

THE JOINT AMERICAN MILITARY MISSION TO AID TURKEY: IMPLEMENTING THE
TRUMAN DOCTRINE AND TRANSFORMING U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, 1947-1954

By

HOWARD ADELBERT MUNSON IV

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY
Department of History

MAY 2012

To the Faculty of Washington State University:

The members of the Committee appointed to examine the dissertation of Howard Adelbert Munson IV find it satisfactory and recommend that it be accepted.

Noriko Kawamura, Ph.D., Chair

Matthew Sutton, Ph.D.

Robert Staab, Ph.D.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The most important people who aided me in the writing of this dissertation are my family and the members of my dissertation committee. My wife Brenda deserves the most singular thanks for her various forms of support, from providing the financial support and child care that made writing this dissertation possible, to listening aloud to every page and offering feedback and encouragement. I would also like to thank my father for helping to inspire my love of history in the first place, and for being an outside reader for this dissertation, in the second. Next, my sister has the distinction for being my only research assistant, not only giving me a place to stay in Washington D.C., but also helping me sift through thousands of documents at the National Archives. I would also like to thank my fellow graduate student, Caleb Sparks, for timing his family's vacation to D.C. so that he could help me drive back to Pullman Washington in thirty-two hours of Indy rock and philosophical discussion. Finally, I would like to thank the members of my dissertation committee for their professional support and criticism. This dissertation is much stronger for your ideas, editorial suggestions, and individual expertise.

THE JOINT AMERICAN MILITARY MISSION TO AID TURKEY: IMPLEMENTING THE
TRUMAN DOCTRINE AND TRANSFORMING U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, 1947-1954

Abstract

By Howard Adelbert Munson IV, Ph.D.
Washington State University
May 2012

Chair: Norikio Kawamura

This dissertation examines the early history (1947-1954) of the Joint American Military Mission to Aid Turkey (JAMMAT) and its role in shaping U.S.-Turkish relations and as a window into the developing Cold War policies and strategies of the United States. This study begins by depicting the relevant and unique contexts for both Turkey and the United States leading up to the Truman Doctrine speech that brought the American mission to Turkey into existence. The remainder of the study uses the National Archive records of the mission itself, related Department of State documents, and memoirs to reveal both the substance of the aid mission and the vagaries of U.S. foreign policy that accompanied it. On the surface JAMMAT was a military modernization program for Turkey as part of the Containment Strategy. Underneath, this study depicts how the actions of JAMMAT also functioned to outfit and direct the Turkish military into a crucial and unknown role in top secret Anglo-American contingency war plans as a sacrificial speed bump in the event of full-scale war with the Soviet Union. Within this context, the work of JAMMAT did serve overt Turkish national security interests, but only secondarily to secret U.S. strategic designs. The great irony of JAMMAT's legacy is that the

work of the mission, combined with the impact of the Korean War and the excellent performance of the Turkish Brigades in the UN police action to Korea, ended up increasing the value of Turkey as an American ally in the Cold War to such an extent that the United States pushed for the inclusion of Turkey into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Thus, intentionally and unintentionally, JAMMAT created the Turkish Model that was a blueprint for later U.S. aid programs and left a legacy affecting the security of Turkey, the Middle East, and the United States.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
INTRODUCTION.....	1
CHAPTER	
1. CONTEXT: TURKEY FROM KÜÇÜK KAYNARCA TO THE SOVIET DEMANDS OF 1945.....	12
2. CONTEXT: THE UNITED STATES FROM WORLD WAR II TO THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE.....	44
3. THE MISSION BEGINS: ESTABLISHING THE MISSION TO AID TURKEY....	67
4. UNCERTAIN FUTURE: JAMMAT AND THE VAGARIES OF U.S. POLICY...102	102
5. THE KOREAN FACTOR: THE WAR, THE TURKISH BRIGADE, AND NATO MEMBERSHIP.....	131
6. CONCLUSION: THE TURKISH MODEL AND THE LEGACY OF JAMMAT...157	157
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	188

INTRODUCTION

It is common knowledge that the Truman Doctrine was a significant step in the history of America's foreign affairs, casting a long interventionist shadow on a global scale from 1947 until the present. Some historians consider it America's declaration of war against the Soviet Union and condemn it for starting the Cold War. Others trumpet it as the policy shift that committed the United States to the defense of the free world and praise it for inaugurating the anti-communist Containment Strategy. Frequently overlooked in the debates over the meaning and/or legacy of the Truman Doctrine are the military missions to Greece and Turkey that the president's speech produced. While the Greek mission helped to defeat the communist rebels in the Greek Civil War, the mission to Turkey represented an ever greater departure from traditional American foreign policy and exerted a significant impact upon the United States, Turkey, and the Middle East during the early years of the Cold War.

The Joint American Military Mission to Aid Turkey (JAMMAT)¹ was a modernization program undertaken by all three branches of the United States military at the beginning of the Cold War. This dissertation examines the mission during the years 1947 to 1952, beginning with the articulation of the Truman Doctrine, which called JAMMAT into existence, and ending with the inclusion of Turkey into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). After 1952 the Mission to Aid Turkey essentially became an unofficial part of the NATO mission rather than a strategic American policy independently helping to shape the early Cold War. The story that this dissertation tells begins well before 1947. The mission was an American idea put into practice

¹ The original title was the American Mission to Aid Turkey (AMAT), but this became JAMMAT in October 1949 following a minor reorganization. To avoid confusion and since it superseded AMAT and became the permanent title for the mission and all its records, this study will subsequently only use the JAMMAT acronym.

half-way around the globe, in a part of the world informed by its own deep and meaningful history. The American mission operated at the invitation of the Turkish government, in conjunction with the Turkish military, and as the records from the mission and relevant State Department files demonstrate, Turkish agency was an ever present component of the mission and its ensuing relevance. This dissertation, therefore, seeks to place the mission within the two important contexts that it bridged. On the Turkish side the context of Russo-Turkish antagonism influenced virtually all Turkish actions, opinions, and policy decisions that related to the American mission. In the United States the essential context revolved around embarking on a new interventionist foreign policy and the subsequent creation of a developing Cold War policy. It is the thesis of this dissertation that between 1947 and 1952 JAMMAT played a much more decisive role in influencing the geopolitical future of the United States, Turkey, and the Middle East than most historians have previously acknowledged. For Turkey the mission was the key to getting into NATO, fulfilling centuries of Ottoman-Turkish aspirations for security, while for the United States JAMMAT and Turkey together helped draw the new superpower into the defense of the Middle East, before oil and terrorism made it a fixed part of American national security.

This dissertation begins by establishing the roots undergirding the American Mission to Aid Turkey, emphasizing the separate paths that Turkey and the United States were on until 1946. The focus of chapter one is the context for Turkey. This chapter establishes the depth and breadth of Russo-Turkish antagonism, while also highlighting the desperate situation that surrounded the recent establishment of the Republic of Turkey. When the American mission began operations in 1947, the Republic of Turkey was a mere twenty-four years old. Nearly every adult, and certainly every leader in Turkey, remembered first-hand the trauma that accompanied the country's independence. These factors, along with Soviet actions during the

Second World War, combined to create enduring Turkish feelings of weakness and vulnerability, and motivated the search for outside assistance, which illuminate the full significance of the American mission in helping Turkey attain NATO membership.

Chapter two presents the relevant American context, beginning at the end of World War Two and establishing the European setting that ultimately invited American intervention in the form of the Truman Doctrine. This dissertation argues that despite the United States taking an increasing interest in the situation unfolding in the Eastern Mediterranean immediately after the Second World War, which helped to highlight the importance of Turkey, the motives of the Truman Doctrine speech were predominantly domestic in origin and meant primarily to benefit the United States. Chapter two includes a brief examination of the numerous examples of popular opposition to continued interventionism following the end of World War II that combined to limit the global strategic plans of the Truman administration and threaten its international economic agenda. This study concurs with Richard Freeland's analysis that preserving the administration's postwar plans in the face of such opposition informed the pivotal Truman Doctrine speech more than concerns over the fate of Greece and Turkey.² It also agrees with the interpretation of scholars such as Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall who identify that the Truman administration was aware of the domestic political advantages that the crisis of the Cold War provided to politicians in office.³ American actions toward Turkey involved more than issues of containing the Soviet Union, just as the work of JAMMAT would involve more than offering training courses. In spite of the original motives, the confluence of early Cold War events, the work of the American mission, and the tenacity of the Turks would all combine by

² Richard M. Freeland, *The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and Internal Security 1946-1948* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972).

³ Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall, *America's Cold War: the Politics of Insecurity* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009).

1951 to turn the United States into a genuine ally of Turkey, something that it certainly was not in 1947. This helps to establish the irony of the ultimate outcome of JAMMAT, which is that American leaders originally planned to exploit Turkey as much as possible while providing the Turks with just enough aid to further American goals, but instead the United States found a perfect Cold War ally, willing and able to help protect one of the most strategic regions in the world from a direct Soviet advance.

The third and fourth chapters deal with the history of Joint American Military Mission to Aid Turkey. Based principally on the National Archives records of the mission itself, and augmented by Department of State documents and U.S. contingency war plans, these chapters contain the specific information that historians of the early Cold War have overlooked. Chapter three focuses on the establishment of the mission to aid Turkey, detailing the activities of the mission during the proving period that consisted of its first six month of active operations. This chapter provides the particulars of what exactly the mission set out to accomplish, the challenges it faced, as well as its reception and early development within Turkey. The principal analytical argument of chapter three is that the United States initially orchestrated the aid material and road construction program in such ways as to virtually compel the Turkish military into unknowingly fulfilling the “sacrificial lamb” role that American contingency war planners cast for the Turkish Republic in the event of all out war against the Soviet Union. Next, chapter four explores the vagaries of U.S. policy, such as the dichotomy that existed in the background between proposals for ending the mission, along with plans for abandoning the Middle East in the event of war, ultimately offset by increasing U.S. military ambitions in Turkey. In another irony, many of the resulting U.S. military initiatives in Turkey, disguised within JAMMAT, combined with events in Korea, ultimately proved instrumental in transforming Turkey into “the strongest anti-

Communist country on the periphery of the USSR,” and “the keystone of the defense of the Middle East.”⁴

The topic of chapter five is the Korean factor and the tremendous impact that the Korean War had on U.S. Cold War policy, domestic and foreign military spending, and U.S.-Turkish relations. This chapter explains how the war in Korea altered U.S. military policy in ways that greatly increased the potential contribution of Turkey as a possible military ally. Further, in a clear validation of the work of JAMMAT, Turkish forces in Korea so impressed the U.S. military that Turkey became more desirable as an ally than as just as a strategically-located speed bump. The chapter concludes with the resulting diplomatic maneuvering that ultimately brought Turkey into NATO. Within this period two diplomatic fencing matches took place that helped determine the ultimate significance of the mission. The first was between the United States and Turkey regarding requests that U.S. representatives made of Turkey that Turkish diplomats refused to institute without the security guarantee that Washington consistently withheld. These American initiatives tipped the hand of developing U.S. intentions in the region and also demonstrate the agency that Turkish leaders always retained in the interests of pragmatic national survival. The second diplomatic contest surrounded Turkey’s inclusion into NATO, pitting the United States against various Western European nations where diplomatic and military issues ultimately combined to favor the fully unified desires of Washington and Ankara.

Chapter six concludes the dissertation, merging the arguments of each chapter into a defense of the thesis that the Joint American Military Mission to Aid Turkey was the hinge upon which U.S.-Turkish relations developed as they did, helping push Turkey into NATO and

⁴ U. S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1951*, vol. V, *The Near East and Africa* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1982), 65 and 24-25. (Hereafter cited as *FRUS*)

helping to pull the United States into the defense of the Middle East. The conclusion also looks at the Turkish Model that JAMMAT created, as well as examines the legacy of JAMMAT for Turkish security, for the security of the Middle East, and for furthering the strategic interests of the United States. The final component of this work is a brief epilogue of U.S.-Turkish relations in the aftermath of Turkey joining NATO to contrast the relationship that JAMMAT helped to create with the one in existence since the mid-1960s. For the United States this has been a continuing lost opportunity in a region of the world that has only increased in importance.

Though the records of the mission, State Department documents, and relevant memoirs, form the primary source backbone of this dissertation, a brief bibliographic essay is in order. To begin with, this study does not rely upon Turkish sources to any large extent. The main reason is that this is first and foremost a study about the American mission to aid Turkey, what the mission accomplished, how the mission affected Turkey as an American ally, and what the mission reveals about the motivations and aspirations of the United States in 1947 and to trace how those changed by 1952. In addition, both mission records and State Department documents contain numerous Turkish sources, from government documents to local newspaper articles.

The only published work that directly deals with the activities of the mission is Craig Livingston's 1994 article in *Middle Eastern Studies* entitled "'One Thousand Wings': The United States Air Force Group and the American Mission for Aid to Turkey, 1947-50."⁵ As the title of the article suggests, Livingston examined only one of the four groups that composed the mission. This dissertation argues that the army program was the largest and most important part of the American groups operating in Turkey, with the Roads Group a strategic second, and the

⁵ Craig Livingston, "'One Thousand Wings': The United States Air Force Group and the American Mission for Aid to Turkey, 1947-50," *Middle Eastern Studies* vol. 30, no. 4 (October 1994): 788-825.

Navy Group coming in fourth behind the Air Force Group. By examining all four branches of the mission, this dissertation is able to categorically evaluate the accomplishments and historical relevance of the full mission regarding U.S.-Turkish relations and American plans vis-à-vis the Middle East.

The historiographical importance of the roles that the mission and Turkey played in drawing the United States into the Middle East becomes clear in comparison to accounts from historians who leave both out. In H.W. Brands' 1994 book, *Into the Labyrinth: the United States and the Middle East*, for example, Turkey's role in influencing the United States and the region begins and ends with the Truman Doctrine speech. From there the focus shifts to Iran, Israel-Palestine, and Egypt. This is a common approach for tracing America's role in the modern Middle East, but produces an incomplete and easily distorted picture. As recently as 2009, Lloyd C. Gardner's *Three Kings: The Rise of an American Empire in the Middle East after World War II*, attempted to synthesize early Cold War history about the Middle East into an American quest for oil and hegemony meant to replace British imperial control. Gardner depicts President Franklin Roosevelt initiating this conspiracy during his February 1945 meetings with regional leaders while aboard the USS *Quincy* in the Suez Canal.⁶ Gardner's arguments agree with Brands' summation that "as it involved the Middle East, the Cold War was about oil as much as it was about any other single item."⁷ In such accounts what is missing is all the evidence of U.S. disinterest in the defense of region, except in the case of ultimately helping Turkey into NATO for reasons of strategic advantage against the Soviet Union in the event of war. This dissertation argues that Turkey's entry into the North Atlantic pact brought a reluctant United States into the

⁶ Lloyd C. Gardner, *Three Kings: The Rise of an American Empire in the Middle East after World War II* (New York: New Press, 2009).

⁷ H.W. Brands, *Into the Labyrinth: the United States and the Middle East* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1994), 8.

Middle East nearly four years before the Suez Crisis exerted its pull and nearly five years before the Eisenhower Doctrine officially articulated an enduring American role in the region.

Instead of following a grand plan instigated by FDR for the creation of an American empire in the Middle East, the evidence in this dissertation points to shifting, ambivalent, and conflicted American policies towards the region. In line with works such as Richard Freeland's *The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism* and Michael Hogan's *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954*, this dissertation argues that the Truman administration was pursuing a hegemonic position in the world after the Second World War, but through the creation of a world-wide open market for American goods and capital and for the construction of permanent military power, but not by or for taking over the Middle East.⁸ The isolationist impulse of the American people nearly upset these plans and helped color the desperate tenor of the Truman Doctrine speech. This study argues that the original goal of the speech was not for moving into the Middle East, but for putting the fear of communist expansionism into the American people and the Republican-controlled Congress in order to set the precedent for an American-led reconstruction of Europe and to perpetuate the position of dominance that America already enjoyed, completely separate from control over the Middle East.

As to the specific emphasis on oil, scholars such as Michael Cohen in *Fighting World War Three from the Middle East: Allied Contingency Plans, 1945-1954*, rightly point out that until the early 1950s there was "a post-war glut of oil on the world market which reduced the strategic importance of Middle Eastern oil." Furthermore, until oil became a predominant issue

⁸ Michael Hogan, *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

and advances in rocket technology invalidated physical containment, Anglo-American military plans for the Middle East centered on defending strategic air bases from which to bomb the Soviet Union into submission, while planning to sabotage the oil wells of the Middle East rather than attempting to hold them.⁹ The greatest contribution of *Fighting World War Three from the Middle East* is the reality check that such plans provided for the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the joint military-State Department committees whose recommendations the JCS and the National Security Council (NSC) used to advise the president on matters of planning and capabilities for national security contingencies. Cohen's study provides information on Anglo-American war plans that is critical to the importance that this dissertation places on the mission, both for determining Turkey's increasing importance to Washington and in drawing the United States into the defense of the Middle East. Anglo-American *joint* war plans for the Middle East began with Turkey in 1946, and until Turkey's entry into NATO, consisted of British officers and diplomats attempting to *increase* U.S. interest in the defense of the region and according to British priorities. Works such as *The United States, Great Britain, and the Cold War, 1944-1947* by Terry Anderson and *The Great Powers in the Middle East, 1941-1947* by Barry Rubin, as well as each of State Department official George McGhee's books concur with the view that Washington saw the Middle East as an area of British responsibility and strove to keep it that way.¹⁰ Limitations enforced upon the U.S. military by the American public made large-scale U.S. commitments to the region's defense impossible until the mid-1950s.

⁹ Michael J. Cohen, *Fighting World War Three from the Middle East: Allied Contingency Plans, 1945-1954* (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1997), 173, 175.

¹⁰ Terry H. Anderson, *The United States, Great Britain, and the Cold War 1944-1947* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1981) and Barry Rubin, *The Great Powers in the Middle East, 1941-1947: The Road to the Cold War* (London: Frank Cass, 1980) and George McGhee, *Envoy to the Middle World: Adventures in Diplomacy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1983), *The US-Turkish –NATO Middle East Connection: How the Truman Doctrine*

British priorities centered on their Suez base complex in Egypt, which American planners initially equally embraced and for which Turkish resistance was a means for purchasing additional operational time. As the British Empire noticeably collapsed in the late 1940s and the military capabilities of Turkey developed as a result of JAMMAT, American planners began to emphasize the military and basing potential of Turkey, while the British continued to advocate the centrality of Egypt. The inclusion of Turkey into NATO essentially ended this debate, but as this dissertation argues this was more as a substitution for committing American forces to the defense of the region, rather than as part of an agenda to replace British influence and control the oil. In the period of the Korean War and NSC-68 the dominant issues were military and strategic, not economic, and a key component to the transition was the Joint American Military Mission to Aid Turkey.

Despite the lack of published works dedicated to the mission itself, there are a number of excellent secondary sources that reference some of the significance of the mission and/or provide some of the essential context that surrounded the program. Two of the most important for the period and the region are Bruce Kuniholm's *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East* and Ekavi Athanassopoulou's *Turkey-Anglo-American Security Interests 1945-1952: the First Enlargement of NATO*.¹¹ Kuniholm's work provides a detailed examination of the separate context of each Northern Tier country (Greece, Turkey, and Iran) up until 1945, followed by a study of the Northern Tier from 1945 until the 1947 Truman Doctrine. For establishing the pre-Truman Doctrine context of Turkey, Kuniholm's work is the most useful. Athanassopoulou's

Contained the Soviets in the Middle East (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), and *On the Frontline in the Cold War: An Ambassador Reports* (New York: Praeger, 1997).

¹¹ Bruce R. Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980) and Ekavi Athanassopoulou, *Turkey-Anglo-American Security Interests 1945-1952: the First Enlargement of NATO* (Portland: Frank Cass, 1999).

subject matter and time period are the closest match to this dissertation. The largest contribution to this work of Athanassopoulou's study is his argument concerning the centrality of NATO to Turkish security concerns. Although Athanassopoulou references the general accomplishments of the mission, his study does not examine it in any detail, nor ascribe to it much significance for helping Turkey into NATO or for drawing the United States into the defense of the Middle East.

A principal argument of this dissertation is that the story was more complicated and ultimately more relevant than that. While the United States military establishment early on appreciated the strategic potential of Turkey's geography, America's political, diplomatic, and military leaders did not possess the will nor popular consensus to fully act upon it. The contingency war plans of the period demonstrate the struggle between desires and abilities relating to the use of Turkey, its people and its bases, in the event of war with the Soviet Union. Turkish representatives understood their potential even better than their American counterparts and used this knowledge with skill and determination. Meanwhile lost to historians in the background of the rapidly unfolding opening stages of the Cold War, the American mission to Turkey carried out its official and unofficial work, the final results of which were out of all proportion to the mission's original goals. The accomplishments of the mission, aided by events in Korea and Egypt and the reaction of policy makers in Washington and London, exerted a significant influence upon the composition and role of NATO, U.S.-Turkish relations, Turkish security, and America's engagement with the defense of the Middle East. JAMMAT represents an important and illuminating chapter for Turkey, the United States, and the Middle East at the start of the Cold War and these are the reasons for this dissertation.

CHAPTER ONE

CONTEXT: TURKEY FROM KÜÇÜK KAYNARCA TO THE SOVIET DEMANDS OF 1945

Prelude

The nineteen-gun salute echoed across the water and reverberated off the surrounding land and buildings. Mehmet Munir Ertegun had returned home for his final rest. In its essence the ceremony was no different than thousands of similar events carried out over the centuries to mark the passing of an agent of international relations. In cold reality, however, Mehmet Ertegun was a convenient corpse, lying in state for nearly two years, whose death now provided the possibility for the conveyance of an important diplomatic message. The dead man was not what was significant. The hearse, the man who owned it, and what the owner was trying to say with it was what was most historically relevant. The guns that roared out over the Bosphorus and obliterated the usual din of the metropolis of Istanbul belonged to the USS *Missouri*, the most powerful warship at that point to have ever entered the Turkish Straits, and their report carried their intended message to Moscow. Sponsored and christened by the daughter of Harry S. Truman and named for his state, the ship was essentially a personal vehicle of the president. It was this personal connection that explained the fact that the Second World War came to an official close upon the deck of the USS *Missouri* in Tokyo Bay less than a year earlier. The diplomatic message that the *Missouri* conveyed this 5 April 1946, was simple yet profound: The United States was asserting that its peacetime interests reached halfway around the world, as far as the Straits of Turkey, the body of whose ambassador the nascent superpower was returning.

Though in no way binding, this loud demonstration was one of the first moves on the part of the United States government to display its intention to intervene on behalf of nations beyond

the Western Hemisphere during peacetime. As such this was part of the revolution in American diplomatic, strategic, and geopolitical thinking that took place in the immediate post-World War II period helping to create the interventionist America that has since exerted such a dominant pull on world history. The single most important turning point in this transformation was the Truman Doctrine speech of 12 March 1947. The fact that this shift, with all its subsequent repercussions, began in large part with Turkey, coupled with the previously unappreciated role that the ensuing interactions between the United States and the Anatolian republic played in drawing America into the defense of the Middle East speaks to the significance of this study. Yet it was not simple *kismet* or fate that brought the United States and Turkey into their unique relationship in 1947 following the ground-breaking Truman Doctrine. As the aforementioned *Missouri* mission suggests there were significant building blocks that preceded the American president's landmark speech. The blocks upon which each nation stood were naturally different, however, some of these differences would repeatedly influence the ongoing interactions between the two nations, providing useful insights into the true nature of the evolving relationship between the United States and Turkey within context of the developing Cold War.

From the American perspective the factors that drew the United States and Turkey together were as old as the Great War and the Great Depression, and as recent as the February 1947 British announcement that the aged empire could no longer afford to provide military aid to Greece and Turkey. For most American policy makers the significance of Turkey only began to take shape in the disappointing aftermath of the 1945 Yalta and Potsdam Conferences. For Turkey, by contrast, the lessons informing its leaders went back centuries and involved Russia most prominently. By the end of the Second World War the significance of this history was becoming evident even to the United States, who had for so long kept itself far removed. For the

Joint American Military Mission to Aid Turkey that the president's speech called into existence, the differences between the factors drawing the two nations together frequently conditioned the assumptions, priorities, and actions of those involved. While the American context was recent, the pertinent Turkish context was, in fact, slightly older than the United States of America, fundamentally beginning two years before Thomas Jefferson penned the Declaration of Independence.

This chapter, therefore, consists of four parts, covering the Turkish context for the American mission to aid Turkey. The first section briefly treats the legacy of Russo-Turkish antagonism from its roots in the late eighteenth century up to start of the First World War. Throughout the early years of the American mission this legacy remained a fresh wound upon the Turkish psyche, regarding all things Russian and explains the staunch anti-communism of the Turks and the burdens that the Turkish people and government were willing to bear to protect their national security from Russian encroachment. The second section examines, in some detail, the catastrophic events that acted upon the population of Anatolia during the early twentieth century. Most leading Turks of 1947 had lived through and rose to prominence during this crisis period, which also gave birth to the Republic of Turkey. The resulting economic and demographic weaknesses incurred from this time still informed most Turkish thinking and policy during the interwar, war, and postwar years. The next section looks at the internal reforms and foreign policy of the Republic of Turkey, stressing actions taken during the interwar period that combined to make Turkey just acceptable enough for the United States Congress to include the country within this first ever peacetime military aid mission. The final section looks at the Turkish perspective during World War II, which due to frequently overlooked Soviet-Turkish relations, differed greatly from the American experience of the same time period. The war years

set the stage for the Soviet demands of 1945, which began the sequence of events that triggered the Truman Doctrine speech and created the Joint American Military Mission to Aid Turkey.

The Legacy of Russo-Turkish Rivalry

The Republic of Turkey's context for what would become the opening stage of the Cold War began in 1774 at the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca back when the world knew the Turks as Ottomans. Though scholars often emphasize the 1699 Treaty of Carlowitz as the beginning of the Ottoman Empire's long slide to collapse, Carlowitz's significance owes to being the first time that Ottoman officials had to sign a peace treaty in enemy territory and cede land to conclude a war.¹ At Carlowitz the enemies of the Ottoman Empire compelled the expansionist state to acknowledge its traditional opponents, especially the Austrian Empire, as equals. The next major war, the 1736-1739 Austro-Ottoman War reinforced the idea of equality, rather than inevitable defeat. The yearly campaigns along the Danube exhausted both sides and ultimately produced stalemate and a fairly stable, if still contested, Ottoman-Hapsburg frontier. The Ottomans could even claim a narrow victory as the 1739 peace accord restored Belgrade to the Sultan.² In contrast to Carlowitz and its aftermath, the 1774 Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca was altogether different.

Where Carlowitz represented a clear setback for the Ottoman Empire and the forced recognition of equality, followed by further stalemate, the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca was a crushing blow that permanently upset the empire's geographical and psychological identity. Since Peter the Great (r. 1682-1725) established the "push to the south" strategy as a fixture of Russian imperialism, subsequent Russian czars and czarinas continually attempted to drive the

¹ Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 36.

² Virginia Aksan and Daniel Goffman, eds. *The Early Modern Ottomans: Remapping the Empire* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 119.

authority of Moscow south into Ottoman lands with the ultimate goal of reestablishing Constantinople as the center of the Orthodox world. As the self-styled Third Rome, Russia would lead the Orthodox peoples religiously and politically through its control of Constantinople and would gain the land, resources, and warm water ports formerly held by the Islamic Ottoman Empire. The push to the south strategy saw its greatest success under Catherine the Great (r. 1762-1796) culminating in the Russo-Ottoman War of 1768-1774. The Russian victories permanently upset the geographical continuity of the Ottoman Empire. The loss of the Crimean Khanate as an ally and buffer state created a new Russo-Ottoman frontier stretching from the Balkans to the Caucasus. With the Russians in control of the Crimean Peninsula this also transformed the Black Sea from a secure Ottoman lake into an avenue of further Russian penetration.³ The Czars further secured through force of arms the right for their merchant ships to transit the Straits, establishing the precedent for questioning the jurisdiction of this strategic water passage, as the Soviet Union would remind Turkey in 1945.⁴ For the Ottomans, Küçük Kaynarca created a vulnerable and extensive northern frontier, the attempted defense of which would prove utterly futile.

After 1768 Czarist Russia replaced Habsburg Austria as the chief enemy of the Ottoman Turks, a legacy the Republic of Turkey would inherit. The new threat from the north greatly accelerated the internal dissolution of the Ottoman Empire along both ethnic and religious lines and helped create the Eastern Question, regarding the division of the failing Ottoman state and the impact that such a division would have upon the balance-of-power in Europe. The internal breakdown that resulted from pan-Slavic and nationalist movements in the Balkan provinces and

³ Erik Zürcher, *Turkey: a Modern History* (New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1993. Reprinted, New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2003), 20.

⁴ Bruce Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 6.

through further decentralization and dependence on warlords within the Arab provinces, would also be instrumental in helping to forge a separate and singular Turkish identity from the historically multiethnic Ottoman Empire.⁵ For the people and leaders of the Republic of Turkey, the connection between the origins of their Cold War and the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca were the consequences of these two centuries of nearly uninterrupted defeat at the hands of Russian armies. One such consequence was the dependence on military and diplomatic aid from outside powers. Ottoman Sultans would first hire mercenary expatriate European advisors, then agree to numerous French military missions, until finally turning to the German military mission that would help drag the Ottoman Empire to its death in the Great War. Due to these precedents the Turkish military of the Republic of Turkey was heir to a long history of seeking military assistance from foreign advisors and from great powers, specifically to combat Russian expansionism. In contrast, for most Americans before the Cold War, anti-Russian grand strategy was as unknown as military assistance programs. Where American international realities in 1946 were of recent construction, Turkish realities were the product of centuries of relevant historical experience.

Anatolia's Long War

Just as World War Two proved to be the decisive event behind America's transition to the position of interventionist superpower, so too World War One was the event behind the creation of the Republic of Turkey. Turkey's vulnerability in 1947 was in direct relation to its terrible starting position as a nation in 1923, a position that resulted from Anatolia's long war of 1912-1923, the total span of the Balkan Wars, the First World War, and the Turkish War of Independence. The Central Powers' opposition to Russia in the event of war was the key

⁵ Aksan, 119.

determinant in Ottoman strategic thinking on the eve of the Great War, as Russia remained the largest threat to the empire. Even the significant domestic political transformation that took place within the Ottoman Empire between 1908 and 1913, bringing the Young Turk leaders of the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP) to power did not alter the fundamental truths of the empire's foreign policy.⁶ The fact that the CUP led the country into arguably one of the most brutal wars in human history, and on the losing side, was clear in hindsight alone.

Far more important, for this study, than going to war on the side of the Central Powers was what the war did to the people of the future state of Turkey that the American mission would begin working with in 1947. Not only did these events literally determine which people group this would be, but such events were still within the memory of most the Turkish leaders that the mission personnel worked with. Back during the attempted centralization prior to the war and especially during the emergency circumstances of the war, the leadership of the CUP reached the conclusion that the only segment of the population that supported the kind of centralization that survival required was the Sunni Muslim Turkic population, principally located in Thrace and Anatolia.⁷ In this way, Turkish nationalism was more the product of the exigencies of the Great War than any other single source. For Armenians, Jews, and Arabs, and later the Kurds, the attempted Turkification that ensued was traumatic, often extremely so. For the Turkish population the war was harrowing in different ways, yet it was also the beginning of their

⁶ The Young Turks were neither disproportionately young nor disproportionately Turks. Originally they were as multiethnic as the ruling elites of the empire had always been. Prominent leaders were Turkish, Greek, Albanian, Kurdish, Armenian, Jewish, and Arab. Their members were Orthodox, Shi'ite, Sunni, Sufi, and secular. What they had in common was a desire to reform and modernize the Ottoman Empire so that it could survive. Hasan Kayali, *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997), 4, 45.

⁷ Lewis, 214.

national awakening and the start of their struggle to survive against the same threats that had faced the Ottoman Empire.

While the most famous struggle of the Great War took place in the trenches of the Western Front, the war ravaged Anatolia in a uniquely comprehensive fashion. The impact on the people who would soon constitute the Turkish Republic was severe for a myriad of reasons. On the one hand there was internal conflict and oppression. For Armenians the suffering began in the mid-1890s during the persecutions of Sultan Abdul Hamid (r.1876-1909). For the rest of the Anatolian population the losses began during the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913. The defeats on the battlefield cost the lives of tens of thousands of soldiers, while the armistice produced a flood of hundreds of thousands of Muslim refugees pouring into Thrace and western Anatolia. The Ottoman Empire was still struggling to settle the refugee problem when the Great War broke out. After joining the Central Powers, Ottoman forces resisted British invasion at the Dardanelles, in Palestine, and in Iraq, while simultaneously trying to fight off Russian invasion throughout the Caucasus. With the loss of the empire's last European provinces during the Balkan Wars, the Ottoman military had no recourse but to recruit most of its troops from the Turkish and Kurdish peasantry of Anatolia, with the losses from the front lines consequently coming disproportionately from the future population of Turkey. The demographic demands of the front lines also meant much of Anatolia's farm lands remained fallow due to a severe labor shortage producing famine among the general population, even before the influenza pandemic of 1918 further depleted the weakened population.⁸ For most belligerents 11 November 1918, brought the nightmare experience of the Great War to an end. For the war-ravaged population of Anatolia it was only the beginning of the next stage in their battle for survival.

⁸ Zürcher, 70-71.

In Anatolia the end of the war brought total uncertainty. Allied forces quickly occupied the Straits and Istanbul, while the British in the Middle East advanced into northern Syria and Iraq. French forces landed on the southern coast of Anatolia as part of their securing of Syria and Lebanon, while the Italians continued to occupy the Dodecanese Islands, and began making landings at Anatolia's western and southern ports. In the face of the accumulated disasters effecting the population of Anatolia from 1912-1918, life had to go on even in the absence of a government and without international aid. The Turks were a defeated enemy, partially occupied and divided by the Western powers, all of whom completely overlooked and discounted the Turkish people as in any way significant.

At the same time that the United States was entering the economic boom and social changes of the Roaring Twenties, in Anatolia nearly every structure of life was in dramatic flux. Though already underway on a small scale and disorganized, the Turkish movement for independence gained essential motivation when on 10 August 1920, the victorious Allies announced the final settlement of the Ottoman Empire with the signing of the Treaty of Sèvres.⁹ The treaty effectively declared a Turkish state to be stillborn from inception. Istanbul and the Straits were to remain under permanent international control, while Greece was to receive Ottoman Thrace and the Aegean territory around İzmir. Italy and France won control over the two largest sections of Anatolia, essentially the southwestern and southeastern quarters. To the

⁹ The British and French representatives were choosing to honor the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, which they had made with imperial Russia for the division of Anatolia and the greater Middle East. The ensuing Mandate System of the League of Nations divided the former Ottoman Middle East between the French and the British. As the mandate powers the British and French were supposed to instruct the indigenous people on self-rule. In reality, both powers arbitrarily drew borders, established subservient rulers, and created new nation states for their own imperial best interests. Turkey escaped this fate through the strength of its national resistance movement, but for much of the Arab Middle East, the British and French occupation and geopolitical machinations fueled deep seated anti-Western and anti-imperial sentiment. Missing from the Sèvres settlement was the Russian share negotiated at the beginning of the war and again in the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement. The Russian objectives in the agreement were essentially identical to those the Soviet Union would levy against Turkey from 1945 on, only minus the emphasis on the Orthodox faith.

east, an Armenian state was to stretch from the Lake Van region of the interior, abutting British Iraq and French Syria, to the Black Sea coast on both sides of Trabzon.¹⁰ Only a rump of north central Anatolia was left for a future Turkish state whose government and economic viability the treaty did not even make reference to. Such was the messy context for the birth of the Republic of Turkey, but it could have been much worse.

The great irony of Turkey's independence and of the legacy of Russo-Turkish antagonism was the unintended role the Bolshevik Revolution played in saving Turkey. The very existence of the Bolshevik Revolution gave Turkey the chance to become a reality. The Eastern Question, regarding the dismantling and partitioning of the crumbling Ottoman Empire, had remained unanswered during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries because of the empire's ability to survive against its own forces of internal disintegration combined with its ability to play rival imperial powers against each other. With the failure of the Central Powers to win the Great War, the victorious Entente provided their answer to the Eastern Question through the Treaty of Sèvres. Their clear goal was to destroy the Ottoman Empire and any successor Turkish state more completely than their similarly harsh treatment of Germany, Austria, and Hungary.

Because the Bolshevik Revolution preceded the end of the war and compelled Russian military units to withdraw from the warzone in Anatolia and the Caucasus, the Ottoman army recaptured all the territory it lost to Russia from 1914-1917, thus creating an unoccupied space for the development of a Turkish independence movement. In addition to the breathing space created in central and eastern Anatolia, an unprecedented *rapprochement* took place between Turkish nationalists and Russian Soviets during the period of the Russian Civil War. Due to the March 1918 treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the Soviet government accepted humiliating peace terms,

¹⁰ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000* (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2000), 45-46.

which in the Caucasus, meant a division of the available spoils between the Ottoman Empire and Soviet Russia. At Brest-Litovsk, the Soviets accepted Ottoman demands to not interfere as they reacquired the districts of Kars and Ardahan as long as the Ottomans renounced their claims to Georgia. Lost during the 1877-1878 Russo-Ottoman War, the Turks regained these strategic provinces commanding the western overland approaches to the Caucasus Mountains, but in doing so laid the seeds for one of the two principal Soviet territorial demands of 1945.¹¹

More important than their compromise over the Caucasus, however, was the opposition that both embryonic states faced from the victorious Western Allies. The anti-Soviet interventions into Russia during the Russian Civil War confirmed the Western Allies as the enemy of the Bolshevik Revolution, while Allied plans for carving up Anatolia confirmed the same as the enemy of the Turkish nationalists. In March of 1921, in reaction to the Treaty of Sèvres, the Ankara-based Turkish National Assembly, signed the Soviet-Turkish Treaty of Friendship. In addition to the treaty, the Soviet government sent weapons and money to their new friends the Turks. The weapons and financing were crucial to the independence of Turkey as the Western Allies, at British insistence, turned to the Greek Army to provide the manpower to subdue the unconquered and unoccupied areas of Anatolia that had begun organizing for national independence.¹²

The Greek landings at İzmir (Smyra to the Greeks) on 15 May 1919 initiated the final phase in the transition from Ottoman Empire to Republic of Turkey. Two distinct motivations lay behind the Greek invasion of Western Anatolia. On the one hand were Greek aspirations for the reunification of a Hellenic Empire. On the other hand were British desires for influence over

¹¹ Hale, 29.

¹² Zürcher, 160.

the Straits, and divided weakness among the states north of Britain's oil sources and its communications links to India within the Middle East.¹³ Greek willingness and manpower catapulted the young nation to a position in Anatolia ahead of France, Italy, or Britain, whose populations were equally unenthusiastic about their soldiers taking part in any more fighting in the aftermath of the losses suffered during the Great War. Having entered the war late and having experienced relatively light casualties, the Greek Army was the ideal candidate to finish off the Terrible Turk.

Initial advances were quick and easy, putting Greek forces within striking distance of Ankara in a few short months. At the Battle of Sakarya River, in a bloody battle of attrition lasting from August 23 to September 13, the Turkish Nationalist Army ultimately triumphed over their Greek adversaries. Too exhausted to exploit their victory, a year-long stalemate ensued. For once, time was on the Turkish side as diplomatically the Western Alliance was coming apart. As France and Italy watched Greek forces occupying the areas of Anatolia allocated to them at Sèvres, both feared that the Greek Empire would be a British puppet state commanding the eastern Mediterranean, effectively threatening Italian positions in the Aegean and completing a British noose around French-controlled Syria. Just one month after the Turkish victory at Sakarya, France agreed to return to the Turkish nationalists the areas of Anatolia that they had occupied, and together with Italy, declared the Entente powers neutral in the Greco-Turkish War. In late August of 1922, after meticulous preparation and led by President Mustafa Kemal, Turkish forces counterattacked at the Battle of Dumlupınar, routing the entire Greek Army all the way back to İzmir. A chaotic withdrawal by sea and the burning of İzmir,

¹³ Margaret MacMillan, *Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World* (New York: Random House, 2003), 428-430.

essentially concluded the Turkish War of Independence. All that was left was for Britain to acknowledge defeat. Admission came in cursory form on October 11 via the Armistice of Mudanya and with finality at the Treaty of Lausanne, signed 24 July 1923.¹⁴ The surviving rump of empire had finally become a nation-state, however, the nature of the preceding eleven years of war left an indelible mark that was still apparent when American mission personnel arrived two decades later.

The external military and internal ethnic and religious strife that gripped Anatolia for over a decade radically transformed the demographics of the future Republic of Turkey and made its subsequent national character possible. The numbers are simply staggering to comprehend. As a result of the combined and related losses of the Balkan War, Great War, and Independence War, Anatolia's population declined by twenty percent due to mortality. Compared to France, the hardest hit Western European state, Anatolia suffered twenty times as many deaths among its population for its size. Roughly 2.5 million Muslims, 800,000 Armenians, and 300,000 Greeks of Anatolia and Thrace died. Warfare and atrocities, famine and disease all combined to produce this staggering loss of life.¹⁵

It was not only death, but also emigration and immigration that further altered the demographic map of the future Turkish state. During the Balkan instability of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century hundreds of thousands of Muslims migrated into Anatolia during each large-scale event, while hundreds of thousands of Armenians and Greeks left. In the final large-scale population swap that was a provision of the Lausanne Treaty, Turkey traded 900,000 of its Anatolian and Thracian Greeks for 400,000 Greek-born Turks. Anatolia's percentage of

¹⁴ Lewis, 253-254.

¹⁵ Zürcher, 170-171.

Muslims increased from eighty percent before the wars to ninety-eight percent after. Culturally, “Anatolia in 1923 was a completely different place from what it had been in 1913.”¹⁶ One can only speculate how different an Anatolian state or collection of states would have been in the face of modern nationalism had it retained a multiethnic, multi-religious demographic map. Whatever the product of such speculation would have been, it would not have had the singular mind for national survival that the personnel of the American mission and the diplomats at the U.S. Department of State would so often observe. This would also be the most important national trait preventing a slide into Soviet orbit.

In addition to the twenty percent mortality decline for Anatolia, population exchange resulted in a net deduction of another ten percent. The catastrophic loss of thirty percent of Anatolia’s population was not, even in the most simplistic reduction, just a loss of people, but it also represented a substantial loss of knowledge, skill, and productivity. The effects to Anatolia’s middle class were similar to Spain after the *Reconquista*’s expulsion of Moors and Jews, only in a world far more dependent on knowledge and specialization. The emigration of Greeks and Armenians removed from the future Turkish state “the large majority of [its] entrepreneurs and managers... [and] an irreplaceable stock of industrial and commercial know-how...there were whole regions where not a single welder or electrician could now be found.”¹⁷ This again had such enormous consequences that the effects were still widespread when American personnel began trying to modernize the Turkish military in 1948.¹⁸ Overcoming the endemic lack of skills and knowledge presented constant challenges and was the reason why the training programs provided by American mission were so significant.

¹⁶ Zürcher, 172.

¹⁷ Zürcher, 172.

¹⁸ Though the Truman Doctrine speech was in March 1947 the mission to aid Turkey did not begin active operations until March 1948.

Another indication of the severity of the trauma experienced by Anatolia's population was the reverse of its urbanization. While the rest of the world continued to urbanize at increasingly rapid rates, the urban population of Turkey actually decreased from twenty-five percent in 1913 to eighteen percent by 1923. Economically, Turkey's Gross National Product would not reach the region's pre-1912 levels until 1930, just in time for the Great Depression to knock the country back down.¹⁹ Turkey's first leaders were acutely aware of their country's resulting weakness and this heavily influenced their subsequent domestic and foreign policies for decades to come. The direction of these policies would be highly relevant in making Turkey acceptable enough to be a recipient of America's first peacetime foreign aid mission.

It is difficult to overstate the important role of the above historical background for determining the context in which the America mission to aid Turkey would find itself. Economically, demographically, culturally, and linguistically, the Republic of Turkey that the U.S. mission personnel began working with in 1948 was very much a product of the recent events mentioned above. Strategically and geopolitically, however, as this chapter has demonstrated, the most important historical precedent for Turkey was not of recent origin. With regards to Russia, the string of defeats resulting from nearly two centuries of Russia's push to the south produced an abiding fear within Ottoman memory that seamlessly passed into Turkish military strategy and foreign policy, despite the Turkish national movement's initial dependence on Soviet Russian support. As interwar Turkish diplomacy reveals, Turkish leaders had no illusions about the long-term viability of the post-World War One Soviet-Turkish *rapprochement*. During the interwar years Turkish fear of Russia remained such a widespread core belief that "Turkish political leaders were not guided in their foreign policy by

¹⁹ Zürcher, 172.

contemporary events...they were firm in their belief that Moscow's benevolence was contingent upon the difficulties that the new Bolshevik regime was confronted with; therefore it could only be short-term."²⁰

Becoming Acceptable Enough

During the interwar years, while the destructive forces of oppression and war had already greatly determined the demographic homogeneity of the future Turkish state, it was the acknowledged Father of Turkey, President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (r. 1923-1938) who was most responsible for the subsequent development of the national character and foreign policy of the Republic of Turkey.²¹ These changes in their totality would later help make Turkey acceptable enough to have a chance at getting the United States Congress to approve the program for American aid. In the aftermath of the successful War of Independence Mustafa Kemal set about redesigning the state and the Turkish people. Modernization, Europeanization, secularization, and Turkification became guiding tenets of Kemalism or Atatürkism. Traditional Ottoman dress, the civil and political influences of Islam, economic backwardness, and even the Ottoman language became the internal enemies that Kemal and his party waged war against.

Culturally, Atatürk banned the wearing of the iconic Ottoman headpiece, the fez, while imposing Western brimmed hats complete with Western-style suits as the new standard of dress for men in Turkey. While dress became Western, the language became Turkish. Under the direction of Atatürk and his Republican Peoples Party (RPP), Turkish linguists began designing a new language for the nation, isolating Turkish elements by removing as many Arabic and Persian loan words, constructions, and grammar as possible. They then married the new

²⁰ Ekavi Athanassopoulou, *Turkey-Anglo-American Security Interests 1945-1952: the First Enlargement of NATO* (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1999), 27.

²¹ He took the surname Atatürk in 1934 after the National Assembly voted the name for him and him alone, in concert with the 1934 law requiring the adoption of family names. Zürcher, 196.

standardized and phonetic language to a modified Latin script so that Turkish looked like any other Western language. As state linguists reinvented the Turkish language, Atatürk's government passed laws requiring the use of the new language in all print media and educational institutions. Within one generation modern Turkish completely replaced Ottoman Turkish and literacy increased dramatically through the use of the logically designed language and script, combined with state sponsored primary education. The American personnel of the mission, most likely had no idea how much easier these Turkish language reforms made their lives and the dissemination of information that was a very necessary part of their mission, not to mention the increased literacy rates they encountered. The language reforms were particularly emblematic of the direction that Atatürkism was taking the country and the lengths to which the regime was willing to go to achieve its desired goals.

In the aftermath of the Treaty of Lausanne the top priority for Turkey was internal reform. By the middle of the decade, however, a diplomatic push accompanied the internal changes and began to attempt to integrate the young republic into the two regional contexts that it quite literally bridged: the Balkans to the west and the Arab states and Persia to the south and east. In 1925 Turkish diplomats began working to improve relations along their country's most vulnerable flank, the western, site of Turkey's most populous cities and where all of Turkish Thrace lay demilitarized and exposed to surprise attack. Bulgaria and Yugoslavia signed treaties of friendship with Turkey in that year. Though not sharing a border, Yugoslavia was important as one of the largest regional players. Turkey's good relations with Yugoslavia would pay unexpected benefits in the context of the early Cold War. This would be particularly true of Turkey's interactions with the United States and the Turkish arguments that helped the Anatolian state become part of NATO.

Another benefit at the time of improved relations with its neighbors was a reduction in Anglo-Turkish animosity. After settling a territorial dispute in the League of Nations over the region of Mosul in 1926 in favor of British-administered Iraq, relations between the recent enemies repaired quickly. The Turkish ambassador in London was quite open and prophetic with the British Foreign Secretary when stating that Turkish foreign policy emphasized two potential future dangers, neither of which was Great Britain. “The nearer danger lay in the possible developments of Italian policy; the more remote danger came from the side of the Soviet Union.”²² Since the United States would essentially take on the mantle left by Great Britain regarding Turkey, the repair of Anglo-Turkish relations had lasting significance.

Reflecting Turkish efforts to normalize its international relations and the limited interwar importance of either nation to the other, it was not until 1927 that the United States and Turkey exchanged ambassadors. This development was of value to Turkey in so far as the United States constituted an important trade partner and had a shared cultural heritage with Great Britain. Since, “as a general rule the United States considered Turkey to lie in the British sphere of interest,” the exchange of ambassadors advanced a few economic interests between the nations but was more valuable as a demonstration of Turkey’s improving relations abroad.²³

The most surprising development, and one of the most portentous in light of future U.S.-Turkish relations, was the rapid lessening of tensions between Greece and Turkey. Long running disputes caused by the population exchanges stipulated in the Lausanne Treaty appeared to be leading the two countries toward another war by 1929 when the returning Greek premier,

²² Athanassopoulou, 4.

²³ George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-1971* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1972), 10, 14, Edward Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1943-1945: Small State Diplomacy and Great Power Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), 124.

Eleutherios Venizelos, suddenly announced to his parliament “that he believed Turkey was a peace-loving country, which would not attack Greece.” At the ensuing Turkish government’s invitation, Venizelos visited Ankara and Istanbul in October of 1930 ultimately producing a Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality. After the Greek triumph, the final step in attempting to normalize its relations with the West came in 1932 when Turkey joined the League of Nations.²⁴ The tremendous losses experienced during the wars strongly motivated Turkish leaders to rely first and foremost upon diplomacy in international relations.

The establishment as policy of Atatürk’s renunciation of adventurism combined with Turkey’s diplomatic efforts to normalize relations with its neighbors in the defense of the status quo, won for Turkey the support of its old enemy Great Britain. With revisionist governments in power in Italy, Germany, and Japan by 1933, Turkey became, in the opinion of the British Foreign Office, a useful neutral or a potential ally. This transformation of Turkey in the eyes of the British enabled the republic to carry off its most significant diplomatic accomplishment since Lausanne. In 1936, at Turkey’s request and with British support, diplomats from across Europe met at Montreux, Switzerland, to revise the demilitarization of the Straits. British support proved crucial for Turkey securing total control over the Straits. Despite Soviet opposition, the convention granted Turkey full sovereignty of the Straits and the right to remilitarize them. Merchant ships would continue to enjoy complete freedom of transit in peacetime, while warships of limited tonnage and total number of either riparian or non-riparian fleets could pass the Straits during daylight hours after making arrangements with Turkish authorities. Non-riparian naval vessels could also only remain in the Black Sea for twenty-one days. In wartime, Turkey gained the right to close the Straits to belligerents or completely if at war itself. From the

²⁴ Hale, 59.

Soviet perspective, ever conscious of the humiliating events of the Crimean War, the Montreux Convention placed control of the naval gateway to southern Russia into the hands of a potential enemy. Montreux was a substantial victory for Turkish sovereignty and security, but helped lay the seeds for renewed Russo-Turkish antagonism. In keeping with America's interwar isolationist sentiment the United States observed the negotiations in the interests of "commercial navigation" but was not a signatory to the convention.²⁵

Turkish control of the Straits was one of the main reasons for Turkey's subsequent strategic significance in what would become the Cold War. The Soviet demands of 1945 for joint control of the Straits helped produce the Truman Doctrine and the American mission to Turkey. Mission personnel would subsequently help the Turks modernize their plans to defend the Straits as Turkey's holding of this waterway was an important part of U.S. contingency war plans during the early Cold War. Without Turkey having full control of the Straits and without the interwar normalization of its foreign relations, it is difficult to impossible to envision a Truman Doctrine that included Turkey and the existence of American military mission to aid Turkey.

The Turkish Perspective in World War II

At a cursory glance the Second World War brought the interests of the United States and Turkey into line. The United States fought to defeat the Axis powers and founded the United Nations to keep the peace in the aftermath. Turkey was neutral during most of the war and then joined the Allies and the United Nations Organization in early 1945. The war, however, did not bridge the historical and geographical gulf that inherently existed between the two countries and their national interests. Turkey's perspective during the war was unique and differed greatly

²⁵ Harry N. Howard, *Turkey, the Straits, and U.S. Policy* (Baltimore: the John's Hopkins University Press, 1974), 145, 152.

when compared to the American experience. Indeed, as this section will illustrate, the war itself perpetuated the distance between the respective leaders in Ankara and Washington, such that Turkish leaders possessed a Cold War-like mentality eight to nine years before their American counterparts. Such a comparison provides useful insights into the limits and the gradual development of America's commitment to international leadership and the defense of the Middle East within the context of the Cold War.

While Turkey managed to tread the path of neutrality during the majority of the war years, it was not without significant difficulty and shifting insecurity. Economically and diplomatically, Turkey approached the war being pulled in two directions. On the diplomatic side, as a non-revisionist state, Turkey favored some kind of Anglo-French alliance for security against Italian or Russian aggression. On the economic side, however, the young republic's economy was most dependent on Germany, an ally of Italy and a traditional enemy of Russia and France. In 1936, fifty-one percent of Turkish exports went to Germany, while fifty percent of imports came from Germany. In keeping with the importance of relations with France and Great Britain, by 1940 the ruling Republican Peoples Party had succeeded in reducing its trade relationships with Germany to just twelve percent of its exports and nine percent of its imports.²⁶ Despite this dramatic decrease, Turkey's continued trade with Germany during the war resulted in heavy diplomatic pressure from both belligerent alliances.

Germany's occupation of Czechoslovakia on 15 March and Italy's invasion of Albania on 7 April 1939 triggered new diplomatic urgency across Europe. In response to Turkish fears of the Albanian War spreading into Greece, as it in fact did, and then on into Turkey, the German ambassador to Turkey, Franz von Papen, sought to allay the fears of their First World War ally.

²⁶ Athanassopoulou, 16 and Hale, 84.

Italy would not attack Turkey, assured von Papen, as long as Turkey and Germany remained friends. Berlin's word, having recently been broken in Czechoslovakia, did not carry as much weight in the eastern Mediterranean as the Royal Navy. On 12 May Turkish and British representatives signed the Anglo-Turkish Declaration of Mutual Assistance, followed on June 23 by a similar Franco-Turkish Declaration. Both agreements essentially only communicated the intention of their signatories to cooperate in the event of war in the Mediterranean.²⁷

For President İsmet İnönü (r. 1938-1950) and the other principal formulators of Turkish foreign policy, mainly in the top echelon of the Turkish military and foreign ministry, the goal of the country's diplomacy was to secure an alliance with Britain and France combined with some kind of continued security agreement with the Soviet Union.²⁸ The British and French declarations were a start, but the unanticipated Nazi-Soviet Treaty of Non-Aggression of 23 August 1939, upset nearly all diplomatic calculations in Europe. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was Turkey's worst nightmare; Russia and Germany in agreement rather than counterbalancing each other, and the Soviet Union and Britain in opposing camps. Though most Americans would quickly forget this period in the wake of Pearl Harbor, for most Turks the time of Nazi-Soviet cooperation was the most relevant for illuminating long-term Russian intentions. While Germany's invasion of Poland and the Anglo-French declarations against Germany signaled the beginning of general war in Europe, it was the relatively overlooked Soviet invasion of eastern Poland on 17 September that confirmed the long-held Turkish fears of reawakened Russian expansionism in Soviet guise.

²⁷ Hale, 66-68.

²⁸ Hale, 72.

Just seven days after invading eastern Poland, on 24 September, Moscow began dispatching ultimatums to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Russian requested that the Baltic States agree to the establishment of Soviet military bases and troop deployments on their soil.²⁹ While the Baltic governments deliberated, the Turkish ambassador to Russia, Şükrü Saraçoğlu, arrived in Moscow to negotiate a mutual assistance pact with the Soviet Union. Instead, he received a list of four Soviet demands. First and second, Turkey was to amend its declarations of mutual assistance with Britain and France to consultation only. Third, the Turks were to sign a Soviet-Turkish pact, which would include a clause absolving the Soviet Union from aiding Turkey in the event of a German attack on Turkey. Finally, in a portent of things to come, Moscow demanded joint Soviet-Turkish administration of the Straits complete with Soviet military bases. Ankara offered to accept the first two demands, but refused to concede to the final two as initially presented so talks continued into the middle of October.³⁰

In the interim, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania submitted to Moscow's dictates, while Finland also received a list of demands, which included a significant loss of Finnish territory and the destruction of the country's frontier fortifications. Both Turkey and Finland rejected parts of the Soviet demands. On 17 October the Soviet-Turkish talks ended with a final Turkish refusal. Two days later Turkey signed a Treaty of Mutual Assistance with Britain and France.³¹ Fortunately for Turkey it possessed strategic value in the eyes of its Western Allies. Unfortunately for Finland, its natural ally Germany had already sold it away as part of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact and it possessed no significant agreements with any other great power. On 30 November 1939 the Soviet Union invaded Finland, conquering during the

²⁹ David J. Smith, *The Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania* (London: Routledge, 2002), 24.

³⁰ Kuniholm, 22.

³¹ Hale, 69.

bloody Winter War what it could not get through intimidation. Few accounts of the early Cold War link the Soviet demands in 1945 with the spate of demands the same foreign ministry issued in 1939 and the consequences. Turkey's leaders, however, considered the Soviet diplomatic pressure that triggered the Truman Doctrine as a continuation of the 1939 demands, simply interrupted by the Second World War.

From the perspective of Ankara there was precious little separating Turkey from the fate of Finland. The only difference had been the declarations of mutual assistance with Britain and France, which Soviet demands had specifically attempted to nullify, and the treaty that the declarations had turned into. Yet even with Turkey and Russia on apparently opposing sides, the Turkish fear of its northern neighbor manifest itself within the stipulations of the Anglo-French-Turkish treaty. Significantly, similar behavior would manifest during the American mission to Turkey where the Turkish government and military would limit American aspirations in the interests of not further antagonizing the Soviet Union. The 1939 treaty compelled military assistance among the signatories in the event of war in the eastern Mediterranean, or war against Greece or Romania. If assistance meant war with the Soviet Union, however, the treaty did not oblige Turkey to act. In addition, Turkish negotiators secured provisions within the treaty that would require Britain and France to act in Turkey's defense in the event of a Soviet attack. For the Western Allies their fears of Germany and Italy drove the pact, but for Turkey Russia was the principal threat. There was also language that connected Turkish belligerency to the reception of adequate amounts of military supplies from Britain and France. It was this last clause upon which Turkish neutrality during the war hinged.³²

³² Frank Weber, *The Evasive Neutral: Germany, Britain and the Quest for a Turkish Alliance in the Second World War* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1979), 45, 82.

Wartime Russian machinations provided the Turkish Republic with two more very significant reasons to continue fearing its northern neighbor. The first came in June 1940, when the Soviet Union annexed the three Baltic States that had granted Russia bases in 1939, and carried out the annexation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina at the expense of Romania. These actions demonstrated Soviet expansionism and showed what would happen to countries that agreed to give bases to the Soviet Union. The second took place in November 1940 in Berlin. With the Molotov-Ribbentrop Non-aggression Pact continuing to endure, Adolf Hitler and Joachim von Ribbentrop met with Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov in secret negotiations to explore the expansion of the Axis alliance to include the Soviet Union and Turkey. Germany wanted Turkey as an ally to threaten Britain's position in the Eastern Mediterranean, culminating in an envisioned invasion of the Middle East and the taking of the Suez Canal via Turkey. Soviet requirements for joining the Axis, however, proved incompatible with German ambitions and remain extremely relevant. The Soviet conditions for accepting a military alliance with Germany included:

‘The establishment of a base for land and naval forces of the USSR within range of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles by means of a long-term lease’; and recognition that the Soviet Union’s center of aspirations be ‘the area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf.’ Turkey’s territory and independence would be guaranteed if she joined the pact; if she refused, ‘the required military and diplomatic measures’ would be carried out.³³

The Soviet Union also required German acceptance of Soviet preeminence along the Romanian coast and in Bulgaria to complete Russian control of the entire Black Sea basin. Because Germany aspired for total control of the Balkan Peninsula, right up to the defensible frontier of an unthreatening Turkey, the overlapping Russo-German ambitions remained incompatible.

³³ Kuniholm, 25.

One shudders to imagine how different the Second World War might have been had Hitler and Stalin agreed to compromise over a stretch of Black Sea coast and the fate of Turkey. In the aftermath of the abortive talks and in an attempt to demonstrate Germany's positive intentions towards Turkey, on 18 March 1941 Adolf Hitler personally revealed to the Turkish ambassador in Berlin the secret Russian demands.³⁴ Turkish leaders as of 1941, therefore, already in possession of centuries of historical memory with the southward drive of Czarist Russia, and having recently witnessed the renewal of that expansionism as evidenced by Soviet actions against Poland, the Baltic States, Finland, Romania, and themselves, now had absolutely no question about the full aspirations of the Soviet Union regarding the space occupied by their country. The stronger the position of the Soviet Union, the more Turkey had to fear.

German victories against Western Europe, the neutrality of the United States, and Hitler's revelations about Soviet goals, convinced Turkey that Nazi Germany was the new power in Europe, possibly for some time to come. Without renouncing or abridging its alliance with Great Britain, Ankara signed the Turkish-German Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression on 18 June 1941. Four days later the Second World War took its most significant turn with the surprise German invasion of the Soviet Union. The timing of the treaty was one further issue that postwar Soviet propaganda would use to incriminate Turkey's government as a pro-fascist regime complicit in the worst disaster to ever befall Mother Russia.

Ankara did welcome the news of the German invasion for providing immediate relief from any potential Soviet aggression, but managed to remain staunchly neutral. Thanks to its alliance with Britain, Turkey had survived the crucial period of Nazi-Soviet cooperation, but war between Germany and Russia still left Turkey in a precarious position. On the surface, Soviet-

³⁴ Hale, 86.

Turkish relations immediately improved. In an announcement on 10 August 1941, full of irony in hindsight of 1945, the Soviet Union “formally confirmed their fidelity to the Montreux Convention, announced that they had no aggressive intentions or claims regarding the Straits, and declared that they were prepared not only ‘scrupulously to observe the territorial integrity of the Turkish Republic,’ but, in the event of an attack by a European Power, to render assistance.”³⁵ Despite these and many other declarations, due to the legacy of Russo-Turkish history, such sentiments in no way ameliorated Turkish fears, nor altered Turkish policy.

Before and during the war, Turkish diplomats and political leaders were quite clear about their abiding fear of Russian expansionism. As far back as 1930, Prime Minister İsmet İnönü had reported to President Atatürk that despite the unprecedented good nature of their relations with the Soviet Union at the time, as soon as the Russians felt that their western boundaries were secure, “they will no longer care to be friends with us.” Even more telling was later President İnönü’s first official conversation with U.S. Ambassador Laurence A. Steinhart. Turkey’s head of state used the meeting to warn that if Germany lost the war completely then the Soviet Union would remain unchallenged and would try to “over-run” the Europe and the Middle East. It is quite telling that this meeting took place not after a great Soviet victory, but during Russia’s darkest hour while German forces were sweeping across the shattered southern Russian front bearing down on Stalingrad in the early summer of 1942. Prophetically, İnönü informed Steinhart that the Soviets would seek to take control of the Straits just as soon as they were able.³⁶ Such concerns fell on deaf ears in the summer of 1942, for the United States was still carrying out a losing defensive war against Japan and could only hope that Britain, and

³⁵ Howard, 163-164.

³⁶ Weisband, 44-46.

especially Russia, could survive against Germany long enough for America's industrial might to begin tipping the scales in the Allies' favor.

Even before the end of the Great Patriotic War, Soviet actions were again forecasting the renewal of traditional Russian expansionism in the direction of Turkey and this trend began the direct path that would lead to the Truman Doctrine and mission to aid Turkey. To the west of Turkey, the unprovoked Russian invasion of Bulgaria on 5 September 1944, "brought Turkish apprehensions...to a fever pitch." Though an ally of Germany after the Nazi conquest of the Balkans, Bulgaria had historic ties with Russia and refused to declare war on the Soviet Union. During the invasion of Russia, the *Wehrmacht* did not use Bulgarian troops to fight on the Eastern Front because German generals assumed the Bulgarians would defect to the Russian side. Despite the ousting of the pro-German government, renunciation of further ties with Germany, declarations for armistice with the Western Allies and for friendly relations with Russia, Soviet armies still invaded and conquered the country up to the Turkish border. Turkey feared the presence of Soviet armed forces on both its eastern and now western borders as well as "the possibility of a synthesis between Bulgarian irredentism and Soviet-supported aggression."³⁷

Just months later, as Turkey was finally preparing to join the Allies, events on the country's eastern border took a similarly ominous turn. On 23 February Turkey declared war on Germany, signing the United Nations declaration four days later.³⁸ That same month, however, Soviet propaganda began airing nationalist and anti-Turkish programs on Soviet Armenia's Erivan radio indicating the threat of combining Armenian nationalist aspirations with Soviet

³⁷ Weisband, 277-278.

³⁸ Under heavy Allied pressure, in April, 1944, Turkey suspended its most important trade link with Germany, chromite, for use in making high grade steel. On August 2, 1944 Turkey severed all diplomatic ties with Germany. Weber, 205, 211, and Howard, 164.

backing.³⁹ The use of Armenians must have been doubly frightening to Turkish leaders who no doubt had been alive during the Armenian Genocide and were aware of the potential of revenge from the ghost of the Ottoman past. Thus, in Turkey there was fear of Soviet aggression via proxy state from both west and east, over five years before the Korean War would convince American policy makers of the serious threat that such proxy attacks could produce.

On 19 March 1945 a far more direct diplomatic move occurred in Moscow. Russian Foreign Minister Molotov officially denounced the 1925 Turkish-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Nonaggression, which the Soviets had renewed as recently as March 24, 1941 and was due to expire anyway for renegotiation on November 7, 1945. The implicit threat in the denunciation of the treaty mere months before it would expire on its own, combined with Turkey's secret knowledge of Russia's negotiations with Germany, produced acute anxiety in Ankara. On June 7 the diplomatic hammer fell. The Turkish ambassador to the Soviet Union was the first to receive the Russian conditions for a new nonaggression agreement. According to Molotov, Turkey would have to cede the two eastern districts of Kars and Ardahan to the Soviet Union and grant the Russians military bases along the Dardanelles and Bosphorus Straits for joint control over the strategic waterway.⁴⁰

Turkish officials were well aware of Russia's historic, military, and strategic ambitions for the Straits. In the case of Kars and Ardahan, however, the possible motivations demand further explanation. Kars and Ardahan had been the spoils of Russian conquest back in the 1877 War. In 1921, weakness and the need for a regional ally had obliged the new Soviet government to return the provinces to the embattled Turkish nationalists. The Soviet Commissar of

³⁹ Kunniholm, 287n.

⁴⁰ *FRUS 1945*, vol. 1, 1018.

Nationalities who negotiated the 1921 treaty was none other than Joseph Stalin.⁴¹ It is possible that Stalin was seeking to erase the memory of where early Bolshevik weakness had compelled him to be responsible for surrendering Soviet territory. Another explanation is that the head of Soviet state security, Lavrenti Beria, who like Stalin was ethnically Georgian, convinced the Soviet premier to demand Kars and Ardahan as former Georgian territories. Such a view receives support from Nikita Khrushchev who characterized Beria as “the only person able to advise Stalin on foreign policy.”⁴² Whatever the true motivations for the Soviet demands, Turkey’s satellite status would have been inevitable from a military standpoint since the country’s principle lines of defense against Russian approach ran through the Straits in the west and through Kars and Ardahan in the east. Not surprisingly, the Turkish government flatly rejected the Soviet demands on the grounds that they would violate Turkish sovereignty and that Turkey had no desire to be a Soviet satellite.⁴³

Moscow followed up its 7 June demands by initiating anti-Turkish propaganda campaigns in communist occupied territories on both side of Turkey. Bulgaria and Yugoslavia began issuing anti-Turkish propaganda while funneling supplies to communist partisans in Greece along supply lines that ran dangerously close to the Turkish frontier.⁴⁴ In Armenia by contrast, Soviet authorities used the Armenian Orthodox Church to hold an Ecclesiastical Conclave for the election of a new Catholicos as an occasion to call on all Armenian émigrés to come home to help reclaim lost Armenian territory. The return of potentially half a million

⁴¹ Kuniholm, 12.

⁴² Athanassopoulou, 41.

⁴³ Howard, 216.

⁴⁴ Athanassopoulou, 45.

Armenians would have provided further justification for the Soviet demand for Kars province, whose eastern portion had historically been Armenian territory.⁴⁵

Though Molotov delivered the June ultimatum, privately he strongly objected to the demands, later describing them as “an ill-timed, unrealistic thing.”⁴⁶ Molotov was quite correct, as the demands created consternation and fear in Washington and London. Back in February at the Yalta Conference, both Churchill and Roosevelt had agreed to Stalin’s arguments regarding the need to revise the Montreux Convention to better protect the Soviet Union. Moscow’s unilateral move signaled that Stalin was serious about changing the Straits regime, but that he had no intention of involving his Allies.⁴⁷ It was these Soviet demands upon Turkey that began the process of the United States taking an interest in the region.

By 1945 Russia’s security network of buffer states was nearly complete. From Finland, to East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, the Russian heartland was finally safe from western invasion. To the north the ice offered unparalleled protection. To the east, no threat since the thirteenth century Mongol invasions had reached the Russian center, nor in 1945 was there any perceivable threat emanating from East Asia. Only on its southern flank, via the Straits and the waters of the Black Sea was the soft underbelly of Russia theoretically exposed to the might of some strong naval power such as Great Britain or the United States. American diplomats interpreted the Soviet demands as an attempt at “closing off the last beachhead of the Western world in this region.”⁴⁸ By the end of the war the U.S. Navy was and would continue to be the largest navy in the world, larger than all other navies

⁴⁵ Kuniholm, 287n.

⁴⁶ Vladislav M. Zubok and Constantine Peshakov, *Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 93.

⁴⁷ Zubok and Peshakov, 92.

⁴⁸ *FRUS 1946*, vol. VII, 804.

combined. In the case of the Straits, if a major power were in possession of the strategic waterway, control would automatically provide both powerful defensive and offensive potential. A Russian fleet based in the Straits and operating in the Eastern Mediterranean would be able to threaten the vital Suez trade routes upon which Britain's imperial life blood pumped and which much of Western Europe's postwar reconstruction would depend for essential raw materials, such as oil. This had been Britain's fear for centuries and, as a result of Moscow's immediate postwar actions, it gradually became an American fear as well, helping to militarize America's originally economically motivated postwar policies.

CHAPTER TWO

CONTEXT: THE UNITED STATES FROM WORLD WAR II TO THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE

As the first chapter demonstrated the pre-1947 Turkish context did not directly involve the United States until after the Second World War. Similarly, the American context leading up to the Truman Doctrine only involved Turkey as one of many variables. The focus of this chapter is the road to the Truman Doctrine from the U.S. perspective. The opening section looks at the good intentions for world supremacy that constituted the basic postwar agenda of the Truman administration. Establishing this agenda is important because it provides the baseline for showing how U.S. policy changed over time. It also illustrates the Truman administration's struggles to balance against competing domestic and foreign interests. Section two focuses on the domestic factors that limited the foreign policy options of the Truman administration during the late 1940s. The postwar demobilization debate, the Congressional fight over funding European reconstruction, initially in the form of a loan to Great Britain, and the sweeping Republican victories in the 1946 mid-term elections combined to jeopardize the postwar plans of the Truman administration. The topic of section three, the 1946 War Scare and the resulting joint Anglo-American War plans that resulted, reveals the way that Soviet actions in Iran first highlighted the role of Turkey in the defense of the Middle East and as a way to gain strategic advantage in a future war against the Soviet Union. The final section briefly treats the British collapse that offered the Truman administration a means to save its postwar agenda through the articulation of the Truman Doctrine.

Good Intentions for World Supremacy

In the United States other concerns initially overshadowed the import of the 1945 Soviet demands upon Turkey. Unlike Turkey, the Soviet Union, or Great Britain, where the primary postwar goal was continued national or imperial survival heavily linked to strategic and military power, the primary postwar goal of the Roosevelt-Truman administrations was economic, heavily influenced by domestic politics. It is tempting to focus solely on the developing diplomatic events that led to the Cold War, relying upon the actions and reactions of the principal actors. In the case of the United States, however, divorcing such a view from the domestic political debates too easily obscures the nature of America's developing postwar agenda. The original overriding postwar goals of America's democratically elected leaders were to avoid the economic pitfalls of the previous world war's peace, while making America's economic superiority permanent.

The Roosevelt-Truman administrations firmly believed that the Great Depression and the Second World War were the result of the failed peace settlements and poor economic policies following the First World War. Economic considerations were, therefore, paramount in their plans for avoiding the bilateral agreements that hampered world commerce and stability after World War I. After struggling with mixed success for a decade to combat the domestic influences of the worst economic downturn in U.S. history, the Roosevelt-Truman administration believed they possessed the formula for preventing a Second Great Depression and a Third World War. The American government's means for achieving this postwar goal was the establishment world-wide of an economic policy of American-dominated multilateralism.¹ The Bretton Woods agreements of July 1944 laid the foundation for this new largely American-

¹ Richard M. Freeland, *The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972), 16.

controlled world economic system to replace the protectionist remains of the old European imperialist system.² At the end of the war this economic agenda was the driving force behind America's postwar plans.

The specter for a repeat of the post-World War I economic collapse was a very real possibility. By 1945 the United States was producing over half of the world's goods and faced the likelihood of unprecedented overproduction, threatening massive unemployment, deflation, and another economic depression. The Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, William Clayton, was quite candid about America's economic future at the end of the war, "Let us admit right off," he declared, "...we need markets—big markets." Multilateralism, as envisioned by the Roosevelt administration and endorsed by the Truman administration, promised to open most of the world to American goods and trade, something that much of the world needed at the time for reconstruction purposes. Such a plan was not without substantial long-term benefit to the international interests of the United States. Roosevelt's Secretary of State Cordell Hull identified the benefits as providing to America "the supreme position in world finance, commerce and industry."³ Combined with America's military and nuclear power, economic multilateralism seemed to promise both the prevention of further world depression and world war, and the establishment, for a long time to come, of American global predominance.

At the end of the war, President Truman took the first step towards the creation of the envisioned multilateral world by immediately terminating the Lend-Lease program without the consultation of any of America's allies. This was a signal that with the war over, U.S. money again had a cost. The cost was to be the implementation of American multilateral designs, the

² Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall, *America's Cold War: the Politics of Insecurity* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009), 35.

³ Freeland, 17-18.

removal of prejudicial trade barriers, trade blocs, and other artificial impediments to free trade. The need for money was supposed to supply the necessary leverage to ensure cooperative implementation.

The first nation to send a delegation seeking renewed access to American capital was Great Britain. In the ensuing talks during the latter half of 1945 American negotiators refused the initial British request for a grant of six billion dollars and countered with a proposal for a low-interest loan of 3.75 billion dollars. The issuance of such a loan was contingent on the British agreeing “to make sterling convertible within a year, to dismantle restrictions on U.S. trade, and to join the American-led incipient multilateral world trading system.”⁴ British leaders were in no position to refuse and reluctantly agreed to the termination of the bloc one year after Congress approved the loan.⁵ This concession, according to historian Richard Freeland, “Was the single most important commercial objective of the American program for the implementation of multilateralism.” The opening of the Imperial or Sterling bloc was so important because before the war the trade between this bloc and North America accounted for nearly half of the world’s total trade.⁶ After the British, delegations arrived from France, Italy, and Greece in search of financial assistance and acceded to cooperate in the construction of multilateralism in return for reconstruction aid.

In short, as of 1945 and the end of the war, America’s postwar policy revolved around making the world safe for American goods. America’s enemies were in ruins, its allies were beholden to the United States for the supply of reconstruction materials and the capital to purchase them. The Atlantic and Pacific still provided exceptional defense, especially when

⁴ Arnold A. Offner, *Another Such Victory: President Truman and the Cold War, 1945-1953* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 129.

⁵ Freeland, 48.

⁶ Freeland, 18.

augmented by the largest navy in the world and America's sole possession of atomic weapons. In this idyllic state of affairs, a tiff between the Soviet Union and Turkey regarding joint control over a small strip of water and a few border provinces appeared insignificant. Many assumed that negotiations would settle the matter, and at Potsdam President Truman even suggested internationalizing the Straits in the same fashion he proposed for all of Europe's inland waterways.⁷ Had such a plan become a reality, Turkey would not have possessed control of the Straits, would have lost much of its strategic potential, and a future Containment Strategy would not have been possible. Stalin and Molotov responded by suggesting the same treatment for the Suez and Panama Canals and the discussion ended in disagreement and indefinite postponement. As the rest of this chapter will demonstrate, between mid-1945 and early-1947 the opinions and policy of America's leaders would undergo a dramatic transformation. Driving this transformation would be the discovery of powerful factors limiting the administration's postwar agenda set within the rapidly deteriorating relations between the Soviet Union and its wartime Western Allies.

Limiting Factors

The factors that limited the Truman administration's postwar plans would also directly influence the American mission to aid Turkey, both by helping to trigger the Truman Doctrine that brought the mission into existence and through their continued impact on the military capabilities and strategic plans of the United States. Grouped together these factors form an unlikely list. The Soviet Union, the American people, the U.S. military, the British Empire, and Congress all conspired quite independently to place concrete limitations upon the options available for the Truman administration to avoid a second great depression, a third world war,

⁷ Howard, 228-229.

and to reach “the supreme position in world finance, commerce and industry.” Unbeknownst to Turkey, these factors would create the context from which their nation would gain the support of a new great power and ultimately an alliance that would provide the security guarantee for which Turks had sought in vain for centuries. There would be a price for such a guarantee and the United States would prove to be a self-interested ally, but an ally nonetheless.

The first obstacle to the Truman administration’s plans for a multilateral world came from the Soviet Union. It is important to remember that lacking hindsight, few informed Americans predicted just how fast the wartime alliance would collapse. At the London Conference of Foreign Ministers in September 1945, the new Secretary of State James Byrnes felt the time was right to begin hardnosed negotiations with Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov over Eastern Europe. Along with most U.S. policy makers at the time, Byrnes assumed that the Soviet Union’s massive reconstruction needs would force the Russians to compromise over the political future of Eastern Europe in the aftermath of the United States ending Lend-Lease. Molotov remained immovable, however, even in the face of thinly veiled nuclear threats and Byrnes belatedly realized that he and the Truman administration had clearly overestimated America’s bargaining position. Instead of begging for renewed credit, ironically Stalin and Molotov also believed that America’s overproduction threatened another economic depression and that such a situation would force the extension of credit to the Soviet Union without any need for concessions on their part.⁸ As to the threat of nuclear weapons, possessing them and having a mandate to freely use them were two very different things. Soviet leaders appeared to understand this maxim better than their American counterparts. While politically this development meant the United States did not possess any appreciable leverage over the actions

⁸ Freeland, 52.

of the Soviet Union, particularly in postwar Eastern Europe, but since the U.S.S.R. was not a dominant player in international commerce, this development did not threaten multilateralism from a strictly economic standpoint. Though predating the articulation of the Containment Strategy, the failure to bring the Soviet Union into America's multilateral world-economic system, roughly translated into the early existence of an economic Containment Policy.

Ironically, the greatest danger to the Truman administration's postwar plans did not come from the Soviet Union at all, but from the people, military, and Congress of the United States of America. There were three interrelated debates that took place in the immediate postwar period that most clearly revealed that a gap existed between the postwar goals of a significant portion of the American people and those of the long-serving government of the Roosevelt-Truman administrations. The two with the most direct and lasting impact upon what would become the Joint American Military Mission to Aid Turkey were the debate over demobilization and the British Loan, each of which this study will treat in brief detail. The third was the 1946-1947 installment of the long-running debate over Universal Military Training (UMT). For the purposes of this study it is enough to summarize that UMT failed before Congress, due to widespread popular opposition and in many ways made permanent the problems that resulted from demobilization. While the British Loan debate threatened the economic and postwar reconstruction goals of the Truman administration, the debates over demobilization and UMT threatened to straightjacket for years the military and strategic capabilities of the Pentagon, the Department of State, and the White House.

The first test of wills between the internationally-minded government and the war-weary populace centered on the demobilization of the armed forces and took place from September to December 1945. The debate in Congress focused specifically on the speed and scale of the

drawdown. The most consistent cry from the American people in these months was “bring the boys home.” Any potential pool of available American military might which the United States government desired to maintain in order to oppose Soviet strength at various points in the world had to first survive the popular demands for demobilization. The War Department, in the supreme irony of this event, actually precipitated its own over-demobilization when it belatedly realized by force of public and Congressional pressure that its attempts at artificially maintaining a larger Army had instead created sufficient anti-military sentiment to imperil its future popular support and funding. By the end of December, as a result of the pressure and the lack of centralized records to forecast such an outcome, the Army had demobilized a total of 4,303,000 personnel in four months, a full 1.8 million more than planned. Instead of leveling out at 2.5 million men in mid-1948, as planned in 1945, by June 1947 the entire U.S. military contained less than 1.6 million personnel with a total Army strength of 990,000.⁹ As of mid-1947 this meant that America possessed only the sixth largest army in the world.¹⁰ This total had to fulfill the occupation requirements for Germany, Japan, and Korea, as well as garrison the country’s global bases acquired during the war. As a result of demobilization and relentless budget cuts, the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Omar Bradley, stated before Congress in 1948 that with only one “combat ready” division the Army “could not fight its way out of a paper bag.”¹¹ The Army would carry this deficit into the next decade, profoundly affecting the U.S. military’s contingency war planning, its psychological self-confidence, and the estimates and recommendations it would provide to the executive branch.

⁹ Howard A. Munson IV, “The Rhetoric and Consequences of the Post-World War II Congressional Debate over Military Demobilization” (TMs, Portland State University, 2006), 93-94.

¹⁰ Anderson, 152.

¹¹ Bradley, Omar N. and Clay Blair, *A General’s Life: an Autobiography by General of the Army* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 474.

While most historians emphasize the noninterventionist politics among some of the Congressional critics of demobilization as driving an irresponsible act of politicians exploiting an emotional issue instead of protecting national security, the often legitimate discontent with the military's performance and its intentions was the principle complaint of servicemen and the main issue of discussion in Congress. The long-term significance of this discontent was that it placed substantial and lasting bounds upon the international power that America's leaders could wield. Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal referred to it as "the paralyzing consequences of demobilization."¹² A *US News and World Report* editorial from March 1946 correctly identified the stakes and direction of this contest when it concluded that "after four years of war the *populace* favored bringing the soldiers home not the building up of strength abroad."¹³ The final result of this rapid dissolution of America's conventional forces was that a nuclear air campaign by the Air Force's newly created Strategic Air Command became the only military response that the United States was actually prepared to make in the event of war.

The next test of the internationalism of the Truman administration resulted from the proposed British Loan. Although the loan negotiations proceeded smoothly, the executive branch duly had to apply for the funds from Congress. In January 1946 the administration submitted its request, just as it was beginning to comprehend the consequences of the recent demobilization debacle. Truman and his advisors hoped that the loan would sail quickly through Congress, setting a precedent for securing future reconstruction funds, upon which the realization of their multilateral economic goals depended. Instead of quick passage, however, the loan request became a battleground for a six-month Congressional debate that threatened any plans for

¹² Walter Millis, ed., *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York: The Viking Press, 1951), 107.

¹³ *U.S. News and World Report* XX (March 22, 1946), 22 in Munson, 94. Italics added.

bolstering Western Europe against Communist pressure as well as the vision of enduring American economic dominance.

The Republican minority in Congress aggressively attacked the loan with fiscal arguments and Anglophobic, isolationist, and anti-imperialist rhetoric. All seemed lost until the last minute defection of the most internationally interventionist Republicans secured the funds. Even after its passage, the British Loan was a defeat for the administration. It was clear that there was no popular mandate in support of the White House's economic policy of multilateralism. Americans were indeed turning inward after the Second World War, just as they had done in the aftermath of the First World War. Opinion polls taken between 1945 and 1946 demonstrated that "fewer Americans considered international problems primary than during the late 1930s, when isolationism had been a major constraint upon American diplomacy."¹⁴ Most Americans had high hopes for the United Nations Organization and that after the horrors of World War Two, world leaders would settle their issue within the world body, rather than risk another war.

The midterm elections of 1946 confirmed what earlier polls suggested regarding the general public's growing disinterest in international affairs. While there were no doubt a multitude of issues on the minds of voters, the fact that Republicans won decisive control of both the House and the Senate for the first time since 1930 attest to the popular discontent with the Truman administration and its domestic and foreign policies. By November, President Truman's approval ratings had plummeted from their 87% high to a sobering 32% low.¹⁵ For all practical purposes, after the stiff opposition to the British Loan that Republicans had shown as the minority, the Truman administration's international postwar plans appeared doomed with a

¹⁴ Freeland, 65.

¹⁵ Freeland, 77-78.

Congress now dominated by the rival party. In addition, many of the new members of Congress were from the far right of the Republican Party and were championing balanced budgets and rejecting American funding for anyone else's postwar reconstruction. After the midterm elections Congress was more Republican, more conservative, and even more opposed to the plans of the Truman administration than ever before. One of the new majority's first items of business, for example, was to propose lowering President Truman's very tight budget of 37.5 billion dollars by an additional six billion or nearly eighteen percent. Such a move confirmed the administration's fears that without desperate action they would be powerless to continue constructing economic multilateralism or to participate in European reconstruction.¹⁶ International events were unfolding in such a way that a pretext for desperate action would soon become available.

The 1946 War Scare and Anglo-American War Plans

At the same time that the British and American negotiators were haggling over the interest rate of the proposed loan, the State Department was still trying to figure out how to respond to the June 1945 Soviet demands upon Turkey. U.S. diplomats declined British and Turkish suggestions for the issuance of a joint statement of protest, since Turkey, with British backing, had already rejected the Soviet ultimatum. Throughout the rest of the summer and into the fall, Russian, American, British, and Turkish diplomats continued discussing the issue with little agreement. Moscow dropped the demand for the two eastern provinces, but remained adamant that Russian security concerns dictated a Soviet presence on the Straits. Britain and Turkey maintained united opposition to the Russian stipulations, while Washington's attempts to

¹⁶ Michael J. Hogan, *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 86.

produce a compromise failed to win any support in Moscow.¹⁷ By November of 1945 events beyond the scope of the Straits, but related to the security concerns of the region, began to raise the pitch of the discourse between the wartime allies.

It was actually a sequence of events across Turkey's eastern border, in Iran, that pushed Washington closer to London and Ankara. In November, two communist uprisings took place in Soviet-occupied northern Iran. With the Soviet military refusing Iranian government forces access to put down the revolts, by December the insurgents were successful and declared the independence of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad. U.S. diplomats and intelligence sources in the region began reporting the buildup of Soviet troops in the Caucasus and in Bulgaria, indicating possible imminent action against Turkey.¹⁸ Following an unsuccessful foreign ministers conference, also in December, even President Truman began to voice serious doubts about the legitimate objectives of Soviet actions and the means that they were using to attain them. In a January 1946 memo to Secretary Byrnes, Truman confided his belief that there was "no doubt that the Soviets intend to attack Turkey" and unless Russia was "faced with an iron fist and strong language, another war [was] in the making."¹⁹

Truman's pessimism reflected the noticeable breakdown in diplomatic cooperation and the increasingly confrontational attitudes and actions of the major powers. In January, communist guerrilla activity began escalating in Greece. On 9 February Stalin gave a rare public speech before the Politburo stressing inevitable hostility between capitalism and communism. Later that month news of a Soviet spy ring in Canada combined well with George Kennan's "Long Telegram" to convince most U.S. foreign policy formulators that the ideology of

¹⁷ David J. Alvarez, *Bureaucracy and the Cold War Diplomacy: The United States and Turkey, 1945-1946* (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1980), 72-73.

¹⁸ Athanassopoulou, 45.

¹⁹ Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs* vol. 1: *Years of Decisions*, (Garden City, NY: Double Day, 1955), 522, in Harris, 19.

communist world revolution and not legitimate security concerns was the driving force behind Soviet actions and ambitions.²⁰ The implications of ideological motivations being behind Soviet actions were that there would not be limits of any kind to Soviet expansionism, justifiable or otherwise, and only force or the threat of force could stop it.

As if to confirm these suspicions, on 3 March Soviet tanks and infantry began fanning out across northwestern Iran, simultaneously heading for the border of Turkey and Iraq, as well as advancing to within eighteen miles of Tehran. The most obvious intent of these actions, in hindsight, was to frighten the Iranian government into providing the Soviet Union with an oil concession similar to those it had already granted to Great Britain and to the United States. At the time, however, London and Washington viewed these actions as a Soviet test of Western will to resist, if not the start of an actual invasion of the greater Middle East. World outcry in the United Nations, led by the United States and Great Britain was immediate and called on the Soviets to withdraw from Iran in accordance with their wartime promises.²¹

Western leaders responded in a concerted manner. On 5 March former Prime Minister Winston Churchill delivered his “Iron Curtain” speech in Fulton, Missouri, with President Truman supportively sitting behind him on the stage. That same day, Secretary of State Byrnes issued a stiff letter of protest to Moscow regarding the failed withdrawal from Iran and took the heretofore unprecedented step of releasing the contents of the note to the press, all before the

²⁰ Alvarez, 79.

²¹ After a tense few weeks, Stalin informed President Truman that the Soviet Union did not plan on invading Turkey and that within six weeks all Soviet troops would be withdrawn from Iran. Stalin further acknowledged that the Azerbaijan and Kurdish breakaway provinces were an internal Iranian issue. Despite the Soviet Premier’s assurances, Russian troops remained in force in northern Iran beyond the promised withdrawal date. George McGhee, *The US-Turkish –NATO Middle East Connection: How the Truman Doctrine Contained the Soviets in the Middle East* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990), 15-16.

Soviets had even managed a response.²² The next day the USS *Missouri* sailed up the Straits to Istanbul “a token [gesture] of the new American stance” and the first concrete manifestation of America’s strategic and military interest in the region. No ship of that size and lethality had ever sailed up the Straits and no American warship of any class had visited Turkey in almost sixteen years.²³ A month later, on 6 April, President Truman gave his Army Day speech, warning of the importance of the “sovereignty and integrity of the countries of the Near and Middle East.” Finally, on 10 May, Soviet forces completed their belated withdrawal from Iranian territory. While the Soviet pullout appeared to vindicate the new get tough American attitude, a July study by the U.S. military predicted that communist Russia would continue a “war of nerves” policy against its former allies.²⁴

The military planners proved correct. Rather than discouraging Moscow, the *Missouri* visit confirmed as never before the need for Soviet control of the Straits. Soviet radio charged America with resorting to “ultimatums and violent notes and the threat of its naval guns.”²⁵ With most of Greece except Athens and Salonika in the hands of communists, on 7 August the Soviets renewed their demands for bases on the Straits.²⁶ This time, however, Moscow not only augmented the demands with an outburst of anti-Turkish propaganda from all sides of Anatolia, but also with “a flurry of Soviet military activity in the Black Sea and Caucasus.”²⁷ With almost three hundred thousand Red Army troops taking up positions along the various Turkish borders and naval maneuvers only forty-five miles off the Turkish coast, war yet again seemed

²² John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), 310.

²³ Howard, 37.

²⁴ Harris, 19-20.

²⁵ Howard, 69.

²⁶ McGhee, *The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection*, 16.

²⁷ Harris, 23.

imminent.²⁸ It appeared that Stalin's earlier reassurances had been merely a gesture to buy some international good will while preparing for the next move. Suspecting that this was indeed the buildup for a real attack, Ankara deployed its military forces, also under the auspices of large-scale maneuvers.²⁹ Yet, in the end, no attack materialized. Historian George Harris characterized this incident as, "The Kremlin was on a fishing expedition to see what profit it could derive...yet until the U.S.S.R. had achieved something of a nuclear capability, Stalin was everywhere unwilling to chance provoking U.S. retaliation by engaging in force of arms against a determined opponent.³⁰ In his attempts to divine "exactly how far the West would go to defend this part of the world" Stalin was discovering that the answer was much more than he had anticipated.³¹

At this juncture it is important to once again note that the dramatic uptick in hostility between the Soviet Union and the Anglo-American governments had not as yet exerted a significant pull upon the attention of the American people. What many historians refer to as the "1946 War Scare" was something most Americans in 1946 were simply not aware of. The Truman administration, the State Department, and the Pentagon, by contrast, were falling into line along two important points of view. The first was the traditional British perspective that feared Russian imperialism and particularly feared its spread into the Middle East. The second was the view, best articulated by George Kennan, which saw radical communist ideology as the motivation behind Soviet expansionism. In the same way that the demobilization and British Loan debates had demonstrated just months prior, the gap between the issues dominating the minds of those in government and those of the governed remained quite wide.

²⁸ Howard, 55.

²⁹ McGhee, *The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection*, 16.

³⁰ Harris, 30.

³¹ Zubok and Pleshakov, 93.

Indicative of this divide, just two weeks after the renewal of Soviet demands for the Straits, on 23 August 1946, the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) issued a report that reflected the beginning of the military-led transformation in America's foreign policy toward Turkey and the Soviet Union. In response to Soviet actions toward the Middle East, the report described the events as part of "a calculated Soviet policy of expanding Soviet de facto geographical political control" concluding significantly that Turkey "was the most important factor in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East."³² The Joint Chiefs then recommended that the War and Navy Departments offer "concrete economic and military aid to the Turks."³³ Unbeknownst to Turkish leaders and the people of Turkey this qualification would ultimately have very meaningful implications for their country and their search for security. For the American people, most still had no idea of the degree to which the wartime alliance had collapsed, nor could they conceive of the growing importance of such a far away and foreign country as Turkey.

Though Secretary of State James Byrnes approved the idea of directly supplying some economic aid to Turkey, he felt that it would be best for Great Britain to continue to deliver the military aid, with the United States perhaps secretly paying for the munitions. The sudden interest on the part of the Pentagon and the Department of the State at its most basic level reflected both a belief in the possibility of immanent Soviet action against Turkey, as well as the fact that U.S. strategic planning had begun taking the Middle East into account, though only in a limited and specific capacity.

³² *FRUS 1946*, vol. VII, 857-858.

³³ Michael J. Cohen, *Fighting World War Three from the Middle East: Allied Contingency Plans, 1945-1954* (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1997), 51.

Back in March of 1946, in direct response to the Soviet actions in Iran, the top military staffs of the United States and Great Britain had resumed their first joint strategic studies since the Japanese surrender. This is particularly relevant, because militaries are by nature secretive and exclusive. The fact that the militaries of both nations would begin joint planning, divulging the sensitive information that such planning required, reflected the seriousness of the international situation by 1946 for those who knew enough to be worried. Codenamed *Pincher*, this contingency series initiated planning for a world war within the next three years. The locations of the first two area studies of the *Pincher* series, *Broadview* and *Griddle*, both completed by August of 1946, demonstrated the seriousness of the recent events. *Broadview* dealt with the continental United States and American overseas bases and reflected the U.S. military's natural top priority. Of particular interest to this work, the *Griddle* study did not deal with an attack on Britain or even Western Europe, but instead dealt with Turkey.³⁴

The explanation for this was that for both plans and the war-winning American air offensive, operation *Makefast*, Turkish resistance to a Soviet attack would be a crucial factor. Other than committing spare U.S. troops, which were rapidly disappearing into the demobilization fiasco, only the resistance of the Turkish military, followed by a concerted defense of Palestine by British forces could, according to the planners, buy enough time for U.S. B-29 bombers flying from Egypt to carry out strikes against Soviet industrial centers beyond the Ural Mountains. While bases in Britain could strike the old heartland of Russia, only the British air base of Abu Suier at Suez in Egypt could reach beyond the Urals to the Soviet industries transplanted eastwards during the war. The Soviet Union's security buffer was so complete that U.S. bombers based in Britain would only be able to strike at 4 percent of Russia's crude oil

³⁴ Cohen, 54.

industrial capacity compared to 69 percent from Egypt. With estimates of Soviet oil reserves at only three months under wartime conditions, the joint planners believed that a task force of U.S. B-29 bombers operating from Abu Suier could destroy 70-80 percent of the Soviet Union's refining capacity within nine months. The Soviet war machine would then grind to a halt in less than a year.³⁵ Britain's position in Egypt, in general, and the Suez base complex, in particular, became the linchpin of the entire Anglo-American defense plans in the immediate postwar period. Historians credit the Soviet spy Donald Maclean, one of the "Cambridge Five," with discovering the substance of the Anglo-American war plans, including the proposed use of nuclear weapons, dutifully informing Moscow, and thus preventing an attack against Turkey from ever materializing. Molotov later offered indirect support for this explanation when he declared, "It is good that we retreated in time or [the situation] would have led to joint aggression against us."³⁶

Despite the acknowledged importance of Turkey and the Middle East by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the small expense of theoretical war game scenarios with the British, the domestic political reality in the United States dictated that Great Britain remained the only power actively involved in propping up the regimes of the Eastern Mediterranean. Yet even with the British aid, according to the Anglo-American war planners in 1946, the antiquated Turkish military would be a mere speed bump for the envisioned Soviet onslaught. The planners estimated that Soviet forces would attack Turkey from the west and the east, steamrolling the Turks within three weeks. In the aftermath of Americans demobilization, only the British occupation forces in Palestine and Egypt would be available to try to continue delaying the Soviet drive to Suez.

³⁵ Cohen, 132-133. The joint planners fixed the 17 Soviet cities that combined to produce two-thirds of Russia's petroleum as the weakest link in the Soviet war machine. Cohen, 18.

³⁶ Zubok and Pleshakov, 93.

Without substantial British and American reinforcements, which would not exist in time, the planners estimated that Suez would fall six months after the start of hostilities.³⁷ This would be three months shy of the nine months necessary for a complete air campaign and, would theoretically, lengthen the war, perhaps catastrophically.

Turkey, therefore, not only represented a potential position for the containment of communism, but its military would be an unwitting key component in Anglo-American war plans for either victory or defeat in a future war with the Soviet Union. This dissertation argues that an unofficial and original purpose of the American mission to Turkey would be to make the country's inevitable sacrifice in a world war a more useful sacrifice. A mission to Turkey would provide the ideal vehicle for improving the efficacy of the Turkish military, as well as the possibility of gaining influence in its deployment. Anglo-American war planners feared that the Turks would squander much of their military in a futile defense of European Turkey, instead of focusing on defending the mountainous eastern half of the country, which would more efficiently buying time for British and American bombers operating from Suez. Any increase to Turkey's defensive capabilities would be most useful, from the Anglo-American perspective, if the Turks used them to defend the Asiatic side of the Straits and eastern mountain passes. This strategic importance of Turkey highlights much of the behind-the-scenes significance of the ensuing Joint American Military Mission to Aid Turkey.

The British Collapse and the Truman Doctrine Speech

By the beginning of 1947, the subject of whether the United States was going to sponsor or ignore postwar European reconstruction, repeatedly deferred by both the Roosevelt and Truman Administrations was entering crisis proportions. America's strongest European and

³⁷ Cohen, 20.

international ally, the British Empire, was entering a period of rapid collapse. The Arctic blast of 1947 that hit all of Europe, and Britain in particular, was the stone that tripped Europe's last official empire. In the midst of the power outages, frozen ports, skyrocketing unemployment, and crushing trade deficits that resulted from the three months of storms, the British government made two painful announcements. First was that its response to the storms had already consumed \$800 million of the \$3.75 billion American loan. Over the remainder of 1947 the American money would sustain Britain like life support, with \$100 million disappearing every week for the rest of the year.³⁸ On 21 February 1947, the second announcement went to Washington and declared the British Empire's inability to continue supplying military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey. America's strongest and most stable ally in Europe was on its knees and in no position to lead Western European or Middle Eastern defense. Despite Britain's glaringly public weakness, the rest of Europe and the Middle East were in arguably worse shape.

As early as September 1946 a joint American-UN Temporary Subcommittee on Economic Reconstruction of War Devastated Areas forecast "serious shortages of food, housing, domestic equipment, tools, footwear, and raw materials throughout Europe." With the exception of Sweden, no European country had returned to pre-war levels of industrial production even before the winter storms hit.³⁹ Economic destabilization promised to only inflame the volatile political and social situation in Europe. The governments of France and Italy both contained significant Communist minorities that would likely grow with popular discontent. Germany and Austria, in ruins and under joint occupation, were also full of desperate people. Though physically untouched by the war, Turkey faced imminent economic exhaustion due to the full

³⁸ Anderson, 165-166.

³⁹ Freeland, 71.

mobilization of its military forces in response to the war and the postwar Soviet demands on the Straits. Worst of all, in Greece, full-scale civil war continued to rage between monarchist and Communist forces with no end in sight. In the United States, a war-weary population had already succeeded in bringing the boys home, but also wanted balanced budgets, no Universal Military Training, an end to rationing and price controls, and a United Nations that was responsible for handling international problems. The Republican control of Congress almost guaranteed that nothing would change the new status quo. Only the British note regarding the pullout from Greece and Turkey offered the possibility of dramatic change.

In a February 1947 memo Joseph Jones of the State Department lamented, “We thus face a situation similar to that prevailing prior to Pearl Harbor: a powerlessness on the part of the government to act because of Congressional or public unawareness of the danger or cost of inaction.”⁴⁰ At a 7 March cabinet meeting President Truman announced that he would attempt to steer the ship of Congressional and public opinion. “The decision is,” declared Truman, “to ask Congress for 250 million [dollars for Greece] and to say this is only the beginning. It means [the] U.S. going into European politics. It means the greatest selling job ever.”⁴¹ For strategic, military, humanitarian, and predominantly economic motivations, the United States was about to expand from being a traditionally hemispheric power to becoming an interventionist world power.

At noon on 12 March 1947, President Truman addressed an emergency joint-session of Congress for the purpose of provoking action. “The gravity of the situation which confronts the world today,” began the President, “necessitates my appearance...the foreign policy and national

⁴⁰ Freeland, 81.

⁴¹ Anderson, 169.

security of this country are involved.” Truman went on to describe the tragic and dire situation in Greece whose chance for recovery, “Is today threatened by the terrorist activities of several thousand armed men, led by Communists.” Next the President depicted Turkey as an underdeveloped guardian of Middle East order and called for financial assistance to effect modernization for the maintenance of continued national integrity. Finally, Truman drew the proverbial line in the sand declaring:

At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life [freedom and oppression]....I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples...I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid.

The implications of failing to aid Greece and Turkey concluded the president, “Will be far-reaching to the West as well as to the East.”⁴²

The president’s speech became a watershed victory for the embattled and enfeebled administration, as well as for its postwar policies and its domestic popularity.⁴³ Public Law 75, Truman’s \$400 million dollars of aid to Greece and Turkey, decisively passed in Congress and became the administration’s hoped for precedent for European reconstruction. According to George McGhee, the then Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, “The Truman Doctrine is rightly credited with leading directly to the promulgation of the Marshall Plan four months later...to the Berlin airlift...and to the success in July 1949 of the US initiative in creating NATO.”⁴⁴ Thus, the president was able to secure Congressional funding for European reconstruction, saving the administration’s international postwar plans, helping to realize the original goal of the continuation of American “supremacy in world finance, commerce and

⁴² U.S. Congress, *Congressional Record* 80th Cong., 1st sess., doc. 171, pt. 2 (12 March 1947): 1980.

⁴³ Memos from Truman staffers from late 1947 demonstrate that there was by then an articulated understanding of the “considerable political advantage in the administration in its battle with the Kremlin” for the president resulting from “times of crisis.” Craig and Logevall, 80.

⁴⁴ McGhee, *The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection*, 33.

industry.” Almost as an afterthought to the international events that triggered it and the domestic politics it had to overcome, the Truman Doctrine speech also created the American mission to aid Turkey, which along with the mission to Greece, became the first peacetime military missions to foreign nations in United States history. The mission to Turkey, therefore, presents a unique vantage point from which to examine the shifting motivations and goals of the United States as it first committed itself to a position of world leadership and to active participation in the Cold War.

CHAPTER THREE

THE MISSION BEGINS: ESTABLISHING THE MISSION TO AID TURKEY

Nearly a year after the Truman Doctrine speech, on 12 February 1948, on the outskirts of the Turkish capital of Ankara, an American clerk struck the final period on his typewriter and withdrew the last page of the first monthly report from the Joint American Military Mission to Aid Turkey. Based on the contents of that first report, it is easy to imagine the disappointment felt by all associated with the mission, whether American or Turk. Two lines from the report explained the situation: “No actual training of the Turkish Army has been accomplished to date” and “no American aid equipment has as yet arrived in Turkey.”¹ Though geographically the equivalent to the Soviet Union supplying military aid to Mexico in 1947, the Truman Doctrine did not initially pose any threat to Soviet control over Southeastern Europe, the Caucasus, or Turkey. Instead, the first year of inactivity on the part of the United States seemed to indicate that rapid modernization of the Turkish military was not an immediate priority in the aftermath of the president’s watershed speech.

After President Truman’s polarizing call to action at the emergency session of Congress back on 12 March 1947 there was indeed a clear disconnect between the rhetoric of the speech and the apparent reality of the “emergency.” On one hand, a closer examination of the details reveals a partial explanation in the complexity inherent to establishing such a mission for the very first time. On the other hand, this same examination also further strengthens the argument that overcoming Republican opposition and setting a precedent for international peacetime

¹ Joint American Military Mission for Aid to Turkey (hereafter cited as JAMMAT), Adjutant General Section Central Files Unit, Monthly Progress Reports 1947-51, 1948, January, box No. 13, RG 334, National Archives.

intervention were much higher priorities than saving Turkey from imminent collapse in the face of sustained Soviet pressure. After all, President Truman needed his interventionist foreign agenda to succeed if he expected to win another term in office and Turkey and Greece had provided the opportunity for saving his administration's postwar agenda.

This chapter, therefore, focuses on the first year and a half of the mission itself, from the first year spent forming the mission to the substantive accomplishments of JAMMAT's first six months of actual operations. The first section of this chapter treats the preliminary work of setting up the mission, which took up most of the first year. The next four brief sections look at the first six months of active mission operations from each of the four branches of the mission. Had the mission not quickly demonstrated achievements during this crucial six-month period once it was up and running it would have ensured its own insignificance, both from the perspective of Ankara and that of Washington. Instead, the first six months of active mission operations laid a foundation for JAMMAT's short-term and long-term relevance. Two themes run through the sections on the work of each branch. One theme emphasizes the totality of the collective actions and accomplishments of the mission personnel and how they created a blueprint within the U.S. military for a systematic peacetime modernization program in a foreign country.² The second theme through these sections identifies the ways in which the work of the mission also began a process of steering the Turkish military into greater fulfillment of the sacrificial lamb role cast for Turkey by secret U.S. contingency war plans. The influence that JAMMAT personnel came to enjoy allowed them to be the crowbar levering the Turkish military into the shape and positions that U.S. war planners most desired. The final section of this chapter

² The American Mission to Aid Greece, by contrast, was a stabilization and counter-insurgency program. The focus of Greek mission was the defeat the relatively small Yugoslav-backed guerilla bands raiding into northern Greece trying to undermine the legitimacy of the government in Athens. The U.S. mission in Greece accomplished this by the end of 1949 and, after Belgrade and Moscow split, it became a permanent non-issue.

summarizes how the mission acted to fulfill Turkish goals, but whenever possible where those goals simultaneously fulfilled the objectives of the contingency war plans, plans which would have deeply disconcerted Turkish officials had they known. Because the mission became a success during its first six months of active operation, its personnel gained greater influence and the mission's early achievements allowed it to gain still greater long-term significance.

The Beginning of the American Mission to Aid Turkey

In its general form the primary goal of the mission to aid Turkey was to prevent Soviet Russian domination of the strategic land occupied by the Republic of Turkey. By 1947 Great Britain would not nor could not defend Turkey from a concerted Soviet takeover. In a narrower sense, it was the people of Turkey, particularly their will and ability to resist, that were preventing a Soviet occupation. As this study demonstrates, it was an understatement to say that there was no shortage of will to resist Soviet pressure among the general Turkish population. U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Edwin C. Wilson identified the source of this will to resist Russian domination as "a hatred of Russia and anything savoring of Russia, which has been passed down by the Turks from father to son for generations."³ The theoretical outcome of a future Russo-Turkish war would not hinge upon the Turks possessing a will resist, but upon having the ability to defend their country. For the people of Turkey, many of whom remembered firsthand the lessons of their War of Independence, the Turkish Army was the only entity that could protect the nation. While this pervasive view had always, and would continue to, undercut the independence and relevance of the Turkish Air Force and Navy, the centrality of the Turkish Army was a fact that all groups involved, British, American, Soviet, and Turkish, were in essential agreement. To American planners, this meant that modernizing the Turkish Army was

³ *FRUS 1947*, vol. V, 260.

the principle goal of the Joint American Military Mission to Aid Turkey. Had American interests remained this straightforward the history of the mission might have been much less relevant.

The first step in the formation of JAMMAT got off to a good start. Public Law 75, which provided the \$400 million requested by the president on 12 March, made relatively quick passage through Congress becoming law as of 22 May. By that date, however, there was still no entity with the authorization to begin spending the \$100 million portion allocated to Turkey. It is important to note that the precedent created by the Truman Doctrine was already bearing additional and more important fruit from the perspective of the Truman administration. Just a few weeks after the passage of Public Law 75, on 5 June 1947, Secretary of State George C. Marshall unveiled the administration's blueprint to rebuild Europe. The European Recovery Program (ERP) also known as the Marshall Plan essentially overtook the Greek and Turkish aid missions as a matter of significance in Washington before either mission was really yet functioning. Though some ERP funds would ultimately make their way to Greece and Turkey, the vastly larger scale and the priorities of the new program signaled that the true international focus of President Truman and his administration was with Western Europe and not the Eastern Mediterranean.

Despite being so quickly overshadowed by U.S. priorities in Western Europe, the mission to Turkey continued. The actual inauguration of the aid program to Turkey did not take place until 12 July, with the Survey Mission, whose job was to determine Turkey's needs, issuing its report three days later. The Survey Mission had toured Turkey from May to July 1947 and its findings provided the initial goals that the aid mission would attempt to fulfill. The report noted the weaknesses of Turkey, from its manpower heavy but equipment deficient Army, to its undersized and underdeveloped Navy and Air Force, to the inefficient organization of the

Turkish armed forces at the lower and upper levels. Since “the equipment of all the Turkish armed forces is in general inadequate and outmoded,” observed the survey report, “All elements of the Turkish armed forces require training with more modern weapons and equipment.” The report recommended that “a United States mission should be sent to Turkey to train the Turks in the technical use and maintenance of any matériel which we may furnish them.”⁴ The primary goal of the mission would, therefore, be to increase the ability of the Turks to defend themselves, through the delivery of more modern equipment and the instruction in its use. As to duration, the ambassador’s report received one redaction upon its arrival in Washington. Representatives of the U.S. Army and Navy removed the report’s recommendation for instituting a continuing aid program of \$100,000,000 every year for a total of five years. Instead, in order to avoid political opposition from Congress, the funding would remain on a year-to-year basis.⁵ Even in the context of at most a five-year lifespan, the aid mission to Turkey was originally supposed to be a short-term modernization program.

The goals and work of the American mission would never be quite that straightforward. Despite pronouncements about the “probability” that Turkey could defend itself successfully against a Russian attack, “provided that her armed forces were completely provided with modern equipment” and if “the United States and/or Great Britain” promptly aided Turkey militarily, the report did admit that “the aid to be furnished to Turkey under the present program will be totally inadequate to insure that its armed forces will be able, in case of attack by Russia, to hold out until outside assistance can arrive.”⁶ From the beginning there was this fundamental contradiction. A public modernization program of the Turkish military so that the Turkish people

⁴ *FRUS 1947*, vol. V, 233-234.

⁵ *FRUS 1947*, vol. V, 236, 258.

⁶ *FRUS 1947*, vol. V, 233-234

would continue to resist Russian pressure. Belief on the part of American planners from the Survey Mission on that Turkey could successfully defend against a Russian invasion with a complete modernization program and outside military assistance from the United States or Great Britain. Yet private acknowledgement that the modernization program was going to be inadequate and outside help would not arrive in time. Examination of what the American aid mission actually accomplished combined with the contents of secret Anglo-American contingency war plans, and the fluctuations of U.S. policy toward Turkey and the Middle East will provide the closest semblance of logic behind these contradictions.

On 23 July U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Edwin C. Wilson became the mission's first chief, in charge of the overall mission and demonstrating one of the handful of attempts to downplay the inherently military nature of the mission to Turkey. In fact, the ambassador's appointment reflected the thoroughly joint nature of policy planning and implementation of these first postwar missions between the Departments of State and Defense. Even with the appointment of the ambassador as chief, however, there were still no personnel for the mission. As the first Coordinator for Aid to Greece and Turkey for the State Department, George McGhee later described how "during the effort to get approval of Public Law 75 (Greek-Turkish Aid), little thought had been given as to how it would be administered [and] when its administration was finally given over to the State Department, there was no precedent to go by."⁷ From the beginning, therefore, the personnel for the mission to Turkey would invent the mission as they went along.

⁷ George McGhee, *On the Frontline in the Cold War: An Ambassador Reports* (New York: Praeger, 1997), 28.

Fortunately for McGhee and the aid missions “a plethora of former participants in the war effort were eager and ready to take part.”⁸ It proved significant that from the beginning of the mission, coming in the shadow of the Second World War as it did, the United States retained a vast pool of individuals, civilian, military, and former military, who possessed the invaluable experience that only the exigencies of war could provide. The men who staffed the mission were eagerly looking for some way to utilize and pass on the skills and expertise that they had acquired during the war. These men knew not only the theory of their given trade, but they had also mastered extensive practice of it, often under the far less than ideal circumstances of incomplete preparation and chaos that usually accompanied war in general and combat in particular. The recent “real” life experiences of most of the mission personnel would be an invisible, but substantive factor constantly aiding the efficacy of the mission during its first and most formative years.

Six months after the president’s speech the organization of the Joint American Military Mission to Aid Turkey finally began. To meet the endemic needs that the survey identified, there would be four basic components of JAMMAT, one group for each branch of the military and a civilian group responsible for building roads. The largest, and always the most important, was the Turkey United States Army Group (TUSAG), whose head was also usually the overall chief of the mission. Coming second in budgetary priority was the Turkey United States Air Force Group (TUSAFG), followed by the Turkey United States Navy Group (TUSNG). During August each military branch selected a chief for its individual mission and the first personnel began arriving in Turkey. The fourth and final group was the Public Roads Administration (PRA). By January 1948 there were a total of 108 mission personnel in Turkey, 53 with the Army Group, 19

⁸ McGhee, *On the Frontline in the Cold War*, 29.

with the Air Group, 16 with the Navy Group, and 20 with the Roads Group. As yet, no equipment had arrived and, therefore, no training had commenced. The members of the mission faced the daunting task of trying to modernize a military of over 600,000, in a culture that none of them were familiar with and in an underdeveloped country where none of them spoke the language.⁹ In spite of this delayed start, the eventual accomplishments of the mission would be instrumental in facilitating an important transformation in American foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.

Even with the total absence of aid material and any training programs for its use, the members of the mission were not idle and, as indicated in their reports, a number of important trends were already becoming discernible. The activities in these early months from August 1947 to January 1948 were essentially the same for each group as reported by the Army Group:

The operations of the United States Army Group of the American Mission for Aid to Turkey have mainly concerned with procurement and formation of the staff, organization, orientation of the staff, preparation and submission of supply requirements, conduct of surveys of the Turkish military establishment, with particular emphasis on the school system, and preparation of plans and materials for the conduct of the instruction and training to be presented to the Turkish Army in the spring training program.

During all of this preliminary work the members of the mission began their extensive interactions with Turks from all over the country. After wide-ranging inspection tours the reports painted a consistent picture of the reaction of America's new partner. "All [mission] personnel reported upon their inspections," went one early Army Group description, "and were enthusiastic in their comments regarding the cordial reception and complete cooperation of the Turkish Army officials." The Air Group summary similarly stated, "Liaison with the Turkish Air Force has

⁹ A principal goal of the mission was to reduce the manpower of the Turkish military from 600,000 to around 300,000, while still increasing its overall firepower, such the Turkish armed forces would place less of a financial drain upon the national budget, yet still delay a Soviet attack more effectively. JAMMAT, 1948, January, box 13.

been most cordial from every viewpoint.” Mission personnel even noted that the Turkish General Staff “accepted with enthusiasm... the plans for the courses and agreed to furnish the necessary school troops and ranges.” The first underlying observation of the mission was the apparent universal zeal and willing cooperation on the part of the Turks. Even the Road Group reports noted that the “reaction of Turkish (civilian) officials to the [roads] program has been enthusiastic.”¹⁰ Enthusiastic and cooperative appeared to be the most operative adjectives the mission personnel applied to their interactions with their Turkish counterparts.

The first test of the new relationship between the United States and Turkey resulted from the slow delivery of aid material. For the professional military men of the mission the delay was an embarrassment and a source of evident frustration. The situation became so intolerable that the chief of TUSAG Major General Horace McBride flew to Washington D.C. to personally incite action. He had a powerful ally in Secretary of State George C. Marshall, the former Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army and “organizer of victory” during World War II. While McBride was trying to grease the logistics gears of army bureaucracy, Secretary Marshall took the matter directly to his counterpart at the Department of Defense. In a letter to Secretary Forrestal, Marshall made clear that the “delay in the shipments of aid cargoes to Turkey” was unacceptable and “a source of great concern to the Department of State.”¹¹ Indeed, the scale of mission shipments into Turkey was almost as embarrassing as the contents. During all of February, for example, only 92.8 tons of mission cargo arrived in Turkish ports. Of this amount, “81.8 tons were household goods, personal property, and automobiles belonging to mission members.”¹² All three United States military branches could not manage to deliver anything heavier than office

¹⁰ JAMMAT, 1948, January, box 13.

¹¹ *FRUS 1948*, vol. IV, 20.

¹² JAMMAT, 1948, February, box 13.

chairs, while mission advisors had their conspicuous displays of personal wealth broadcast to the people that they had come to help. Such a state of affairs, no doubt, angered the mission personnel nearly as much as their Turkish hosts.

In February there was also a noticeable change in the tone of the Turkish press regarding the American mission. Government influence with the press was such that changes in the media generally dovetailed with the views of those in the top echelon of Turkey's government. The appearance of the first negative press caught the attention of mission personnel. The JAMMAT's January report noted that a number of Turkish articles focused "on the slowness of the arrival of the aid equipment [and]...some editorial writers have suggested that the U.S. moved entire armies during the war more quickly than aid equipment is being moved to Turkey."¹³

Considering the wartime experience of the members of the mission, they certainly knew first-hand that the Turkish editorial writers were completely correct. The American military had repeatedly overcome logistical obstacles during the war on a scale and frequency that no other country had come close to matching. In the case of the mission to Turkey the inexcusable delay of virtually all aid material was nearing the point of bringing American credibility into question.

For the future viability and long-term significance of the mission, it was fortunate that an American-supplied *Şeker Bayramı* arrived early, with the coming of spring.¹⁴ The first large-scale aid shipments reached Turkey in March. Hypothetically, giving two weeks for collection stateside, one week for loading, and the two weeks required for transit, most of these shipments were likely the result of the combined efforts of General McBride and Secretary of State

¹³ JAMMAT, 1948, January, box 13.

¹⁴ *Şeker Bayramı* or Sugar Holiday/Festival is the three-day holiday that follows the daylight fasting during the month of Ramadan, which was not until August of 1948. From the Muslim perspective it would be the closest equivalent to "Christmas coming early," as it is a time when people exchange gifts and give out sweets to their loved ones and neighborhood children.

Marshall. Regardless of the motivation, the important issue was the arrival of substantive and meaningful aid. Since the Turkish military carried out its live-fire exercises in the summer months the spring training program was essential for realizing any significant progress in 1948. Back in January, mission personnel speculated that if the supplies failed to arrive before spring, then “the spring courses cannot be started by 1 April 1948, [and] indoctrination of the Turkish Army in American techniques...will be impossible.” Though it was just the beginning of aid shipments, the pent up preparations of the mission personnel sprang into action. All three military groups immediately began course instruction, the PRA broke ground on three of the four top priority road projects, and the first twenty-eight aircraft flew into Turkish airfields, quickly receiving their distinctive white crescent moon and star on red background markings.¹⁵

By April no one in Turkey was talking about the slow progress of the American aid program. During the month 10 aid ships arrived bearing twice the tonnage as the previous total for the year. The first large quantities of tanks, self-propelled guns, trucks, and towed artillery arrived for the Turkish Army. For the navy, four submarines were nearing the Turkish coast. For the air force, eight flights of P-47 Thunderbolts flew in from Germany, while the escort carrier USS *Rendova* (CVE-114) stopped off on what would be a round-the-world voyage to deliver a flight-deck full of T-6 Texan trainers. For months the American media had predicted that Turkish ports, infrastructure, and, by some implications, competence would prove incapable of absorbing the quantity of projected American aid. In the actual event, the Turkish Prime Minister established a coordinating group headed by General Omurtak, Chief of Staff of Turkish Armed Forces, to expedite the handling and distribution of the aid equipment. On the recommendations of the mission, the Turks immediately issued the less complicated aid material to military units,

¹⁵ JAMMAT, 1948, March, box 16.

while storing the more technical equipment until trained personnel became available. According to the American personnel on the ground “the speed of the unloading and the movement of cargos inland... exceeded expectations.”¹⁶ As of March and April 1948 both parties in this new relationship appeared to be doing their part to make a success of the mission to aid Turkey.

With the first deliveries of equipment the most important work of the mission began. In a general sense the members of the mission were essentially teachers establishing new military school system. Though by April the number of mission personnel had more than doubled to 240, with less than 100 instructors each in TUSAG and TUSAFG and a third as many for TUSNG it would still have taken decades to train a military the size of the Republic of Turkey.¹⁷ From the beginning, therefore, the mission depended on partial exponential growth instruction by turning the course graduates from the original classes into the faculty at the requisite Turkish schools. JAMMAT personnel provided the initial instruction and then became the de facto deans of the various specialized schools. The reality of the mission over time would prove more complex than the original theory and, instead of becoming more straightforward it would, in fact, become increasingly multifaceted. A look at the work done by each branch within the six month proving period provides the necessary details for illustrating that JAMMAT was not a small foreign training program, but instead was a systematic modernization program helping to revitalize a decrepit Turkish military.

The Navy Group

Due to the limited nature of the navy in modern Turkish history, stemming itself from traditional Western naval supremacy in the region, the inland development of the independence

¹⁶ JAMMAT, 1948, April, box 13.

¹⁷ JAMMAT, 1948, April, box 13.

movement that founded the Turkish Republic, and Turkey's limited heavy industry base, the envisioned sphere of TUSNG was geographically the smallest and operationally the most limited of the three service branches. Yet even in this most simple case, the complexity of establishing up-to-date and functional World War II era naval schools, logistics, and maintenance systems proved to be a very involved process. When TUSNG first arrived in Turkey there was usually series of the inspections of facilities. Next came the recommendations of required and suggested changes to everything from "receiving, storing and accounting procedures" to unit organization and the physical layout of new schools, the existence of which were themselves the result of previous recommendations. TUSNG, for example, secured approval for the establishment of a shore gunnery school and a navigation school, helped select their locations, and provided the suggested layout and equipment lists to outfit each school.¹⁸

It is particularly telling that the Turkish Navy did not already have a navigation school and less telling that a school for shore gunnery also did not exist. The lack of a navigation school was emblematic of the very limited range and capability of the 1940s Turkish Navy. As for shore gunnery, no other navy in the world had the appreciation possessed by the U.S. Navy for the tactical potential of ship-based shore bombardment. To some extent in the European Theater, and to a much greater extent in the Pacific Theater, during the Second World War the U.S. Navy had perfected the art of shore gunnery for either the support of ground forces or the destruction of enemy infrastructure anywhere near a coastline. Although battleships and cruisers mounted the largest guns and served most spectacularly throughout the war in the shore bombardment role, the humble destroyers had proven time and again to possess the ideal combination of sufficient firepower and low draught that made them the most flexible gun platforms of the navy. TUSNG

¹⁸ JAMMAT, 1948, April, box 13.

personnel knew that the U.S. Navy had earmarked a number of destroyers for the Turkish Navy, and that Turkey's extensive coastline would make such destroyers extremely useful in a shore bombardment role in any future war as long as their captains and crew had enough specific training to realize that potential.

Of course it was not enough to supply the major items and establish training schools to teach their various uses. There was also the matter of maintenance of every type of system in use. In a destroyer there were a lot of systems. TUSNG designed and taught courses to use and maintain the ships, their guns, the sights that aimed the guns, etc. Adequate maintenance required adequate facilities, which themselves required spare parts, machines to fabricate spare parts, and trained personnel who knew how to keep the facilities and the ships in running order. Even utilizing the existent Gölçük Shipyards and the other naval facilities on the Princes' Islands in the Sea of Marmara, TUSNG still recommended and oversaw the establishment of an electronics school, a radar school, a torpedo maintenance shop, a minesweeping repair station, a new warehouse district, a narrow gauge railroad, a road building program, and a score of other projects. Other recommendations led to "improvement in warehousing, preservation, stock control, and inventory procedures at Gölçük, and for bettering fire protection there."¹⁹ A long-term plan developed out of the recommendations of the naval group to completely rehabilitate the Gölçük Shipyards to the point that they could adequately service the quantity and types of ships that the U.S. Navy planned to hand over to Turkey.

In spite all of the physical improvement projects that the naval group initiated their primary role remained as teachers. TUSNG instructors established courses in a wide variety of areas from fire fighting, damage control, gyro operation, and welding, to minesweeping, fire

¹⁹ JAMMAT, 1948, July, box 13.

control (ships' guns), gun sight maintenance, machine tool operation, and mine handling and assembly practices. Other courses offered to Turkish naval personnel included shipyard industrial courses, naval supply system, electronics maintenance and operation, salvage operations, and deep sea diving. In addition, hundreds of other Turkish Navy personnel spent months at sea with the U.S. Navy in the Atlantic training on the vessels destined for Turkey. As of June the U.S. Navy had transferred fifteen vessels to the Turkish Navy: four fleet submarines, eight minesweepers, a net layer, one diesel oil tanker, and an internal combustion engine repair ship. By July 1948, 95% of the naval group's material for the fiscal year had arrived. These were just some of the accomplishments that TUSNG could point to during the first six months of intensive operation.²⁰

The details of the equipment that the naval group provided and the work that its members recommended and oversaw offer unique insights into the unofficial motives and intentions of American planners and policy makers. The best use of the equipment and training provided to the Turkish Navy by the American naval group was for a holding action at the Straits. The four *Balao*-class submarines provided by the mission were three times the size and many times the capability of the next largest submarine class operated by the Turkish Navy.²¹ The American submarines were the perfect weapon to augment the land based defenses along the northern choke point of the Bosphorus, the inland Sea of Marmara, and the southern narrows of the Dardanelles. Yet any coastal defense submarine could have accomplished these limited goals to some extent. The fleet submarines and training supplied by the mission, by contrast, also gave

²⁰ JAMMAT, 1948, July, box 13.

²¹ *Jane's Fighting Ships of World War II*, (New York: Crescent Books/Random House, 1994), 252-253.

the Turkish Navy a weapon that could significantly disrupt merchant and military traffic within the Black Sea, provided that access to resupply within the Straits area remained available.

Similarly, the minesweepers given by the U.S. Navy would also offer crucial support to a holding action at the Straits. If the Soviets mined the Straits by air to deny its use to the Turks or any other forces allied to the Turks the minesweepers would be in place to rapidly clear paths. Just as easily, the minesweepers could work in reverse and deploy mines to slow Soviet moves through the strategic waterway. In the same way, the rehabilitation of the Gölçük naval yards would provide support to all naval operations for as long as possible due to its location on the eastern side of the Straits. In this case, the equipment and training provided by TUSNG increased the Turks ability to defend the Straits, particularly the Anatolian side of the strategic waterway, but would do next to nothing to help defend the European side. According to the 1946 *Griddle* war plans, American analysts worried that the Turkish military would attempt to defend Istanbul on the European side trapping much of its military forces in the hopeless attempt.²² Noticeably, TUSNG did not initially provide the Turks with any landing craft or support craft other than those directly suited for submarine and minesweeping operations. In line with American contingency plans, the naval group and mission allowed the United States to forward deploy the most effective blocking and support vessels to the most strategic maritime geographic position along the Soviet frontier, without violating Turkish sovereignty or having to commit American personnel.

The Air Force Group

The next slightly less-orphaned Turkish service was the air force. TUSAFG certainly had their work cut out for them, especially considering that their area of operations covered the entire

²² Cohen, 55.

country. While the navy group operated around the Sea of Marmara, the air force group was constantly moving around Turkey from air field to air field, and from school to school. Another constraint not faced by the navy group was dealing with a service that the Turkish Army essentially considered part of itself. One of the first specific objections made by TUSAFG, for example, had been the practice of the Turkish Army placing Air Force communications officers “on tours of duty by the Army” and recalling them “on relatively short notice” whenever the Army felt the need. The air group “strongly” recommended permanent integration of Air Force communications officers within the Air Force, judging it “uneconomical for the Turkish Air Force to spend months and years training these men and then losing their skills.”²³ Fortunately, though inter-service squabbling was a constant annoyance, it was never a debilitating weakness.

Something that was a grave weakness of the Turkish Air Force was the state of its facilities. According to the mission’s first monthly report, TUSAFG engineers stated “that in general the Turkish air bases are in poor condition...[and] a major construction effort will be required if the air base system is to be developed to the point where it will support war operations by the TAF.” There were two chief factors explaining the condition of Turkish air bases. The first started during the war and was largely the fault of Winston Churchill. In the British prime minister’s eagerness to get the Allies into the Balkans before the Soviets, Churchill had dispatched, and Ankara had accepted, a group of British advisors who built airfields across Turkey for the Turkish Air Force. Churchill and the British intended to use these airfields themselves to support a Balkans campaign in conjunction with a co-belligerent Turkey. The Turks for their part were happy to have British-built airfields at no cost to themselves, but had no intention of joining the war before their own national security needs were safe. Unfortunately in

²³ JAMMAT, 1948, January, box 13.

their haste to erect a large number of fields in a short period of time, the British engineers focused their efforts on the landing strips themselves and left virtually everything else incomplete. By 1948, according to TUSAFG surveys many of these air bases were “scarcely usable.” In addition, “their total number far exceeds the present requirements of the TAF...[and] none of them have adequate auxiliary facilities (field lighting, gasoline storage, etc.).”²⁴

Instead the American air group “selected 15 airfields and directed that they be developed into modern bases over a five year period.” Not only were the landing strips deteriorating but the “repair facilities are in general very limited for both aircraft and ground vehicles.” To accomplish these goals TUSAFG created an Aviation Engineering Program that supplied “rock crushers, finishers, graders, spreaders, asphalt tanks, tractor trailers, dump trucks, crash fire trucks, cargo trucks, welding equipment, generators, compressors, well drilling equipment, shop equipment, testing equipment and spare parts,” as well as the knowhow to use and maintain them.²⁵ While it appears odd at first glance that an air group would have cited limitations for ground vehicle repair as a major problem, the aforementioned list of ground crew vehicles necessary to the operation of aircraft and airfields makes the need abundantly clear. In addition to all of the construction equipment, other vehicles such as fuel trucks, specialized ordinance transport vehicles, and simple jeeps and trucks were essential for servicing an aircraft and for limiting its turn-around time on the ground. When a number of mission-supplied Air Force vehicles arrived that were not in working order TUSAFG ordered an “emergency requisition” of “a quantity of vehicle parts (3000 pounds of GMC and Jeep parts)...from Germany by air...[to] immediately repair a number of laid-up vehicles.” Despite the frequent mentions of the previous

²⁴ JAMMAT, 1948, September, box 14.

²⁵ JAMMAT, 1948, August, box 14.

limitations of the Turks in the categories of “tools and equipment” there was some praise, since they “had centralized all that was available ...so that the maximum use is being made of it.”²⁶

The facilities improvement projects undertaken by the Air Group were significant, but the Turkish Air Force, to their credit, had been doing an admirable job in spite of the restrictions they had previously experienced, and they appeared enthusiastic in working with their American advisors to realize the changes that both groups desired.

Like the navy group, despite all the supplemental duties, the air group’s principal occupation remained instruction. Aircraft maintenance classes began with the assembly of all the T-6 trainer aircraft. Check rides for proficient Turkish pilots commenced immediately with the arrival of P-47 fighters and A-26 light bombers during April. By May the “first actual reorganization of a Turkish Air Force unit along U.S. Air Force lines was accomplished with a light bomber battalion.” Stressing decentralization of authority and independent decision-making, TUSAFG humbly “estimated that the reorganization has increased the battalion efficiency at least 100%.” While the American air group was reorganizing the established Turkish pilots and getting them familiarized with their new equipment, once the training aircraft were operational, flight courses for new pilots also began. Among the other less glamorous but equally important courses were fire-fighting and aircraft maintenance and repair. TUSAFG also introduced a new engineering and inspection system, as well as new equipment for the control tower, weather forecasting, and ordinance sections of the TAF. By the end of May, four hundred and thirty-three or 64% of the expected aircraft for 1948 had reached Turkey. A second escort carrier, USS *Siboney* (CVE-112), delivered sixty-four AT-11 Kansan twin-engine trainers, while three more flights of P-47 fighters arrived from Germany. By the end of June, “More than 50

²⁶ JAMMAT, 1948, January, box 13.

training courses with 2,300 members of the Turkish Air Force in attendance had been completed or were in progress...utilizing American Aid equipment with American instructors.”²⁷ Not all of the air group’s work, however, involved new courses, new equipment, and facilities inspections.

From the beginning of the mission, “at the request of the Turks” the air group was also in charge of two major reorganization studies. One was clearly within the sphere of the air force and one went far beyond strictly air force concerns. The air force matter was the reorganization of the Turkish Air Defense System. This entailed planning for radar installation sites, communications networks, and anti-aircraft gun emplacements and strategies. The second study examined a complete reorganization of the Turkish Ministry of National Defense and General Staff. These two bodies were the top civilian and military authorities within Turkey on all matters of national defense.²⁸ Though we will treat the details of the mission’s recommendations later, it is enough to point out just how wide the responsibilities of the air group were and how much trust the Turkish military showed in their American advisors.

As with the naval component of the mission, the air component helped to steer likely Turkish actions into greater alignment with America contingency war plans. On the one hand, giving the Turkish Air Force only two combat types of aircraft and two trainer types did help accomplish one mission objective of trying to simplify the maintenance and operating costs of the Turkish Air Force. All of the aircraft that the Americans selected for the Turks had radial engines, as opposed to the inline engines of most other American fighters at the time, thus streamlining future maintenance. The weapons themselves, however, were strictly tactical in nature. The A-26, for example, was a light, fast, twin-engine attack bomber that American pilots

²⁷ JAMMAT, 1948, April, May, June, box 13.

²⁸ JAMMAT, 1948, February, box 13.

during the war had perfected into a low-altitude ground-attack aircraft in Europe and a low-altitude anti-ship weapon in the Pacific. Significantly, the American mission did not provide the Turkish Air Force with any 4-engined long-range strategic bombers, such as the B-17, B-24, or B-29, essentially confining the American-supplied Turkish bomber force to a hit-and-fade role in support of Turkish Army ground operations within the airspace surrounding Anatolia.

The case was similar for the fighter type the mission chose to supply to the Turks. Though a solid air superiority fighter, the P-47 Thunderbolt was not the top fighter in U.S. arsenals. It did happen to be the best ground-support fighter in the very large American post-WWII inventory. The P-47 mounted eight heavy machine guns, could carry a wide assortment of air-to-ground rockets and bombs, and weighed nearly twice as much as the next best Turkish fighter, the British-supplied Supermarine Spitfire.²⁹ This meant the Thunderbolt could deliver tremendous firepower against ground targets and at the same time allowed it to absorb large amounts of damage, both of which were essential characteristics for a successful ground-attack aircraft.

Though it made sense to give the Turkish Air Force a rugged dual-purpose fighter, the tactical ground-attack capabilities were certainly not an accident and took a page out of the wartime *Luftwaffe* playbook. Having lost air supremacy to the Red Air Force from 1943 on, the German Air Force increasingly adapted its fighters to ground-attack variations, as it allowed them a much greater chance to provide air support to ground units and survive to fight another day. American planners assumed that in the event of a Soviet invasion of Turkey the Red Air Force would quickly win air superiority and ground attack operations would almost immediately

²⁹ Jim Winchester, ed., *The Aviation Factfile: Aircraft of World War II* (London: Thunder Bay Press, 2004) 19, 222-223.

require the speed of a fighter aircraft in order to reach a target and attempt an escape. The ideal goal would be the delay and destruction that just a few P-47s could inflict on invading Soviet vehicles effectively trapped along the winding roads of mountainous Eastern Turkey. The ratio of P-47s to A-26s also reflected the American belief in a rapid loss of air supremacy. The TAF received 30 of the light bombers compared to 240 of the fighters. The air equipment was good, but by its attributes, it limited some Turkish options and steered Turkish actions in directions favorable to American contingency war plans.

The Army Group

Not surprisingly, the group with the largest purview and impact was the army group. TUSAG had the most personnel during the entire mission and had by far the largest and most disparate service to modernize, spending the largest appropriation and receiving the bulk of aid material. TUSAG instructors oversaw and reorganized eight separate army schools. The Signal School, Armored School, and War College were all conveniently located in the center of the country at Ankara. To the northeast of Ankara the Infantry School, to the southwest the Artillery School, far to the southeast the Drivers Training Center, to the south the Transport School, and far to the west, along the Sea of Marmara, the Antiaircraft School. In order to cover all this ground and the different specialties involved, TUSAG itself had to divide into ten different sections: Artillery, armor, antiaircraft, finance, infantry, medical, motor-transport, ordnance, port-transportation, and signal.³⁰

Naturally, the principal occupation of TUSAG staff was instruction. One of the first courses was to teach Turkish army personnel “receiving, storing and accounting” using the incoming aid shipments as practice. Once the aid material began arriving in the spring, driving

³⁰ JAMMAT, 1948, January, box 13.

courses were the next priority. Accordingly, truck driver courses began on 12 April 1948, with 35 instructors and 370 students. A similarly sized group would take a one-month course every month for years to come. In June, after just two full months of driving courses, TUSAG organized a 258-mile motor march involving 264 vehicles and 1300 men in two columns traveling from Kayseri to Konya as part of a consolidation of driving schools. It was a useful demonstration of the off-road capabilities and qualities of American aid vehicles as the journey traversed a hundred mile stretch completely devoid of roads.³¹ Nothing like this cross-country motor march had ever taken place in Turkish history, as the vehicles for such a trip had never previously existed within the nation.

During the various army courses the value of the average Turkish soldier quickly caught the eye of the Army Group staff. The monthly reports included numerous positive observations regarding the capabilities and interest level of their Turkish students. Referring to all courses overseen by the mission came this report, "It is interesting to note that the percentage of students completing the courses successfully, was very high." Particularly telling was a report from the Artillery School at Polatli stating, "Instruction was enthusiastically received by all students...they absorbed the instruction as rapidly as students at an American Artillery School."³² Despite its hubris such a comment was indeed high praise, particularly when coming from officers who had recently been part of the massive American war machine responsible for so many of the Allied victories of the Second World War. Not only were the experienced professionals of each U.S. group demonstrating flexibility and ingenuity, but the Turkish sailors, airmen, and soldiers that they worked with were manifesting high motivation, aptitude, and

³¹ JAMMAT, 1948, March, box 16, April and June, box 13.

³² JAMMAT, 1948, June, box 13.

competence. From all accounts, mutual respect was one of the first universal characteristics with which to describe both sides of the mission to aid Turkey.

Like the other two missions, the army group took on duties that went beyond a simple arm-and-train approach. One of the most important of these auxiliary projects had to do with communications. Prior to the American mission the Turkish military had its own radio network, but the size and reach was not extensive. By July 1948 the American mission had supplied the Turkish military with some 5,572 radios. The quantity, quality, and sophistication surpassed anything previously available to the Turkish armed forces. As a result, personnel under the supervision of TUSAG Signal Corps ran the radio networks used by every group from the Turkish General Staff on down. Not only did the radio operators trained and overseen by TUSAG handle the communications of the Turkish military within the country, but they also handled direct communications between the United States and Turkey via the circuit linking Ankara and Frankfurt.³³ By September radio communication had become so pervasive and standard that the mission submitted plans to establish its own “radio net between TUSAG headquarters and the schools and ports.” This is a good example of how very quietly, and through each of its branches, the mission was gradually entrenching itself in Turkey, coming into possession of the rudiments of its own command and control in ways that indicated the aspiration for a longer stay than a temporary aid program would suggest.

By the equipment that it provided, the American Army Group also directed potential Turkish military actions into greater alignment with American war plans in ways that did not require consultation. This was most obvious in the capital equipment categories and the ratios supplied. In the case of armored vehicles, the two equipment types that the Turkish Army

³³ JAMMAT, 1948, July, box 13.

received were decidedly defensive in nature, which was significant for weapon types that most often existed for carrying out offensive actions. The principle tank type that the American mission supplied was the M-24 light tank. For a light tank it possessed good armament and excellent speed that combined to make it ideal for reconnaissance, ambush, and retreat. As a light tank, however, their protection and firepower were completely inadequate to survive a head-to-head engagement against any of the Soviet medium or heavy tank types that were the backbone of all Soviet armored formations. TUSAG could have given the Turks various medium M-4 Sherman variations with greater armor thickness and heavier caliber guns. Availability was not an issue. The United States built more M-4 tanks during the Second World War than any other tank model made by any other country.³⁴ Selection of the M-24 by the mission virtually precluded any offensive use by the Turks of the American-supplied tanks.

While the Turkish army received 125 M-24 light tanks, even more telling was 250 M-36 motor gun carriages delivered by the American mission. Known originally as tank destroyers (TDs), the idea behind their creation had been the fundamentally flawed Great War battle-cruiser concept adapted to land warfare.³⁵ According to the theory tank destroyers were supposed to be battlefield hunters with greater speed and firepower than a tank allowing them to rapidly deploy to the front opposite any massed tank assault force, knocking out enemy tanks with impunity. As a result of this philosophy, during the war U.S. tank designers produced tanks with low-velocity guns and medium armor for supporting infantry operations, since the TDs were supposed to take care of fighting enemy tanks. Unfortunately for the American Tank Destroyer Command and all American tankers during the war, the physics of the idea did not translate into reality. It proved

³⁴ George Forty, *World War Two Tanks* (London: Osprey, 1995. Reprint Bournemouth: The Book Package Company, 1996, 1998), 109.

³⁵ Charles M. Baily, *Faint Praise: American Tanks and Tank Destroyers during World War II* (Hamden: Archon Books, 1983), 38.

impossible to build a vehicle that had both greater firepower and greater speed than a tank, and all attempts required sacrificing armor protection. While the final American tank destroyer design of the Second World War was the fastest armored vehicle in existence at the time, a high velocity projectile still always won the race between speed and firepower.³⁶

The Germans, by contrast, focused on gun and armor development, willingly sacrificing speed for survivability and lethality. Throughout the war, therefore, American TD variants, and by default all American tanks as well, always lagged behind the Germans in the areas of firepower and armor. This meant that U.S. tank destroyers were essentially slightly faster, but under-armed and under-armored tanks. Indeed, in the interests of mass productions, most WWII tank destroyers, including the M-36, shared the same chassis as the entire M-4 tank family, rendering the separate designation of tank and tank destroyer essentially moot.³⁷

The re-designation to motor gun carriage reflected the actual use of TDs during the war. American soldiers preferred to use their tank destroyers as either a direct-fire artillery weapon against fixed enemy defensive works or as an ambush weapon against attacking enemy tanks, where the element of surprise helped to compensate for their lack of armor protection. In both roles the vehicle's speed aided in rapid relocation, creating the "shoot-and-scoot" tactic generally used by mobile artillery units or gun motor carriages. Since the tank destroyers used direct (horizontal) fire as opposed to the indirect lobbing fire of true artillery, the former TDs became motor gun carriages. Semantics aside, the M-36s that the American mission supplied to Turkey mounted a 90mm high-velocity gun that was the most powerful tank or anti-tank weapon used by American forces during the Second World War. This made the M-36 the perfect weapon for the

³⁶ Christopher R. Gabel, *Seek, Strike, and Destroy: U.S. Army Tank Destroyer Doctrine in World War II* (Ft. Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, Leavenworth Papers No. 12, 1985, 24-26.

³⁷ George Forty, *World War Two Armored Fighting Vehicles & Self-Propelled Artillery*, (London: Osprey, 1996), 93.

Turkish Army to have in order to carry out the mission the United States wanted Turkey to play in American contingency war plans. The M-36 could destroy even the heaviest Soviet tanks, but only if used repeatedly from prepared defensive positions in a geographic context that limited the avenues of approach available to an attacking enemy, such as the confines found in mountainous eastern Turkey. Using an M-36 offensively as a heavy tank would result in the rapid loss of machine and crew. Thus, within their own jurisdictions, each branch of the military mission was helping to direct the Turkish military in ways that subtly served American interests through limiting Turkish capabilities.

The Roads Group

Despite its innocuous all-civilian status, one of the most essential components for realizing American interests in Turkey was the Public Roads Administration (PRA), the final branch of the Joint American Military Mission to Aid Turkey. Though the Roads Group enjoyed a public relations advantage over the military groups because it was ostensibly a non-military project for the benefit of civilians and the overall Turkish economy, in reality the PRA was an unofficial arm of TUSAG, enjoying separate, and therefore additional, funding, personnel, and equipment. From the beginning, the PRA's purpose was to construct and/or improve "roads rated first military priority."³⁸ Later, contingent on time and funding, the Roads Group was to build or upgrade routes that were of secondary military priority, ultimately expanding to the creation of an entire Turkish Highway System. In actuality, after accomplishing its unofficial military mission the PRA's mandate fully diverged from matters of military consideration, ultimately becoming entirely separate from the military missions.

³⁸ JAMMAT, 1948, January, box 13.

Officially there were four principal objectives of the Roads Group at its start in 1948. The first was the overall goal, “to establish a long-range Highway improvement Program.” The second was organizational, “To establish a pattern for Highway Administration on a national level.” The third and fourth goals were functional. Turkey would need to acquire “uniform [building and maintenance] standards” as well as “modern highway equipment” and “train[ed] Turkish nationals in its use.” While the Road Group would successfully realize all of its goals in time, initially and unofficially, “the primary objective of the PRA group” was “the construction of four routes especially selected for their strategic military value.” Significantly, all of these routes formed a nexus of American interest in the southeast corner of Turkey.³⁹

The starting point for the routes were the ports of İskenderun and Karataş located on either side of the Gulf of İskenderun, occupying the absolute northeast corner of the Mediterranean Sea. From the primary port of İskenderun the first route ran 60 km north to a road junction at the ancient fortress of Toprakkale, then into the mountains for over 850 km to the northwest to the strategic city of Erzurum. Any defense of eastern Turkey would by necessity of the mountainous geography have to center on Erzurum. Erzurum straddled the confluence of the Pontic Mountains and the eastern Taurus Mountains, near the headwaters of the Euphrates River. This made it the gateway to both central and southeast Turkey and the Syrian Plain. From the backup port of Karataş the second route ran straight north 26 km to the important inland city of Adana. The third route, running 112 km west to east from Tarsus to Toprakkale, passed through Adana connecting both ports. The final route ran from Tarsus in a northwesterly direction 122 km to Ulukışla.⁴⁰ In total, the proposed project would create a road network in southeast Turkey

³⁹ JAMMAT, 1948, January, box 13.

⁴⁰ JAMMAT, 1948, September, box 14.

in the shape of an upper case H with the lower legs consisting of the two ports, connected at the crossbar by the Tarsus-Toprakkale route, with each upper section running northwest and northeast respectively, to the two main routes over the Taurus Mountains. It is important to note that the route to Erzurum was nearly eight times the length of the westerly route and starting from the southeast ports headed directly toward the junction of Soviet Georgia and Armenia, from where any Russian invasion of eastern Turkey would have to come.

The original outlook for the overall roads project was a bit bleak. According to one of the first surveys “there is an almost total lack of modern road building equipment and the attendant repair shops, mechanics and operators in Turkey today.” Like the other groups, the Roads Group had to wait until the initial major deliveries of heavy equipment in March to seriously begin their first projects. Yet despite the dour initial assessments and the delay in aid material, optimistic reports quickly came in. “Experience from the past two months,” read one of the first reports, “indicated that the Turks have both the will and the ability to learn to operate and maintain modern road building equipment.” By April the PRA had even “cooperated closely” with the Turkish Ministry of Public Works in drafting a new highway law destined to create an independent and streamlined Highway Department by establishing “clear authority and responsibilities” to help accomplish Turkey’s and America’s goals. Though initially a formality from the perspective of the Americans, it would be more than a year before the recommendations became law.⁴¹ This issue was one of the first of what would turn out to be a number of examples of the Turks demonstrating their continued sovereignty over their decision making in the face of pervasive American “recommendations” and the influence inherent in an advisor-advisee relationship.

⁴¹ JAMMAT, 1948, April, box 13.

Just as with the other branches of the mission, the Roads Group had to engage in a significant amount of teaching and extracurricular activity in order to achieve success. By August of 1948, 1100 Turkish road workers were actively engaged on all four priority routes having received their training from PRA members at the İskenderun Depot, where additional training continued. Of the 1100 trained Turkish workers the Roads Group deployed 830 to the route from İskenderun to Erzurum, demonstrating its first priority status and the larger nature of the project. By August, this principle route was approaching 100 km of all-weather road or was roughly 12 percent complete. The much shorter and more straightforward Adana-Karataş road, by contrast was nearing 70 percent completion. The Tarsus-Ulukışla route, which had been “asphalted under British direction during the War as a military project” had “seriously deteriorated,” but maintenance work under PRA supervision had in six months returned it to 58 percent repaired. Similarly, the Tarsus-Toprokkale road mainly required maintenance work to make it passable and to prepare it for later surfacing.⁴²

All of these projects, however, shared certain unexpected difficulties that the Roads Group had to solve. After training workers in the use of the heavy equipment supplied by the mission, the next greatest difficulty was construction of facilities to maintain the equipment. The creation of the İskenderun Depot was one step in a multi-step process that ultimately developed a major repair facility at Elezig, the fallback position from Erzurum, as well as a string of smaller repair shops built along the length of the İskenderun-Erzurum route. After equipment, personnel, and repair facilities came issues of obtaining materials for bridges and road surfaces. Early PRA reports emphasized the obsolescent and expensive nature of Turkish bridge building design and construction procedures. “Ways must be found,” urged the PRA, to build “cheaper, better and

⁴² JAMMAT, 1948, August, box 14.

more rapidly constructed bridges.”⁴³ This meant determining and acquiring suitable local materials, matching them with functional and cost-effective designs, and then making the vision a reality. Similarly, the crushed rock necessary for grading and paving purposes did not yet exist in Eastern Turkey. In addition to the “six field survey crews [that] were at work selecting the most economical routes for future operations on military roads,” other survey groups explored Turkey’s eastern provinces searching for appropriate rock deposits from which to make the crushed rock needed for all stages of the Roads Program. In the specific case of the rock, it required an American materials engineer making a “difficult trip by jeep and horseback” into southeast Turkey to find a suitable Harbol rock-asphalt deposit.⁴⁴

Not only did materials for building provide unexpected challenges, but so too did labor. During the summer, for example, PRA projects experienced significant labor shortages because of the demands of the Anatolian wheat harvest.⁴⁵ For the progress of the Roads Group the coming of winter freed up labor and spurred renewed efforts before the harsh weather of eastern Turkey brought all work to a halt. According to a PRA report, “Work on the priority routes was sharply accelerated during the month of September, particularly on the İskenderun-Toprakkale-Erzurum road...[where] additional Aid equipment was sent...and the working force was increased from 830 to 2500 men.”⁴⁶ The scale of manpower dedicated to this project again provides further evidence of the singular significance of the road to Erzurum.

By its very nature the work of the Roads Group played into American war plans for Turkey and in a way that was easily amenable to the Turkish military and government who paid for most of its costs. From September came this report:

⁴³ JAMMAT, 1948, February, box 13.

⁴⁴ JAMMAT, 1948, May, box 13.

⁴⁵ JAMMAT, 1948, June, box 13.

⁴⁶ JAMMAT, 1948, September, box 14.

To stretch the \$5,000,000 Aid appropriation as far as possible, the Turks agreed that the funds should be used mainly for the purchase of equipment, shipping costs, and Mission personnel salaries. The Turks, through the Ministry of Public Works, are paying for all road construction costs.⁴⁷

From the Turkish perspective the connection of their northeastern defensive lines to southeastern ports had the potential for great risk or greater reward. In its eastern regions the lack of good roads was a strategic advantage against a Soviet invasion whose movement and logistics would be dependent on motorized equipment. From one angle building the Erzurum-İskenderun road opened all of eastern Turkey to a rapid Soviet advance. From another perspective, however, its connections to the ports and American insistence on its priority indicated an increased likelihood of American intentions to supply Turkish forces in the eastern part of the country and to potentially land troops to help liberate the rest of the nation.

There was, however, a third view on the meaning of the Erzurum-İskenderun road. To American planners, the construction of the road would force the Turks to commit substantial troops to its defense. In conjunction with the strengths and weaknesses of the equipment provided by the mission, the best use of aid weaponry would be a concerted defense of mountainous Eastern Turkey, rather than the far more vulnerable west provinces and less defensible central plateau. Just as the existence of the road would force Turkish troops to its defense the road would also be a most tempting lure for invading Soviet forces, providing the ideal delaying-action scenario desired by American planners. In this way the Americans could dictate to some extent how both sides would behave in the event of a Soviet push through Turkey towards the Middle East, simply by constructing a road.

In Fulfillment of U.S. War Plans

⁴⁷ JAMMAT, 1948, September, box 14.

All of the points of correlation between the 1946 Plan *Griddle* contingency war plan and the early mission activities strongly suggest that strategic matters relating to Turkey's unwitting role in the defense of the Middle East were exerting a significant pull on the actions and recommendations of the Joint American Military Mission to Aid Turkey. Yet American 1940s conceptions of the defense of the Middle East were not for the benefit of the region, nor for securing its strategic oil. In the late 1940s Middle East oil was far more important for future European reconstruction than it was a source of current American oil consumption. The bleak predictions of these initial Cold War plans place the Middle East into an unexpected perspective.

To begin with there was not going to be a concerted defense of the Middle East. British leaders and planners argued strongly for the vital importance of the region in any future conflict. The budget-strapped and rapidly demobilizing American military, however, did not have the numbers or the funding to dedicate anything more than token forces to the region's defense. Further, the importance of Middle East oil to Europe's reconstruction appeared as a minor issue in strategic war planning, since Anglo-American war planners generally "conceded the loss of Western Europe to a Soviet onslaught." Similarly, in the event of all-out war and a Soviet push into the Middle East, American strategists did not intend to defend the oil fields, but instead planned to destroy the region's oil wells in order to further starve advancing Russian forces. The Anglo-American war plans for the late 1940s depended on allowing Soviet forces to overextend themselves while Allied airpower demolished the industrial base of the USSR.⁴⁸

In these overall Anglo-American war plans Turkey played a small but potentially key role. As mentioned briefly in Chapter 2, plan *Griddle* speculated on the performance of an unsupported Turkey in the face of a full-scale Soviet invasion intent on overrunning Anatolia en

⁴⁸ Cohen, 21, 40, 176.

route to conquering the Middle East from Suez to the Persian Gulf. Though unallied, the planners of *Griddle* predicted that Turkish forces would attempt to defend the entirety of their country through every means available. *Griddle* planners speculated that much of Turkey's military would sacrifice itself in a hopeless defense of European Turkey, while in the eastern mountains the remaining Turkish forces would make a more lasting, though equally futile, stand.⁴⁹ The Anglo-American war planners estimated that the total delay the Turkish military would inflict on a Soviet advance into the Middle East would be three to five weeks. These weeks represented crucial, albeit insufficient, time that American B-29 bombers, operating out of the British airbase at Abu Suier Suez, would be using to carry out conventional and/or nuclear raids against essential Soviet military and supply infrastructure located beyond the range of any other Allied base.⁵⁰ Thus, the quality of Turkish belligerence against any Soviet attack aimed at the Middle East became an unwitting yet integral variable of America's long-term strategy for victory against the Soviet Union. As argued in this chapter, the Joint American Military Mission to Aid Turkey provided a mechanism to influence and improve this variable.

By logical extension, if the quality of Turkish belligerence was such a crucial factor then anything that improved that quality was also purchasing additional time for America's strategic campaign against the beating heart of the Soviet war machine. In this context the mission to aid Turkey became as much an issue of American defense as of Turkish defense from the perspective of Anglo-American war plans. Yet as the Cold War continued to develop American priorities were shifting to an increased focus on Western European reconstruction as an essential component for America's long-term economic vitality. These economic concerns stressed the

⁴⁹ Cohen, 55.

⁵⁰ Cohen, 20, 175.

centrality of Germany for the long-term health of Europe's economy and by extension the economy of the United States. This in turn motivated the merging of the western occupation zones and the introduction of a single currency in what would become West Germany. This integration then triggered the Berlin Blockade, which greatly exacerbated Cold War relations and produced a flurry of new contingency war plans.

At the same time, America had been pumping increasingly large-scale funds into Western Europe in the form of the Marshall Plan, making the idea of allowing Soviet forces to overrun these same nations less and less tenable. The Marshall Plan and the Berlin Blockade provided the twin impetuses behind European integration and ideas of military alliance. For Turkey and the place of Turkey in the eyes of American planners, these developments in Western Europe created further uncertainty. JAMMAT in effect, suggesting continued American interest, but if the United States were to join the Western European Union military alliance, how would the Soviet Union respond to the countries on its periphery that were left out? For the leaders of Turkey, with their future security remaining uncertain, the American mission continued to provide them with both their best chance for defending themselves and their most important connection to a great power that might come to their aid in the event of war.

CHAPTER FOUR

UNCERTAIN FUTURE: JAMMAT AND THE VAGARIES OF U.S. POLICY

In its original conception the Joint American Military Mission to Aid Turkey was a short-term program. U.S. military planners hoped to modernize the Turkish armed forces by providing relatively new equipment and imparting the knowledge of how to use and maintain such equipment, while reducing the overall size of the Turkish military in the process. Fighting capabilities would increase while cost decreased. The temporary nature of the mission was both indicative and the result of the lack of a coherent U.S. policy toward the Middle East at the time. As of mid-1948 Washington did not have a Middle East policy separate from Containment, which was simply to keep the Soviet Union out of the region by temporarily bolstering the military forces of Greece, Turkey, and Iran. Indeed, even the future of the American mission to aid Turkey, the sole U.S. position of strategic consequence in the Middle East, was in doubt.

This chapter follows three mostly separate tracks that together allowed the convergence of U.S.-Turkish interests discussed in chapter five. The first section charts the rather eccentric course that U.S. policy toward Turkey and Middle East defense went through between mid-1948 and late 1949, while at the same time noting the dogged pursuit manifest by Turkish representatives for an alliance with the United States. The next section follows the steady course of JAMMAT's accomplishments in the second phase of the aid program, accomplishments which further enhanced the value of the Turkish military from the perspective of Washington and added to the influence of JAMMAT within Turkey. Section three examines the impact the new Turkish government had on the continued development of U.S.-Turkish relations within the framework of the American aid mission. Understanding the combined context that these three

tracks put into place is essential for accurately critiquing the final movement in the transformation of U.S.-Turkish relations during this period of the early Cold War.

The Vagaries of U.S. Policy and Turkey's Quest for a Security Guarantee

Despite the inferred reassurance that the American mission provided Turkey and the constant, explicit reassurances from U.S. foreign affairs personnel, between mid-1948 and late 1949 U.S. policy toward Turkey and the defense of the Middle East was very uncertain. At the same time, for Turkish leaders and diplomats, since reassurances did not translate directly into national security and could not be the basis for future confidence, they doggedly pursued a binding security arrangement with the United States. These agendas were, therefore, at cross purposes during this period and usefully illustrate the distance that the accomplishments of the ongoing mission and later events would manage to close.

The first evidence that there was contemplation of a change in U.S. policy toward Turkey appeared in a 27 May 1948 telegram to the U.S. Embassy at Ankara from then Acting Secretary of State George A. Lovett, ordering Ambassador Edwin C. Wilson to inform the Turkish government that from henceforth it must pay all expendable military costs associated with the use of aid equipment. Lovett elucidated that “adherence to this policy, to the extent possible without defeating objectives of US policy with respect to Turkey, may avoid embarrassment in a future year when it may become consonant with US interests to *reduce* or *terminate* military aid to Turkey.”¹ While not a decision to terminate, Lovett’s memo did reflect the change in priority that Turkey’s leaders and diplomats were experiencing in light of developments between the nations of Western Europe and the United States.

¹ *FRUS 1948*, vol. IV, 98. Emphasis mine.

To better secure its Marshall Plan investment in Western Europe, and taking into account the recent consolidation of Communist power in Hungary and the Soviet coup in Czechoslovakia, Washington instigated the beginnings of European integration by unofficially requiring and backing the formation of the Western Union alliance through the Brussels Treaty of 17 March 1948. This alliance brought Great Britain, France, and the Benelux countries together in the first example of postwar collective security. As of 11 June 1948, with the passage of the Vandenberg Resolution, Congress authorized the president and itself to commit the United States to foreign military alliances for mutual defense. The gist of what was happening was not lost on Turkish diplomats. In April, just as the American mission was beginning to function, the Turkish Ambassador to the United States Hüseyin Ragıp Baydur presented his government's concerns about the formation of a U.S.-backed Western European military alliance, "Lest the United States should grant...certain guarantees to the countries of Western Europe against aggression without simultaneously granting similar guarantees to Turkey." The ambassador elaborated on two points. If Turkey did not receive a similar declaration of American support then the Soviet Union might interpret such a move as indicative that Turkey was vulnerable to renewed aggression. Second, the ambassador feared that the absence of a declaration for Turkey in the face of a declaration for Western Europe would undermine the morale of U.S. supporters in Turkey and appear to confirm the suspicions of those who favored appeasement of the Soviet Union. From State Department assessments it is clear that Washington knew that there were virtually no Turks in favor of appeasing the Soviet Union since the Turks were so nationalistic and anti-Russian.²

² *FRUS 1948*, vol. IV, 35, 83, 191.

More ominous for the future of the mission and U.S.-Turkish relations was a 12 October 1948 top secret telegram, from Charles E. Saltzman, the State Department member of the powerful State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In this memo, Saltzman communicated that the committee urgently requested that the JCS determine whether or not the United States had any long-term strategic interests in Greece or Turkey. Saltzman further stated that “coincident with a decrease in or elimination of direct military assistance to Greece, military assistance to Turkey *will be reduced* to minor proportions or eliminated.”³ In reaction to the greatly enlarged scale of foreign aid outflow that funded the Marshall Plan and Congressional demands for a reappraisal of all foreign aid programs, the Department of State was readying the military missions to Greece and Turkey for the budgetary chopping block.

Implicit in the above statement was the dependence of Turkey on the continued importance of Greece. This reveals the belief, likely inherited along with the responsibilities from Great Britain, that Greece was the priority in the area and support for Turkey was part of stabilizing Greece. While this was not a statement suggesting that the United States was going to completely abandon Greece or Turkey, for European Recovery Program funds would still be theoretically available; however, the purpose was to decrease aid and clearly revealed the essential link between Greece and Turkey in U.S. policy up to that time. If Greece became less of a priority so would Turkey and the likelihood of either becoming part of a U.S.-backed security arrangement would be quite remote. Indeed, Turkey’s own strength of national solidarity and unswerving commitment to resisting any future communist aggression were working against Turkey by providing Washington with enough comfort to consider reducing military aid.

³ *FRUS 1948*, vol. IV, 158. Emphasis mine.

In December 1948 the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that Greece did not possess long-term strategic interests for the United States. According to the Salzman memo this should have signaled the beginning of the end of JAMMAT, however, the decision on Greece was not the only pronouncement by the Joint Chief in December. Unlike Greece, the JCS declared that Turkey did possess long-term strategic value. Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal first articulated the rationale behind the JCS recommendations to the National Security Council (NSC) in a memo to the State Department back on 24 November 1948. Forrestal's report for the first time recognized that "Turkey is strategically more important than Greece since in addition it dominates major air, land, and sea routes from the USSR to the Cairo-Suez area and to the Middle East oil fields."⁴ As in most lists made by military planners, the placement of "Middle East oil fields" behind the "Cairo-Suez area" was indicative of lesser prioritization. From the American perspective of 1948 foreign oil was not nearly as significant as in later decades. Similarly, the importance of the "Cairo-Suez area" was also only secondarily connected to the Suez Canal. Instead, as discussed in chapter 3, the strategic key in the region for U.S. war plans of the time was the British airbase at Abu Suier and its role in the destruction of the Soviet petroleum industry in the event of war.

In the weeks following the reappraisal of Turkey's strategic importance to the United States, high ranking American officers began visiting senior JAMMAT and Turkish authorities. Such visits provided favorable indications to Turkey regarding the American military's increasing interest in the Turkish armed forces. From 17 to 19 December the Secretary of the Department of the Army, the Honorable Kenneth C. Royall, the Army Vice Chief of Staff, General J. Lawton Collins, and the Army Chief of Operations Group, Plans and Operations

⁴ *FRUS 1948*, vol. IV, 191.

Division, General Staff, Brigadier General Thomas S. Timberman visited Turkey. The Royall group consulted with the group chiefs of the mission and paid official calls to the Turkish Foreign Minister Neçmettin Sadak, Minister of National Defense Hüsni Çakır, and President İnönü. Next, from 19 to 20 December the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Radford, accompanied by Republican Senator Edward V. Robertson (WY) inspected the Turkish fleet, met with JAMMAT heads, and visited the same Turkish triumvirate as the Royall group.⁵

During the meetings both groups deferred questions of any kind of future U.S.-Turkish alliance to the visit of Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, Admiral Richard Lansing Conolly in late January. Conolly arrived with elements of the newly created Sixth Fleet, consisting of an aircraft carrier, escorted by a heavy cruiser, light cruiser, an anti-aircraft cruiser, and two destroyers.⁶ Conolly's visit was an impressive and welcome show of force, but the admiral also deferred Turkish queries regarding an alliance to future diplomatic meetings. When President İnönü pressed the admiral about at least initiating "joint military operational planning," Conolly replied that "he had 'no authority [to] open formal Turkish-American General Staff talks,'" and instead suggested an "exchange of ideas between the Turkish General Staff and General McBride [chief of JAMMAT] who would act as his intermediary."⁷ The United States was willing to let Turkey share and coordinate its plans with the members of the mission, but was still not interested in treating Turkey as an equal to the point of revealing American defense plans for the region or disclosing the lack thereof. Turkey's heightened status in Washington was translating into increased foreign visits of significance, but long-term questions remained unanswered.

⁵ JAMMAT, 1948, December, box 14, and *FRUS 1948*, vol. IV, 217.

⁶ From this point on the Sixth Fleet became a permanent U.S. naval force in the Mediterranean. JAMMAT, 1949, February, box 16.

⁷ *FRUS 1949*, vol. VI, 1641.

In general policy planning at the start of 1949, for example, Turkey remained a Tier Two or Title II country. In U.S. national security parlance this meant that Turkey ranked ahead of Title III nations such as Denmark, Norway, and Portugal, but well behind Tier One countries such as the Benelux states, France, and Great Britain. Even within Title Two, Turkey still officially ranked last, behind Greece and Italy.⁸ In the “desired rights section” of the general national security policy paper forecasting goals for the year, under the heading of Turkey was “right to supplement through the current Turkish aid program Turkish effort in the development of a military base in the Iskenderon-Adana area.” This was the area of Southeast Turkey where JAMMAT had been especially active and interested. For the United States to “desire the right” to aid the Turks in the development of a military base above and beyond all that the Turks had already granted to JAMMAT, indicated that there was going to be more to the story of the “Iskenderon-Adana area.”⁹

Noticeably absent was any mention of desiring Turkey’s inclusion in a security arrangement. Instead there was continuation of the idea that Middle Eastern countries were only expected “to impose a delay on enemy operations directed toward their area” in contrast to “Western European nations” where the goal was to stop an enemy attack as much as possible. Nowhere was there any indication that Turkey’s lack of increased priority resulted from a failure on the part of the American mission or of the Turks. To the contrary, in the “Objectives of FY 1950 MAP (Military Aid Program)” there was specific praise for JAMMAT and desire for continuation of the “significant progress already made toward...the modernization and combat

⁸ *FRUS 1949*, vol. I, 262.

⁹ *FRUS 1949*, vol. I, 307, 314, 317.

effectiveness of existing Turkish Army forces.”¹⁰ From the standpoint of Washington, however, the long-range strategic interest of the United States in Turkey only brought about a reevaluation of what Turkey could offer America, yet not to the degree of actual reciprocity.

Not all Americans involved in policy planning dismissed the implications of the JCS decision to recognize Turkey’s long-term strategic importance. A telegram from George McGhee, the then Coordinator for Aid to Greece and Turkey, to Secretary Lovett as early as 19 November 1948, predicted, “If this decision is made [accepting that Turkey possessed long-term strategic interests which ‘justify assistance over and above that permitted by present policies’],” then, “Turkey will occupy with respect to this country a position more comparable to the Western Union countries than to Greece.”¹¹ Just a day later on 20 November the U.S. ambassador to Greece, Henry F. Grady, wrote Secretary of State Marshall voicing similar sentiments. Lamenting that Greece was “one of the weakest links” in the region, he declared that “the democratic defense of Europe must hinge on England and Turkey.”¹² McGhee and Grady typified the individuals who appreciated Turkey’s strategic potential and sought to use the American mission and some type of security agreement as mechanisms to direct and control that potential as much as possible. Yet tension remained between how much the United States could ask of Turkey while at the same time continuing to reject Turkish overtures for a binding security agreement.

One such one-sided proposal was the suggestion that the State Department approach the Turkish government regarding arrangements to build and/or upgrade airfields in Turkey to American specifications and allow the stockpiling of aviation gasoline. The principal was almost

¹⁰ *FRUS 1949*, vol. I, 307, 314, 317.

¹¹ *FRUS 1948*, vol. IV, 184-185.

¹² *FRUS 1948*, vol. IV, 189.

the same as the forward deployment of any of the other aid material. Just as painting a Turkish crescent moon and star on ex-U.S. minesweepers, submarines, and destroyers allowed them to be on hand ready to delay a Soviet attack against the Straits, so to the existence of airfields of adequate size, with necessary facilities, and the prepositioning of aviation fuel would allow the rapid deployment of U.S. aircraft to Turkish bases in the event of war. The obvious problem with this plan was that the runways and fuel would be for offensive action against the Soviet Union. A half dozen submarines could interdict much Black Sea shipping, but that was inconsequential compared to the threat to Soviet security posed by almost immediate air attacks against essential Soviet industry deep inside of Russia. If Turkey agreed to such a plan and then the Soviet Union discovered the scale of the proposed construction and stockpiling, then the United States needed to guarantee Turkey protection. This, of course would constitute a pledge that the JCS knew they lacked the capacity to fulfill. In NSC 36/1 from 15 April 1949 the council declared, “In the face of our unwillingness...to give a guarantee or other formal assurance that the U.S. will safeguard Turkey’s territorial integrity” pursuing the stockpiling of aviation fuel “would be unwise at this time.”¹³

The decision to refrain from asking was astute. From the Turkish side there was no let up to the requests for a U.S. security guarantee even without the mention of airfields and aviation fuel storage. In a memo from Joseph C. Satterthwaite, the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (NEA), to which Turkey belonged in State Department organization, to Under Secretary of State Lovett, Satterthwaite addressed the issue of “Future United States Policy Toward Security of Nations Threatened by the USSR but not included in the Proposed North Atlantic Defense Arrangement.” Though supposedly referring to “nations” in the plural

¹³ *FRUS 1949*, vol. I, 324, and vol. VI, 1654-55.

the entire discussion instead centered on Turkey. Regarding inclusion in the North Atlantic pact or a bilateral pact, the NEA director described how Turkish officials had “continued to raise this question throughout the summer and fall.” Satterthwaite described that “this insistent activity arises primarily from Turkey’s desire to assure itself of at least as close a relationship with the United States as that of any other nation similarly exposed,” and how “extremely serious” such entreaties were from the Turkish side. Indeed, Satterthwaite acknowledged that “no other nation in the NEA area has posed the same question to us in so direct and insistent a fashion.”¹⁴ Time and events would confirm that this unprecedented Turkish insistence was not the result of an over-appraisal of Turkey’s importance on the part of Turkish officials but an under-appraisal on the part of American policy makers.

Just days before the arrival of Secretary Royall’s group and Admiral Radford’s group, U.S. Ambassador Wilson addressed a note to the Turkish foreign ministry in response to the constant Turkish entreaties. Stressing that the talks for possible U.S. involvement in an Atlantic defense pact were still “exploratory,” Wilson regretted that the United States could not extend any agreement to Turkey at the time. The final rationale for rejection was that Washington considered it “doubtful, however, that Turkey, which is neither in Western Europe nor on the Atlantic, could be considered to form geographically part of this regional group.”¹⁵ Instead of having Turkey join what would become on 4 April 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Washington favored creation of an “Eastern Mediterranean Bloc.” While the Pentagon prepared policy papers, the consultations with would-be bloc members constantly collapsed in the face of Washington’s lack of commitment and Turkey’s intransigence. Turkey continually

¹⁴ *FRUS 1948*, vol. IV, 172-173.

¹⁵ *FRUS 1948*, vol. IV, 213-214.

accepted American suggestions of adhering to such an arrangement in theory, but always refused in fact unless the United States was a full signatory. Since the Middle East was part of the British sphere and demobilization and Congress had slashed postwar U.S. military strength, the Joint Chiefs of Staff remained adamant about staying out of the business of trying to defend the Middle East, even after declaring that Turkey had long-term strategic significance for the United States.¹⁶

Despite the uptick of visits by high-ranking American military officials, after the late inclusion of Mediterranean Italy into the North Atlantic alliance, Turkish diplomats again conveyed their consternation. Italy became a major point of outrage when Foreign Minister Sadak traveled to Washington and with Turkey's Ambassador to the United States, Feridun Erkin, met with Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson and NEA Director Satterthwaite on 12 April 1949. After the meeting Director Satterthwaite described that the Turkish diplomats were at a loss as to how they should explain to their government and public why the geographic bounds of the emerging pact, which the Turks had accepted as a valid principle, were obviously no longer important, yet the United States still refused Turkey admittance. Once again Turkish diplomats received only verbal assurances along with Director Satterthwaite's frank but unofficial belief that there would not be a guarantee within the next year.¹⁷ Satterthwaite's prediction would prove accurate as the U.S. government and military continued to focus first on Western Europe.

After the inclusion of Italy, it was clear that a diversion of views had developed between how the Turks saw their relationship with United States and how Washington viewed the Turks.

¹⁶ *FRUS 1948*, vol. IV, 159-160.

¹⁷ *FRUS 1949*, vol. VI, 1647.

The JAMMAT report to Washington from as early as December 1948, included an article by Edwin B. Greenwald of the *Associated Press* that plainly spoke of these differing views. “At present there is the firm opinion in Turkey that in the event that the country is dragged into war American soldiers will fight shoulder to shoulder with the Turks,” wrote Greenwald, “According to American opinion on the other hand, this long term defense aid, has greatly perfected [sic] the last stronghold against communism and Middle Eastern unity and Africa.”¹⁸ Many Americans considered the mission a success, but for the Turks their security continued to officially hinge on their 1939 alliance with Great Britain, of little value by the late 1940s, and unofficially on their indeterminate relationship with the United States. For Turkey the only positive indication of American intentions remained the presence of the JAMMAT.

The final vagary of United States policy toward Turkey and the Middle East came in the form of contingency war planning and would have potentially broken the relationship, had Turkish leaders been privy to the plans. Up to 1949 British diplomats and war planners had succeeded in getting the U.S. Joint Chiefs to agree to the commitment of some American forces, roughly three and a half divisions or 40,000 troops and 350 tactical aircraft, for the defense of the Suez base in Egypt. Though never as much as the British leaders asked for, the inclusion of American forces was essential to the proposed delaying actions, which along with Turkish resistance, would theoretically buy the Abu Suier airbase at Suez enough time for its bombers to destroy the Soviet petroleum industry. Had these plans retained their shape and a Soviet invasion taken place, American aircraft, naval forces, and potentially some ground forces may indeed have been fighting shoulder-to-shoulder with Turkish armed forces. In October of 1949, however, U.S. planners announced to their astonished British colleagues the withdrawal of all of

¹⁸ JAMMAT, 1948, December, box 14.

the American forces from the proposed defense of the Middle East. Except for a small contingent of marines destined for Bahrain whose task would be to oversee the destruction of the oil wells of the Gulf area, in the event of war the United States would leave the Middle East to its own fate.¹⁹

The rationale behind this move was twofold. First, Turkish defensive capabilities were improving through JAMMAT and this alone could buy the necessary time for air operations from Egypt to succeed without having to commit U.S. troops. This in turn would free available U.S. forces to concentrate in the Western Mediterranean for the defense of the Iberian Peninsula in order to remove the need for a massive amphibious invasion of Western Europe, which was still sure to fall. A retreat to the Pyrenees would allow an escape for some NATO forces, particularly the French, and basing in Casablanca in North Africa would provide a final sea barrier to stop the Soviets if the defense of Spain failed. With the formation of NATO, the Middle East dropped from second priority, behind the defense of Great Britain in American war plans, to a distant third. Protecting the Middle East, would again be a strictly British responsibility.²⁰ For Turkey this meant that in the event of a Soviet attack, Great Britain would fight behind Turkish territory to hold Egypt, while the Americans would stay mostly in the Western Mediterranean trying to hold Spain. Through the benefits of the American mission, Turkish forces would kill more Soviets for a longer period of time, but according to U.S. war plans their job would still be to fight and die alone in the failed defense of their country.

The Second Phase: JAMMAT to the Spring of 1950

¹⁹ Cohen, 45-46.

²⁰ Cohen, 46-47.

While diplomats, military planners, and politicians debated policy and staged visits, the work of the Joint American Military Mission to Aid Turkey continued unabated, increasing in efficiency and in depth. The various military groups of the mission were nearing completion of their initial goal of the delivery of major items of weaponry and establishing the training courses for the operation and maintenance of such end-use items. For the members of the mission the accomplishments of 1948 were only the beginning of what they hoped would be a long and multi-stage transformation of an antiquated and rusting military machine. After the initial technical training, the second phase would be tactical training, followed by combined arms operations.²¹

The annual maneuvers of the Turkish First Army in early October, observed by President İnönü, high ranking officers of the Turkish armed forces, and the chiefs of the mission's military groups, provided a demonstration of Turkish capabilities under mostly ideal and choreographed circumstances. Despite the contrived nature of maneuvers, the overall impression was positive. The report back to Washington described that "tanks and planes furnished to Turkey under the Aid Program played a prominent part and gave a commendable performance." Of special note, the report pointed out that "the operations of the aid tanks surpassed expectation and indicated that the Turks had absorbed tank instruction as rapidly as would American students...driving was excellent and radio communications also went well." The critique of the Turkish aircraft involved described their formation flying as "satisfactory" but declared that "more training will be needed to acquire superior combat tactics."²² The potential for the Turkish military personnel

²¹ JAMMAT, 1948, December, box 14.

²² JAMMAT, 1948, October, box 14.

to be the equals of their American counterparts was again in evidence, but without tactical training such aptitude would matter little on a real battlefield.

Indeed, the greatest weakness of the Turkish military after its obsolete pre-mission equipment was its lack of people with up-to-date combat experience and intimate knowledge with the combat tactics and strategy of modern weaponry. Turkish military personnel had not fought a pitched battle since the First World War and Independence War, where tanks, if they existed at all, moved at the speed of an infantryman walking, zeppelins occasionally bombed cities far away, and the fastest weapon of war was a biplane. Not only were many of Turkey's pre-mission weapons of Great War vintage, but the knowledge behind the best use of World War II-era weaponry under combat conditions was not a part of the Turkish military at all.

Overcoming this factor was the second major goal of the American aid mission and was absolutely necessary given the quantity of experienced personnel that Soviet Russia and its satellite states would commit to any serious invasion of Turkey.

The biggest theoretical obstacle to modernizing the tactical and strategic mindset of the Turkish military came on 21 October 1948. On that date "the Turkish General Staff formally approved the detailed plan for the reorganization of the Ministry of National Defense as recommended by the Mission in June, 1948."²³ Hypothetically this restructuring would produce a more flexible, responsive, and open military hierarchy subservient to Turkey's elected civilian leaders. In reality, while the restructuring did not take place until mid-1949, it would take even more time to change the mindset of Turkish colonels and generals.

By the end of 1948 the size of the American mission to Turkey had more than tripled to over three hundred personnel. This allowed TUSAG alone to set a goal of instructing 5000

²³ JAMMAT, 1948, October, box 14.

students in 55 courses for the 1948-1949 academic year. Such a jump represented a 34% increase over the first year of the mission and indicated the expanding ambitions of the mission.²⁴ Mission personnel were not only making plans for 1949, but in light of the Joint Chiefs' decision about Turkey's long-term strategic importance to the United States, also had clearance to begin determining the 1950 program.²⁵

The end of 1948 also brought the first full winter to the mission and one of surprising harshness for a Mediterranean country. Turkey's inland uplands usually experienced four season weather, but the winter of 1948 was severe and brought most mission and Turkish military activities to a complete halt. The heavy snow storms "seriously hampered progress of highway construction [since] it was necessary to lay off large numbers of Turkish laborers because they do not have adequate clothing to work in the sub-zero weather." Even "instruction at the Turkish service schools was greatly handicapped by poor or inadequate facilities furnished by the Turkish Army," once the winter weather set in. The snowfall grounded most of the TAF in Eastern Turkey because "the Turkish Air Force had no snow ploughs" nor "adequate weather reports and forecasting." Against Russian forces that had become experts in winter warfare during the Second World War, this was an unacceptable situation. In response the U.S. Army and Air Force group personnel revised their 1949 aid and training programs to include snowplows and snowplow courses, as well as proposing the delivery and installation of eighteen weather stations located at TAF bases and requisite courses in meteorology and equipment

²⁴ JAMMAT, 1948, October, box 14.

²⁵ JAMMAT, 1948, December, box 14.

maintenance. Planned or unplanned the parameters of the mission seemed to grow exponentially, ultimately a key to its long-term success.²⁶

After a slow start due to the winter weather by February of 1949 in warmer areas, and March and April at the higher elevations, the American mission was clearly entering into new territory and the second phase of the program. February witnessed a test of the defenses of the Bosphorus “in joint maneuvers of the Turkish Army, Navy and Air Force, based on Mission plans and directives.”²⁷ This was very significant for two reasons. First, it demonstrated a great deal of trust and some deference among the highest level of Turkish civilian and military authorities to allow American mission personnel to plan the defense of the most strategic area (from the Turkish perspective) of the country. Second, such trust and deference provided the mission with an entirely new and very influential mechanism for steering Turkey’s defense establishment in directions that were advantageous to U.S. strategic interests. The mission personnel involved in preparing the defense plans for Western Turkey were able to ensure, for example, to convince the Turkish General Staff to assign their older equipment to the defense of European Thrace. In this way JAMMAT was able to remove the American fear that the Turkish military would commit too many of its forces to the futile defense of European Turkey and threaten the viability of the fighting withdrawal in Eastern Turkey that secret U.S. war plans depended on.²⁸

Another key part of phase two began in March with the inauguration of mission courses at the Staff College in Istanbul, a venerable and prestigious institution of the Ottoman Empire. This was “the first course of instruction presented to Turkish general and senior field grade

²⁶ JAMMAT, 1948, October and December, box 14.

²⁷ JAMMAT, 1949, February, box 16.

²⁸ JAMMAT, 1950, December, box 106.

officers under the Mission program.” Not only was JAMMAT beginning the process of trying to inculcate senior Turkish officers with U.S. tactical and strategic doctrine, but TUSAG personnel also prepared “revised Tables of Organization and Equipment based on the U.S. Army tables... to assist the Turkish General Staff in mobilization planning and assignment of Aid equipment.”²⁹ While TO&Es are far more humble than a staff college filled with field grade officers in dress uniform, the influence conferred upon those who prepared them was just as significant. In the process TUSAG personnel shared with the Turkish Army the organization of American units from an infantry squad up to a full division, as well as determined how to divide up the aid material. For an American military that had worried that the Turkish Army might diffuse U.S. aid equipment over too many units, being able to have TUSAG prepare the TO&Es for Turkey was another grant of substantial authority to the mission personnel.

In addition to these major new areas of influence the mission continued to function in all of its original and more modest duties. Training at all schools continued, as did inspections of facilities, defenses, and infrastructure. Construction of new buildings continued, while TUSAFG opened an entirely new Communication School at Gazi Emir Airfield with general courses in radio, telephone, telegraph, and a specialized program for “Ground-Controlled Approach and Radar Officers.” In June the Turkish Army, following TUSAG recommendations, conducted a “combat team demonstration using live ammunition, the first of its kind ever conducted in Turkey, involved the coordinated use of Armor, Infantry and Artillery.” This was the first of many such events to follow and had been a major point of emphasis by the American advisors to

²⁹ JAMMAT, 1949, March, box 16.

test and perfect the tactical doctrines that were the main focus of the second phase of the mission.³⁰

Additional evidence of the competence of Turkish military personnel continued to figure prominently in mission reports. Some of the most significant examples came in the form of an artillery-firing demonstration at the Polatli Artillery School, the proficiency examination results from the TAF's F-47 fighter pilots, and annual 1st Army maneuvers in Thrace. In Turkey in 1949, and in light of Polatli being one of the flagship Army schools established by the mission, an artillery demonstration by the graduating class was no small matter. In attendance was "the President of Turkey, the American Ambassador, the Chief of TUSAG, the Chief of Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces, 200-300 Turkish Army officers, about twenty invited foreign observers and members of the Turkish press." The report to Washington described the event as "a very credible performance" and Turkish newspapers "widely publicized" the demonstration "some of which devoted an entire page to the event." Of special note was the inclusion of foreign observers, the first mention in the mission records of their presence at Turkish military events. For the pilot proficiency examinations the results were "excellent," with the report stressing that the examination was "the same given to U.S. Air Force F-47 pilots." At the 1st Army war games the Turks undertook a complicated "Joint Ground-Air Force airlift and supply maneuver" from Etimesgut Airfield to a simulated defense of Konya Airfield. The operation, "involving the movement of 300 Infantry and Artillery personnel with their equipment... was conducted in a very satisfactory manner," according to the mission report. The maneuver received high "phase

³⁰ JAMMAT, 1949, June, box 16.

two” praise from JAMMAT chief General McBride and the other TUSAG officers for revealing “the application of sound tactical doctrines as well as efficient organization and preparation.”³¹

On the roads front, mid-1949 witnessed two milestones. On the crucial Toprakkale-Erzurum route “all efforts were being devoted to improvement of the road” such that it appeared “likely that all-weather passage will be possible by the end of this year’s construction season.” This had been the highest priority route of the American road building group from its inception and its near completion ushered in a transformation for the roads program. The second milestone was the separation of the Roads Group from the mission. As of July 1949, all “purchases and expenses of the PRA Group” came “from Economic Cooperation Administration funds.” The ECA was responsible for administering the funds of the Marshall Plan, divorcing the Roads Group from the mission. At the same time the Turkish Minister of Public Works outlined an ambitious “9-year plan for development of the 23,000 kilometers of the State road system.” Now that the PRA group had completed the roads of first military priority for the mission it truly became a civilian aid program with separate funding and began to help build a nation-wide road network that the Turkish people and their politicians wanted, augmented by Turkish funding through the Department of Roads and Bridges. An offshoot legacy of the American mission to aid Turkey was the creation of enough roads and the infusion of enough vehicles that Turkey soon became an automobile nation. To add to this automobile legacy the mission was also responsible for supplying tens of thousands of automobile tubes and tires, building tire retread factories, and producing the first modern road map in Turkish history.³²

³¹ JAMMAT, 1949, July, box 16, and September, box 17.

³² JAMMAT, 1949, June, box 16 and November, box 17, and 1950, February, box 20. A major contributing factor to JAMMAT’s knowledge for the road map of Turkey was the elaborate plans that mission personnel put together for the demolition of all roads, bridges, and tunnels in Eastern Turkey. Compiling this information required numerous tours by air and jeep throughout the area and is another indicator of the U.S. military’s preoccupation with the Turks

In a similar fashion the Air Force Group was responsible for establishing a number of modern and essential components of Turkey's air infrastructure, all of which helped make flying in Turkey much safer and more effective. In addition to the control towers, support buildings, and the radars for the interior airspace of the country that the Air Group built during 1948, in 1949 TUSAFG added 24-hour radio beacon and tower operations at five Turkish airbases, completed the national radio net, and began installing the country's first early warning radar system. Data from early 1950 showed that "the 1949 accident rate in the Turkish Air Force was 45 percent below the rate for 1947, before the start of the aid program." This in spite of "an almost two-fold increase in the number of flying hours logged over 1947 [including] more all-weather flying than ever before."³³

Part of this improvement was also due to the Air Group finally succeeding at convincing the Turkish Air Force to reduce the types of aircraft it had in operation, by "declaring 231 aircraft obsolete." The Air Group could state with pride that "since the beginning of the Aid Program, the Turkish Air Force has reduced the number of types of aircraft in operation from 22 to 11, thus simplifying the supply and maintenance problem and only using their best and most modern planes." The reason for pride lay in convincing the Turks to give up on anything that still functioned:

Reluctance of the Turkish Air Force to declare these aircraft obsolete lies in the Turkish character, which hesitates to discard anything. The country is poor and the Turk, as an individual or as a government official, hesitates to retire obsolete equipment for fear that some use might be made of the object at some future date.

buying time in their defense of this mountainous region. It is also interesting to consider that the engineers building the Toprakkale-Erzurum road, most likely designed it with an eye to its demotion and defense.

³³ JAMMAT, 1949, October, box 17, 1950, January and April, box 20.

TUSAFG personnel also set up the Turkish Air Force Engineering School outside of Izmir “designed to graduate 500-600 aircraft mechanics a year as contrasted to the 60 mechanics formerly trained by the Turks each year.”³⁴ The engineering school was the answer to the most pressing problem in the Turkish Air Force, the lack of technically trained support personnel, which combined with the removal of obsolete aircraft types to further improve pilot safety, aircraft lifespan, and the overall performance of the TAF.

Another accomplishment of TUSAFG that would prove to benefit the overall military mission and subsequent American missions to other countries was the inauguration of advisory field teams. Instead of just overseeing the training facilities, staging brief periodic inspections, and viewing the annual maneuvers, the Air Group began systematic, location-by-location advising operations that could last for weeks at a time. Rather than one or two officers on a day trip inspection, this approach utilized an integrated team of officers and enlisted men possessing all the specialties required by the destination in question. They would then get to know each location and the units operating there, observing their interactions and performance, offering critiques, assisting in the resolution of disputes, increasing efficiency, and leaving knowing that Turkish forces were making maximum use of aid material and training. This strategy soon proved itself superior and both the Army and Navy Groups began practicing it on a unit-by-unit and location-by-location basis. The approach required a great deal more work and travel than the previous method, but it demonstrated the commitment of mission personnel to improving the Turkish Armed Forces in every way within their capacity.³⁵

³⁴ JAMMAT, 1949, October, box 17.

³⁵ JAMMAT, 1950, February and April, box 20.

By the start of 1950 the mission could also point to the substantial cumulative amount of aid material that the United States had given to the Republic of Turkey. For the Turkish Army there was very little additional weaponry in the 1949 program. In general item categories such as trucks, however, the aid mission could boast of delivering over 7300, more than doubling the total number of trucks of all types in the entire country. In addition, the mission had completed delivery of nearly 3300 trailers to go along with the trucks. During the year, in a testament to its efficiency, mission schools had trained over 8,000 Turkish drivers at a cost of only \$44,000 in aid money or \$5.50 per driver. By January 1950 there were also 871 more Quonset huts, one thousand more radios, one thousand more telephones, and twice as many switchboards in the Turkish armed forces than the previous year. The Turkish Air Force received the remainder of its C-47 transport aircraft, diverted during Berlin Blockade³⁶, while the Turkish Navy greatly updated the firepower and flexibility of its surface fleet with the delivery of four ex-U.S. Navy destroyers.³⁷

Late 1949 to early 1950 also witnessed a new Turkish strategy of advertising their new military hardware, the competency of their forces in its utilization, and their relationship to the United States through JAMMAT. First there had been the invitation to the twenty foreign observers at the Polatli Artillery School graduation. Then in January “the Turks also invited the Army, Air and Naval attaches of Great Britain, Italy, France, Spain, Greece, Iran and Syria to view the American-supervised Anti-aircraft school in Tuzla, the Armored school in Ankara, and the Artillery school during the month.” Finally in March, the Turkish government managed to appropriate much of the spotlight from a JAMMAT publicity drive planned by the U.S. Military

³⁶ Somewhat surprisingly, there is no indication from JAMMAT records that the Berlin Blockade caused increased anxiety in Turkey, beyond being an inconvenience slowing the delivery of some U.S. equipment and sidetracking a number of journalists scheduled to report on the American mission.

³⁷ JAMMAT, 1949, December, box 17.

Air Transport Service in Germany that was supposed to “primarily report on the Joint Military Mission.” Instead, “the Turkish government made most of the arrangements in Ankara, where the newsmen viewed the Turkish War College, the Armored School... a two-hour military review of an Armored Brigade...and an air show of American C-47 cargo and F-47 fighter aircraft.” “The largest single group of correspondents ever to visit Turkey,” the report stated somewhat vaguely, that “they apparently were well-impressed by what they saw.” Whether the American mission or the Turkish armed forces or both had done the impressing remained unclear. The report did conclude with the observation that “the Turkish government is continuing its rather recent policy of showing their military schools to military attaches of western powers.”³⁸

Turkish authorities recognized that the continuing work of the mission was transforming their antiquated military into a modern force. They realized that the mission was making their military strong enough in some areas to advertise that fact to Western European states. These were the same states which were just beginning the process of rebuilding their own military forces with American aid for NATO, an alliance that Turkey wanted very much to join. American diplomats, however, had made it clear that Turkey was not going to get an invitation to NATO. In their dogged fashion, Turkish leaders continued to look for ways to make their country and military indispensable to the United States. The Turkish government hoped that the American aid mission would not only continue to modernize its military, but would also lead to a U.S.-Turkish alliance. Events were about to provide such opportunities.

A New Turkish Government

³⁸ JAMMAT, 1950, January and March, box 20.

The year 1950 was a transformative one for the United States and for Turkey. Due to public knowledge of the successful Soviet detonation of a nuclear weapon by September and the “loss” of China by December of 1949, by 1950 the Cold War had already taken on frighteningly new geographic, military, and psychological dimensions. In the midst of the Second Red Scare at home and in reaction to the call for a complete reappraisal of America’s standing and strategy in the world stemming from a nuclear-armed Soviet Union, the National Security Council issued NSC-68 in April of 1950. This document would come to define in many ways America’s response to the Cold War and recommended massive increases in defense spending and the expansion of foreign aid missions. Interestingly enough, President Truman initially rejected NSC-68, sending it back for review. Events in Korea, however, would shortly revive the spirit and substance of the document, with lasting implications for JAMMAT and Turkey. Yet before this took place, in Turkey the spring of 1950 ushered in a brand new period in the country’s history, when on 14 May the increasingly popular opposition Democratic Party finally swept into office in the country’s first transition of power due to democratic election.

Pressure from Washington for Turkey to become more democratic, such that it could actually qualify for the principals of the Truman Doctrine, was a factor in Turkey’s budding democracy, but was only one of many. Atatürkism had always made clear that single-party rule was a necessary stop-gap measure until the country was economically, socially, and militarily stable enough to endure the added acrimony of partisan politics. In the aftermath of the Second World War and the calls for freedom, independence, and democracy, especially in contrast to the single-party communism of the Soviet Union, the Turkish people and many in their government were eager for true political pluralism. The surprise relationship with the United States that resulted from the Truman Doctrine and its growing importance in the eyes of Turkish leaders

simply provided added incentive. Despite the radical nature of ending single party rule after twenty-seven years in office, the fundamental tenets of Turkey's foreign policy did not flinch. In fact, the evidence from JAMMAT records points to an increased willingness on the part of the new government to accommodate every American recommendation in the pursuit of obtaining a binding security alliance.

In a move to consolidate its own political future and to address one of the chief complaints of the American mission, the new government immediately began a large-scale turnover of the country's military elite. "The first major action of the newly-elected Democratic Party government," read a mission report, "was replacing in June the four top leaders of the Turkish Armed Forces." This was only a half truth. There were two forced retirements, but one general received a promotion to the highest position under the new mission-recommended restructuring of Turkey's national security apparatus, while the fourth former head enjoyed a horizontal shift to a new and powerful advisory group. The real substance of the "general housecleaning" came when "it was announced during the month that 14 generals, 200 colonels and 300 lieutenant colonels would be retired." This was significant change, with the mission report adding that the Democratic Party was making these moves "for the purpose of moving younger officers into more responsible positions."³⁹ Noticeably absent from the following months' reports was any complaint from the mission groups speaking to the loss of a single important working relationship with the retired officers. To the contrary, the housecleaning seemed to take American preferences into account, bringing scores of the American-trained officers into positions of greater influence and responsibility, with a corresponding uptick in the approval of additional American recommendations.

³⁹ JAMMAT, 1950, May and June, box 20.

The most important recommendation the new Turkish government and military leaders suddenly approved in the immediate aftermath of the election was the establishment of a U.S. Engineers Group within JAMMAT to “supervise the construction of runways and airfield facilities in Turkey.” Yet why would the mission need an Engineers Group? The construction of runways and airfield facilities had been activities that TUSAFG had undertaken since its inception and they had trained Turkish personnel in the required skills since 1948. The reason behind the creation of the Engineer Group was that despite the aborted attempt in early 1949 at pursuing the airfield and aviation fuel stockpiling program of NSC 36/1 and continuing “grave doubts” from the Department of State, the Department of Defense ultimately went ahead with the plan only with slight modifications. Instead of asking the Turks if the U.S. could build airfields and stockpile aviation fuel for potential U.S. air operations against the Soviet Union, the Pentagon proposed to sell the plan as merely facelift operations “without direct and open operational control of the project.” Cognizant of the ramifications both in Turkey and in Congress, the State Department Director of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, James Bruce, in February advised his Defense counterpart Major General Lyman Lemnitzer, “It is imperative that, to the extent possible, it should appear that the work is being done for Turkey, compatible with the needs of the Turkish Air Force, and not for the United States of America in view of the needs of our armed forces.”⁴⁰

Two months later in April the Department of State again advised duplicitous caution to the Defense Department. “The Department [of State] recommends that to the greatest degree possible the testimony before the Budget Bureau and Congress be limited to the general statements that these funds are for the rehabilitation of certain Turkish airfields...to permit the

⁴⁰ *FRUS 1950*, vol. V, 1234-1235.

fullest efficient use by the Turkish Air Force,” read the top secret memo. “It is recommended that details of size, strength, and location of airfields not be testified to,” elaborated John H. Ohly, the Deputy Director of Mutual Defense Assistance. Ohly knew that the building of a brand new airbase at İncirlik, within the “Iskenderun-Adana area,” with a runway of “over 10,000 ft.” and capable of accommodating a “100,000 lbs. gross load weight” would certainly raise suspicions before a Congressional committee.⁴¹ Pragmatic as ever, yet even more desperate than their predecessors, the new Turkish government supported the plan. In a meeting with the Turkish Secretary General Faik Zihni Akdur, U.S. Ambassador George Wadsworth related that Akdur “was quite definite in expressing the view that the least publicity given to any matter of this kind the better” assuring the ambassador “that no local publicity would be given.”⁴² Turkey was receiving new and improved airfields that its own Air Force could use and that it could deny to American forces unless Turkey received a security agreement. Furthermore, Turkish leaders were giving the United States something in Turkey that the U.S. military might consider worth fighting for.

By April of 1950, therefore, the Joint Military Mission to Aid Turkey had grown and succeeded well beyond its original conception. The Turkish armed forces and both the old and new Turkish governments had afforded mission personnel unprecedented access and influence in the hope of making their country so invaluable to the United States that they would merit a U.S. commitment to Turkish sovereignty and security. JAMMAT was also exceeding expectations as the middleman between the United States and Turkey, such that the mission had the authority to begin staff planning with Turkey. The members of the mission could also point to significant

⁴¹ *FRUS 1950*, vol. V, 1250.

⁴² *FRUS 1950*, vol. V, 1259.

achievements in using their access and influence to advance U.S. strategic interests in the area, even as the United States secretly withdrew from the proposed defense of the Middle East. By late 1949 and early 1950 even British contingency war planners had to grudgingly acknowledge “the increased importance of Turkey as an element in the defense of the Middle East.” This was due to new assessments by both British and American contingency war planners, that thanks to the work of JAMMAT, Turkish resistance “would be much stiffer than hitherto estimated.”⁴³ Yet until Turkey attained a U.S. security guarantee, the mission’s existence and accomplishments remained tenuous. In the event that the Soviet Union attacked Turkey, would the members of the mission constitute the core of an American Expeditionary Force to fight shoulder-to-shoulder with the Turks in the defense of their country? Or would the mission terminate, its members facing the ignominy of bidding a hasty retreat to the safety of the U.S. Navy, while their Turkish students, colleagues, and friends fought to the death alone and abandoned? For two countries whose ideological and strategic interests were so close and one of whose military was so open with and interwoven to the other, a tipping point was nearly, but not quite, at hand.

⁴³ Cohen, 180-181.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE KOREAN FACTOR: THE WAR, THE TURKISH BRIGADE, AND NATO MEMBERSHIP

The single most influential event determining the eventual inclusion of Turkey into NATO and the drawing of the United States into the defense of the Middle East was the outbreak of war on the Korean Peninsula. Just as in 1947 with the Truman Doctrine, the effects of this transformational event upon the United States and Turkey were neither instantaneous nor symmetrical, yet the aftermath brought both sides into step as never before. U.S. leaders would continue to undervalue the potential Turkish contribution, but with much less certainty and unanimity than before. Turkish leaders would attempt to cash in on the investments that JAMMAT had helped them to accrue, while at same time begin to threaten to move toward neutrality with potentially catastrophic consequences for the United States in the Middle East. The war in Korean also simultaneously undercut American strategic self-confidence and highlighted Turkish strengths and potential.

This chapter examines the two final variables that brought U.S.-Turkish relations into close enough alignment for the United States to finally push for Turkey's inclusion into NATO. The first variable, the Korean War, had sweeping repercussions on U.S. Cold War policy that were psychological, financial, and strategic in nature. Everything about the war, from the surprise attack of a Soviet proxy state upon a U.S.-backed government, to the unexpected reverses on the battlefield suffered by U.S/UN forces, to the war's dependence on conventional forces, all worked in favor of increasing U.S. appreciation of both Turkey's exposed position and its military potential. The war in Korean also allowed for the second variable, the Turkish

Brigade, to demonstrate the exceptional capabilities of the Turkish military in a modern war; capabilities which JAMMAT had helped to hone. The combination of these two variables with all of the previous work of JAMMAT and U.S. ambitions for a base in southeast Turkey proved enough for Turkey to receive an invitation to join NATO. Membership in NATO became the keystone of Turkish national security and granted the United States a permanent position from which to defend and/or intervene in the Middle East.

The Korean War

When communist North Korean forces crossed the 38th parallel to begin the invasion of South Korea the significance of what was beginning was not immediately apparent in places such as Washington D.C. or Ankara. Just four days after the start of the conflict, at the request of the new Turkish Foreign Minister Fuad Köprülü, JAMMAT chief Major General McBride met the foreign minister to discuss a number of issues. General McBride asked the foreign minister about his and his government's reaction to the "Korean Situation." Minister Köprülü speculated that it was only a political move on the part of Moscow and that in view of the stance taken by the United States in the United Nations "the Soviets would not directly participate in any military actions" nor did his government consider it "a Soviet opening of a worldwide military action." He argued that "should the Soviets decide to begin a world conflict, they would not initiate action in a remote and unimportant area such as Korea." Minister Köprülü then proceeded to question General McBride about JAMMAT's opinion of the recent changes in command within the Turkish armed forces, the general conditions of the Turkish military, and the still high defense costs within the Turkish budget.¹ Clearly at the start there was little appreciation for just

¹ JAMMAT, 1950, June, box 9.

how important such a “remote and unimportant an area such as Korean” would prove to be for both Americans and Turks.

The significance of the Korean conflict grew as American forces experienced multiple defeats. Not only did U.S. forces experience a string of defeats for the first time since the dark days of 1941-42, but these defeats came at the hands of a North Korean People’s Army that possessed mostly small arms and artillery, and just over a hundred ex-Soviet tanks of early WWII vintage. For the nuclear-equipped United States military in possession of the most advanced air force and largest navy in the world, the setbacks in Korea seemed inexplicable. Geographically, it was ideal that the first hot war of the Cold War began right next to a position under U.S. occupation. The close proximity of Japan to the Korean Peninsula meant that substantial U.S. land, sea, and air forces were on hand to react. The problem was that substantial did not immediately translate to enough, nor did it denote experienced troops and adequate equipment. As far as combat units with full equipment and logistics to fight a series of pitched battles, American forces were woefully unprepared, as the first action involving U.S. forces in Korea all too clearly demonstrated.

The first engagement involving U.S. troops became emblematic for the way this war cracked conceptions of American superiority and the inevitability of its forces to secure easy victory. When the ad hoc Task Force Smith staged a classic prepared ambush of the lead units of the North Korean advance, what was supposed to be in the words of Commander-in-Chief, Far East Command General Douglas MacArthur “an arrogant display of strength” instead turned into an embarrassing American rout. Though in most accounts at the time blame fell to the “men of 1950,” this was in fact the long shadow of postwar over-demobilization, followed by excessively tight military budgets, combined with prioritization for nuclear and strategic air assets at the

expense of conventional forces. Most U.S. weapons used in Korea came from poorly maintained stockpiles from the Second World War, often in the condition that units had left them in after extensive use. Finally, there was also the issue of an overall military commander who was so arrogant as to think that simply because they were Americans under his command four hundred lightly armed men backed by six pieces of artillery with no air cover would intimidate an “inferior” enemy whose force attacked with nearly 40 tanks, plentiful artillery, and over four thousand infantry.²

The ensuing battles did little to improve the image of America’s conventional forces. Despite landing two full divisions from Japan, the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) continued to push the surviving Republic of Korea (ROK) and arriving U.S. forces down the peninsula, to a last stand at the Pusan Perimeter. From the beginning, therefore, Korea confirmed beyond a doubt that the United States was not prepared for a conventional war, neither on the comparatively small-scale of the initial battles in Korea or anywhere else in the world. At the outbreak of war in 1950 U.S. Army was still 40,000 personnel or roughly three divisions below its authorized strength of 630,000. Of this total, the Army consisted of only ten under-strength combat divisions and eleven independent regiments.³ This translated to a total Army combat strength of less than 200,000. The remainder of the total were support and administrative personnel and those staffing foreign bases and foreign military missions.

To rectify the situation President Truman and Congress cooperated to increase U.S. defense spending by a total of 257 percent by the end of 1950.⁴ In light of European security

² Thomas E. Hanson, *Combat Ready ? : the Eighth U.S. Army on the Eve of the Korean War* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2010), 1.

³ Hanson, 13.

⁴ John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 113.

remaining the highest defense priority outside the United States, however, despite the increased spending, even combined American and ROK forces rarely enjoyed numerical superiority during the Korean War. Significantly, since North Korea did not possess nuclear weapons, the American nuclear deterrent, which continued to grow due to defense spending, remained virtually worthless to the troops on the ground. This situation only increased appreciation for the value of conventional forces, both from the United States and from its allies. The United Nations resolutions that turned the conflict into a UN police action were more than public relations tools for the United States in its opposition to world communism. Instead, the appeals for military contributions from member states also proved to be an ingenious mechanism for quickly procuring welcomed additional conventional forces.

For the same reason that the Korean War reminded the U.S. military and Congress of the importance of conventional forces the war also rewrote the scale of U.S. foreign military assistance. Though most of the aid continued to go to Europe, a clear discrepancy remained between Western Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean region. The original budgeting for FY 1951, completed in early 1950, allocated just over \$1 billion in U.S. aid to the eleven NATO countries, while Greece and Turkey were to split \$120 million.⁵ Within a week of North Korea's invasion of South Korea, President Truman submitted a new budget for military assistance. The revised budget now scheduled \$3.5 billion for the North Atlantic countries, while the total for Greece and Turkey only increased to \$200 million. This was part of the militarization of U.S. foreign policy following the adoption of NSC-68. More indicative of the difficult threat of hot war via proxy state or "the danger of satellite states engaging in hostilities" that U.S. planners

⁵ *FRUS 1950*, vol. I, 321.

now appreciated along with the newfound respect for conventional forces, was Turkey's jump to Title I status in matters of military aid.⁶

Turkish benefits from the Korean conflict were not only the indirect advantages experienced by most similarly exposed pro-American governments, but more importantly resulted from direct Turkish actions. On 25 July 1950, just one month after the Communist invasion, the new Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes announced that "4,500 Turkish soldiers would be sent to Korea to fight for the United Nations against the North Koreans."⁷ This was no small contribution. Except for the Republic of Korea, the United States, and the combined forces of the British Commonwealth, Turkey dedicated more troops than any of the other nineteen nations that actively supported the UN police action.⁸ Just days after offering what would become the first of three Turkish brigades that would serve in Korea, Turkey officially and publically requested adherence to the North Atlantic Treaty. This was a calculated risk by the new Turkish government, especially on the part of Prime Minister Menderes. Though the Turkish Grand National Assembly unanimously approved the dispatch of troops on 30 July, the fact that Menderes unilaterally committed the brigade five days earlier without first consulting parliament created a major firestorm among his political opponents. This attempt to immediately leverage Turkey's unswerving support for the United States and its allies into a NATO membership further exposed the ruling party to a political backlash in the event of failure.

To avoid such an eventuality, in a series of meetings with U.S. officials and European heads of state, the Turkish Foreign Minister Köprülü and Prime Minister Menderes argued strenuously for the inclusion of Turkey into NATO. Their arguments rested on five main points.

⁶ *FRUS 1950*, vol. I, 352, 408.

⁷ JAMMAT, 1950, July, box 20.

⁸ Lee Hyung Suk, Chairman War History Compilation Committee, *The History of the United Nations Forces in the Korean War* (Seoul: The Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Korea, 1977), 381.

First of all Turkey had been patient, but “Korean developments” created a “pressing new urgency.” Second, the “Turkish approach was essentially realistic” being willing to accept the “present limitations on possible European aid if Turkey were attacked.” Third, “in [the] Near East [the] effect would buttress wavering morale.” Fourth, Turkish morale would also increase “where further deferment would be ‘not only painful but at best, a moral deception.’” Finally, fifth, Turkey was not looking to hide behind the strength of other nations, since “Turkish policy already “relies first on its own armed forces and wishes to strengthen them through more effective cooperation with JAMMAT.” Taking these points into consideration the Turkish representatives concluded that admission to the pact “seems eminently logical to all Turks.”⁹

The North Atlantic Treaty members, however, rejected Turkey’s request for a variety of reasons. There was regional opposition from the Scandinavian members that Turkey had no business in an Atlantic Pact. The British delegates opposed Turkey’s inclusion into NATO out of a desire to bind the Anatolian republic and its increasingly effective military into a British-controlled Middle East alliance. Most importantly, the United States also rejected the Turkish appeal because NATO in its present state was not yet secure and the Korean conflict was further dividing limited resources. The decision of the NATO foreign ministers was fulfilling a U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum in which the JCS stated, “It might be possible to obtain the [military] benefits of Turk and Greek participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and at the same time minimize the disadvantages thereof by according to these two nations an associate status.” Also of note in this JCS memorandum was a summary statement that once NATO’s defenses were secure, “The United States [should] consider raising the question of full

⁹ *FRUS 1950*, vol. V, 1298.

membership for Turkey and Greece.”¹⁰ Though from the Turkish perspective the request seemed “eminently logical” the timing was not the best for the Americans. President Menderes and his advisers may have believed that with the military reverses that U.S. forces were experiencing at the time, the demonstration of Turkey being willing to come to the rescue would create a feeling of reciprocity among U.S. leaders. Unbeknownst to most, however, General MacArthur was at the time organizing a bold maneuver that promised to completely reverse the course of the war in Korea, such that the plight of the UN mission would not be as dire as it appeared.

The Turkish Brigade

Meanwhile back in Turkey, amid the widespread disappointment and political fallout resulting from NATO’s rejection, the members of the American aid mission continued their usual work and began helping to organize and train the “Anatolian Lions” of the Korean-bound 1st Turkish Brigade. After overcoming a series of obstacles, ranging from a UN delay in formally accepting the brigade, to an obscure Turkish law granting soldiers an extended leave when changing station, and the other expected confusion of organizing an expeditionary force for the first time in a nation’s history, JAMMAT succeeded in helping to expedite the embarkation of the brigade upon five U.S. transport ships bound for Korea by late September. Accompanying the brigade and continuing training aboard ship were five officers from JAMMAT’s Army Group. These officers transferred to the U.S. Far East Command and remained with the Turkish Brigade for the duration of the war. The 1st Turkish Brigade was now a test case for the efficacy of JAMMAT and value of the Turks as allies. As such it is highly relevant to describe in some

¹⁰ *FRUS 1950*, vol. V, 1307.

detail the first battle involving Turkish troops, both for the American and the Turkish perspectives that followed.¹¹

When the Turkish Brigade landed on the Korean peninsula on 19 October 1950 the situation could not have been more different from what Turkish leaders expected back in late July. In mid-September, while the Turks were embarking aboard their American transports, American naval forces carried out a surprise amphibious landing of three fresh divisions, X Corps, at Inchon, retaking the South's capital of Seoul and cutting off nearly the entire North Korean People's Army further south along the peninsula. The next day, on 16 September, the main UN force, the Eighth Army, broke out of the Pusan Perimeter that it had been struggling to defend since early August. As the Eighth Army raced north and X Corps cut across the peninsula, most of the nearly victorious North Korean Army dissolved into a mass of fleeing men, many taking to the central mountains as guerilla fighters. By the time the Turks landed, UN forces had just crossed the 38th parallel to begin the unification of Korea. After a few weeks at the UN Reception Center at Taegu for further training, equipping, and familiarization, the Turkish Brigade received its first order, to move north and join IX Corps, one of the three corps that together constituted the Eighth Army, the largest and most powerful UN force. On 13 November the Turkish Brigade became an attachment of the 25th US Infantry Division as the Eighth Army continued to push toward the Yalu River border of North Korea to meet General MacArthur's deadline of ending the war before Christmas.¹²

By 24 November the Turkish Brigade found itself shivering just behind the front line as UN forces began their "end-the-war offensive." The cold winds from Manchuria had begun

¹¹ JAMMAT, 1950, August and September, box 20.

¹² Suk, 382-383.

whipping down the Korean Peninsula, bringing an early and severe winter, with snow flurries and sub-zero temperatures. After a day and a half of almost resistance-free advances the units of the Eighth Army were spread like an open umbrella across northwestern Korea. On the left or west flank was I Corps, consisting of a US and a Republic of Korea division and the British Commonwealth Brigade. At the apex of the umbrella stood IX Corps, with two U.S. divisions and the Turkish Brigade. To their right, up in the foothills of the Taebaek Mountains, was the II ROK Corps with three nearly full divisions or roughly 30,000 men. As the sun set on 25 November UN forces settled in for another cold night, only to be awakened after dark by the sound of blowing bugles and shrill whistles signaling a Chinese attack. Three Communist Chinese Armies, or roughly 300,000 men, launched coordinated surprise night assaults against IX Corps in the center and the II ROK Corps to right. By morning of the 26th the Communist Chinese Forces (CCF) had destroyed all three divisions of the II ROK Corps and had two full armies advancing against the now exposed right flank of the Eighth Army. The Chinese plan was to drive these two armies behind the remaining two corps of the Eighth Army cutting them off from the south and destroying them in turn. By early afternoon IX Corps' command post summoned General Tahsin Yazıcı, the commander of the Turkish Brigade, to a hasty briefing. Working through translators IX Corps command staff showed General Yazıcı the situation map and ordered his unit to press eastward into the void left by the retreat of the II ROK Corps to try to reestablish a right flank blocking position to the east of the road junction town of Kunu-ri. Kunu-ri was only 10 miles by straight road from the coast. If the CCF gained quick access to Kunu-ri they would be able to cut off the Eighth Army before it could retreat south.¹³ A veteran of the First World War and Independence War, General Yazıcı unquestionably knew enough

¹³ Suk, 383.

about warfare to fully understand the gravity of the situation and what IX Corps and the remaining Eighth Army were asking him and his men.

With no more support than a single U.S. tank platoon and truck transport, which both left once the Turks were near their destination, the Turkish Brigade took up positions near Kunu-ri, and began advancing east up the road in fulfillment of their orders. On 27 November a former JAMMAT liaison signal officer attached to the brigade “picked up a [IX] Corps message in which the Corps Commander wanted the Brigade to turn back.” The message was two hours old and as the Turks reversed their direction of march they began to come under increasing enemy fire, not reaching the village of Wawon until midnight. The lead units of the advancing Chinese armies had now engulfed the Turkish Brigade. With repeated local counterattacks and clever reshuffling of his forces General Yazıcı and the men of the brigade managed to beat back all Chinese attacks during the night. Despite marching and/or fighting non-stop for two days by this point, the next morning the Turkish Brigade executed a fighting withdrawal back down the road to the next village of Sillim-ni.¹⁴ At Sillim-ni General Yazıcı took the extraordinary step of ordering his three battalions into positions occupying ten kilometers of the strategic road to Kunu-ri. This was another deliberate attempt to force the Chinese to either slowly bypass his extended positions or to take them from the Turks by force. The Chinese once again attacked at midnight, hitting the unsupported Turkish battalions from all sides. By morning the three Turkish battalions, short of food and ammunition, carrying their hundreds of wounded on their backs,

¹⁴ Military professionals and military historians generally characterize a fighting withdrawal as the most difficult maneuver in warfare.

managed to fight their way to Kunu-ri, which the U.S. 2nd Division was already in the process of retreating through.¹⁵

Not only had the Turkish Brigade managed to buy enough time for the 2nd Division to retreat, but by delaying the Chinese along the east-west road from Kunu-ri to Tokchon, the umbrella of the Eighth Army was able to close and withdraw through the narrow road corridor pressed against the coast by the foothills of the mountains. Though all the units of the Eighth Army, from the shattered divisions of the II ROK Corps to the hard-pressed 2nd US Division fought heroically, only the Turkish Brigade had been available to try to delay the two Chinese armies intent on slicing in behind the Eighth Army. Although initial reports said that the Chinese had destroyed the entire Turkish Brigade most of its constituent parts fought their way back to Kunu-ri intact, yet not before suffering nearly 1,000 casualties. With virtually no communications, no more logistics than they carried on their backs, no armored vehicles, and with no greater firepower than their own artillery the 4,500-man brigade had delayed and fought through tens of thousands of Communist Chinese. At this point tragedy struck in the form of bad luck or the evil eye as the Turks would say. While coordinating a further withdrawal plan with 2nd Division, General YAZICI agreed to split his brigade, due to limited road space. His Command Post and artillery battalion followed one route, while his two bloodied infantry battalions marched off along another. Unknown at the time, the CCF had managed to infiltrate a division strength blocking force along the route that the Turkish infantry battalions, a regiment of the U.S. 2nd Division, and elements of various ROK units were in the process of marching down. In what

¹⁵ Suk, 384-386.

would become known as the “gauntlet” 3,000 of the 7,000 U.S., Turkish, and ROK soldiers that marched down the road would not make it through the Chinese block alive.¹⁶

In the succession of UN retreats triggered by the massive Chinese intervention, the unexpectedly outstanding performance of the Turkish Brigade became one of the few media bright spots in what was otherwise a host of alarming and disheartening news. Despite the fact that much of “the media’s coverage during December was negative,”¹⁷ on 11 December 1950 *Time* magazine ran an article about the Turkish Brigade entitled “Why Withdraw?” The article described how stories of “swarthy, fiercely mustachioed Turks howling down upon them [Chinese] with bayonets fixed” were “spreading like a tonic along the U.N. line.” There were anecdotes from U.S. doctors of Turkish soldiers waiting until they “had at least three wounds” before reporting to the medics. Included were descriptions of the Turks fighting for days “short of food and ammunition, fighting with knives and fists, hurling stones at endless waves of Chinese attackers.” “Yet U.S. tanks that went forward to rescue trapped Turkish units,” continued the article, “found the Turks preparing to attack.” A quip from General Yazıcı in response to orders “to pull back from positions where they were surrounded by the swarming Chinese,” became famous and inspired the title was, “Withdraw? Why withdraw? We are killing lots of them.” Most significantly, for this dissertation, the article ended with the following summation:

The U.S. had spent over \$200 million in military aid to Turkey on the assumption that the Turk was a good soldier, who would defend his country if neighbor Russia attacked it. The Turks in Korea proved the assumption well justified.¹⁸

¹⁶ Suk, 389.

¹⁷ Steven Casey, *Selling the Korean War: Propaganda, Politics, and Public Opinion in the United States, 1950-1953* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 149.

¹⁸ “Why Withdraw?,” *Time* (Dec. 11, 1950).

Indeed, this was the most important result of Turkey contributing troops to the Korean conflict. A 1952 summary of JAMMAT's accomplishments to that date described, "That Turkey has shown full appreciation for this aid is exemplified by the heroic conduct of her troops in Korea" and "it is the fighting quality displayed by this Brigade (Korean Brigade) that has given to us a full realization of the capability of the Turkish Nation."¹⁹ The United States and the world became familiar with the idea that Turks had in them the makings of excellent soldiers. It took one battle in Korea to make common knowledge what JAMMAT reports had been sending back to Washington for years.

There were many others whose similar sentiments regarding the quality of the Turkish soldiery reached a much greater audience due to the role of the Turkish Brigade in the Korean War. A *New York Times* article from 22 December 1950 interviewed the new head of JAMMAT Major General William H. Arnold, who had succeeded Major General Horace L. McBride back in August. Pronouncing the JAMMAT a "sound" investment, General Arnold described Turkish soldiers as "capable of durability and ferocity that is hard to match" and declared "in a pitched battle, I'd be as please to have the Turks on my flank as any troops in the world."²⁰ This was particularly relevant in light of the prevalent U.S. media disdain for the "softies" of II ROK Corps who "threw away their weapons and ran" and who were thus responsible, according to such accounts, for the debacle that resulted from the Chinese intervention.²¹ The praise for the men of the Turkish Brigade was also significant in the context of all the media questions about the American "men of 1950" and their role in the reverses experienced by U.S. and UN forces. To this day the Turks enjoy an untarnished Korean War legacy as a "first-class fighting force."

¹⁹ JAMMAT, 1952, October, box 7.

²⁰ A. C. Sedgwick, "Turks' War Deeds Please U.S. Aides: Members of Military Mission in Ankara are Convinced Investment was Sound," *New York Times* (Dec. 30, 1950): 6.

²¹ "Hard Guys and Softies?" *Time Magazine* (December 11, 1950).

Despite the contrast that the performance of the Turkish Brigade offered to that of the II ROK corps, the official Republic of Korea history of the Turkish contribution during the Korean War praised the Turks for their “relish for hand-to-hand fighting, their first-class leadership, [and] their discipline under fire... attributes of the Turkish fighting men which the fighters of other nations admired so much.”²² The Turkish Brigade’s performance in Korea confirmed in every way the efficacy of the work of JAMMAT and the validity of its existence, yet this was the same Turkey that the United States and European foreign ministers had so recently rejected for NATO membership.

The Resurrection of NATO Membership

The size of Turkey’s contribution to the Korean conflict and the consistent exemplary performance of Turkish fighting men created a problem for the United States in light of the rejection of Turkey’s application to join NATO. Of the twelve original members of NATO only the United States and the British Commonwealth contributed more troops to the UN police action than Turkey. Belgium and Luxembourg, for example, combined to send one battalion, or 700 men, with a total of roughly 3,500 serving in Korea between 1950 and 1955. The Netherlands also sent a single battalion. France, with a huge population compared to Belgium and the Netherlands, also dedicated only one battalion. Even slightly more populous than France at the time, Italy only contributed a Red Cross field hospital. Similarly, Denmark and Norway offered medical support. Portugal and Iceland sent nothing. In short, with less than half the population of France alone, Turkey committed nearly 15,000 troops during the three years of

²² Suk, 381. This is according to the official Republic of Korea history of U.N. contingents in the Korean War. Being as much of the praise for the performance of the Turkish Brigade came in derogatory comparison to the performance of the three Korean divisions of the II ROK Corps, it is especially relevant that in Korean annals of the war the high reputation of Turkish soldiers remains unquestioned.

fighting or more than the combined total of nine NATO members.²³ Though the forces of all the NATO members who sent troops justly earned solid reputations in Korea, none surpassed that enjoyed by the Turks.

The implications of the performance of the Turkish Brigade after its first trial by fire were immediate and public. On 15 December 1950 the *New York Times* ran an article from Istanbul entitled “Reward is Expected.” The article described how newspapers throughout Turkey carried “long descriptions of exploits of the Turkish soldiers” such that there were spontaneous “mass demonstrations of pride” across the country. With Korea “her one proving ground in recent times,” read the article, “Indications are that not only Turkish officials but also the mass of Turkish people feel that the country’s actions, adherence to the United Nations and sacrifices in the common struggle should have an immediate reward...inclusion in the Atlantic Pact.” After outlining Turkish arguments that no other country was “more determined to fight” the article ended by noting, “Frequently the question is asked, ‘Does the United States really believe that France, Italy, the Scandinavian countries would fight?’”²⁴

Regardless of U.S. opinions about its NATO partners, the stars were not yet in perfect alignment for Turkey to join the Atlantic Pact. In Turkey’s favor, Washington had acknowledged that Turkey did possess long-term strategic value to U.S. national security. Also, Turkey was fulfilling nearly all U.S.-suggested security recommendations, from airfields to minefields to roads, and JAMMAT was not only modernizing Turkish forces but also advising Turkish military planning. In addition, Turkey had proven itself a staunch ally of the United States in United Nation sessions, and was continuing to dedicate nearly forty percent of its annual budget

²³ Suk, 117, 195, 265, 381.

²⁴ “Reward is Expected” *New York Times* (Dec. 15, 1950): 6.

to national defense, which it was now offering to the North Atlantic Alliance. In comparison, America's most important ally, Great Britain, the most militarily active member of NATO, only dedicated eight percent of its national budget to defense.²⁵ Furthermore, in the process of justifying its need for aid, Turkish officials had made available to U.S. officials "total estimate revenues, defense expenditures, refugee expenditures, normal government running expenses, and investment expenditures." Though Ambassador Wadsworth described the resultant "over-all fiscal picture" as "dark," it was proof that Turkey had made itself an open book to the United States. Ambassador Wadsworth cited the ECA as acknowledging that the "principal impact of increased defense expenditures would fall on either the investment program (which the United States had been overseeing as a compliment to JAMMAT) or alternatively on general standard of living through inflation or increased tax burdens." There was, declared the ambassador, "So very little fat in [the] Turkish economy" because of its defense spending and its involvement in projects "of special interest to the US."²⁶ U.S. officials were, therefore, fully aware that Turkey was doing everything in its power to try to win full U.S. acceptance as a partner state.

Yet, instead of admitting Turkey into NATO as a full member, the foreign ministers of the member states ultimately accepted the U.S. plan to propose an associative status regarding military planning to Greece and Turkey. Before such planning took place, however, informal U.S.-Turkish conferences continued via JAMMAT. In one such meeting on 23 December 1950 Chief of Staff of the Turkish military, General Nuri Yamut presented "Mediterranean Geopolitics from the [Turkish] military point of view." Within Ambassador Wadsworth's synopsis of the general's discussion was an interesting appraisal of the military strength of the

²⁵ Lawrence S. Kaplan, *A Community of Interests: NATO and the Military Assistance Program, 1948-1951* (Office of the Secretary of Defense Historical Office, U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C., 1980), 120.

²⁶ *FRUS 1950*, vol. V, 1328-1331.

region. General Yamut posited that “if Yugoslavia is secured (as an opponent of the Soviet Union following Joseph Broz Tito’s split with Joseph Stalin), then Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey form the strongest defense force in the Eastern Mediterranean.” Even more pointedly, he declared, “If Yugoslavia is secured, the three countries can produce a force of 50 to 60 divisions, more than all the NATO countries can produce at the moment.”²⁷ While the actual practical validity of this statement was debatable, just a month later in a U.S. policy paper on the “comparative strength” of America’s allies came the following, strikingly similar, analysis:

Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey and Iran... [constitute] the shield of the Middle East and, perhaps *even more importantly*, of Africa. The forces in being in *Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey* are the most sizable and best trained forces presently in existence on the Eurasian land mass which are available to the non-Soviet world. These forces have probable capacity of holding a bridge to Eurasia in the event the U.S.S.R. *occupies Western Europe*.²⁸

General Yamut’s argument had gotten through to Washington, but had taken on even larger ramifications. If the forces of Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey could deny a portion of Eurasia during an all-out Soviet invasion and protect the Middle East and Africa then U.S. contingency war planning could move in a whole new direction.

After the rapid realization of America’s unpreparedness to fight a conventional war, policy papers began referring to “increasing the military potential” of countries such as Turkey. Now that the Korean conflict had demonstrated not just in its opening stages, but far more after the Chinese intervention, that the U.S. military was manpower deficient in its conventional forces, there was increased value for supportive states in possession of large military forces. Turkey certainly fit the description. By December 1950 NSC 68/3 considered that “notwithstanding the *marked effect* of American military aid already rendered, the *numerically*

²⁷ *FRUS 1950*, vol. V, 1349.

²⁸ *FRUS 1951*, vol. I, 46-47. Emphasis mine.

strong Turkish armed forces still lack adequate military equipment, supplies, and training needed to attain the level of combat effectiveness deemed essential for that country.”²⁹ For years the United States had at times vacillated over continuing the program and had all along been content to provide Turkey only enough assistance to ensure that it would present attacking Soviet forces with enough of a speed bump to delay their advance sufficiently for U.S. bombers operating out of Egypt to have the requisite time to nuke Soviet petroleum and military industry back into the Stone Age. Legitimate Turkish fears of actually fully defending a Soviet or Soviet satellite threat had not previously been “deemed essential” in American strategic planning. Now, however, U.S. planners had a new appreciation for Turkey’s vulnerable position and the conventional military strength of superb quality that the republic was offering through alliance.

American national security policy planning at the beginning of 1951 began with the ominous statement and conclusion that the “The United States is now in a war of survival; [and] the United States is losing that war.”³⁰ The Korean factor continued to force military planning to overshadow all other budgetary and political concerns. A special report on “public attitudes toward the U.S. foreign aid program,” for example, mentioned that “many commentators have cited the excellent performance of the Turkish troops in Korea as evidence of the soundness of the military aid program.”³¹ The fact that Turkey had a standing army of 300,000, increasingly U.S. trained and equipped, with a wartime reserve strength of 1.5 million, also became a statistic frequently noted in U.S. diplomatic and military correspondence. If the 4,500-man Turkish Brigade could repeatedly show themselves superior to full CCF regiments and divisions, then

²⁹ *FRUS 1950*, vol. I, 437. Emphasis mine.

³⁰ *FRUS 1951*, vol. I, 7.

³¹ *FRUS 1951*, vol. I, 274.

how invaluable would 300,000 to 1.5 million naturally strategically positioned Turks prove to be in a major war against the Soviet Union?

Just as the general Turkish population speculated, such conjecture was especially relevant in light of NATO's weakness. In a report to the NSC from the National Security Resources Board came the admission that "should [general] war come in 1951 or 1952, NATO cannot be counted on as a serious factor in United States defense plans."³² Such an appraisal explains the discussion of probable Soviet occupation of Western Europe and the importance of the recognition of Greece, Turkey, and Iran as constituting "the shield of the Middle East...and Africa." Though we have already discussed the importance of Africa, the aforementioned policy paper on America's allies offered an insightful and brief description of the centrality of Africa in U.S. strategic planning:

In the event of war with the U.S.S.R. in the next few years, Africa would be essential as a base of operations. It would give us the possibility of continued air attacks on the U.S.S.R. power base and would provide us with the necessary opportunity for a build-up of strength directed to the re-invasion of Europe. Without Africa, it is doubtful whether the invasion of Eurasia under Soviet control would be possible.³³

Africa was only important because of the continued certainty of Western Europe's fall and the need to have other bases from which to counterattack the Soviet Union by air and re-invade Europe. Within this context, without the U.S. modernization of the Turkish military and the fighting quality of Turkish personnel, there was nothing else to stop the Soviet Union from taking Europe, the Middle East, and the sections of Africa essential to U.S. defense plans.

Further significance for Turkey derived from NSC 68/4 which by August of 1951 warned that "the Western position in the Near East has, except in Greece and Turkey, deteriorated" due

³² *FRUS 1951*, vol. I, 12.

³³ *FRUS 1951*, vol. I, 47.

to continued Arab-Israeli tensions and a solidification of anti-Western sentiment. As a result of these trends and continuing disputes over traffic through the Suez Canal “British relations with Egypt...have worsened substantially, as have prospects for stability in Egypt.” Due to such developments and their implications to America’s African-based defense plans, this same policy paper also noted with satisfaction the “accretion of strength” in Turkey whose “military forces have had an additional period of training and have absorbed additional U.S. equipment” courtesy of JAMMAT.³⁴

Another NSC policy paper evaluating America’s foreign military assistance programs described Greece and Turkey as “solid bastions of strength in the Eastern Mediterranean” and declared that “Turkey, in particular, is a model to the Arab World of the benefits to be derived from close cooperation with the United States.” The concept of Turkey as a model to the Arab world deserves special note. Not only had Turkey’s military strength always been the frontline factor of security for the rest of the Middle East, but now there was also appreciation for JAMMAT as a potential model to the Arab world for dealing with the United States. Such a view indicates the beginning of Washington taking the Middle East more seriously especially given Britain’s deteriorating standing in the region. In light of the worsening situation in the Near East, continued the NSC paper, “Far from sliding into a policy of neutralism, Turkey is insisting upon entering into fully developed mutual security arrangements with the North Atlantic powers.”³⁵ Once again the United States was not and had not been pursuing an active Middle East policy, but was reacting to the changing world situation. As a result of the war in Korea and the weakening of Britain’s position in Egypt, by the start of 1951, U.S. policy makers were

³⁴ *FRUS 1951*, vol. I, 155.

³⁵ *FRUS 1951*, vol. I, 375, 377.

beginning to discuss Turkey's possible entry into NATO in a positive light and as a key factor in the defense of the Middle East.

By the end of January 1951, Secretary of State Dean Acheson, speaking for his Near East Asia (NEA) staff was calling on Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall for a JCS reevaluation of U.S. Middle East policy. The NEA paper that Acheson attached to the request began with this understatement: "U.S. actions have not adequately reflected U.S. policy that the security of the Middle East is vital to U.S. security." Specifically highlighted was Turkey, which the report called "the keystone of the defense of the Middle East."³⁶ It was from this starting point that a series of conferences began the process of formally determining Turkey's incontrovertible value to America's European and Middle Eastern security plans. The first step occurred on 30 January 1951, when the Department of State and the Joint Chiefs hashed out the military priorities of Middle East defense, Turkey's ideal role, and whether or not Turkey was in Europe, in the Middle East or both. The final settlement was that Turkey was crucial to the defense of both regions.³⁷ In a memo the next day from George McGhee, who represented NEA at the meetings and supported a security offer to Turkey, he declared, "\$30 million spent for this purpose [supplemental military aid] in Turkey will buy more security for the U.S. than \$30 million spent either in this country or elsewhere."³⁸ For perennially budget conscious military and government officials when an argument made cents it made sense.

McGhee's statement was an acknowledgement of parity and reflected the beginning of a new reality for U.S. interests within Turkey and the region. It reflected a realization that Turkish soldiers were the equals of American soldiers, that Turkish leaders, with the influence of the

³⁶ *FRUS 1951*, vol. V, 24-25.

³⁷ *FRUS 1951*, vol. V, 37-38.

³⁸ *FRUS 1951*, vol. V, 1115-1114.

American mission, would utilize American funding as well as American leaders would, and that beyond parity, a dollar spent in Turkey was worth more than if spent in the United States. This allowed for a new twist on the idea that supporting Turkish forces in Anatolia substituted for the need for U.S. forces to defend the Middle East. Though George McGhee articulated this view it was not his alone. The widespread acknowledgment of the seemingly universal quality of Turkish troops had appeared repeatedly in mainstream U.S. media outlets, within U.S. diplomatic correspondence, and reached the highest levels of the U.S. military.

Two weeks after the State-JCS settlement on Turkey, meeting from 14 to 21 February the “Middle East Chiefs of Mission” conference brought together the heads of NEA departments, top level military representatives, and every U.S. ambassador and foreign minister from the region. Appropriately, the conference took place in Istanbul. The conclusions of the assembled officials and officers included such statements as “all states in the region recognize Turkey’s exposed situation and its importance to Middle East defense...[and] most of them would be expected to view with approval a special, formalized security commitment to Turkey.” There was also a warning that “if an offer is not made soon, there is reason to believe that Turkey will veer towards a policy of neutralism.” “In order to assure Turkey’s immediate cobelligerency, utilization in collective security action *of the military potential which Turkey is building*, and immediate United States and Allied *utilization of Turkish bases*,” advised the assembled Chiefs of Mission, “a commitment on the part of the United States is required.” Such a commitment should be “through adherence to NATO” either “as a separate regional grouping” or “directly.” The conference also singled out praise for “the military aid program” and “the training capacities of the members of the United States military mission,” which they characterized as “of the

highest standard.”³⁹ JAMMAT had been essential to the “building” of Turkey’s military potential and in conjunction with the Turkish will to resist had helped to make Turkey indispensable to American national security.

The final set of meetings solidifying the transformation of Turkey in U.S. policy, that as yet had not involved any consultation with Turkey, took place from 2 to 3 April in London between policy makers from the United States and the United Kingdom. As the most important ally of the United States and still the dominant power in the Middle East, British objections to Turkey joining NATO continued to stem from Britain’s desire to bring the increasingly American-trained Turkish military into a Middle East alliance under ultimate British command. With U.S. promises to urge Turkey to join a theoretical Middle East alliance, British representatives agreed to drop their opposition. In the words of George McGhee, who authored the report of the meeting, “It now appeared to us desirable that Greece and Turkey should be admitted to NATO.” McGhee admitted, “It was merely for us on the political side to set the framework...we already had military missions in Greece, [and] Turkey.”⁴⁰ That was all it took.

With appreciation for Turkey at an all-time high the NSC staff completed an up-to-date reevaluation of “the position of the United States with respect to Turkey.” The report declared that a “direct USSR attack on Turkey would precipitate global war.” It cited U.S. military objectives in Turkey as retaining “base areas in Turkey,” delaying “materially an USSR advance,” and assuring “control by the Western powers of the Eastern Mediterranean and the security of base areas in Egypt.” Regarding JAMMAT the report specifically noted:

The United States military aid program which has been in effect since 1947 has been directed to the attainment of these [above mentioned] objectives...Without United States

³⁹ *FRUS 1951*, vol. V, 50-52, 54-55. Emphasis mine.

⁴⁰ *FRUS 1951*, vol. V, 106.

or other foreign assistance *this modernization program could not have been undertaken* by Turkey on an adequate scale as its defense expenditures were already absorbing 40-50% of its budgetary revenues. In the absence of such assistance, the defensive capabilities of the Turkish armed forces would have steadily *deteriorated*.

The report went on to qualify this judgment by pointing to the fact that “since the inauguration of the military aid program, the peacetime strength of the Turkish Armed Forces has been reduced in numbers by almost 50 percent” but with the equipment, training, and supervision of “the American Military Mission” the “combat potential and capabilities...are *considerably greater* than when the Armed Forces were double their present size.” Nor did the report overlook Turkish agency, characterizing the Turks as “one of the most reliable allies of the free world.”⁴¹ With the U.S. military convinced, America’s entire diplomatic corps from the region onboard, Great Britain in grudging agreement, and policy written out, it was now only a matter of consulting the Turks or as the policy planning staff understated it, “It is believed that this philosophy could be sold to the Turks.”⁴²

From 13 to 14 October 1951, delegations from the United States, Great Britain, France, and Turkey met in Ankara to discuss the latter’s inclusion into the NATO command structure, while simultaneously playing a key role in a still theoretical Middle East Command. Despite pressure from the big three at the meeting, the Turkish delegates stood firm that the issue of admission into NATO was a separate matter from negotiations concerning Turkey’s role in a Middle East Command. The Turkish delegation made it clear that Turkey, by its geographical position would play a crucial role in blocking a variety of potential Soviet routes to the Middle East, whether Turkey was in NATO or a Middle East alliance or not. Yet, in spite of American arguments, British threats and flattery, and French indifference, the Turkish pragmatic and

⁴¹ *FRUS 1951*, vol. V, 1153, 1155. Emphasis mine.

⁴² *FRUS 1951*, vol. V, 148.

single-minded focus on NATO membership alone as the solution to all of its decades, even centuries, of national security concerns remained unshakable. In the end, British Field Marshal Sir William J. Slim, who had desperately argued for the inclusion of Turkey in a Middle East alliance, conceded defeat with the simple phrase “welcome to NATO.”⁴³ On 22 October 1951 Turkey signed the Protocol of the North Atlantic Treaty. From this point on Turkish national security, the Joint American Military Mission to Aid Turkey, and United States Middle East defense policy entered a distinctly different era.⁴⁴

In regards to the role of the American mission to Turkey and its impact on U.S. Middle East policy, the mission was only one variable, yet it remained the key variable. The two fundamental building blocks were Turkey’s inherent geographical position and the unity and determination of its people. There was also the unexpected situational variable of the Korea War, which essentially constituted the luck factor that loosened the purse strings of Congress and triggered the global policy reappraisal in Washington. It is certainly ironic that without a North Korean invasion of the South, a world away from both Turkey and the United States, there would not have been the policy changes that took place nor the opportunity, however tragic, for Turkish soldiers to prove to the world the forgotten mettle of their people. Yet with these variables taken into account and given their due, without the Joint American Military Mission to Aid Turkey the Turkish armed forces would have remained an oversized, obsolescent, and a thoroughly uninviting strategic situation that would have bankrupted the Turkish government, deterred potential foreign supporters, and further destabilized an already fractured and volatile Middle East.

⁴³ *FRUS 1951*, vol. V, 226.

⁴⁴ *FRUS 1951*, vol. V, 1180.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION: THE TURKISH MODEL AND THE LEGACY OF JAMMAT

The inclusion of Turkey into NATO fulfilled the last significant Turkish and American security goals, which JAMMAT personnel had been working toward for the previous five years. Just five years earlier Turkey had been a loosely attached ally to a tottering Great Britain, under intense Soviet diplomatic pressure, with no meaningful ties to the United States or any other significant world power. Turkey's armed forces were numerically strong, but numbers counted for precious little when the military's weapons were predominantly of First World War vintage. To make matters worse, the interwar and Second World War weapons that the Turkish military did possess were a hopeless mix of German and British makes, models, and calibers, with degrading ammunition and difficult or impossible to obtain spare parts. The supply, storage, and logistics systems of the Turkish armed forces were even more of a mess, compounding the endemic lack of modern and standardized weapons in every way possible. Even the neutrality of the Second World War that arguably saved Turkey a great deal of suffering worked against its military by not testing and developing the personnel and various weapons systems of its armed forces. Economically, Turkey had been so near bankruptcy that there was no way for the country to fix the glaring weaknesses of the military that was its only source of potential national security. Thanks to the Truman Doctrine and the Joint American Military Mission to Aid Turkey, by 1952 the dark days of early 1947 were a distant memory.

This concluding chapter evaluates the legacy of JAMMAT from four perspectives and ends with an epilogue summarizing subsequent U.S.-Turkish relations. The first perspective is the Turkish Model, the legacy that JAMMAT officers authored at the request of the U.S.

National War College in 1954. This record became the U.S. military's synopsis of the early aid program to Turkey and a resource for instruction at the National War College. The remaining three perspectives for assessing the historical significance of JAMMAT and its accomplishments are to look at its impact on the security of Turkey, the Middle East, and the United States. These four views together encapsulate the negative and positive legacies of the Joint American Mission to Aid Turkey from 1947-1954. The epilogue then presents a brief sketch of U.S.-Turkish relations since 1954, in order to contrast the promise of the JAMMAT years with the lost opportunities of later decades.

The National War College Report

In May of 1954 members of the mission to Turkey completed a briefing paper for on the history of JAMMAT at the request of the faculty of the United States National War College. By becoming part of the curriculum at the institution responsible for training the nation's proven career officers in the methods and examples of national grand strategy, this document highlighted the elements of the Turkish model that the U.S. military considered the most relevant. More than anything the report showed how the Americans who worked with Turkey most frequently had come to view their partner state and the efficacy of the aid mission itself. Within this context it is important to point out that the experts in Washington deferred to the officers of JAMMAT in the writing of the National War College *Briefing Paper on Turkey* reflecting the country-wide expertise gained by mission personnel over the course of the previous six years. Of all the documents within the records of the mission, due to its intended audience, this briefing paper portrays both JAMMAT and Turkey very candidly and from an overt perspective of U.S. national interests. It is, therefore, an appropriate and useful vehicle for

examining some of the accomplishments of the mission, critiquing its evolution, and beginning a discussion of its historical legacy.

As a comprehensive briefing paper this report examined the political, military, economic, and historical matters of significance within Turkey that figured into U.S. interests in the region. By 1954 the authors could offer praise of Turkey's successfully functioning democracy. The report also emphasized the benefits of the nation's strong commitment to secularism, the population's "well nigh unanimous support of the Government's anti-Soviet, pro-West foreign policy," and the almost complete lack of a "Communist problem" in Turkey due to the fact that "Turks in general hate all things Russian, and to them Communism is primarily a Russian product."¹ These basic characteristics of Turkey, however, would prove to be the exception rather than the rule for most would-be U.S. allies during the remainder of the Cold War. For this reason the United States would struggle to apply the Turkish model successfully to other states.

The report's political conclusions regarding Turkey were entirely positive. The authors characterized Turkey as "by far the most stable country in the Middle East" even "more stable than many European nations." Much of this was due to the combination of "a stable Government, a well-informed and enthusiastic public, pro-Western orientation, and ingrained hatred and distrust of the Russians." For these reasons the report considered Turkey "an invaluable source of strength in the Middle East as a deterrent to Russian aggression and as a constructive influence among the other Middle Eastern States." Noticeably absent from the language of the report in the political section was any mention of Turkey as part of Europe or as a model for European states. Clearly, in the eyes of the authors of the report and their

¹ JAMMAT, 1954, May, box 2.

understanding of the priorities of their target audience, Turkey was geopolitically and culturally part of the Middle East, was a defender of the Middle East, and offered a model to “other Middle East States.”²

Under the topic of Turkish foreign relations, however, the mission authors highlighted one of the side benefits of the strong relationship with Turkey, for which JAMMAT had made the largest contribution. This particular side benefit took the form of winning Turkey as a diplomatic ally in matters of foreign and military relations with European states. Though Turkey was not a model to European nations politically, it could still play a useful role in European military and diplomatic affairs. As one example, the briefing paper noted Turkey’s crucial help in establishing the February 1953 Balkan Pact between Turkey, Greece, and Yugoslavia.³ Though of less significance after the death of Joseph Stalin, due to improved relations between Moscow and Belgrade, the pact had been the best means for unofficially securing Yugoslavia’s military to the West in order to close the Balkan hole in NATO’s territorial continuity. The strong relations between the United States and Turkey resulting from the work of JAMMAT had made such an unlikely pact a short-term reality.

Another advantage of the close U.S.-Turkish relationship had to do with Germany. The report noted Turkey’s historic ties with Germany, particularly the observation that the Turks “respect and admire the German military tradition and potential” to the extent that “it is probably no exaggeration to say that the Germans enjoy a higher reputation in Turkey than any other people, with the possible exception of ourselves.” This was important in 1954, because as the Cold War took shape so rapidly in the aftermath of the Second World War, U.S. leaders

² JAMMAT, 1954, May, box 2.

³ JAMMAT, 1954, May, box 2.

increasingly found themselves arguing against their European allies, so recently under German occupation, for the absolute necessity of including West Germany's military potential within NATO. This seemed especially important after the lessons of the Korean War in order to help offset the overwhelming conventional numerical superiority enjoyed by Communist forces stationed in Eastern Europe. The report declared, "The Turkish Government strongly favors the progressive integration of the German Federal Republic in the bloc of Western European states...[and] would undoubtedly be prepared to support the admission of the Federal Republic into NATO."⁴ Such support did help to offset the opposition to West Germany's subsequent integration into the North Atlantic Alliance.

The briefing paper also analyzed the general Turkish economy, particularly within the context of the junction of economic reality and military policy. The authors observed that the presence of "technical and managerial skills" among the general population was "either lacking or present to a very small extent." This was still part of the long shadow cast by the events of the Great War and Independence War discussed in chapter one and encountered continuously by the members of the mission. Despite the difficult position presented by the Turkish economy when the mission began, according to the 1954 report, "During the period 1948-53, a spectacular expansion of the economy took place" with the Gross National Product increasing by forty percent. The JAMMAT officers correctly diagnosed that Turkey was going through "a structural change" from "the self-sufficient isolation of the peasant in his village," which accounted for roughly eighty percent of the population, to a monetizing economy, with increased "division of labor," the development of "construction and service industries," and "a broader market for goods and services being created." The chief causes of this economic expansion, according to the

⁴ JAMMAT, 1954, May, box 2.

report, were the “high level of investment (made possible with the help of U.S. aid), the economic policies of the Turkish Government, favorable markets for Turkish export products (prior to 1953), and good weather.”⁵ Whether by directly influencing the Turkish economy through infrastructure projects from roads to airports to ports, or indirectly, by substituting aid in place of Turkish government purchases for defense, the work of JAMMAT had a major impact on the growth of the Turkish economy. As later sections of the report would unintentionally illuminate, however, the forty percent increase in the GNP was not the whole story.

The remainder and bulk of the briefing paper to the National War College centered on the direct political, economic, and military implications of the American mission to Turkey. When complimenting their own accomplishments the JAMMAT officers pointed “the Turkish defense establishment of today” as the proof of their effectiveness. The mission authors also directed a great deal of praise to the Turkish people who “during the last six years...through their Government have left no doubt as to where they stand on issues arising from the cold war.” Specifically, the briefing paper highlighted the Turkish contribution to the Korean War, the unanimity displayed by the 404 to 0 vote in the Turkish Grand National Assembly in favor of joining NATO, and Turkey’s active membership in the Council of Europe, the Organization for European Economic Co-operation, and the European Parliamentary Union. “In such organizations,” observed the report, “The Turk considers himself an equal partner with the United States.” With a hint of mystification, the authors further elaborated, “There is evidence in fact that the Turk, in his thinking, gives equal weight to the Turkish factors [for collective security] of available manpower and determination to resist on the one hand, and the American

⁵ JAMMAT, 1954, May, box 2.

military assistance program on the other.”⁶ As America’s war in Vietnam would later painfully illustrate, the Turks were in fact correct, in that to be successful a military aid program did require rough parity between a unified will to resist on the part of a recipient nation and a systematic aid program on the part of the provider nation.

The section of the report that revealed the downside of the American mission dealt with the direct economic implications. This section began by bluntly acknowledging that “the cost of maintaining the defense establishment created by Turkey to meet NATO requirements and supported by U.S. military end-items programs is in excess of present Turkish financial capabilities.” Indeed, the report exposed that American aid had always come with strings attached. In this case the forty percent increase in GNP came with an important condition. At some point, and more likely toward the inauguration of the American mission to Turkey, “the Turkish government has accepted the principle that as national income and government revenue rise a portion of the annual increase will be devoted to the support of the defense establishment.” For the purpose of revealing what kind of ally the United States was to Turkey and the nature of the motivations behind American policy, the questions that arise are what was the definition of “a portion” and how did this equate to the original mission goal of reducing the size of the Turkish military to allow the country to pay indefinitely for the maintenance of its armed forces?

The answer exists within the briefing paper and other mission records. It is clear from mission and State Department documents referenced earlier in this dissertation that from the beginning of the mission to as late as 1951 Turkey’s average defense expenditure hovered around forty percent of its national budget. According to data from within the National War College report, however, by the time Turkey joined NATO the percentage had not decreased, but

⁶ JAMMAT, 1954, May, box 2.

began to steadily trend upward. In 1952 it was forty-one percent, in 1953 it was forty-three percent, and in 1954 it was up to forty-six percent. Essentially through JAMMAT and then through NATO, the United States had ensured that Turkey spent the increase of its GNP on an equal or greater increase to its national defense establishment.⁷

There were two variables at work in this outcome. On the one hand, the Turks repeatedly manifest a desire to achieve security that overrode their economic reality. Their historic fear of Russian expansionism was so deep and pervasive that, in the words of the 1954 report, “the Turks would find it politically palatable to build a military force which would be even beyond the limits imposed by the current military assistance programs.”⁸ On the other hand, the United States, through JAMMAT and even more so through NATO was able to exploit Turkish willingness to overcome this insecurity to its fullest degree. In this way, despite all of the generosity on the part of the United States to help modernize the Turkish military, the Turkish government and the Turkish people continued to bear a far larger per capita burden for defense than their European and American counterparts.⁹ Originally, Turkey’s desire for a security guarantee drove such national sacrifice, then the protocols for admission into NATO set them in stone. In reality the Turks had little choice. They could either face isolation and Soviet pressure or the recommendations of JAMMAT and the requirements of NATO, and they chose the path that least infringed upon their national sovereignty.

Thus, unintentionally, the National War College report provided details on the price that Turkey had to pay to join the North Atlantic Alliance. Most likely this did not become an advertised part of the Turkish model. Despite having the lowest GNP of any nation in NATO, the

⁷ JAMMAT, 1954, May, box 2.

⁸ JAMMAT, 1954, May, box 2.

⁹ Kaplan, 120-121.

protocols that the Turkish representatives signed in order to join compelled Turkey to dedicate nearly its entire war machine to NATO command. According to a 1952 summation of the mission to that date, NATO requirements assigned “3 Army Headquarters, 8 Corps Headquarters, 16 Infantry Divisions, 3 Cavalry Divisions, 6 armored brigades, 6 infantry brigades, and 3 Border Infantry Brigades” to NATO or “virtually all of the Army.” Similarly, the Turks pledged “the entire Turkish Air Force.”¹⁰ Between 1952 and 1953 in fulfillment of its NATO commitments the Turkish Army had to conscript and field an additional seventy thousand men or nearly a twenty-five percent increase over the force reduction levels that JAMMAT had recently helped the Turkish Army to achieve.¹¹ In this way the United States and its NATO allies managed to leverage Turkey’s desperation to join the alliance into a greater contribution of its military forces than that of its contemporaries. For the United States, in particular, this represented a complete return on its original material investments into the Turkish military, but with the substantial interest of all the added Turkish personnel who would utilize the weapons and endure the casualties.

Financially, the United States did not abandon the Turkish government to bankruptcy. The United States provided aid equipment at reduced prices, offered Turkey some grant money, as well as low-interest loans. In addition, the U.S. mission had “since 1950” increasingly turned to “counterpart” funds where “for each dollar of grant aid received, Turkey is required to deposit the equivalent in Turkish Liras in a special fund in the Central Bank.” “Of this lira fund, called ‘counterpart,’” explained the 1954 report, “90% is available to the Turkish Government for production programs, developed jointly by the Turkish and U.S. Governments [while] the

¹⁰JAMMAT, 1952, October, box 7.

¹¹ JAMMAT, 1954, May, box 2.

remaining 10% is the property of the U.S. Government to be used for meeting administrative costs.” Counterpart became the preferred U.S. method for subsidizing the increases to the Turkish military that the Turks themselves could not pay for outright, but as the description reveals, the system required the Turkish government to match funds. The United States was then able to direct the spending of said funds into production programs its agencies had helped to develop. While certainly not sinister, it was also less magnanimous than the aid program appeared on the surface. The report frankly described counterpart as being “used almost entirely to supplement the budget of the [Turkish] Ministry of National Defense in order to support U.S. and NATO objectives.” More harmful in the long-run, the transition to counterpart funds to immediately boost the size of the Turkish military “ended partial investment of American aid into [the] Turkish economy and directed it back to defense.”¹² During the period from 1947 to 1954, therefore, the U.S. goal of providing Turkey with a less expensive and economically sustainable military transformed beyond recognition into a system designed to maximize Turkish military potential for its own sake and especially for the sake of its allies. The long-term sacrifice would accrue to the Turkish people and the Turkish economy, which remained near the edge of collapse due to the lack of full development. In 1947 Turkey maintained an unsustainable defense establishment because of Soviet diplomatic pressure. Ironically, by 1954 Turkey maintained a far more capable but equally unsustainable defense establishment due to U.S. and NATO pressure. This was the hidden downside of JAMMAT’s Turkish Model and getting Turkey get into NATO.

Legacy of JAMMAT and Turkish Security

¹² JAMMAT, 1954, May, box 2.

The long-term legacy of JAMMAT to Turkish security is straightforward, but more significant in view of the details of its systematic application than simply in the hindsight of its generally positive outcome. An important contribution of this study is the idea that even though the United States was originally trying to use the work of the mission to better exploit Turkey's effectiveness as a sacrificial speed bump to a Soviet attack on the Middle East, the same work ultimately helped Turkey into NATO. Yet in the short-term the path was anything but straight. As this dissertation has shown, U.S. policy makers considered terminating the program and, by 1949, had completely withdrawn any proposed U.S. forces for the defense of the region. Even with the unanticipated outbreak of war in Korea and the performance of the Turkish Brigades, the foreign ministers of the NATO countries rejected Turkey's application to join the North Atlantic Pact. The aid and training of JAMMAT was the first, and the most important, ongoing step in making the Turkish military eligible for membership. Without the work of the American mission, Turkey would have failed to qualify according to every measure of military readiness. Turkey was only close enough for NATO membership, arguably by 1950, because of the systematic nature of the modernization program carried out by JAMMAT. By 1952 Turkey was a member of the most powerful military alliance in the world, bound securely to the principal non-communist armed forces of Europe and North America. Membership in NATO had been and continues to be the principal pillar of Turkish national security, yet, Turkey's entry into NATO was not a foregone conclusion nor was it the inevitable result of the America's Containment Strategy. Instead it was the result of the work of JAMMAT and strategic potential of Turkey and its military.

Beginning at the ground floor in the spring of 1948 and moving up, the American mission had begun rebuilding the Turkish military. During the crucial first six months, despite the delays

in the arrival of the aid material, the small mission groups succeeded along two essential avenues, with both short-term and long-term benefits. First, they were responsible for the delivery and issuance of the most essential end-use items for the Turkish military, immediately modernizing the potential resistance that Turkish forces could offer against even an imminent Soviet attack. Second, the mission members created a modern school system for every branch and facet of the Turkish military. Ultimately, the school system was the only mechanism by which the mission could realize long-term, military-wide improvements. The network of schools also provided the means for keeping the modernization program up-to-date as technology continued its relentless advance.

Inventing the process as they went, the mission personnel recognized that supplying modern weapons was the first and, in many ways, easiest step to a modernization program. The training that the schools imparted was essential for the use of the aid weapons, yet the delivery of the weapons and the training in their basic operation was only the begging of the work. For the weapons to get to where they needed to be in a conflict, and for them to continue to function under combat conditions, required a supply and distribution system far more modern and efficient than underdeveloped and dilapidated system that Turkey possessed in 1947-48. Just as with the military school system, the logistics system of Turkey required substantial improvement to both the knowledge of its personnel and the infrastructure of its facilities. The mission was responsible for the construction of supply and maintenance depots, warehouses, and much of the port and road infrastructure that made the logistics system possible. Due to the specialization of the separate branches of modern militaries, JAMMAT had had to simultaneously update and partially create a functioning logistics system for the Turkish Army, Navy, and Air Force. Yet possession of modern weapons alone would not have been enough to get Turkey into NATO.

Nor, for that matter, would weapons and training, nor even weapons, training, and a functioning logistics system.

Turkey's general military infrastructure was also outdated and deteriorating in 1947. Providing the Turkish Army with updated tanks, motor gun carriages, and trucks, that were essential ingredients in modern concepts of mobility, was a gesture of limited utility on the part of the United States in 1948, in light of the inadequate road network of the most defensible eastern half of Turkey. The Roads Program had made a concerted defense of Eastern Turkey much more possible and effective, even as it simultaneously had made it a necessity for the benefit of U.S. contingency war plans. Similarly, giving the Turkish Air Force a modern all-weather fighter was only a partial benefit to the defense of Anatolia without equally up-to-date early warning radar, airport lighting, a nation-wide radio and weather forecasting network, and the people with the knowledge and skills to properly use and maintain each of these interlocking systems. JAMMAT had been responsible for upgrading Turkish air bases, naval bases, ports, roads, and fixed defenses and for providing the education that kept these complex systems in operation.

The national security benefits for Turkey derived from joining NATO did not stop with being a member of a collective security alliance. Via JAMMAT, NATO Turkey received a new infusion of updated aid material, much of which mission personnel had advocated for some time, but that the requirements of NATO now made essential. In 1952 the Turkish Air Force took delivery of its first jet fighter squadron. In 1953 additional and more modern submarines joined the Turkish Navy. Most importantly, in April 1954 the first of over a thousand M-47 main battle

tanks began arriving in Turkey.¹³ The M-47 was the first new tank design adopted by the U.S. Army and Marine Corps since the Second World War and was the most advanced American tank in mass production at the time. Not only was the quality and lethality of the M-47 dramatically better than the M-24 light tanks and M-36 gun motor carriages that JAMMAT originally supplied to the Turkish Army in 1948, but the scale was also a noticeable departure from the 375 total armored fighting vehicles previously supplied by the American aid program. The most advanced weapons systems upgrade made possible by the previous work of JAMMAT and the NATO alliance came in 1957 when the United States offered to base 17 nuclear-tipped medium-range Jupiter missiles in Turkey. With deployment beginning in 1959, by their proximity to Russia, these missiles helped trigger, and by promises of their removal, helped resolve the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Despite the target that such missiles painted on their country, the Turks welcomed the missiles as a confirmation of their high standing as an American and NATO ally, and their unilateral removal produced one of the first cracks in U.S.-Turkish relations.¹⁴

As the above dates infer, JAMMAT and Turkey not only survived the transition to a Republican president in the United States in 1953, but benefitted from it substantially. President Dwight D. Eisenhower was no stranger to taking military and strategic factors into serious consideration. Turkey's relationship vis-à-vis the United States and JAMMAT had not been a pet project of the Truman presidency. As the Chief of Staff of the United States Army and then as the first Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, Eisenhower was intimately aware of Turkey's strategic value to the United States and the essential work of JAMMAT. Eisenhower knew that Turkey would contribute the largest military contingent within NATO and, in the event of war he

¹³ JAMMAT 1954, May, box 6.

¹⁴ Philip Nash, *The Other Missiles of October: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Jupiters, 1957-1963* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 174.

assigned to Turkey the role of securing NATO's right flank. In May 1953, President Eisenhower's Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles toured the Middle East, adding Turkey to an originally Arab-only itinerary. Dulles reported back that Turkey was "a delightful contrast" to the Arab states and declared "there is today virtually no defense in the Middle East, except for the Turkish flank position."¹⁵ Just days later Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov informed the Turkish ambassador in Moscow that the governments of Armenia and Georgia agreed "to renounce their territorial claims on Turkey" as did Soviet Russia regarding bases along the Straits.¹⁶ Thanks to JAMMAT, NATO, and the recent death of Joseph Stalin, Turkey was in a strong enough position that the new Soviet government sought to soften its tone toward Turkey and began pursuing less rancorous relations with the Anatolian republic for the duration of the Cold War. With the exception of a brief flare up during the First Cyprus Crisis of 1964, Turkey's strong military and alliance position, which would have both been impossible without JAMMAT, provided the country with a sense of national security that it had never enjoyed before and has enjoyed ever since.

A less direct legacy, but one as important for subsequent Turkish history, was the domestic political impact in Turkey of JAMMAT reversing the Turkish military's slide to obsolescence. Instead, JAMMAT helped to make the Turkish armed forces into organization that would continue commanding national pride and respect. In the ensuing decades of Turkish history there were numerous points of acute political instability and crisis, and in each case the Turkish military stepped in, usually in the form of a coup, taking charge of the country, ultimately reinstalling democracy, secularism, and civilian government. Though it would take a

¹⁵ Dulles Report of 29 May 1953, PPS 47-53, box 30, RG 59. NA. in Cohen, 317.

¹⁶ Howard, 267.

separate study to determine whether or not JAMMAT contributed directly to the idea in Turkey of the military as the saviors of democracy, the research of the current study clearly shows that JAMMAT did make a major contribution to the prestige of the Turkish military. In 1947 JAMMAT found a backward military, whose personnel had obsolete equipment, incomplete training, and archaic logistics. The experience and mentality of most Turkish military leaders remained largely stuck in the early 1920s. In spite of the high standing of the Turkish Army in Turkish society, this was not a recipe for continued national respect, but of impending embarrassment and shame. The work of JAMMAT was instrumental preventing this. The mission funded, supplied, and led the transformation of the Turkish armed forces into a military staffed by younger and better educated commanders, who benefitted politically from the increased reputation and prestige that accumulated to them by being members of a strong modern military. JAMMAT, therefore, provided both the actual means and much of the prestige that would allow the Turkish military in the future to seize control of the country in times of crisis.

Legacy of JAMMAT and Middle East Security

The defense of the Middle East was not a high priority of the United States military during the first half decade of the Cold War. Between 1945 and 1949 U.S. concerns for the defense of the Middle East reflected fear that any Soviet advance into the region, even if just to test Britain's weakening grip, would likely so threaten the British Empire's access to oil, trade, and communications as to produce a Third World War. The actions of the United States during the 1946 War Scare and the delayed Soviet withdrawal from Iran reflected a desire to contain the Soviets from the region, but in no way demonstrated an agenda of usurping British hegemony or of taking an active role in the region's defense. The 1949 removal of even the token forces that U.S. war planners had previously allocated for the defense of the region revealed the full depth

of the Pentagon's opposition to playing an active role in the security of the Middle East. The proposed termination of the mission to Turkey in 1949 was also a symptom of this same thinking. Opposition from domestic political realities and excessively tight military budgets were not enough to allow for anything other than a Europe-first and Europe-only approach to full defense commitments.

Thanks to the JCS acknowledgement of the long-term strategic significance of Turkey, JAMMAT survived its proposed termination. Similarly, the outbreak of the Korea War and the implementation of NSC-68 opened the floodgates of military funding. Congress could allocate all the funds it wanted to, however, but it was impossible to turn dollars into mass produced weapons and trained personnel over night, especially with a large-scale war in Korea actively consuming war production. Thus, even though the United States military was in a stronger position by 1951 there were still deep divisions between the U.S. Defense and State Departments over whether or not to take a more active role in Middle East defense. A meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the relevant heads in the State Department to discuss this very issue was particularly revealing about the differing attitudes and positions of those individuals most heavily influencing the decision making of the NSC and the president.

The dominant personalities at the 6 February 1951 State-JCS meeting in question were Army Chief of Staff General J. Lawton Collins and Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East, South Asia, and Africa George McGhee. Acting as unofficial moderators for the discussion were JCS head General Omar Bradley and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Forrest Sherman. George McGhee was about to embark on a tour of the Middle East in order to quiet fears coming from the region that the United States was disinterested in the security of the unaligned states of the Middle East. The reason for the discussion was a memo circulated by McGhee proposing a

re-evaluation of the strategic position of the Middle East in U.S. national security plans and greater engagement with the states in the area.

Born in Waco, Texas to a banking family, McGhee became an accomplished and wealthy oil man, with a doctorate in geology and physical science from Oxford on a Rhodes Scholarship.¹⁷ As such, McGhee had plenty of connections within the oil industry and his views, likely mirrored the security concerns of U.S. oil interests in the Middle East and Saudi Arabia in particular. The principal issues motivating his proposal was projections that in the event of a long world war the U.S. would use up its domestic oil resources and by abandoning the Middle East “without firing a shot” would make it “doubtful” for U.S. firms to “resume their oil concessions and other interests following ‘liberation.’” The war in Korea, the massive American military buildup resulting from the implementation of NSC-68, and growing instability in countries such as Egypt and Syria, were all working together to make Arab-controlled oil a more important commodity not just for European reconstruction but also for the future stability of the United States. “The peoples we plan to abandon in war are the same peoples we must continue to work with upon liberation,” declared McGhee.¹⁸

The Secretary of NEA also argued that in the event of a world war, whichever side denied Middle East oil to the other, would likely win a long war, since neither side could consolidate Western Europe’s economic recovery and harness its decisive military potential without the oil from the Middle East. To avoid this outcome, in general, McGhee proposed applying a reduced Turkish Model to the unaligned states of the Middle East in order to secure them to the West. He stressed that his plan could accomplish a strengthening of resolve in states

¹⁷ McGhee, *On The Frontline in the Cold War*, postscript “about the author.”

¹⁸ *FRUS 1951*, vol. V, 4, 10.

such as Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, and Saudi Arabia, without committing American troops or providing binding security agreements. McGhee declared, “I understand the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel such steps [as troops and treaties] are not possible under present circumstances because our main effort must be in Western Europe and because of our commitments in the Far East.”¹⁹

Specifically, McGhee, with Secretary of State Acheson’s full support, wanted to issue a statement to “make it clear to all of the countries of the Middle East that the United States in coordination with the United Kingdom is prepared to assist them in strengthening their capabilities to defend the area as a whole against aggression.” There would also need to be “small training missions,” an increase in “the number of Arab and Israeli trainees in the United States military schools,” and the furnishing of “token quantities of arms and ammunition.” As the Coordinator of Aid to Greece and Turkey, McGhee had direct experience with the U.S. missions that resulted from the Truman Doctrine and cited “the intimate working relations with the Turkish, Greek and Iranian armed forces which the US enjoys through the military missions and aid programs to those countries” as rationale for repeating their success throughout the region. McGhee further compared his plan to an insurance policy to protect the significant U.S. investments in Greece and Turkey, singling out “Turkey’s fighting power” as “potentially the greatest in free Europe outside the United Kingdom.” Turkey’s power, he warned, “Could not be effectively realized if Soviet forces surround it from East and South.”²⁰ As the U.S. Ambassador to Turkey from 1952-1953, McGhee would continue to be a strong proponent of maximizing Turkey’s military potential.

¹⁹ *FRUS 1951*, vol. V, 4, 22.

²⁰ *FRUS 1951*, vol. V, 4, 22, 24.

Army Chief of Staff General Collins was an equally firm supporter of the importance and efficacy of the mission to Turkey, which the U.S. Army had always been in charge of and which he had personally visited from 26 to 28 August 1950. On grounds tied to the success of the Turkish mission Collins aggressively attacked McGhee's proposal:

There are two reasons why the people of the Middle East [Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, and Saudi Arabia] want U.S. leadership: (1) we will furnish equipment and pay the bills; and (2) in the event of war, they think, we will send troops and aircraft to the Middle East. We are kidding ourselves and kidding them if we do anything which indicates that we are going to put forces in that area. The forces to do that are just not in sight. This is a U.K. responsibility. The U.K. would like very much to have us take this responsibility, but it is a job which the U.K. and the Commonwealth have got to do. We must stick to the periphery [Turkey and Iran]...If we take responsibility for this job now, we are assuming a responsibility which we cannot meet in time of war. I am unalterably opposed to putting forces in that area.

In addition to not wanting to distribute false hope, the other part of the Collins' opposition to McGhee's proposal was because it was not fully in keeping with the Turkish Model. Collins doubted that the United States would be able to lead a unified will to resist among various Arab states and Israel, where neither the will nor the unity across states existed. In comparison to his low opinion of military capabilities of the Arab states he pointed out, "The Turks will fight and they should be of considerable help." Collins bluntly declared, "I favor putting our effort into places where the people will fight."²¹

General Bradley supported many of McGhee's points and tried to moderate General Collin's position, but through reasoning slightly at odds with McGhee's arguments. "I am much concerned about the Middle East," inserted Bradley, "The oil there is important to us and might be very important to the Russians, although they would have a great deal of trouble getting it home...[but] the Middle East is the gateway to Africa." "If we lose Asia," he continued, "which

²¹ *FRUS 1951*, vol. V, 33, 38, 39.

we seem to be in danger of doing, and lose Africa, then we will be confined to the Western Hemisphere, and that is why I am concerned about the Middle East.” Staking out the middle ground Bradley identified that it was “a question of priorities on limited supplies of equipment that worries the Army.” “Where is all the equipment needed around the world to come from,” queried the head of the Joint Chiefs, “Perhaps in 18 to 24 months we can allocate some to this area.”²² In the end the competing parties agreed to disagree yet all concurred that McGhee would not be discussing these matters with the Israelis nor the Arabs on his trip.

These discussions reveal a great deal about U.S. strategic thinking at the time and in direct relation to the work accomplished by JAMMAT. By 1951 the oil of the Middle East was starting to become a significant variable in top-level U.S. discussions of America’s role in the defense of the region. Clearly, however, oil was not yet the driving motivation behind U.S. policy and actions. Significantly, for the thesis of this dissertation, throughout the discussions of U.S. military weakness and the importance of maintaining oil and U.S. prestige, both sides of the debate repeatedly cited the centrality of Turkey’s military strength, its will to resist, and, the utility and importance of the American mission there. In the aftermath of the performance of the Turkish Brigade in Korea, the success of JAMMAT and capabilities of the Turkish military were not in doubt.

McGhee’s proposals never became a reality, but in its place, as discussed earlier in chapter five, the NEA director was instrumental in getting Turkey into NATO and extending the NATO umbrella into a position blocking the most direct routes between the Soviet Union and the Middle East. With the joining of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan in the 1955 Baghdad Pact and the creation of the Central Treaty Organization or CENTO alliance, any Soviet attack toward the

²² *FRUS 1951*, vol. V, 35.

Middle East would trigger war with Turkey, which would trigger war with all the countries on Russia's southern periphery and with NATO. With the collapse of Britain's position in Egypt and Turkey's growing and developing military strength, U.S. planners by 1952 had rejected the Egypt-first strategy and replaced it with a Turkey-first approach to defending the Middle East and for launching an air campaign at Central Russia in the event of war. Thanks to the work of JAMMAT the United States became a full ally to Turkey, helping to protect the Middle East from direct Soviet expansion. Though partially undone by the nationalist, socialist, and anti-imperialist movements in the Arab world in states such as Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, Turkey's blocking position remained throughout the Cold War and limited Soviet penetration in the Middle East to comparatively indirect military assistance programs and precluded direct Soviet control of any Middle Eastern state for the duration of the Cold War. This is another important legacy of the Joint American Military Mission to Aid Turkey.

Legacy of JAMMAT and United States Security

The overall purpose of the Joint Military Mission to Aid Turkey was to improve the national security of the United States. To accomplish this, the aid program set out to accomplish at least one of two goals. Either, the work of JAMMAT would discourage Soviet aggression in the area, thus preventing an outbreak of general war. Or, in the event of war, the improved military capability of the Turkish military that was continuously resulting from the work of the mission would still fulfill the essential role of slowing a Soviet advance into the Middle East enough for an Egypt-centered USAF strategic bombing campaign to cripple essential Soviet industry and win the war. Either way, based on the outstanding performance of the mission during its crucial first six months, JAMMAT was a success almost from the beginning, substituting for the need to station U.S. troops in the region.

In the long-run, however, the American mission to Turkey accomplished much more than these original twin purposes. Through the ever improving efficiency of the Turkish military resulting from the systematic nature of the mission, JAMMAT was able to greatly increase the security of Turkey, thereby improving, at the same time, the security of places deemed essential in U.S. contingency war plans. The weapons, organization, physical construction, and tactical and strategic recommendations provided by JAMMAT, for example, greatly increased the security of the Turkish Straits. Increased security at the Straits translated to increased protection of the oil, trade, and communications networks that passed through the Suez Canal. Turkey's bottling up of Soviet naval power in the Black Sea, even if just for a few weeks or months in the event of all-out-war would also protect the U.S. 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean from a surprise attack and provide freedom of maneuver through the entire Mediterranean basin. Another example of the almost immediate benefits of JAMMAT to U.S. security was the repositioning of essential military hardware before the outbreak of war. The modern submarines and minesweepers that the United States supplied to the Turkish Navy, allowed for the possibility of rapid interdiction of Soviet shipping in the Black Sea or even the clearing of a path for a quick U.S. carrier strike against targets in the Ukraine or the oil infrastructure within the Caucasus.

Arguably the most significant contribution of JAMMAT to the long-term security interests of the United States was the development of the Iskenderun Pocket and the construction of the Incirlik Airbase within the pocket. In a country whose very geography is some of the most strategically significant in the world, the Iskenderun Pocket became the most important real estate for the United States in Turkey or in the Middle East for most of the rest of the twentieth century. The transition from the Egypt-first to the Turkey-first Anglo-American strategy for Middle East defense and its accompanying air campaign against Soviet industry were only made

possible by the work of JAMMAT by helping to create the İskenderun Pocket. Named for the port city at the north-east corner of the Mediterranean Sea, İskenderun, ancient Alexandretta, was part of a crescent of land from Adana to İskenderun around the Gulf of İskenderun. With the protection of the Taurus Mountains to the west, north, and east, and the Syrian Desert to the south, this was the most secure area in Turkey from potential Soviet attack. Because of the mission to aid Turkey, U.S. leaders maintained hope that the United States could gain a permanent base within this area.

The problem from 1947 to 1951 had been the knowledge that Turkey would demand a binding security agreement in return for granting the United States such a controversial base on Turkish soil. As detailed in chapters three through five, JAMMAT used its influence with the Turkish military to encourage, and in some ways compel, the Turkish armed forces into a dedicated defense of the mountain chains protecting the pocket. JAMMAT also recommended and built the roads, ports, petroleum storage, and improved the supporting airfields that made the İskenderun Pocket a modern staging and basing area, though ostensibly for the sake of the Turkish military. The records of the mission clearly demonstrated JAMMAT officials prioritizing the roads in the area, pushing the development of larger port facilities at İskenderun against Turkish objections²³, and favoring the area with the bulk of its petroleum storage construction program.²⁴ This dissertation has also emphasized in chapter five that this was all in fulfillment of U.S. National Security Council directives from as early as 1947.

²³ The İskenderun Naval Base Controversy centered on a real estate dispute involving waterfront land owned by the Turkish Minister of Communications. One member of the Turkish General Staff objected to the proposed naval base on military grounds, but in the end the General Staff approved the JAMMAT recommendations. JAMMAT, 1951, September, box 9.

²⁴ JAMMAT recommendations resulted in the placement of four out of six large petroleum oil lubricant (POL) depots in the eastern part of the country. These depots were five times larger than the existing Turkish military oil depots. As a result the Turkish military ended up with more military POL storage in the east than in the rest of the

The twin purposes of the supporting infrastructure that JAMMAT built in order to develop the pocket acted as further incentives for the Turkish military to defend the area and was preparation for the crown jewel of the pocket, an American airbase. As discussed in chapter 4, Turkish approval for JAMMAT to build the İncirlik airbase only became possible with the election of the new Democratic government. Part of the new government's platform had been that it could obtain a binding security guarantee from the United States. The creation of the Engineer Group within JAMMAT and its ensuing actions leaves little doubt that both sides struck an unofficial deal, probably the approval to construct a special air field in return for getting associate status with NATO, since both events took place in December 1950.

Immediately upon its formation, "Members of the Engineer Group began reconnaissance of the Adana area in anticipation of directives to begin major airfield development in that area." In February of 1951 the Secretary of the U.S. Air Force Harold K. Finletter visited Turkey and "inspected the site of the proposed airfield at Adana," the future home of the Adana or İncirlik airbase. According JAMMAT records, "Surveys of the Adana site were begun during the month [February]." A report from April included information that revealed the original completion date for "all runway and taxiway paving and half the gasoline storage and distribution systems at the Adana project" was to be 1 January 1952.²⁵ These above specifics are important because all of this took place before U.S. policy makers decided it would be advantageous to have Turkey in NATO.

Once Turkey was a member of NATO the U.S. National Security Council was able to realize related and long-awaited goals. "The admittance of Turkey into NATO," wrote Secretary

country, such that eighty-six percent of the POL storage in Eastern Turkey was the result of JAMMAT recommendations. JAMMAT, 1950, October, box 6.

²⁵ JAMMAT, 1950, December, box 20, and 1951, January, February, April, box 21.

of State Acheson to the NSC, "Places the project in a new light." The project in question was the stockpiling of aviation fuel in Turkey on a very large scale. The U.S. Navy wanted 2400 barrels at depots along the coast "for use in connection with 6th Fleet carrier-based aircraft mission involving attacks on targets in the Caspian and Black Sea area and possibly in support of ground forces." Even more significantly, the Air Force requested 10,000 barrels at two supporting airbases and a further 100,000 barrels at İncirlik. These vast quantities of aviation fuel were for the strategic air offensive against Central Russia, with the intention of turning Turkey into an unsinkable and well-defended U.S. aircraft carrier stationed permanently off the southern coast of the Soviet Union. For the sake of perspective, the closest similarly secure airbases available to U.S. military were either in Great Britain or in Japan. Though the İncirlik base did not officially become a joint U.S.-Turkish base until 1954, policy, planning, and development of the base had preceded Turkey's inclusion in NATO and were directly made possible by JAMMAT.

In addition to its proximity to the center of the Soviet Union, the U.S. base complex at İncirlik had one other major advantage over U.S. bases in Great Britain and Japan. Neither the British Isles nor the Japanese Islands were in the Middle East. Due to the essential work of JAMMAT the United States came to possess a major base of operations with a 360 degree radius that could dominate the Balkans, the Eastern Mediterranean basin, the Middle East proper, and Iran. İncirlik hosted the U-2 spy plane program and provided the air cover for the interventions into Lebanon that were the first examples of the Eisenhower Doctrine in action. The Eisenhower Doctrine authorized the use of American economic and military aid to any Middle East country that requested it for use against aggressive forces backed by international communism. For good or ill, JAMMAT's accomplishments laid the foundation for the United States to take an active role in the Middle East before the Suez Crisis of 1956 or the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957. In

fact, possession of İncirlik airbase allowed the United States to reject the Anglo-French actions against Egypt, which prior to 1952 the United States would most likely have taken part in. That the İncirlik airbase is still in operation by the United States Air Force speaks volumes to its significance as a base for the promotion and support of U.S. interests in the region. İncirlik, therefore, remains a concrete testament to the legacy of JAMMAT.

Conclusion

As a military modernization program, the Joint American Mission to Aid Turkey proved to be a success well beyond its initial goals, with demonstrable historical relevance for Turkey, the Middle East, NATO and the United States. JAMMAT's accomplishments with the infrastructure and armed forces of Turkey and the intimate working relationship that it was instrumental in forging between both countries demonstrated the enormous potential of the Turkish Model for extracting political, economic, and strategic benefits from an apparently magnanimous aid program. In the process JAMMAT provided insights into the original and changing motivations and shifting policies of the United States with respect to Turkey and the general region during the early years of the Cold War. The perspective from the records of JAMMAT was a United States that was a generous and calculating ally and an ally that endeavored to realize as much of a return upon its investment as possible. Also within this study has been clear and consistent evidence that the United States did not pursue a course of displacing the British Empire in the Middle East for the sake of oil, but was primarily concerned with protecting or gaining new access to key bases in the region from which to win an all-out-war against the Soviet Union. There is profound irony in the fact that the role that U.S. leaders feared the Soviet Union wanted for Turkey as a base of operations from which to command the Middle East, became by the mid-1950s, the role that the United States would essentially exercise

for much of the Cold War. Turkey's strategic geography was such that whoever had the most influence over Anatolia controlled a gate of immense offensive and defensive potential. Thanks to the work of JAMMAT the United States discovered and helped to create an ideal Cold War ally and came to enjoy nearly exclusive influence over Turkey. Even in the light of United States self-interest and the exploitation of Turkey's insecurity, this remains the essence of the Turkish Model and the legacy of JAMMAT.

Epilogue: The Loss of a Strong Relationship

Despite the closeness of the relationship that developed as a result of the Joint American Military Mission to Aid Turkey and the help of the United States in getting Turkey into NATO, U.S.-Turkish relations did not survive intact through the duration of the Cold War. This was not a failing on the part of the United States military in its continuing close relations with the Turkish armed forces. Nor was this a failure on the part of Turkey to be a staunch ally to the United States by trying, as many nations did, to play the Soviets and the Americans off against each other. Instead, the culprit, in many ways, was the length of the Cold War, its seemingly unending nature. As nations came to accept the Cold War as fixed and a relatively stable part of world affairs, regional animosities resurfaced. In the case of Turkey and Greece, the regional contest that resurfaced centered on the island of Cyprus.

Containing a slight Greek-speaking majority and a sizable Turkish-speaking minority, Cyprus was a powder keg just waiting to detonate Greco-Turkish relations. Neither country had controlled Cyprus during their modern existence nor was the crisis that developed primarily motivated by competing territorial ambitions. At issue was the protection of "their" people on Cyprus. In spite of a power-sharing constitution governing Cyprus and guaranteeing the rights of Turkic Cypriots, most Greek Cypriots favored union with Greece or *enosis* and full control over

the island. In late 1963, when the Greek Cypriots proposed amendments to the constitution for removing the rights of Turkic Cypriots, the dysfunctional unity government completely collapsed and ethnic fighting ensued. As illegal Greek militias drove one-third of the Turkic Cypriots from their homes and into vulnerable enclaves, the Turkish government threatened military action, based on one fatally flawed assumption. The Turkish government knew that U.S. leaders since the Truman administration considered Turkey to be strategically more important than Greece to the United States. As this study has shown that idea went back to the 1949 policy reappraisal carried out by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Turkish government of once-again President İsmet İnönü assumed that since Turkey was strategically more important than Greece and had proved itself such an unswerving Cold War ally, that the United States would either support Turkey against Greece or, at the least, agree to arbitrate a settlement. Instead, in a painfully blunt letter, President Lyndon Johnson threatened Turkey's NATO membership and forbade Turkey to use U.S.-supplied military equipment against Greek Cypriots. After quickly becoming public knowledge, the Johnson letter signaled the beginning of widespread disillusionment within Turkey of the United States as an ally.²⁶

The abrupt nature and tone of the Johnson letter and the threat it levied against the keystone of Turkish national security brought to the surface all pretexts for anti-American sentiment. The double standard of Turkish defense spending compared to the United States and its other Western allies, the unilateral American decision to bargain away Turkey's shared Jupiter nuclear missiles during the Cuban Missile Crisis, and legal immunity of American military personnel based in Turkey all became leading issues in the ensuing public outcry.²⁷ Yet

²⁶ Hale, 148-150.

²⁷ Hale, 150.

one could somewhat dismiss Johnson's letter as an undiplomatic mistake on the part of a particularly forceful president. Events during the next round of the Cyprus Crisis, however, made the American position toward Turkey crystal clear. When Turkey did take action in 1974 to safeguard the Turkic Cypriot population from impending ethnic cleansing, the Congress of the United States placed an arms embargo on Turkey, even to the point of overriding a presidential veto. In domestic American politics, the Greek lobby proved supreme. Though generally not antagonistic, U.S.-Turkish relations have never recovered.

In light of the excellent working relationship that developed out of the early JAMMAT era and into the NATO period, the ensuing break in U.S.-Turkish relations over an issue of no strategic value to the United States has been, and will continue to be, a painful loss. Turkey's strategic geography has not changed and its potential for influence in the region, has actually increased in the interim. Freed of its sole dependence on its alliance with the United States, yet still safe and important within NATO, the Republic of Turkey has taken a more assertive and independent diplomatic role in its region. As the United States discovered during the Second Iraq War, Turkey only allowed the USAF to carry out logistics support operations from İncirlik Airbase. Denying U.S. requests for using İncirlik as an offensive base, forced the United States to advance only from Kuwait and prevented flanking air and air-to-ground operations in western and northern Iraq. Though not decisive due to an unexpected lack of conventional Iraqi resistance, the Turkish limitations were demonstrations of Turkish sovereignty and the distrust of American exploitation of Turkish cooperation. Whether in relations with Syria, Iran, Russia, Georgia, or Israel, Turkey is an important player in a region that remains very significant to the United States, and the originally close relationship with Turkey would only have aided in the subsequent pursuit of U.S. objectives. Instead Turkey remains a wary acquaintance, a former

friend. Such is a rather sad ending to a relationship originally characterized by its cooperation, respect, and growing mutual interests.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Documents

Hoag, Major General Earl Seeley. *Hoag Papers*. United States Air Force Historical Research Center, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. Microfilm, rolls C5105 and 34150.

Joint American Military Mission for Aid to Turkey, Adjutant General Section Central Files Unit, 1947-54, boxes No. 1-11, 13-14, 16-17, 20-21, 104-108, RG 334 (Interservice Agencies), National Archives II, College Park, Maryland.

U.S. Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States 1945*. Vol. I, *The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference)*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966.

_____. *FRUS 1946*. Vol. VII, *The Near East and Africa*. Washington, 1969.

_____. *FRUS 1947*. Vol. V, *The Near East and Africa*. Washington, 1971.

_____. *FRUS 1948*. Vol. IV, *Eastern Europe; the Soviet Union*. Washington, 1974.

_____. *FRUS 1949*. Vol. VI, *The Near East, South Asia, and Africa*. Washington, 1977.

_____. *FRUS 1950*. Vol. V, *The Near East, South Asia, and Africa*. Washington, 1978.

_____. *FRUS 1951*. Vol. V, *The Near East and Africa*. Washington, 1982.

_____. *FRUS 1952-1954*. Vol. VIII, *Eastern Europe, Soviet Union, and Eastern Mediterranean*. Washington, 1988.

U.S. Congress. House. President Harry S. Truman's address before a joint session of Congress on the situation in Greece, Turkey, and the Middle East. 80th Cong., 1st sess. *Congressional Record* 171, pt. 2 (12 March 1947).

U.S. Congress. Senate. Senator Vandenberg of Michigan speaking for the British Loan to the Senate. S.J. Res. 138. 79th Cong., 2nd sess. *Congressional Record* 91, pt. 3 (22 April 1946).

_____. Senate. Senator Taft of Ohio speaking against the British Loan to the Senate. S.J. Res. 138. 79th Cong., 2nd sess. *Congressional Record* 91, pt. 3 (24 April 1946).

_____. Senate. Senator Taft of Ohio speaking against the British Loan to the Senate and Senator Barkley of Kentucky speaking for the British Loan to the Senate. S.J. Res. 138. 79th Cong., 2nd sess. *Congressional Record* 93, pt. 4, (29 April 1946).

_____. Senate. Vote on S.J. Res. 138. 79th Cong., 2nd sess. *Congressional Record* 92, pt. 4 (10 May 1946).

Memoirs

Acheson, Dean. *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1969.

Bradley, Omar N. and Clair Blair. *A General's Life: An Autobiography of General of the Army*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983.

McGhee, George. *Envoy to the Middle World: Adventures in Diplomacy*. New York: Harper and Row, 1983.

_____. *The US-Turkish –NATO Middle East Connection: How the Truman Doctrine Contained the Soviets in the Middle East*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990.

_____. *On the Frontline in the Cold War: An Ambassador Reports*. New York: Praeger, 1997.

Millis, Walter, ed. *The Forrestal Diaries*. New York: The Viking Press, 1951.

Vandenberg, Arthur H. *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg*. Edited by Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr. and Joe Alex Morris. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952.

Newspapers

New York Times

Time

Books and Articles

Aksan, Virginia, and Danie Hoffman, eds. *The Early Modern Ottomans: Remapping the Empire*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Almond, Gabriel A. *The American People and Foreign Policy*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1950.

Alvarez, David J. *Bureaucracy and the Cold War Diplomacy: The United States and Turkey, 1945-1946*. Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1980.

_____. "The Embassy of Laurence A. Steinhart: Aspects of Allied-Turkish Relations 1942-1945." *East European Quarterly* 9 (Spring 1975): 39-52.

- Anderson, Terry H. *The United States, Great Britain, and the Cold War 1944-1947*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1981.
- Athanassopoulou, Ekavi. *Turkey-Anglo-American Security Interests 1945-1952: the First Enlargement of NATO*. Portland: Frank Cass, 1999.
- _____. "Western Defense Developments and Turkey." *Middle Eastern Studies* 32, no. 2 (April 1996): 77-108.
- Baily, Charles M. *Faint Praise: American Tanks and Tank Destroyers during World War II*. Hamden: Archon Books, 1983.
- Beisner, Robert L. "Patterns of Peril: Dean Acheson Joins the Cold Warriors, 1945-1946." *Diplomatic History* 20 (Summer 1996), 321-355.
- Bernstein, Barton J. *Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration*. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970.
- Bernstein, Barton J. and Allen J. Matusow, eds. *The Truman Administration: A Documentary History*. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1966.
- Brands, H.W. *Into the Labyrinth: the United States and the Middle East*. New York: McGraw Hill, 1994.
- Bryson, Thomas A. *Seeds of Mideast Crisis: The United States Diplomatic Role in the Middle East during World War II*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1981.
- Carleton, William G. *The Revolution in American Foreign Policy: It's Global Range*. New York: Random House, 1963.
- Casey, Steven. *Selling the Korean War: Propaganda, Politics, and Public Opinion in the United States, 1950-1953*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
- Citino, Nathan J. "The Ottoman Legacy in Cold War Modernization." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* Vol. 40, (2008): 579-597.
- Cohen, Michael J. *Fighting World War Three from the Middle East: Allied Contingency Plans, 1945-1954*. Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1997.
- Cole, Wayne S. *Norway and the United States 1905-1955: Two Democracies in Peace and War*. Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1989.
- Craig, Campbell and Fredrik Logevall. *America's Cold War: the Politics of Insecurity*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009.

- Dallek, Robert. *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy 1932-1945*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.
- Diggins, John P. *Up From Communism: Conservative Odysseys in American Intellectual History*. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1975.
- Doenecke, Justus D. *Not to the Swift: The Old Isolationists of the Cold War Era*. Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1979.
- Donovan, Robert J. *Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman, 1945-1948*. New York: W. W. Norton, 1977, reprint University of Missouri Press, 1996.
- Etzold, Thomas H., and John Lewis Gaddis, eds. *Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1978.
- Feis, Herbert. *From Trust to Terror: the Onset of the Cold War, 1945-1950*. London: Anthony Blond Limited, 1970.
- Forty, George. *World War Two Tanks*. London: Osprey, 1995. Reprint Bournemouth: The Book Package Company, 1996, 1998.
- _____. *World War Two Armored Fighting Vehicles & Self-Propelled Artillery*. London: Osprey, 1996.
- Foster, H. Schuyler. *Activism Replaces Isolationism: U.S. Public Attitudes 1940-1975*. Washington D.C.: Foxhall Press, 1983.
- Frazier, Robert. *Anglo-American Relations with Greece: The Coming of the Cold War, 1942-47*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991.
- Freeland, Richard M. *The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and Internal Security 1946-1948*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972.
- Gabel, Christopher R. *Seek, Strike, and Destroy: U.S. Army Tank Destroyer Doctrine in World War II*. Ft. Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, Leavenworth Papers No. 12, 1985.
- Gaddis, John Lewis. *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1972.
- _____. "Was the Truman Doctrine a Real Turning Point?" *Foreign Affairs* 52 (Jan. 1974): 386-402.
- _____. *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982.

- Gardner, Lloyd C. *Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy 1941-1949*. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970.
- _____. *Three Kings: The Rise of an American Empire in the Middle East after World War II*. New York: New Press, 1999.
- Hale, William. *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000*. Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2000.
- Hammond, Thomas T., ed. *Witnesses to the Origins the Cold War*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1982.
- Hanson, Thomas E. *Combat Ready?: The Eight U.S. Army on the Eve of the Korean War*. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2010.
- Harlow, Giles D., and George C. Maerz, eds. *Measures Short of War: The George Kennan Lectures at the National War College, 1946-1947*. Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1991.
- Harper, Alan D. *The Politics of Loyalty: The White House and the Communist Issue, 1946-1952*. Westport: Greenwood Publishing Corporation, 1969.
- Harris, George S. *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-1971*. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1972.
- Hasegawa, Tsuyoshi. *Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan*. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005.
- Hearden, Patrick J. *Architects of Globalism: Building a New World Order During World War II*. Fayetteville: the University of Arkansas Press, 2002.
- Hogan, Michael J.. *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- Hogan, Michael J. and Thomas G. Paterson. *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, 2nd ed. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- Holsti, Ole R. *Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2004.
- Howard, Harry N. *Turkey, the Straits, and U.S. Policy*. Baltimore: the John's Hopkins University Press, 1974.
- Jane's Fighting Ships of World War II*. New York: Crescent Books/Random House, 1994.

- Kaplan, Lawrence S. *A Community of Interests: NATO and the Military Assistance Program, 1948-1951*. Washington DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Historical Office, 1980.
- Karsh, Efraim and Inari. *Empires of the Sand: the Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East 1789-1923*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999.
- Kayali, Hasan. *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918*. Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 1997.
- Kinkead, Eugene. *In Every War but One*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1959.
- Knight, Jonathan. "American International Guarantee for the Straits: Prelude to the Truman Doctrine." *Middle Eastern Studies* 13 (May 1977): 241-50.
- Knox, Donald. *The Korean War: Pusan to Chosin: An Oral History*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers, 1985.
- Kuniholm, Bruce R. *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980.
- _____. *The Near East Connection : Greece and Turkey in the Reconstruction and Security of Europe, 1946-1952*. Brookline, MA: Hellenic College Press, 1984.
- Levering, Ralph B. *The Public and American Foreign Policy, 1918-1978*. New York : William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1978.
- _____. *The Cold War: A Post-Cold War History*. Arlington Heights, IL: Harlan Davidson, 1994.
- Lewis, Bernard. *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 3rd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.
- Lewis, Julian. *Changing Direction: British Military Planning for Post-War Strategic Defense, 1942-1947*. London: Sherwood, 1988.
- Livingston, Craig. "'One Thousand Wings': The United States Air Force Group and the American Mission for Aid to Turkey, 1947-50." *Middle Eastern Studies* Vol. 30, no. 4 (October 1994): 788-825.
- MacMillan, Margaret. *Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World*. New York: Random House, 2003.
- Mango, Andrew. *Atatürk*. London: John Murray, 1999.

- Mark, Edward M. "The War Scare of 1946 and its Consequences." *Diplomatic History* 21 (Summer 1997): 383-415.
- Morgenthau, Hans J. *In Defense of the National Interest: a Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy*. With an introduction by Kenneth W. Thompson. New York: Knopf, 1951. Reprint, New York: University Press of America, 1982.
- Moss, Alexander. *The Famous Five*. New York: Bookmailer, 1958.
- Munson IV, Howard A. "The Rhetoric and Consequences of the Post-World War II Congressional Debate over Military Demobilization." Master's Thesis, Portland State University, 2006.
- Nash, Philip. *The Other Missiles of October: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Jupiters, 1957-1963*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997.
- Offner, Arnold A. *Another Such Victory: President Truman and the Cold War 1945-1953*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002.
- Oren, Michael B. *Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East 1776 to the Present*. New York: W. W. Norton, 2007.
- Russell, Kirk and James McClellan. *The Political Principles of Robert A. Taft*. New York: Fleet Press Corp., 1967.
- Pach, Chester J. Jr. *Arming the Free World: the Origins of the United States Military Assistance Program 1945-1950*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1991.
- Parry-Giles, Shawn J. *The Rhetorical Presidency, Propaganda, and the Cold War, 1945-1955*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002.
- Paterson, Thomas G. *On Every Front: The Making and Unmaking of the Cold War*. New York: W. W. Norton, 1992.
- Patterson, James T. *Mr. Republican: A Biography of Robert A. Taft*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972.
- Poole, Walter S. "From Conciliation to Containment: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Coming of the Cold War, 1945-1946." *Military Affairs* 42 (Feb. 1978): 12-16.
- Rosenberg, Emily S. *Financial Missionaries to the World: the Politics and Culture of Dollar Diplomacy 1900-1930*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003.
- Rubin, Barry. *The Great Powers in the Middle East, 1941-1947: The Road to the Cold War*. London: Frank Cass, 1980.

- Sheehy, Edward J. *The U.S. Navy, the Mediterranean, and the Cold War, 1945-1947*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992.
- Smith, David J. *The Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania*. London: Routledge, 2002.
- Smith, Gaddis. *American Diplomacy during the Second World War, 1941-1945*, 2nd ed. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1985.
- Suk, Lee Hyung. Chairman War History Compilation Committee. *The History of the United Nations Forces in the Korean War*. Seoul: The Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Korea, 1977.
- Tompkins, C. David. *Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg: The Evolution of a Modern Republican, 1884-1945*. Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1970.
- Vali, Ferenc A. *The Turkish Straits and NATO*. Stanford: Hoover Institute Press, 1972.
- Weber, Frank G. *The Evasive Neutral: Germany, Britain and the Quest for a Turkish Alliance in the Second World War*. Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1979.
- Weisband, Edward. *Turkish Foreign Policy 1943-1945: Small State Diplomacy and Great Power Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973.
- Westad, Odd Arne. *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- Winchester, Jim, ed. *The Aviation Factfile: Aircraft of World War II* London: Thunder Bay Press, 2004.
- Wittner, Lawrence S. *American Intervention in Greece, 1943-1949*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1982.
- Zabeki, David T., ed., *World War II in Europe: An Encyclopedia*, Vol. 1. New York: Routledge, 1999.
- Zubok, Vladislav M., and Constantine Peshakov. *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996.
- Zürcher, Erik J. *Turkey: a Modern History*. New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1993. Reprinted, New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2003.