 604; Richard Nixon Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.

Toast; Dinner for Prime Minister Golda Meir; 9/25/69; folder 1; NSC box 604; Richard Nixon Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.

Memo; to Kissinger “your talk with Rabin 5:30; 5/8/69”; folder 1; NSC Box 604; Richard Nixon Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.

Memo; President to Secretary of State; 6/30/69; folder 4; NSC box 649; Richard Nixon Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.

Memo of conversation; Rabin, Kissinger, Hoskinson; 11/17/69; folder 2; NSC box 605; Richard Nixon Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.

Memo; security the constant problem; 1969, folder 2; NSC box 604; Richard Nixon Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.

Memo, memo to President Carter “Escalation in the Mid-East; folder 2; NSC box 605; Richard Nixon Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.

Memo, consequences in North Africa; 2/14/70; folder 2; NSC box 605; Richard Nixon Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.

Memo; for Kissinger –Packard Memo on assistance; 2/25/70; folder 2; NSC box 605; Richard Nixon Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.

Memo of conversation; Rabin, Argov, Kissinger, Sanders; 4/25/70; folder 1; NSC box 606; Richard Nixon Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.

Document, Soviet Combat Role – Israeli Embassy 4/29/70; folder 1, NSC box 606.

Memo, to Kissinger – Israeli comments; 5/7/70; folder 1; NSC box 606; Richard Nixon Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.
Memo; to Kissinger - Yost on Eban; 5/21/70; folder 1; NSC box 606; Richard Nixon Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.

Memo, to President-Soviet Pilots, folder 1; NSC box 606; Richard Nixon Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.

Memo; to president – assistance to Israel; folder 1; NSC box 606; Richard Nixon Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.

Memo; Israel/Mid-East/SALT; 10/27/70; folder 1; NSC box 608; Richard Nixon Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.

Talking paper; folder 1; NSC box 608; Richard Nixon Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.