Separated by a Coup:
The Implications for Future U.S. Counter-Proliferation Policy

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Global Politics

Honors Thesis
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PASS WITH DISTINCTION
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As thesis advisor for Alexis Blanc.

I have read this paper and find it satisfactory.

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Table of Contents

Introduction 1
Framework for Analysis 4
Strengths of the Counter-Proliferation Regime 5
Weaknesses of the Counter-Proliferation Regime 8
A Case Study of Two Nuclear Weapons Proliferators 26
  Pakistan 27
    Implications of Response to Pakistani Actions 31
  Iran 32
    Implications of Response to Iranian Actions 37
Discussion of the Implications for Future Counter-Proliferation Policy 38
Endnotes 44
References 49
Précis: Separated by a Coup: The Implications for Future U.S. Proliferation Policy

I was first introduced to the debate surrounding how the spread of nuclear weapons was causing the nature of state-to-state relations to evolve while studying international politics as an exchange student at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth. There I took a ‘War, Strategy and Intelligence’ course. The course sparked my interest in the idea of ‘weapons of the underdog’, and how possessing nuclear weapons could make an otherwise inconsequential state a significant player in the international community. These interests led me to an examination of the nonproliferation debate; whether the spread of nuclear weapons should be looked at favorably, or as something that should be avoided at all costs.

When researching how many states had achieved nuclear weapons status, it quickly became apparent that a very small number of states were actually able to develop the technology. I also found dire predictions however that soon a significant number of states would have the technology, so I began to research the steps that the nonproliferation regime had taken in their attempts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons technology. One of things that immediately grabbed my attention was the weaknesses in the regime and the inconsistencies in how a potential proliferator was dealt with. With the current debate over the potential of Iran achieving nuclear weapons status, I became very interested in the effect those past inconsistencies might have on the current attempts to curtail Iran’s probable quest for nuclear weapons.

This honors thesis project is considered a classical thesis. For this paper I tried to incorporate a large variety of literature and differing viewpoints so I could present a well-rounded, analytically sound argument. I began with my base interest in proliferation cultivated at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, and utilized political science journals,
newspaper articles, books released by prominent think-tanks, and a variety of works from noted authorities in proliferation studies.

In completing this paper I found that there were a variety of opinions concerning whether the spread of nuclear weapons should be looked at favorably. I also found a steady opinion that no matter which side of the fence one stood on there were some serious weaknesses in the counter-proliferation regime. The main theme that seemed to prevail throughout was that the counter-proliferation regime had a debilitating tendency of being inconsistent. I specifically examined the cases of Pakistan and Iran when determining the extent and implications of the unbalanced reaction to proliferation by the counter-proliferation regime. I found a significant lack of basis for the diverging courses the U.S. has taken in confronting nuclear proliferation within each country.

The biased approach of the non-proliferation regime enables potential proliferators to make an analytically sound argument in validating their illicit nuclear weapons programs. For example, why should they be held to a standard (no nuclear weapons) that the counter-proliferation regime refuses to abide by? It further became apparent that this problematic circumstance is causing many states to begin to lose trust in the regime, potentially motivating them to seek nuclear weapons to make themselves feel more secure. I found that the U.S. needs to refocus its counter-proliferation attempts. It needs to make a concerted effort to avoid its past selectivist approach to proliferation, and instead should either consistently condemn or support the spread of nuclear weapons.

The field of nuclear proliferation is a fascinating subject. The political and strategic ramifications of the spread of nuclear weapons will always be extremely relevant because there will always exist states who do not feel secure and who will therefore seek nuclear weapons. Conversely, state will always exist who will either
approve or disapprove of their neighbor acquiring such weapons, and who will act accordingly. The manner in which this test of wills unfolds will be enacted for generations to come.
I. Introduction

Naturally endowed with an aggressive and inherently conflictual nature, mankind has been a plague to itself throughout its existence. Thomas Hobbes' pessimistic, though fairly accurate, summation of his fellow man provides an entirely plausible explanation for centuries of warfare. Records of attempts to conquer or destroy one another or to foster alliances to strengthen one’s strategic position are rife in the annals of history. Numerous generations of the political elite have focused on the development of destructive tools to advance this endeavor, with the march of time ushering in more complex and efficient means of devastation.

With the advent of nuclear weapons technology, a select few became the caretakers of the knowledge of a destructive force that knows no boundaries, the ultimate weapon. In response to this awesomely deadly technology, Bernard Brodie (1942:62) stated that in the past, "The chief purpose of our [US] military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have no other useful purpose." Disregarding the truth of those words, the United States and the former Soviet Union, the world’s two superpowers, quickly became embroiled in an alarmingly tense and hostile bid for ideological supremacy. Both delegated significant portions of government money and intellectual capacity to building an exorbitant number of weapons with increasing destructive capacity in an effort to gain the strategic edge. The two governments also placed extensive emphasis on diplomacy and spreading their ideologies (capitalism and communism) to other countries, attempting to broaden their global influence and gain an edge in the balance of power.
Another important offer that accompanied accepting the influence of one of the
two powers became known as the “nuclear umbrella”, which was the guarantee of
nuclear protection should another state attack. With the backing of a nuclear power, fear
of having an aggressor state attempt an occupation of one’s own state began to recede.
The logic behind this reasoning became known as deterrence theory. Statesmen reasoned
that it would be irrational for an aggressor to judge the comparative gain from capturing a
neighboring country as more beneficial than risking opening their country to being
completely destroyed in a nuclear war. Therefore, less conventionally equipped states
had this additional, weighty incentive to become an ally of either the United States or
Soviet Union.

The decades that comprised the Cold War also saw an international community
with a very skewed distribution of power, with two powers competing for, and essentially
having, all of the influence and military strength. An important dynamic of the Cold War
was its all-encompassing nature, and the diplomatic measures that were undertaken by
the two global hegemonies for the purpose of gaining influence were largely responsible
for this. Each of the two superpowers placed their considerable efforts not only into
increasing their nuclear stockpiles, but, equally importantly, into cajoling, bribing or
strong-arming other states into adopting their ideology. Offers of economic, military and
diplomatic aid were routinely extended to prospective allies.

Two of the states that were central to the U.S.’s strategic bid to gain more
influence than the Soviet Union in the fight for ideological supremacy were Pakistan and
Iran. These two strategically important countries took advantage of the perks (i.e.
conventional weaponry in the form of U.S. F-16s to Pakistan and economic assistance to
Iran to help the state modernize) being extended to them. Many countries, including these two, were able to set aside their regional differences for a time[^9], but they soon realized how much their militaries could stand to gain from the conventional weaponry being offered in exchange for their patronage. However, in very short order, many states also began to become dissatisfied with the conventional weapons at their disposal. They began to associate prestige, power and influence with nuclear weapons. They began to see these weapons as the “great equalizer” that would change the status quo[^9]. They began to grasp for nuclear weapons.

At that point in time, United States for all intents and purposes controlled the global economy, and possessed a military superiority matched only by a single state. It therefore had a strong incentive for maintaining the status-quo balance of power. The Soviets likewise saw the advantages inherent in their position. Both perceived it to be in their best interests to develop some type of arms control that would limit the weapons capabilities that the rest of the world could develop. Thus, the development of a global nuclear arms control policy began to command an even more important role in American foreign policy.

On an international scale, the superpowers and nearly the entire international community came to an agreement on arms control policy when the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) came to fruition in 1970. The NPT declared that its signatories not already in possession of nuclear weapons would not seek them, and that those already in possession of said weapons would seek a path towards disarming themselves.[^10] As an incentive for the non-nuclear weapons states to accept this agreement, the NPT also stipulated that the Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) would
facilitate "the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy." In combination with the protection of the "nuclear umbrella" offered to the allies of the two superpowers, in the beginning it drastically reduced the motivation for some states to seek nuclear weapons.

II. A Framework for Analysis

Even at the height of the Cold War however, the 'umbrella of protection' extended by the U.S. was limited to its Western European allies and Japan. Therefore, states in regions still plagued by tense hostilities such as South Asia and the Middle East felt they had a strong enough incentive to seek nuclear weapons. Presently, states in such regions have even more of an incentive for seeking nuclear weapons because now that the Cold War has ended they cannot depend on assistance from the superpowers to maintain their conventional weaponries. Therefore the NPT impeded the development of nuclear weapons programs in these regions, but it did not stop them because it failed to provide an adequate sense of security for countries like Pakistan, India and Israel. As more and more states have begun to seek nuclear weapons, this has sparked a response from the creators of American foreign policy to develop and impose increasingly strict nuclear arms control regulations, with an eye towards maintaining the status-quo. These changing security considerations have culminated in the present complexity of international security.

With these developments at the forefront, this paper will address the inconsistency and double-standard that plagues American counter-proliferation policy. Because the U.S. is at the forefront in setting an example for the other states in the international
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weapons in each country's possession. The ubiquitous feeling of a necessity to take the world one step back from the brink of nuclear war fomented the creation of these grand treaties between the two adversaries. However, one essential treaty was created that enabled the international community as a whole to take the proverbial step back from the nuclear edge. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty addressed both the issue of smaller states seeking to develop nuclear weapons capability and the disarmament of the nuclear countries.

The NPT is a beneficial and worthwhile agreement that has significantly contributed to the incremental pace at which proliferation has progressed. Piet de Klerk (1999:52) notes for example that the NPT is the "most widely adhered-to international arms control treaty in history". The treaty has also paved the way for states to disarm, with South Africa, Brazil, Argentina and Switzerland voluntarily relinquishing their nuclear weapons programs. Disarming the nuclear states has also occurred to a limited degree with the formation of the counter-proliferation regime. For example, in excess of "18,000 nuclear warheads" have been removed from the arsenals of the U.S. and Russia since the ratification of the NPT, and additional agreements have been reached that will remove "100 tons of weapons-grade plutonium" from their respective armories.

Another significant strength of the counter-proliferation regime has been the International Atomic Energy Agency. The IAEA possess the ability to recommend violators of the agreement to the Security Council for possible sanctions if it detects discrepancies in domestic nuclear energy facilities that would indicate the state is diverting its enriched nuclear fuel elsewhere. Kapur (1990:126-7) noted that "The IAEA is doing an excellent job in nuclear installations that are under safeguards". The
effectiveness of the IAEA has also been significantly buttressed by the 1997 Additional Protocol. The Additional Protocol provides inspectors with the ability to inspect any building they suspect of being used for illicit nuclear weapons activity with as little as two hours notice. It also authorizes them to take environmental samples, and requires states to provide more information to the Agency about the operation of their nuclear facilities. These new abilities enable the Agency to be considerably more accurate in its estimations of the overall size of a state's nuclear program and the whether it is being used within the guidelines of the NPT.

The counter-proliferation regime has also taken significant steps forward with the use of the Nuclear Suppliers Groups and export controls. The export control regimes that have formed, such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group, have played a very important role in curtailing the problem of sensitive nuclear technologies being exported in a careless manner. Under the NPT, these groups have to come to an agreement on what materials should be categorized as "trigger list" component. For every item that a country tried to import that appeared on the list, they would be required to implement IAEA safeguards before they could use the component.

The Proliferation Security Initiative developed by the current Bush Administration is another very beneficial export control tool. The Initiative allows patrols in the waters of participating countries, and grants the right of inspections to be made on shipments that are suspected of containing illegal merchandise. The U.S. has also taken important steps to be aware of other countries, for example Russia, agreeing to export sensitive weapons technology. For example, India currently does not possess a means for delivering a nuclear weapon by missile. In 1995 the Indian government tried to import
“cryogenic booster engine technology” from Russia that would significantly speed up the process of developing a missile. 25 Because of significant U.S. pressure however, the trade was cancelled. 26 Karl (1996:106) notes that by facilitating the cancellation of this trade, the U.S. “set back by a decade... an intercontinental-range ballistic missile [for India].”

Another important contribution of the counter-proliferation regime has been the international norms that it has created against possessing nuclear weapons and testing nuclear weapons. Karl (1996:106) observes that proliferators have been discouraged from conducting full-scale nuclear tests because of concern over violating “international non-proliferation norms.” The benefit of this lack of testing is obvious in that it is much more difficult for states to develop the effectiveness and reliability of their nuclear armories if extensive full-scale testing cannot be done. 27

B. Weaknesses of the Counter-Proliferation Regime

Present day situations mandate a new method of dealing with the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology besides simply relying on the NPT. The daunting nature of the problem however has caused many in the political world to shy away from acknowledging changes that must be made. For example, the recent refusal by the United States to cooperate in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty has put a stop to a very promising agreement for stifling the spread of nuclear weapons. 28 These problems must be addressed with alacrity as a variety of noted authorities voice the opinion that “the proliferation of nuclear weapons is undoubtedly the most complex and pressing strategic challenge facing the US and the international community.” 29
The inclination towards continuing to devise grand strategies and treaties that a large number of countries can be party to are a mistake because in order to get such an agreement, its signatories have to feel that it is in their best interests. The consequence is that the international community runs the risk of ending up with an agreement that is so generic that it really does not have the power to do anything. Additionally, Levi and O'Hanlon (2005:46) argue that these types of strategic arms accords generally focus on regulating arms races which are no longer the main security issue, and in the process waste valuable time that needs to be spent addressing the problem of nuclear weapons technology proliferation.

There are five main problems with the current non-proliferation regime. Two problems with the existing counter-proliferation establishment are the power limitations inherent in both the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the International Atomic Energy Agency. In conjunction, the tools most pervasively utilized by the above mentioned non-proliferation regime such as sanctions, export controls, and the idea of a ‘nuclear taboo’ have some notable weaknesses in their utility. Another destabilizing weakness is that none of the above mentioned aspects of the current non-proliferation regime attempt to address and mitigate the motivations behind nuclear proliferation. Bailey (1991:39) notes that security and prestige are two of the main motivating factors driving states to seek nuclear weapons. States are losing their trust in the credibility of the non-proliferation regime however as some states are allowed to proliferate (i.e. Pakistan and Israel) and others are not (i.e. Iran and North Korea). Consequently, states are lacking the sense of security that the NPT was designed to provide.
The fifth and most debilitating aspect of the counter-proliferation regime intertwines with and exacerbates each of those weaknesses. The system is viewed by many states such as India, Pakistan, and Iran as an overt attempt by the powerful states already in possession of nuclear weapons to maintain the status quo. They argue that if nuclear weapons are so insignificant then what is the ‘nuclear haves’ justification for possessing them. Therefore these states feel they are validated in refusing to abide by the regulations the ‘nuclear haves’ attempt to impose on them. This idea of the existence of a double-standard is buttressed by the fact that there is blatant inconsistency in how the non-proliferation regime punishes states with illicit nuclear weapons programs. For example, North Korea was completely ostracized from the international community when it withdrew from the NPT (a completely legal action), while the sanctions on Pakistan remained in place for only 5 years before they were removed.

First, the power limitations are inherent in any international agreement that has such a large number of signatories. An example can be found in the language in the NPT in the section mandating the reduction of nuclear weapons. The language is completely subjective, stating only that the current nuclear states “declare their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date...measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament.” So the nuclear states intend to disarm at some point in time, but they might not if it is never convenient, and even if that moment does arrive, they are only agreeing to consider disarmament measures, not completely disarm. This weakness works against the purpose of the non-proliferation regime, validating the nuclear have-nots charge of a double-standard existing within the counter-proliferation regime. The
nuclear-haves are demanding that the other states adhere to the spirit of the treaty, while not holding themselves to the same standards.

An additional flaw in the NPT is that a country can simply choose to not sign it or they can choose to withdraw from it. The international community has no recourse in either of these cases beyond verbally admonishing the rogue state. The entirety of the treaty Carter (2000:97) notes “depends on the goodwill of its participants, and does not guarantee that countries will not violate their commitments.” The consequences of this lack of a credible coercive capability were demonstrated by the fact that India, Israel and Pakistan all refused to sign the treaty. North Korea signed the treaty but later withdrew because it did not feel the restrictions being a signatory placed on the country were in the best interests of the state. India and Pakistan are now acknowledged nuclear states, and Israel and North Korea are both defacto nuclear weapons states.

The influence of bias within the non-proliferation regime can be seen as the former three states still find a place of acceptance within the international community even though their actions violate an important international norm. Bias can again be seen by the fact that North Korea became the recipient of the full displeasure of the U.S., and was punished in a comparatively greater measure than the former three states. These circumstances are counter-productive for the non-proliferation regime, because they give the impression that even if countries do violate their commitments, it does not guarantee that punishment will be dealt out in an equal manner.

Another problem with the NPT is that it lacks an ability to make signing important aspects such as the 1997 Additional Protocol mandatory rather than optional. When the NPT was first signed, each signatory submitted a list of its nuclear facilities to
the IAEA, and the Agency had the authorization to monitor only those facilities on the list. Additionally, the IAEA had to give the state notice before it could inspect a facility. These aspects created a too-little-to-late situation because an early warning mechanism is practically non-existent. The 1997 Protocol has the potential for eliminating these problems because, as has been noted, the IAEA does an excellent job of monitoring the facilities that are under its jurisdiction. Unfortunately, not every country has signed it. Though the United States has strongly pushed for every state (most prominently Iran) in the international community to become signatories of the Protocol, a signature from the U.S. is conspicuously absent, adding to the already difficult position of the counter-proliferation regime of maintaining its credibility.

Another obstacle faced by the IAEA is that even if a country does get recommended to the Security Council, all five of the permanent members on the Security Council must agree on a punishment for the state in violation of the agreement. Even if sanctions have been instituted, there still exists the possibility that the country may believe sanctions are an acceptable opportunity cost in return for possessing nuclear weapons technology and continue on the same course. Pakistan is an excellent example of a state willing to drive itself into economic turmoil to keep its nuclear weapons program. Arms control experts have observed that even if sanctions have been instituted, “the NPT contains no formal provisions for forcing a country to abandon the activity.” Therefore, the rogue state can continue on in the same manner. To compound the problem, some countries continue with more international disdain than others, again strengthening the argument that there is a crippling double-standard within the non-proliferation regime.
Part of the reason that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty can be ineffective is due to the unproductive tools available for the enforcement of the policies laid out in the charter. The dissuasive tool of sanctions weighs heavily on the side of the unproductive tools. Many experts view sanctions as self-defeating and ineffective. Thakur (2000:117) provided an explanation for the self-defeating phenomenon. He notes that if sanctions were moderately imposed so the country would see the potential economic harm that might befall their country, they could have the opposite effect. He argues that with those countries the "nuclear hawks would feel vindicated, saying that they were now being treated with respect." On the other hand if a harsh response is immediately realized it "would be self-fulfilling. The hawks would argue that the friendless state that is the target of hostile international attention needs an arsenal of nuclear weapons to defend its interests." Sanctions are a dangerous double-edged sword.

Another drawback of sanctions involves their development and effective implementation. For example, if a country such as the United State, after failing to reach an agreement within the Security Council on the necessity of sanctions, decides to impose unilateral sanctions, the effects on the target country’s nuclear weapons program have proven to be minimal. For example, when the U.S. imposed sanctions on Pakistan in 1990, Pakistan continued with its weapons program. Matinuddin (2002: 95-6) notes "President Khan...strove hard to ensure the progress and eventual success of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme despite the Pressler Amendment. In fact, all governments that followed his continued to provide the necessary funds to the Khan Research Laboratory".
Because there are so many suppliers in the market, if a country is motivated enough to achieve nuclear weapons status, then it will simply look to other suppliers for the technology. Thakur notes that because "of the range of sellers on the international market place: it is virtually impossible to secure universal participation in embargoes." Additionally, a way of monitoring cooperation is lacking even if cooperation can be achieved.

These unilateral sanctions are also serving as a limitation because they are instituted unequally. Two states could be doing the same thing, but one is severely sanctioned by the U.S. and the other is not. These biased actions are counter-productive for the regime. States such as India point to this inconsistency in punishment when seeking to discredit the non-proliferation regime. For example, the failure by the U.S. to maintain its sanctions against Pakistan while keeping them in full force against India until just recently, and even going so far as to agree to sell Pakistan U.S. F-16s in 1994.

In most decisions taken by the international community, there also exists the deciding factor of economics. By and large, if a state stands to gain a huge profit from skirting technologies restrictions, Thakur (2000:116) observes it is "usually more powerful than the motive for enforcing them." The consequences of this theory of economics are made readily apparent by the present situation in Russia. With the fall of the Soviet Union, the unbelievably stringent checks and balances systems have gone with it. For example, before the fall of the Soviet Union, the security was so strict that no one was allowed to travel to a town harboring a nuclear facility. Also, the travel of its citizens "was strictly regulated: members of the Soviet Union’s nuclear complex were, as a general rule, not permitted to travel abroad". Allison et al (1996:36) warns that with the
despair running rampant through the masses the potential for nuclear leakage is more a
"when" not "if" question. 48

Economic incentives for proliferation additionally outpace security considerations as the prevalence of feelings of aimlessness spread throughout the military establishment in Russia. Once a fearsome power and now barely outfitted and rarely paid, the result could be a "breakdown in the Russian military's guardianship of nuclear weapons." 49

The last decade has revealed more than six incidences of low-level planning where "weapons-usable fissile material" was easily removed from various Russian nuclear facilities. Such occurrences indicate that the potential of a worst case scenario of fissile nuclear material falling into the wrong hands has become a frightful reality. If poor, unorganized individuals can easily remove this dangerous material, the potential for a well-funded, organized group to successfully steal some of this material becomes highly likely. 50 Undoubtedly, the world has a monumental arms control issue to deal with.

The next tool in the current non-proliferation regime's bag of discouragement is the use of export controls. Export controls face many of the same limitations as sanction in that they are exceptionally hard to monitor, it is difficult to get all the major nuclear technologies suppliers on board, and even then there are alternatives for a determined seeker of nuclear weapons technology. Additionally, once again the economic implications are always the deciding consideration for states.

A combination of factors makes export controls very hard to monitor. First there are enormous expanses of water on which a plethora of vessels transfer cargo that needs to be monitored. In conjunction, challenges are also posed by the difficulty inherent in circumventing illegal shipments of nuclear technologies when the size of the potential
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threat is so huge and the illegal material is so small. Even though it is a step in the right direction, the Proliferation Security Initiative developed by the current Bush Administration, is limited by all of these aspects, including the fact that they can only patrol in the waters of participating countries. Levi and O'Hanlon (2005: 4) observe that given the "small size of much dangerous weaponry and equipment and thus the difficulty of finding and tracking it, attempts at interdiction alone are insufficient to meet the massive and mounting threat of WMD proliferation."51

Export controls currently in use are also limited by the fact that the suppliers of nuclear weapons technology were thrown into a significantly altered security environment at the end of the Cold War. Obviously each state holds their own interpretation of the nature of this new environment, and therefore their arms control approaches have often taken very divergent courses. The export control regimes that have formed such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group, while beneficial, do possess some weaknesses. For example, not every group member is in accord concerning which countries pose a potential security threat, and who should therefore be refused access to sensitive technologies. Currently, the U.S. and Russia are in disagreement over whether Russia should build a nuclear reactor for Iran in Bushehr.52 However, if the Group decides to cut a country out of the nuclear technology loop as it were, there still exists the potential that the ousted state can simply go to another supplier such as North Korea, Pakistan, or India, who may be much more willing to sell them what they want.53

This brings up the second weakness, not every state with nuclear weapons technology is a member of such a group and therefore does not have to abide by the export restrictions (most notably North Korea). For example, there is significant concern
over the fact that North Korea has supplied Iran with medium-range missiles and that North Korea is helping Iran develop their nuclear weapons program. Additionally, even though Pakistan is a member of a nuclear suppliers group, it still had problems keeping its sensitive nuclear technologies from being exported. For example, the Father of the Islamic Bomb, Dr. A. Q. Khan, was found to have placed sensitive weapons designs on the black market, selling nuclear weapons information to Libya, Iran and North Korea. Kahn later informed investigators that one of the motives for spreading the technology was “to defy the West”. Additionally, the state can also create networks of businesses that front as legal enterprises, obtain the sensitive technology, and then pass the technology onto the state; which Pakistan did with alarming success in developing their nuclear weapons program.

Finally, the economic component again plays a significant role in whether the potentially policies on export control are implemented efficiently, if at all, and buttresses the accusations of there being a double standard. An excellent example that demonstrates this idea is the 1978 U.S. Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act. This Act stipulated that U.S exportation of nuclear technologies would be terminated to any country found to be lacking fuel cycle safeguards in all their facilities, or found evidence that the state was actively seeking nuclear weapons technology and material. Further accompanying consequences were even direr. The Act stated that the U.S. would cease with all foreign and military aid to the guilty party. However, a Presidential waiver did accompany this act that authorized these rules to be overridden in instances where there were more pressing “national security considerations”.
The implications and inherent duplicity of this waiver were soon realized as for a period of time sanctions were not imposed on Israel or Pakistan even though definitive proof existed that those states were guilty of violating the U.S. Proliferation Prevention Act. There are numerous reasons why Israel went unpunished. One is because a powerful Jewish constituency existed in the U.S. interested in the preservation of the Jewish state; another is because the U.S. was Israel's main ally during the 80's and Israel was not classified as a threat to U.S. national security. Pakistan flew under the radar because of the U.S. interest in helping to keep the Soviets out of Afghanistan during the 80's, and Pakistan was the route through which the U.S. sent aid in this endeavor.

The double-standard that continually accompanies economic considerations is additionally demonstrated by the manner in which the U.S. approached China when intelligence indicated that Chinese had sold sensitive nuclear weapons technology. Available intelligence warned that in at least nine instances in only a two-year span, 1995-1997, to both the Iranians and the Pakistanis. Thakur (2000:106) notes “Washington simply refused to act, always looking to fudge the issue because of a desire to avoid damaging the lucrative trade relationship.” There is simply so much money to be made in the arms market that Karsh (2000:94) observes that weapons producers throughout the international community “will fight hard to maintain their share in the lucrative market…”

Two more components used by the non-proliferation regime are no-first use pledges and nuclear-weapons-free zones. The logic behind the first idea is flawed. The basis of these pledges is that a state would declare they would not be the first one to launch a nuclear warhead, and therefore if a crisis occurred, some stability would be
guaranteed. Quinlan (2000:53) discounts this reasoning arguing the irrationality of expecting that a state "in extremis" will unwaveringly abide by a peacetime declaration is "manifest fantasy." The concept of weapons-free-zones is also unhelpful and limited. When regions are willing to impose nuclear weapons bans then obviously there was no security concern or motivation to have nuclear weapons in the first place, so the agreements are essentially curtailing a problem that never even existed. Weapons-free-zones are also limited by the fact that they "do not fit every setting". It follows by reason that if even one state in an area refuses to abide by the ban, then all of the other countries will refuse to as well because they will not feel assured of their security (which is exactly the case in the Middle East and South Asia).

Lastly, the idea of a 'nuclear taboo' exists that the nuclear non-proliferation establishment relies on as reassurance that even if a country does achieve nuclear weapons status, even with all of the above mentioned stringent checks systems, they will not use them. Political scientists warn that relying on the concept of a nuclear taboo poses a serious pitfall because it is a theory suffused in ethnocentrism, and may lead to Western antipathy towards non-Western motives for acquiring weapons of mass destruction. Gray (2000:25) notes the lack of applicability of such an idea for the non-proliferation regime observing that

Such a taboo has proved itself no reliable barrier to further nuclear proliferation...one should not presume causal connection between the phenomenon of a very slow pace of nuclear proliferation and the international popularity of a nuclear taboo.
Many of the states which this theory is directed towards are "embattled polities", and this further weakens the applicability of the theory because the proponents of this theory largely consist of citizens of happily nuclear weapons capable states. Obviously however, it is much easier to discount the utility of something already in one's possession. Supposing that the former type of states' will uncompromisingly restrict their national security goals, and view nuclear weapons as "morally insignificant", just because the nuclear haves say they are, is a completely unrealistic expectation. Gray (2000: 28) notes that the only means through which a reliable nuclear weapons taboo could come into existence would first require that states feel there is no security incentive for acquiring them, at this point however, the taboo would become unnecessary.

The third major weakness in the non-proliferation regime is that the motivations behind states' quest for nuclear weapons remain largely unaddressed. Bailey (1991:39) lists the three main causes of proliferation: security, prestige, and bureaucratic inertia. There also exists an additional motivating factor in the pursuit of nuclear weapons technology, the fact that the rewards offered in return for not developing nuclear weapons are loosing their attractiveness. Generally, when the U.S. and the international community are devising a response to acts of proliferation, the response almost entirely focuses on the punishment that should be dealt out, rather than emphasizing curtailing the motivations driving the proliferation.

The motivational factor of security possesses arguably the widest influence on attempts to acquire nuclear weapons because there is huge propensity in world leaders to view nuclear weapons as a guarantor of national security. Levi and O'Hanlon (2005:3) note that feelings of security did not result from the signing of the NPT. The reason for
this is because meaningful limitation on the distribution of nuclear arms technology by
the superpowers did not exist, nor did the NPT address the conflicts that were beginning
to influence the developing world. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the arms
control measures that were employed at the end of the war offered many states a feeling
of credible protection. Unfortunately, as the sense that there exists a double-standard and
unequal punishment being dealt out by the regime has become so prevalent the counter-
proliferation community has lost much of its credibility.

Therefore, in response to this bias, the feeling of security NPT provided has been
largely lost, and states feel the need to provide for their own security in an effort to
ensure the state is largely imperious to outside influence. Nuclear weapons generally
seem the surest way accomplishing this goal. Gray (2000:7) observes that “in 1991 the
United States taught the would-be regional hegemons a master class in why nuclear
armament is not a dispensable luxury if one chooses to act in ways strongly deplored by
Americans.” The 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States further emphasizes
this point with the elevation of a policy of preemption to the forefront of the national
security agenda. This aggressive approach has provided a significant source of
motivation for developing nuclear weapons in many of the countries that consistently feel
the brunt of U.S. disapproval. Ziemke (2000:88) observes that a state’s conduct is
shaped by the outside world, and if it views the outside world as hostile, this will be
reflected in their strategic decision making process when they seek methods for
defending their state.

The next consideration for states in the development of nuclear weapons is the
perceived prestige that arguably accompanies nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons have-
nots look at the world and see two groups: on the one hand, technologically advanced, powerful countries, and on the other significantly less powerful countries lacking a solid technological infrastructure. By and large, the former possess nuclear weapons, the latter do not. The correlation between these two occurrences undoubtedly is due to more than the possession of nuclear weapons, but it is undeniable that the correlation exists. Therefore, underdeveloped countries, justifiably or not, view nuclear weapons as K. Bailey (1991:39) terms it "a symbol of technological prowess and are thus a means of gaining political clout."

This prospect of gaining political clout is significant motivational factor for seeking nuclear weapons. It can even become a very influential domestic issue. For the citizens of many states who believe that they are being shortchanged on the scale of influence in the international sphere, possessing nuclear weapons becomes a salient issue for the populace. The people will support the leaders they feel are "on the right track" so to speak in raising the nation's influence and respect within the international community; those leaders developing nuclear weapons programs.

The motivational factors of prestige and public support for a nuclear weapons program combine with the idea of bureaucratic inertia. The combination of these three aspects has the potential to set a ball in motion that may gather so much momentum behind it that it becomes impervious to opposition. Bureaucratic inertia theorizes that in order to get a nuclear weapons development program up and running many aspects of the country must be mobilized: the scientific community, the military and political leaders. Huge amounts of government funding must be pumped into this endeavor, with institutions being built and jobs subsequently being created. As mentioned above,
because the populace desires international prestige they are in support of those leaders
"unveiling nuclear weapons programmes" as O'Neil (2000:205) remarks, so leaders that
support such programs are the ones who will have the popular support. Because the
support of the program is coming from so many powerful and influential parties, it can
quickly escalate to unstoppable proportions. As K. Bailey (1991:39) notes, "Once a
nuclear weapons program is initiated, even when the intent is only to develop the option,
it takes on a life of its own."

The final unaccounted for and currently unconsidered motivational factor driving
states to develop nuclear weapons programs is the undeniable fact that the opportunity
cost of not developing nuclear weapons is seen to be much higher than it used to be.
With the NPT in the 1970's, states willing to relinquish their rights to developing nuclear
weapons were promised access to a technology that many saw as the wave of the future.
A technology many thought would greatly reduce dependence on fossil fuels. They were
also promised that nuclear weapons would loose their relevance causing the current
nuclear states to gradually disarm. None of these prospects have come to fruition. Carter
(2000:98-9) notes an additionally drawback of nuclear power namely that "because of the
high cost of nuclear power plants and the technical skill required to operate
them...peaceful nuclear power may have lost its glitter..."

In the view of the leaders of many developing countries, they are being asked to
sacrifice national security, prestige, popular support, and possible loss of power, and in
return they are offered comparatively little. The nuclear nations are not going to disarm,
nuclear power is extremely expensive, and some governments feel that their viability
hinges upon military support. Emphasis on military support invariably leads to emphasis
on weaponry. In the face of such opposing costs and benefits, certainly from the viewpoint of the nuclear have-nots, the pros column for considering developing a nuclear weapons program has considerable weight. Such states need new, stronger incentives that the current non-proliferation regime is failing to provide, to encourage them to not seek a nuclear weapons capability.

Lastly, the most significant weakness of the non-proliferation regime that has been an underpinning aspect throughout is the double standard that exists, effectively decapitating any authoritative leg the nuclear haves might be able to stand on. On the one hand nuclear weapons states are asking other states to not go after a nuclear weapons capability, but on the other they are maintaining, and often expanding, their own nuclear capability. K. Matinuddin (2002:16) observes that the mammoth United States' military is supplemented with 35,000 nuclear warheads. When the U.S is in a position of overwhelming military superiority, and still insists on such staggering numbers of nuclear weapons, it is a very untenable position to argue that "nuclear weapons lack utility."?

There exists another bias in the nuclear non-proliferation regime that undermines its credibility and adds fuel to the argument of the double-standard. The fact that some states develop a nuclear weapons capability and go unpunished, while others do so and the censure of the entire international community rains down upon them. The 1978 U.S. Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act reinforces this notion of a double-standard. No one has ever heard of sanctions being imposed upon Israel even though their nuclear weapons program is possibly the worst keep secret of the century. Additionally, Pakistan received billions of dollars in U.S. military and economic aid throughout the 1980’s. Later declassified government documents revealed that from as early a time as 1983, the
government knew the Pakistanis were developing a nuclear weapons program. The report stated that “There is unambiguous evidence that Pakistan is actively pursuing a nuclear weapons development program...we believe the ultimate application of the enriched uranium...is clearly nuclear weapons.”\textsuperscript{72} For an additional seven years the U.S. would supply aid to Pakistan, blatantly disregarding the Pressler Amendment that demanded the flow of aid to cease in such a scenario. K. Bailey (1991:3) contends, “Other nations, observing that Israel, India, and Pakistan are not penalized for nuclear proliferation, query why they should continue to forgo such weapons.”

All of these aspects, especially the blatant bias, have combined to create an environment where non-nuclear countries feel they are being essentially hood winked by the nuclear haves who they argue are simply trying to maintain their status-quo superiority. There does not seem to be any realistic potential for the nuclear states to disarm.\textsuperscript{73} Indeed why would they when it would be political suicide to suggest such a thing. However, even though this may be the reality of the situation, the non-proliferation regime cannot just assume that the rest of the members of the international community without nuclear weapons will simply accept it and move on. In such an environment where disarmament is not an option the world is bound to have proliferation. Thakur (2000:109) succinctly observes that “the choice is between progress and reversal, not between progress and the status-quo: a progression down to zero for the existing nuclear weapons states, or the spread of nuclear weapons to the other states.” The current non-proliferation regime fails to keep that in mind and ends up demanding a disproportionate amount compared to what it is willing to sacrifice, virtually guaranteeing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
III. A Case Study of Two Nuclear Weapons Proliferators

With all of these flaws in mind with the past and current nonproliferation regime, this paper will now move to an analysis of two very similar states, Pakistan and Iran. Both states are limited, underdeveloped, democracies, both were extremely vital ideological battle grounds during the Cold War, both are strongly Islamic, both harbor terrorist groups, and both have unstable governments with even more unstable economies. The deal breaking difference between the two countries is that one ousted a government that Washington was not partial to in a coup, and the other ousted a government that the U.S. did favor in a revolution. Therefore one, Pakistan, has ally status and all the perks that accompany it, and the other, Iran, has rogue state status.

First the nuclear weapons program of Pakistan will be examined. A timeline for its development, the motivation, the influence of public opinion, the progressive reactions of the United States and the nonproliferation regime, and the ensuing Pakistani responses will be presented. Second, those same aspects will be examined from the perspective of the current situation with Iran (motivation, popular support, etc.). This analysis will attempt to identify the similarities between Pakistan, and Iran. Further, it will examine the consequences and implications of the differences in approach the nonproliferation regime took, and are taking, in curtailing the nuclear weapons programs of these two states. An argument will be made that these actions, to the nonproliferation regime’s detriment, are lending further credence to the increasingly advocated argument that a double standard exists which makes the nonproliferation regime untrustworthy and unfair.
A. Pakistan

When the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty was completed in 1968 South Asia underwent its first test of whether or not it had potential to become a nuclear weapons free zone. When India refused to sign and Pakistan followed suite, in the eyes of the fledgling nonproliferation regime, the test had failed. In the first two decades since its conception in 1947, Pakistan had been at war with India three times. This failure to check the building tension in the region with the NPT would have serious consequences. With such a battle ridden past and with a military inadequate to face down their much stronger neighbor, the Pakistani government felt their options were severely restricted. In January 1972, President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, with the support of the military, started the groundwork for Pakistan to develop a nuclear weapons program. When in 1974 India tested its first ‘peaceful’ nuclear explosion, under tremendous domestic and political pressure, Bhutto promised “we should have to eat grass and get one, or buy one of our own.”

Pakistan also began to cultivate a friendship with the United States in hopes that having such a stalwart ally would dissuade any aggressive moves by the Indian government. However, in order to hedge its bets as it were, Pakistan also began to covertly construct a uranium enrichment facility in the 1979. Unfortunately for the Pakistani government, it was not secret enough and the United States quickly cut off all economic and military aid to Pakistan under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. These drastic repercussions had very little effect in discouraging Pakistan. K. Bailey notes “Pakistan demonstrated no remorse and did not alter its nuclear plans. Clearly it was willing to forsake U.S. assistance to arm itself with nuclear weapons.”
The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan that same year. In response to the Soviet threat, the U.S. quickly changed its position. For the next decade the U.S. would send Pakistan over $5 billion in aid, the president continually certifying under the Pressler Amendment that Pakistan did not have an active nuclear weapons program, and that if it did, the aid being sent was decreasing the country’s potential for developing nuclear weapons. K. Bailey (1991:41) notes that the persuasion and inducement of aid “may have slowed the bomb program, but it did not stop it.” With the abrupt end of the Soviet threat in Afghanistan, in 1990 the U.S. imposed the Pressler amendment sanctions, which halted military sales and economic assistance. This severe action had little effect other than to anger the Pakistanis who charged that the actions currently being taken to develop their nuclear program were not significantly different from what had been occurring from the previous years in which Pakistan had consistently been certified for aid.81

Through a system of “theft, a supplier’s irresponsibility, and services rendered to the United States” Pakistan acquired a formidable nuclear infrastructure82, and by 1991 had built six bombs.83 It was not until 1991, when India and Pakistan reached an agreement that neither would attack the other’s nuclear facilities, that Pakistan was swayed to halt the development of its nuclear weapons program. Matinuddin (2002:307) notes that by July of that same year, “reliable reports from Islamabad confirm that Pakistan had frozen production of HEU and halted the manufacturing of nuclear weapons components.”

Throughout all of the above mentioned developments public support never waned. In fact, even though Pakistan has “become a nuclear power with a begging bowl”84 the people still support it. The extent of the toll the nuclear weapons program has
taken on the Pakistani economy are demonstrated Ahmed and Cortright’s (1998:77) observation that after paying debts and the military “a mere 5 percent of the total budget is left over for all social, economic, and community services”. Unshakable in its belief that India poses a substantial threat to Pakistani sovereignty, the populace of Pakistan will continue to sacrifice in order to maintain the capability. Numerous experts argue that the tense and often violent relationship with neighboring India foments support for the Pakistani nuclear weapons program, and until this perceived threat can be marginalized or ended through credible regional peace agreements, public support will not wane.85 Since regional stability does not appear to be in the offing, governmental support for maintaining Pakistan’s nuclear weapons status will not abate.

A very untenable political situation has been created in Pakistan because of the impoverished state of the economy, the military’s unshakable hold of influence in the government, and the pervasiveness fundamental Islamic groups.86 Social unrest occurs due to the ubiquitous nature of the substantial economic hardships in Pakistan. The public does not connect their economic hardships and the expense, both the real and the opportunity costs, of the state’s nuclear weapons program.87 So unrest ferments and forms fundamental Islamic groups seeking to facilitate change in the government while the original support for the nuclear weapons program is maintained. These developments have cultivated the necessity for the prevailing government powers in Pakistan to depend on the military for its survival. In order to do this the political party in power needs to support the military’s priorities, namely the necessity of nuclear weapons for the defense and security of Pakistan against India. It quickly becomes an extremely untenable, if not
impossible, position from a political standpoint to campaign against having nuclear weapons.

Because none of Pakistan's leaders could afford to reverse the nuclear weapons program, the sanctions imposed during the Bush Administration remained in place until 1995. During the Clinton Administration however the U.S. moved towards a more conciliatory approach with Pakistan because the government again needed the support of the Pakistani government, this time to counter terrorist activity in the region. This move was intended to be a moderating influence on the Pakistani nuclear weapons program. It was designed to encourage the Pakistanis to act with restraint, enabling them to remain the recipient of the implicit support of the U.S., and therefore aid from the international community.

The first concessionaire step entailed the revision of the Pressler amendment and re-institution of the flow of economic assistance to Pakistan. With the Brown amendment the following year, $370 million would be sent to Pakistan, and would authorize further military assistance and aid to be sent to the state for "counterterrorism and other purposes". The final measure that solidified the impression of apparent consent of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program by the U.S. came when Pakistan's leading nuclear weapons scientists was found to have been extensively sharing nuclear weapons designs, technology and equipment with countries such as Iran and Libya. When President Musharraf refused to extradite or to punish Dr. Khan for his actions, the response from the U.S. lacked any strong criticism of the President's inflammatory decision.
The Pakistani government’s response to these shows of acceptance was suspicion and guardedness. Ahmed and Cortright note that the “Pakistani leaders have maintained a firm stance against any concessions in return for more flexible U.S. policy...insist that a unilateral and verifiable capping of the nuclear program is unacceptable”.93 To compound the failure by the U.S. to secure cooperation and a scaled down Pakistani nuclear weapons program, other domestic actors have used these concessions as illustrations of how the nuclear weapons program can be used as a bargaining tool. Ahmed and Cortright (1998:12) further observe that other domestic actors have used these concessions “as a tool to gain legitimacy, claiming to have successfully defended national interest in gaining military assistance without compromising the nuclear program”.

1. Implications of Response to Pakistani Actions

However necessary to national security or well intentioned, this new policy of engagement and concessionaire measures towards Pakistan has significantly buttressed the arguments that a double-standard exists within the nonproliferation regime. The U.S. had effectively moved to a policy of acceptance rather than punishment, with the Pakistanis having to make no effort to curtail their nuclear weapons program.94 This circumstance was a double-edged sword because it sent mixed messages.95 It fostered the impression that the punishment meted out by that nonproliferation establishment would be weak and limited towards an ally that developed a nuclear weapons program; inadvertently encouraging such states to seek nuclear weapons.96 Conversely, the policy by the U.S. of accepting Pakistan back into the fold of the international community gave states that were on the periphery of the community a pulpit from which to disparage the nonproliferation regime for its demonstrably biased approach to its mission of stifling the
spread of nuclear weapons technology. These states then had strengthened validation for seeking nuclear weapons because obviously the regime could not be trusted to be fair and consistent in its mission.

B. Iran

One of the main arguments that The Islamic Republic of Iran presents for justifying a possible nuclear weapons program is this idea of a double-standard. This essay will now move to a discussion of whether Iran intentions are to develop nuclear weapons, and what the state’s motivations would be. It will examine public and government support for such a program, and what the reaction from the nonproliferation regime, particularly from the United States, has been to address the problem. Throughout, it will compare and contrast those aspects with the evolution of the Pakistan nuclear weapons program.

Intelligence reports and State Department analysis indicate that Iran is in fact developing a nuclear weapons program. In a similar situation to Pakistan in its early stages, Iran is currently within their legal bounds with their nuclear program, but they are on the brink of becoming self-sufficient and will no longer need outside technology and expertise to continue developing their nuclear weapons program. Experts agree that, “Under the guise of a civilian research programme, Iran is gradually accumulating the technology and expertise necessary for constructing nuclear weapons”. Findings at the Natanz installation in August 2002 revealed that the Iranians are technologically advanced enough to enrich uranium to almost nuclear weapons grade purity. When outside support loses its role as a necessity, monitoring the developments within Iran’s nuclear weapons program will become extremely difficult. Additionally, like in the case
of Pakistan, once the program reaches a certain point of self-sufficiency, the powers of persuasion that the nonproliferation regime possesses will lose their poignancy.

Evidence that Iran's intentions are focused towards a nuclear weapons program regardless of their disavowals can be found from their refusal to move their reprocessing capacity outside of the country. Compromises from the U.S and its European allies have been summarily rejected, making it difficult to conclude that Iran is not seeking an illicit nuclear weapons program. Reuters notes "Diplomats have said that Iran's insistence on processing uranium is tantamount to an admission that it wants nuclear weapons... because processing in Russia would be much cheaper and less controversial."\textsuperscript{100}

Additionally, Iran further plans to develop seven more plants for the processing component of the fuel cycle, and this plan is projected to cost Iran approximately $6.0 billion.\textsuperscript{101} The implications of these plans of Iran's true intentions are demonstrated by the fact that Iran could alternatively invest in the renovation of its natural gas infrastructure for less than half the cost of those seven new processing facilities.\textsuperscript{102} Another aspect that indicates that Iran's program is not as completely peaceful as Iran maintains is the fact that Iran simply does not have the uranium resources to support the nuclear facilities that it is constructing. Iran would be dependent on foreign sources for uranium. However, Iran's current and sought after capabilities \textit{are} "well-scaled to give Iran a significant number of nuclear weapons."\textsuperscript{103} Iran's nuclear energy program is simply not economically or technically feasible. In conjunction with Iran's extensive deception and concealment record, the relatively unambiguous conclusion is that there has to be a greater intent for nuclear weapons capability embedded within its nuclear energy program.\textsuperscript{104}
Experts disagree over whether Iran can still be deterred from pursuing nuclear weapons technology at its present stage. Some point out that a nuclear program like Iran’s could be of such a level that is possesses a catalyst quality. Essentially, that an environment has been created in which even if the government wanted to halt the program, there is such broad public and military support for it that it would be political suicide; an identical situation to which the Pakistani government found itself in. Conversely, some believe that the project is dependent on the vitality of certain political parties. Chubin (1995:100) notes that “it is as stable as the political position of its patrons, and as such may be susceptible to delay, reversal and cancellation.” Such a circumstance is markedly different from the one Pakistan faced because the military and popular support for a nuclear weapons program were unwavering, so there the possibility the program would be halted did not exist. Unfortunately, past inflammatory rhetoric by the United State has validated the religious conservative’s rhetoric, and placed the parties most adamant of Iran’s need for nuclear weapons firmly back in a position of power.

U.S. policy makers have pointed their efforts towards acquiring the support of the international community in hopes that threats of punishment in the form of sanctions will serve to curtail an Iranian nuclear weapons program. Achieving a resolution through the IAEA committee that threatened to send the issue to the Security Council for possible sanctions has backfired. These measures have only inflamed the Iranian people as their government has manipulated these actions to validate their platform of Iran being a victim of international aggression and hatred. As the Iranian people have begun to be more susceptible to the hard-liner’s rhetoric, the once emerging moderate groups are being quickly tossed to the wayside. This consequence has further added to the number
of citizens not only in support of the necessity of a nuclear weapons capability, but also
to the number of citizens reverting to the image of the United States and the West as the
“Great Satan”. With the U.S. additionally making disparaging remarks about the
moderate parties, those parties are lacking even outside support, and the situation in Iran
is quickly regressing to the antagonistic, threatening state of affairs that had only recently
begun to be challenged.

Iran has some very strong motivational factors driving it to seek nuclear weapons
capability. Its national myth of victimization\textsuperscript{110}, its state of isolation, and its feeling that
an aggressive international community threatens the national sovereignty of Iran coalesce
to create a very insecure state. Iran possesses a ubiquitous national myth of victimization,
which is bolstered by the view that Iran is a great civilization that has too long been
unfairly marginalized and dictated to by the Western powers.\textsuperscript{111} Because Iran is so
isolated from the international community, these impressions are unlikely to be
challenged because there is little outside influence to convince the populace otherwise.
Aspirations within Iran to become a great power, fighting the interfering, dictatorial
forces of the Western world run rampant.\textsuperscript{112} In a very similar circumstance to Pakistan,
the sophisticated nature of Iran’s nuclear program has been a source of pride and been a
perceived as a foreshadowing of Iranian greatness, making it extremely popular with the
Iranian populace.\textsuperscript{113}

Iran also faces a security dilemma; much like Pakistan did and still does with
India, which makes the idea of having a nuclear weapons capability very attractive. The
United States currently has over 140,000 soldiers maintaining the security and stability of
the newly freed Iraqi State that obviously shares a border with Iran. In combination with
past inflammatory rhetoric labeling Iran as part of the “Axis of Evil”, Iran’s conservative hard-liners have capitalized on the opportunity to draw upon the Iranian national myth to issue their own inflammatory rhetoric charging that the national security of the state is in extreme peril. As the election of religious conservative President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad demonstrates, the Iranian people are sympathetic to the picture that presents Iran as being a potential victim of imperialist aggression once again.114 It is extremely hard to refute such conclusions because in combination with the 140,000 American troops stationed next door, the international community, and the United States in particular, have been very aggressive in confronting a potential Iranian nuclear weapons program. Additionally, the Iranians can point to the fact that while their state is under assailment, the U.S. has for all intents and purposes accepted the reality of a Pakistani nuclear weapons program, putting up little fight against it. This comparative inaction fosters the impression that the international community is unjustly targeting Iran, and that the state has a right to counter these menaces.

The alarming, threatening rhetoric from the United States directed at Iran combines with the economic circumstance in Iran to create a very powerful motivator for the Iranian populace to advocate the nuclear weapons program. Iran’s economy has taken a significant beating from the sanctions that the United States has placed on it. Iran’s perilous economic condition can be seen in the “double-digit inflation and unemployment rates, bloated bureaucracy, industrial decay and cumbersome subsides...[the Iranian economy] creates approximately 400,000 new jobs for the million job seekers that enter the market annually”.115 As can be seen by these statistics, Iran is in desperate need of the foreign investment that is being blocked by U.S. sanctions that, as intended, stifle Iran’s
economic development and curtail its acceptance into the global economy.\textsuperscript{116} Projections by Iran's Ministry of Economy and Finance indicate that in order to rebuild itself into a modern state Iran would require an estimated $17 billion a year in foreign investments.\textsuperscript{117}

1. Implications of Response to Iranian Actions

Immediately following the Iranian Revolution in 1978, Ayatollah Khomeini was able to mobilize support for his rhetoric about the evil nature of the United States by his effective use of symbols.\textsuperscript{118} Keddie and Gasiorowski (1990:16) note that the Iranian populace "felt a deep resentment and hatred toward the United States for its unconditional support of the shah since 1953", who was a brutal dictator. Therefore, the hardships that the Iranian populace suffered from the crippling economic impact of the American sanctions were seen as painful but bearable. Coming into the late 1980's with their economic situation still unimproved and the hatred starting to dissipate, Iranians began to clamor for reform and were beginning to be open to cooperation with the United States.\textsuperscript{119} Unfortunately, as mentioned above, the recent inflammatory rhetoric from the U.S. castigating Iran has brought those old feelings of resentment and hatred back to the forefront. Currently, even though the statistics demonstrate the extent to which the Iranian infrastructure needs foreign investment, the Iranian populace has again reverted back to the mindset that they can bear these hardships and strike a blow for all the states being unfairly treated.

An elemental part of the Iranian rhetoric in criticizing every potential agreement for stopping its nuclear weapons program is their perception of "American hypocrisy" with regards to the application of the NPT. Particularly after its handling of the Pakistani nuclear weapons program, the Iranians view the U.S. as an "arrogant power", throwing
its weight around, and pursuing a policy of “selective proliferation.”\textsuperscript{120} It is important to note that these criticisms are not limited to the conservative hard-liners. Takeyh observes that, “The selectivity of U.S. condemnation and its presumption that the current states are the only ones capable of acting judiciously with nuclear weapons is routinely condemned by Iranian writers, academics, and politicians as arrogant and self-serving.”\textsuperscript{121} It is also important to note that Pakistan and India present this same argument to buttress their own arguments against signing the NPT. Another point that bolsters Iran’s charges of arrogance and selectivity on the part of the U.S. is that fact that Iran has signed the 1997 Protocol. This agreement allows the IAEA to inspect any facility they choose with as little as two hours notice, and also authorized the IAEA to take environmental samples to further ensure there was not any cheating going on. As noted previously, an agreement from the U.S. to abide by this Protocol is conspicuously absent.

\textbf{IV. Discussion of the Implications for Future Counter-Proliferation Policy}

Throughout the course of this analysis, this paper has demonstrated that there are some very significant weaknesses plaguing the counter-proliferation regime. Many of these weaknesses are centered upon the fact that the U.S. has adopted a selectivist approach to proliferation. This approach differentiates between “destabilizing and stabilizing proliferants”.\textsuperscript{122} Each case of proliferation is dealt with separately, and depending on the U.S.’s view concerning whether the proliferator poses a threat, the U.S. will choose to either support or prevent the state from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.\textsuperscript{123} Martel and Pendley (1994) advocate this course of action for U.S. foreign policy, encouraging the U.S. to curtail proliferation in “radically hostile states like Iran and North Korea... while not interfering in Pakistan...”\textsuperscript{124}
The problems inherent in this approach are exactly what are plaguing the counter-proliferation regime today. Advocating a foreign policy approach saturated in subjectivity is simply asking for trouble. First, as Schneider (1994:215) accurately points out, there is no guarantee that a regime the United States supports today will still be in power five years from now. Iran is a perfect example of this idea. During the reign of Shah Muhammad Pahlavi, the U.S. exchanged a significant amount of nuclear technology with Iran. The U.S. government turned a blind eye on the implications of his investment of some "$100 billion in nuclear infrastructure at a time when most of his subjects were still struggling for their daily existence." Iran was able to extensively develop its nuclear infrastructure so that when the Iranian Revolution took place in 1979, this hostile new government had a now potentially threatening nuclear capacity.

The second problem with the selectivist approach that the U.S. has adopted is that it erodes the international norms that have developed against proliferation. Schneider’s (1991:215) summation of the situation is excellent in his query of how these international norms can be preserved in an environment where “it is suddenly acceptable for any state to produce nuclear weapons providing its leadership is not hostile or aggressive”. This manner of selectivity within the non-proliferation regime is counter-productive in that it causes many of its supporters to lose their trust in the reliability of the regime. If states feel that they cannot trust the regime to work at stifling proliferation across the board then there is a strong potential for motivating even these anti-proliferation states to seek nuclear weapons.

U.S. dealings with Pakistan are an excellent example of the dangerous consequences of the fickle nature of U.S. foreign policy. With the end of Soviet
aggression in Afghanistan, the U.S. demonstrated its inconsistent tendencies once again as sanctions were quickly imposed on Pakistan for its illicit nuclear weapons program. Once again however, the U.S. feels that the support of Pakistan is elemental in the War on Terror, and therefore that it is in the national interests to grudgingly accept, but accept nonetheless, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. The accusations of hypocrisy and arrogance that the nuclear have-nots argue taints the non-proliferation regime are brought into stark relief. Nuclear weapons development seems to be acceptable when the U.S. depends on the goodwill of the country to further its own interest.

The problematic nature of this selectivist system has further been demonstrated by this analysis as it has shown how similar the situations are between Pakistan and Iran’s developments of nuclear weapons programs. However, the U.S. has taken a selectivist approach towards the two, accepting the former and punishing the latter. There are differences between the two such as the fact that Pakistan is an ally (read their support is seen to be vital for fighting the War on Terror), and Iran is an antagonistic, belligerent state that flagrantly disregards international norms. An important question for the future of the non-proliferation regime however is whether Pakistan and Iran are different enough to validate even the selectivist approach that the U.S. takes to each country’s illicit actions. Are the surface assumptions of friendliness, stability, and cooperation emanating from Pakistan simply that, a false surface glossing over the true nature of the beast? Considering their similarities, a credible argument can be made questioning the judiciousness of the selectivist approach that the U.S. has taken.

For example, their motivations for seeking nuclear weapons are the same: security. A significant number of experts agree that the main motivational factor for
Pakistan to develop nuclear weapons was the threat from India. Iran has repeatedly stated that the hostile stance of the international community (particularly the U.S.) has motivated it to seek nuclear weapons. Secondly, with Pakistan’s status as a “nuclear power with a begging bowl”, both countries also have a very similar economic situation. Severe economic instability has led to social instability and further straining the hold of the current Pakistani government. As mentioned, a similarly poor economic situation is faced in Iran.

Even with Pakistan’s role as an ally against terror, a significant portion of the population does not support the government aiding the U.S. in this war. There is a significant amount of anti-American sentiment in Pakistan resulting from disapproval over President General Musharraf’s support of the U.S.’s War on Terror. Unrest can be seen by the two assassination attempts on Musharraf in November of 2003. In the face of such discontent over the actions of the government, is Pakistan markedly more politically stable than Iran? Some experts argue that Pakistan has significant potential for being a security threat because “it has nuclear weapons, little transparency, and a brittle government that may someday be replaced by a much more extreme regime with sympathies towards terrorist groups.”

The main deal breaking difference that seems to negate all of the similarities between Iran and Pakistan is how the current governments came to power. The military coup in Pakistan brought to power a government favorable to facilitating U.S. interests in the area, whereas the Revolution in Iran brought to power a government violently opposed to any such furthering of American interest. If the government of Pakistan’s goodwill in furthering the national security interests of the U.S. is removed from the
dynamic, a very different situation evolves; a situation in which the Pakistani's illicit actions are treated very similarly to the Iranians. Many third world countries who have strongly supported the counter-proliferation regime in the past have begun to see this, and it has caused many to begin to doubt the trustworthiness of the non-proliferation regime. The consequences are that the downfalls of the selectivist approach previously mentioned may quickly begin to become apparent throughout the international community.

Security concerns have been shown to be a main motivating factor behind nuclear proliferation. Hobbes argues that the international system is always in a state of nature, therefore making it inherently conflictual.\(^{131}\) It should then it would follow that the nonproliferation regime will not be able to provide that complete sense of security. Acknowledging a lack of ability to bring to fruition an international environment free of threat, it leads to the assumption that states will therefore always feel motivated to seek some type of protection. Proliferation pessimists (e.g. Gray, 1193:145) follow this view, and do not feel that arms control efforts have a notable chance of stifling the spread of nuclear weapons, and that the international community needs to learn how to function with nuclear weapons being in the possession of many countries.\(^{132}\) In an era where the strategic battlefield can be made level by the possession of one catastrophically effective weapon, it becomes very plausible that small, conventionally inferior states will seek such a weapon in order to ensure their protection against much larger foes.

While the spread of nuclear weapons might be inevitable, it is certainly reasonable to attempt to make it as slow a trickle as possible. The counter-proliferation regime was formed to serve this purpose. Freaver and Niou (1996: 211) argue that the U.S. has two options when confronting proliferators; it can take a purist approach or a
pragmatist approach. The former being that all proliferation be completely curtailed even if military measures must be utilized (i.e. the Israeli bombing of Osiraq). The latter approach indicates accepting the "inevitability of some minimal level of proliferation".\textsuperscript{133}

This is an excellent method for examining how the U.S. should react to potential proliferators. However, once the U.S. has chosen an approach it needs to stick with that approach, or it will risk compromising the credibility of the counter-proliferation regime. The pragmatic approach it has taken towards Pakistan and the purist approach it has taken towards Iran works against the non-proliferation regime and is counter-productive in its selective nature. The non-proliferation regime has made central to its validation the argument that all forms of proliferation are equally bad.\textsuperscript{134} This tendency to employ both approaches when confronting proliferation however, enervates this central ideal of the counter-proliferation regime, and makes an extremely difficult task of stifling the spread of nuclear weapons technology an even more arduous uphill battle.

\hspace{1cm} Excellent work!
\hspace{1cm} 3/23/06
Deterrence theory is the idea that an adversary will be stopped from doing something because the expected reaction of their opponent and the punishment that will result is seen to outweigh the perceived benefits of their actions. For a more in depth discussion see Sagan and Waltz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate”, 1995 and Art and Waltz “The Use of Force Military Power and International Politics” 1982.

Because many states had ‘taken sides’ in the Cold War, there was concern that if regional disputes were allowed to erupt into war then a consequence could be an inadvertent escalation to complete nuclear war when the U.S. and Soviet Union came to the aid of the respective allies in the dispute. For a more in depth discussion see Lewis Dunn’s “Controlling the Bomb: Nuclear Proliferation in the 1980s”, 1982 in Art and Waltz’s “The Use of Force Military Power and International Politics”.

O’Neill “Weapons of the Underdog” and Quester “The Unavoidable Importance of Nuclear Weapons” pg. 31-2 in Baylis and O’Neill (eds) “Alternative Nuclear Futures The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Post-Cold War World”.

For example the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan led to over $5 billion in aid and military equipment being authorized by Congress to be sent to Pakistan to contain the Soviet aggression in the ‘80s. When the Soviet Union dissolved in 1990, all aid was immediately cut. For a further discussion see Matinuddin, “The Nuclearization of South Asia”, 2002, pg. 17.

This insecurity fostered from regional disputes and an absence of protection was the justification for India, Pakistan, and Israel declining to sign the NPT, and the explanation for why North Korea withdrew from it.
For example, in this era of globalization, countries can simply turn to other suppliers when confronted with sanctions, or they might even be willing to suffer the economic repercussions of their actions and continue on regardless. Additionally, sanctions and export controls are very difficult to enforce. Pakistan is an excellent example of this when the 1990 sanctions were imposed by the U.S. For more information see Bailey “Doomsday Weapons in the Hands of Many: The Arms Control Challenge of the ‘90s”, 1991.

There is a lack of security because states cannot trust that their neighbor, who might be an ally of the U.S., will be deterred from developing nuclear weapons by the punishments that should result under the guidelines of the NPT. There is the sense that states supporting U.S. interests largely go unpunished when they develop nuclear weapons, for example Pakistan and Israel, which leaves neighboring states feeling uncertain of the security of their state.


Thakur, 2000, pg. 116 in Baylis and O’Neill (eds) “Alternative Nuclear Futures The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Post-Cold War World”.


Thakur, 2000, pg. 116 in Baylis and O’Neill (eds) “Alternative Nuclear Futures The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Post-Cold War World”.

Ibid, pg. 117


Thakur, 2000, pg. 116 in Baylis and O’Neill (eds) “Alternative Nuclear Futures The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Post-Cold War World”.


Thakur, 2000, pg. 116 in Baylis and O’Neill (eds) “Alternative Nuclear Futures The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Post-Cold War World”.


Ibid, pg. 47-8.

Ibid, pg. 31.

Ibid, pg. 27.


60 Thakur, 2000, pg. 106 in Baylis and O’Neill (eds) “Alternative Nuclear Futures The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Post-Cold War World”.

61 Ibid, pg. 106.


64 Ibid, pg. 54.

65 Gray, 2000, pg. 28 in Baylis and O’Neill (eds) “Alternative Nuclear Futures The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Post-Cold War World”. 


69 Tahir-Kheli, “India, Pakistan and the United States Breaking With the Past”, 1997, pg. 5.


71 Tahir-Kheli, “India, Pakistan and the United States Breaking With the Past”, 1997, pg. 64.


78 Tahir-Kheli, “India, Pakistan and the United States Breaking With the Past”, 1997, pg. 5.


83 Thakur, 2000, pg. 111 in Baylis and O’Neill (eds) “Alternative Nuclear Futures The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Post-Cold War World”.


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As mentioned, during the 1980's, the U.S. Congress authorized some $5 billion in aid to be sent to Pakistan to help ward off the Soviets, even though the U.S. had intelligence that strongly indicated that at least some of this money was being used for a nuclear weapons program.


Thakur, 2000, pg. 111, in Baylis and O’Neill (eds) “Alternative Nuclear Futures The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Post-Cold War World”.


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