Policing the Anticommunity: Race, Deterritorialization, and Labor Market Reorganization in South Los Angeles

AQ4 Aaron Roussell

Recent decades have seen the rise of both community partnerships and the carceral state. Community policing in Los Angeles arose after the 1992 uprisings and was built on two conceptual building blocks—the territorial imperative and community partnership—which remain central more than 20 years later. At the same time, LA has undergone a significant black-to-Latino demographic shift linked with its restructured economy. This article discusses these changes using archival analysis and 5 years of participant observation in one South LA precinct. Police help to reshape the demography of South LA in ways conducive to post-Fordist economic shifts. The "community" concept appropriated by urban governance initiatives is composed against ~~the~~ unwanted "anticommunity," which serves to heighten territorial control over black and Latino residents. Rather than encourage community cogovernance over the institution of policing, community rhetoric facilitates racial preference in neighborhood transition under the auspices of an increasingly bifurcated labor market.

The rise of community partnerships in urban governance has increasingly dominated the discussion on crime, law, social services, and institutional initiatives (Brown 2010; Herbert and Brown 2006; Hughes and Edwards 2002; Myers and Goddard 2013; Rose 1996). A parallel trend, referred to by such phrases as the carceral state, the prison nation, and the new social control, has seen the rise of mass incarceration, as well as the increased regulation and surveillance of public space and black and brown populations (Beckett and Herbert 2009; Foucault 1995; Gelman, Fagan, and Kiss 2007; Richie 2012; Stuart 2011). Implicated in both of these currents has been the adoption of

community policing by nearly every major urban police force in the country (Johnson and Roth 2003), a tactical and philosophical shift which purports to reconnect urban populations with those agents the state has assigned to protect citizens and maintain order. Focusing on the shifting demographic and economic terrain of Los Angeles, this article describes ways in which community policing helps remake urban neighborhoods. The community in community policing, rather than reflecting organic notions of residents, conforms to police notions of territorial control.

The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) began implementing community policing in 1992, in tandem with the national push for such initiatives. This effort was not a spontaneous desire to engage more closely with LA residents, but rather a political response to the 1991 police beating of motorist Rodney King and the 1992 uprisings that followed the acquittal of his assailants by a white jury in Ventura County. Residents, particularly in majority black and Latino South LA where the uprisings began, exerted collective pressure to combat police racism and brutality (Costa Vargas 2006; Davis 1993a; Loyd 2012). The independent Christopher Commission Report generated in the interim recommended community policing as one way to make police "accountable to all segments of the community" and create a more "positive relationship" with the community (1991: 105–106). The LAPD's resulting community policing approach remains the official response to calls for police accountability in LA.

Although the popular image of South Los Angeles is that of an African-American ghetto—a "spatially segregated and contiguous Black community" (Patillo 2003: 1046)—black residence began to decline in the early 1980s from a height of about 85 percent. By 2007, South LA was over half Latino and nearly one-third immigrant, a number which certainly undercounts the undocumented population (Hipp et al. 2010). Families with means of all ethnoracial groups have left South LA for the LA Harbor, Long Beach, and the suburbs (Davis 1993b; Soja 2014). As Costa Vargas (2006) suggests, South LA "is quickly becoming the exclusive home of the brown and black California version of the *lumpenproletariat*, and as such has become the site for an unprecedented volume of imprisonment and deaths" (28)—a broad statement supported by other LA researchers (Davis 2006; Stuart 2011; Valle and Torres 2000). Linking demographic transition to urban governance, ~~he~~ suggests that up to 14 percent of black outmigration from LA in the 1980s and 1990s was due solely to the forced migration of incarceration.

These demographic shifts are also linked to the vast urban restructuring that LA has undergone since the 1970s (Soja 2014; Soja, Morales, and Wolff 1983). The rise of LA's bifurcated service and information economy in place of its postwar manufacturing dominance has provided the area with limited job growth, swelling the Latino population of South LA by pulling immigrants from Mexico and Central America (Ibarra and Carlos 2015; Valle and Torres 2000). Such a post-Fordist arrangement allows for both investment in high status, high income technology and entertainment industries on the one hand and a supportive economy of workers carrying out low-status, labor-intensive tasks on the other. By the end of the 1990s, LA remained the largest industrial city in the United States, but its "industries [were] based on nonunionized low-wage workers … drawn increasingly from the ranks of immigrants, legal and undocumented" (Valle and Torres 2000: 4). Many service employers, such as hotels and cleaning services, explicitly prefer immigrant and undocumented Latinos over native-born black citizens. One ostensible reason for this is their "soft skills": Zamudio and Lichter (2008) argue that this is code for tractable immigrant labor, as undocumented migrants can be paid substandard wages, collect no benefits or worker's compensation, and are unlikely to sue over workplace violations. Yet the preference against black labor has long been a historical trend in LA (Sides 2003). As Marcelli, Pastor, and Jossart (1999) remind us, this economic arrangement also swells the ranks of the informal economy of both visible and invisible, citizen and noncitizen labor, including day labor, prostitution, street food vending, and drug selling. Meanwhile, the homeless population has expanded significantly in LA's "skid row," about three-fourths of whom are black, particularly since the 2008 housing market crash (Stuart 2011).

To expand on the relationship between the turn to community on the one hand and the growing prison nation on the other, this article situates both trends within a framework that emphasizes the responsivity of each to the racial/capitalist state. It contributes to a developing, place-based literature that considers together political economy, law enforcement, and the racialized social forces that shape urban space. For example, Lynch and her colleagues (2013) identified economic and political pressures from gentrification and tourism as driving differential drug law enforcement in San Francisco. These policies subjected black residents in different neighborhoods to coercive containment or expulsion depending on the political/economic development goals for each neighborhood. In LA, Stuart (2011) finds that special law enforcement task forces sweep homeless populations in "Skid Row" into subpoverty

positions using initiatives underwritten by businesses that profit 124
from this labor. He discusses in other work the rehabilitation- 125
oriented policing of the homeless in Skid Row compared to their 126
expulsion from "prime" commodified urban spaces (Stuart 2014). 127
These authors explicitly connect patterns of racialized law enforce- 128
ment to neoliberal economic policy, yet such logics are not simply 129
economic, using cultural understandings of racial inferiority to 130
enable policies that would not pass muster if the affected popula- 131
tions ~~were middle-class whites~~ (Alexander 2010; Katznelson 2006). 132

Germane to this community-governmentality nexus, Brown 133
(2010) considers the failure of federal community-building initia- 134
tives in Seattle. She charts the irreconcilable views of those who 135
envision community improvement as an enhancement of law 136
enforcement and black residents who insisted on investing in the 137
community's residents directly and policing the police. Also in 138
Seattle, Herbert (2005) suggests that community policing 139
devolves responsibility from the state to local residents. He finds 140
that residents involved in these community-government efforts 141
resent the offloading of government responsibility. These studies 142
contend that urban police practices implicate a larger considera- 143
tion of neoliberal governance (Yarwood 2007). Rather than 144
addressing police tactics or backgrounding police as automatons 145
enforcing unjust law, this article extends these analyses by high- 146
lighting the dynamic role of police in reshaping urban 147
environments. 148

The Los Angeles Police Department in South LA provides a 149
case study through which to examine community policing as a 150
political project located at the intersection of these trends. This 151
article argues that police are helping to reshape the demography 152
of urban territory in ways that are conducive to post-Fordist eco- 153
nomic shifts. The document analysis and ethnographic methods 154
brought to bear here trace the contours of the LAPD's commu- 155
nity concept as one particular mechanism through which is 156
occurs. "Community," in this incarnation, is composed in opposi- 157
tion to an "anticommunity" animated by racial preference and 158
labor utility. The category of anticommunity is instrumental, pro- 159
viding the means to punish and exclude South LA's black com- 160
munity while controlling the influx of Latinos as low-wage and 161
informal labor. 162

I expand below on the multiple methods used to investigate 163
these concerns and then present the data and analysis over two 164
sections. The first section comprises an analysis of more than two 165
decades of LA's community policing efforts, examining the LAPD 166
vision for community directly. The second section illustrates how 167
the LAPD has operationalized its definitions of community, terri- 168
tory, and partnership to tighten coercive and regulatory control 169

over its impoverished and working class racial geography. These 170
sections build toward a final discussion where these threads draw 171
together into a larger discussion of race, class, territorial policing, 172
and the use of community by the neoliberal state. 173

Methods 174

Exploring both the roots and the contemporary fruit of com- 175
munity policing over multiple decades requires multiple methods 176
and data sources. First, archival documents generated by LA 177
municipal government beginning in 1991 provide much of the 178
historical context.[1] These documents outline the collective 179
thought processes that went into the creation of the program. 180
Several are large, well-defined plans for community policing, 181
exchanged between LA's Commission for Public Safety, City 182
Council, and Police Department, while others are Departmental 183
memoranda intended for officers of all ranks to read, under- 184
stand, and incorporate into practice. Yet others comprise official 185
and independent assessments of the LAPD after scandals and 186
uprisings. Together they describe the plans for incorporating res- 187
idents and other stakeholders into the community policing pro- 188
cess. They also provide a window into the meanings that the 189
LAPD ascribes to the concept of community—as well as places of 190
silence (see Smith 2005). 191
The second portion of this article analyzes LA's contemporary 192
community policing approach. This analysis is drawn from ethno- 193
graphic data collected over 5 years (beginning in August 2008 194
and ending in May 2013) in the LAPD precinct referred to pseu- 195
donymously as "South Division." The hundreds of hours of par- 196
ticipant observation undertaken in South Division mainly 197
comprised attendance at community-police meetings, neighbor- 198
hood events with a strong police presence, and ridealongs with 199
community policing officers (Senior Lead Officers, or "SLOs"). 200
These investigations also produced more than 50 interviews with 201
residents, neighborhood stakeholders, officers, and police admin- 202
istrators. South Division's SLOs are divided evenly between black, 203
white, and Latino, but I was able to negotiate ridealongs only 204
with the majority Latino and white SLOs during my fieldwork, 205
although I was able to observe them all in other ways. Latino and 206
white SLOs get along well and support each other's efforts, but 207
undermine the integrity and work ethic of the Division's black 208
SLOs behind their backs. As a white man co-conducting research 209

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[1] Special thanks to Cheryl Maxson at the University of California, Irvine, for provid-
ing many of these documents from her studies of community policing in LA in the 1990s.

with a Latino partner, I was quickly associated with this dynamic, 210
and consequently was unable to access those networks. Such an 211
addition would deepen the analysis and must be left for future 212
work, but the larger dynamics are unmistakable. 213

During these sessions, I always carried a notebook and jotted 214
down as much as I could about the scene unfolding before me. 215
Meetings and ridealongs were ideal situations in which to take 216
detailed notes, enabling the recording of entire conversations with 217
key words, phrases, and exchanges largely intact. As soon as possi- 218
ble after these events, I wrote up these jottings into organized sets 219
of fieldnotes, reconstructing observation sessions and situating 220
them with respect to prior events and my own reactions (Atkinson 221
2001). An hour of observation was equivalent to five or six single 222
spaced pages, and I reproduce some of these below. All names of 223
people, places, and locations are pseudonyms (excluding political 224
figures). All data were entered into MaxQDA qualitative data analy- 225
sis software for sorting and coding. I used an open coding proce- 226
dure, noting and memoing while conducting close readings of each 227
piece of text. Themes and subthemes emerged and cohered into 228
the sets of ideas presented here in dialogue with larger theoretical 229
understandings (Emerson 2001; Emerson, Fretz, and Shaw 1995). 230

Partnership and the Territorial Community: Policing in the   231
1990s   232

Definitions of community policing tend to cohere around 233
four major themes (e.g., Goldstein 1987; Skogan and Hartnett 234
1997; Skolnick and Bayley 1988). First is community crime pre- 235
vention, which necessitates a public, visible police presence that 236
must be seen as accessible and caring. Second, police patrol must 237
reorient to enhance nonemergency service to render police avail- 238
able and unremarkable. Third is the idea that police must be 239
accountable to the public, engaging not only with supportive resi- 240
dents but also those residents who may level negative feedback. 241
Skolnick and Bayley (1988) suggest that "getting to know people 242
will not work if police insist on one-way communication. Unless 243
police are willing, at the very least, to tolerate public feedback, 244
community policing will be perceived as public relations, and the 245
chasm between police and public will grow wider once again." 246
(10) Finally, police command structure must decentralize to 247
become more adaptable and idiosyncratic to the constituent area. 248
The promises of accountability and partnership in particular 249
make community policing attractive to municipalities undergoing 250
spikes in unrest and dissatisfaction with police (Independent 251

Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department 1991; John-
son and Roth 2003).

Los Angeles' community policing approach remains the
ongoing governmental response to calls for police accountability.
It has weathered the tempests of the Rampart Scandal (1998–
2000), May Day protests (2007), Occupy LA (2010), and ex-
LAPD officer Chris Dorner's private war with law enforcement
(2013), to name a few. Police presented as governing crime, dis-
order, and public safety in a different way than they had in the
past; a way more in tune with community needs and desires. To
effect this, the LAPD had to answer the questions "What is
community?" and "What is community's place within police gov-
ernance?" Rather than tapping indigenous notions of community
in ways relevant to the uprisings (Costa Vargas 2006; Loyd 2012),
the Department opted to reanimate discarded partnership strat-
egies and reassert control of the city through a rigid territoriality.
This section first describes how the LAPD arrogated to itself the
task of defining community, and proceeded to position geo-
graphic compartmentalization and sociobiological theories of con-
flict, predation, and ownership as the cornerstone of its
community project. It continues by demonstrating how police
defined the partnership relationship as community information
harvesting and perception management.

The Territorial Imperative

The LAPD has always seen itself as understaffed and outnum-
bered, using heightened aggression to make up for its perceived
manpower deficiencies (Greene 2000; Herbert 1997). Police
administrators adopted the "territorial imperative" to remedy this
problem in the early 1970s (Los Angeles Police Department
1992, 1999; Parks 1999; Williams 1995). According to LA's Com-
munity Policing Implementation Plan (1997): "[Officers will
emphasize] the 'territorial imperative,' where police officers and
the people they serve take ownership of a Basic Car Area bring-
ing them closer together. This is a key ingredient of Community
Policing." The territorial imperative was de-emphasized in the
1980s, but returned with the 1992 community policing mandate.

In 1966, amateur anthropologist Robert Ardrey published *The
Territorial Imperative*, an influential book among social Darwinists.
Ardrey described humans and other animals as genetically encoded
for territorial dominance, impelling them to violent conflict over
geography. Applying crude evolutionary biological reasoning, he
argued that if territorial conflict is biologically predetermined, there
is little use in attempting to rein in this impulse—instead, better to
win and control the territory. In the world of human geography,

this reasoning naturalizes oppression as a necessary feature of the 296
contemporary race and class order.[2] After its publication, the LAPD 297
adopted the territorial imperative as organizational ideology, pre- 298
dating the contemporary community policing movement by several 299
decades. As former LAPD administrator Jeff O'Malley suggests in 300
his interview: 301

> If you want [officers] to become proactive and you want them 302
> to take ownership then you have to give them a piece of real 303
> estate. That's when the territorial imperative came in. Today I 304
> believe, firmly believe, in that if people have ownership, they 305
> treat it differently than they would if they don't. 306

307
The technology behind the LAPD's territorial imperative is 308
that of division and enumeration. Community, consequently, is 309
overlaid onto a grid designed for territorial control. In the eyes 310
of police, LA comprises increasingly granulated and hierarchical 311
levels of space, beginning with "reporting districts" used for fix- 312
ing crime locations, aggregating up to "Basic Car Areas" (BCAs; 313
e.g., "18SLO029"), which aggregate again to precincts run by 314
Captains (known as Policing Areas or Divisions), and again to 315
LA's four Bureaus, each headed by a Deputy Chief. In explaining 316
the territorial imperative, one 1990s-era LAPD administrator dis- 317
cussed the Senior Lead Officers (SLOs) in charge of BCAs as 318
"lone predators," in their responsibility to their "real estate." 319
Another used the metaphor of "mountain lions" jealously patrol- 320
ling their turf and disallowing other officers from jurisdiction 321
except in moments of crisis. Community policing reinforced 322
rather than challenged the LAPD's geographic formulation of its 323
mission, drawing its concern for community directly from the ter- 324
ritorial imperative. 325
The LAPD reinforced this geographic interpretation of com- 326
munity by using crime and U.S. census data to conduct a territo- 327
rial analysis in 1997 through "work load, demographics, natural 328
boundaries, and the identified natural service communities" (Los 329
Angeles Police Department 1992, 1997). This analysis "result[ed] 330
in the creation of an additional 16 Basic Cars in 1995; and an 331
additional 3 Basic Cars in 1996, Citywide, to meet community 332
needs" (Los Angeles Police Department 1997). Further assessments 333
subdivided the original 18 policing Divisions into the current 21. 334
"Community needs," thus, comprise the statistical assessment of 335
police territorial coverage and are coterminous with workload 336
needs—if officers feel overworked in an area or mark the area as 337

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[2] See Alland (2004) and Lewontin, Rose, and Kamin (1984) for a more nuanced cri-
tique of sociobiology generally and the territorial imperative specifically.

requiring special attention, this is what the community needs 338
(Greene 2000). This data-driven territoriality was extended further 339
during the tenure of William Bratton as Police Chief (2000–2009), 340
who introduced the geographic crime-mapping program Compstat 341
to which each area commander was responsible. In sum, we can 342
meaningfully refer to the "18SLO029" community, map the 343
streets, and pull up years of demographic and crime statistics, 344
imputing through these measures community desires, needs, prob- 345
lems, and progress. 346

Two things are important to highlight. First, whatever else 347
community might be, in an operational sense, it is grounded in 348
the territorial imperative. That residents might constitute alterna- 349
tive conceptions of community—or advance alternative concep- 350
tions of space (see Herbert 1997)—is not relevant. Resident- 351
centric notions of community are backgrounded or adjunctive to 352
this schema. Second, while geography and community are not 353
necessarily oppositional, this nexus has not been generated from, 354
or in partnership with, residents. Rather it was revitalized from 355
sociobiological theories and strategies of conflict and predation 356
concerned explicitly with spatial control. The notion of commu- 357
nity within community policing is mobilized less to serve "the 358
community," however that might be defined, and more toward a 359
territoriality that arrogates geopolitical power to police. The ways 360
that power can be used to determine the content of those spaces 361
is taken up in the contemporary analysis below. 362

Problem Solving Partnerships 363

Despite marking community-as-territory, in the political 364
foment of 1992, administrators had to articulate how they would 365
make police accountable to residents—a key component of com- 366
munity policing (Goldstein 1987; Skolnick and Bayley 1988). Pro- 367
posals outlining strategies for community-police cogovernance 368
and more general community-oriented rebuilding were rejected 369
out of hand (Costa Vargas 2006; Davis 1993b).[3] The first step was 370
to fix the Department's Chief to a renewable contract subject to 371
approval by City Council. The second was community partner- 372
ship, intended to keep police "accountable to all segments of the 373
community" (Independent Commission on the Los Angeles 374
Police Department 1991: 106). Obliquely referencing the upris- 375
ings, the LAPD immediately penned *Building Public Safety* (1992), 376

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[3] For example, see Costa Vargas (2006), which details the Coalition Against Police
Abuse plan to independently elect a community review board with the power to subpoena
and fire officers. This plan is still sometimes referenced at Police Commission meetings dur-
ing the two minute "community comment" block.

describing the steps the department would take to "institute a 377
'new beginning' to build public safety confidence between the 378
people of Los Angeles and their Police Department." The docu- 379
ment asserts that the "community has a legitimate right to partici- 380
pate in the design, implementation, and assessment of public 381
safety services," hinting at a robust and ongoing role for the com- 382
munity in reshaping the institution of policing. 383

Community-Police Advisory Boards (CPABs) are the only unit 384
replicated within every Division specifically demarcated as a place 385
for community-police strategic cogovernance. The main mecha- 386
nism for realizing community partnership, CPABs are the direct 387
descendants of the community meeting groups from the 1960s 388
that characterized police efforts toward community under the 389
original territorial imperative. Chief Bernard Parks pays homage 390
to those groups in his Strategic Plan on Community Policing 391
(1999), in which he declares that CPABs were established for 392
ensuring a "continuing transmittal of information between the 393
community and the police." CPABs "advise and inform the Los 394
Angeles Police Department's Area Commanding Officers of 395
quality-of-life problems and concerns in the community ... to 396
share information and develop problem-solving strategies." This 397
language, from a 2009 brochure entitled *Celebrating the* 398
Community-Police Partnership, demonstrates the ongoing informa- 399
tion provision element of CPABs overlaid with the cogovernance 400
rhetoric from 1992: "The CPABs serve as advisory and problem- 401
solving groups predicated on a community government phil- 402
osophy" (Los Angeles Police Department 2009). 403

In reading community through CPABs, several roles for this unit 404
are noted, none of which fit the description of "full partner" (Parks 405
1999) or "designer" of policy (Los Angeles Police Department 1992). 406
First, police see community as a strategic resource while positioning 407
itself as the problem solving actor at all geographic levels. The infor- 408
mation that informs these solutions is partially, though not exclusively, 409
from local participants. Soon after taking over command of the 410
LAPD, Chief Williams made this clear: "The role of Community- 411
Police Advisory Boards is to advise and inform Area commanding 412
officers of community problems and concerns" (Williams 1993). Wil- 413
liams (1995) touts the "SARA" approach (Scanning, Analysis, 414
Response, Assessment), which emphasizes a consideration of patterns, 415
causes, consequences, and results in solving crime problems and sets 416
officers as the locus of problem solving and data analysis (Center for 417
Problem-Oriented Policing 2013). In contrast, the role of the commu- 418
nity is that of complainant and data source. 419

Second, the informational relationship also comprises absorp- 420
tion and dissemination. CPAB members in 1992 were required to 421
learn from the LAPD in a training program that continues (albeit 422

unevenly) two decades later (Los Angeles Police Department 1992). 423
The ethnographic data gathered for this study suggests that this is 424
an opportunity to reorient community members into supporting 425
police efforts, which they are expected to represent in their own 426
neighborhoods (see Roussell and Gascón 2014). The community- 427
police relationship can be summarized as follows: residents present 428
police with complaints and information; the LAPD explains to resi- 429
dents how it polices and self regulates; residents represent these 430
views locally. The core of this approach is largely unchanged from 431
the 1960s and provides no mechanism of accountability for police 432
nor any serious engagement with cogovernance, regardless of the 433
community's "legitimate right to participate in the design, imple- 434
mentation and assessment of public safety services" (Los Angeles 435
Police Department 1992). This contradiction between community 436
political rhetoric and operational reality is perhaps best expressed 437
by the public comments of Chief Parks regarding CPAB: 438

> Those community panels [CPABs], matched up with LAPD's 439
> geographic service divisions, "were never perceived to be a 440
> citywide political force that can out-vote captains, the chief of 441
> police, the commission," he said. Those advisory panels "are 442
> one of thousands of inputs" the Police Department uses in 443
> relating with citizens. 444
>
> (Pool 1999) 445

446
Despite the rhetoric of community empowerment marketed 447
to LA residents after the violence of 1992, much of the commu- 448
nity policing vision is a throwback to prior tactics and concepts 449
developed in the 1960s. After a moment of crisis, the LAPD pre- 450
sented itself as a remade organization by highlighting the larger 451
tropes of community policing within the threads of its past, nota- 452
bly the territorial imperative. Yet this vision for community polic- 453
ing had to pass public muster to maintain legitimacy after the 454
uprisings and includes strong language on community cogover- 455
nance to preempt claims of a lack of accountability. To officers, 456
community means territory; for residents, community is defined 457
as CPABs. The word "community" is used liberally, but power is 458
not returned to community residents. Instead, echoing Seattle, 459
the concept is appropriated and residents are made responsible 460
to the LAPD (Herbert 2005). 461

Anticommunity Policing: RACE AND LABOR   462

Conceiving of community as territory enables a de-emphasis 463
of the needs of residents in demarcated spaces, particularly when 464

residents have little power to effect institutional change through 465
partnership. The focus shifts from people to place. Those whose 466
presence is coveted, useful, or simply tolerated can be discussed 467
as "the community" against individuals and groups seen as prob- 468
lematic. Residents who come together with police to create com- 469
munity in CPAB meetings participate directly in this effort. This 470
articulation of who is (and who should be) considered community 471
is complicated by the presence of multiple meetings in South 472
Division segregated by race and language. While the English 473
meeting, composed mainly of black residents, is officially cele- 474
brated, the Spanish meeting of Latino residents is relegated to 475
"outreach"; yet the Spanish meeting closely tracks the demo- 476
graphic changes occurring in South LA. This section uses the 477
community/anticommunity framework to understand the logics of 478
South Division's segregated meeting dynamic. It proceeds 479
through three subsections, explaining first the themes that 480
emerge from the English meeting and then those of the Spanish 481
meeting. The final section details how LAPD uses its territorial 482
prerogative to remake community by picking and choosing 483
among these themes under its community mandate. 484

In "The Death of the Social," Rose (1996) argues that the 485
"turn to community" is an emergent governance practice which 486
legitimates the shift toward state disinvestment in the public wel- 487
fare. He suggests that the state uses communities as repositories 488
through which state power can be exercised while simultaneously 489
absolved of its supportive responsibilities—the idea of community 490
becomes a discursive tool to make palatable neoliberal social pol- 491
icy. Tactically, he indexes the rise of this community approach to 492
the articulation of an "anticommunity," grounding claims to com- 493
munity against undesired populations. The appeal is intuitive: 494
references to community conjure up notions of solidarity, togeth- 495
erness, and nostalgia overlaid with a sense of consequence for the 496
basic social fabric (e.g., Putnam 2000). In establishing CPAB, with 497
a mandate to partner over neighborhood concerns, police have 498
provided a symbolic platform for residents to participate in con- 499
structing community in a way that encourages such bifurcations. 500
It is against such anticommunities that community itself is 501
constituted. 502

The official South Division CPAB meetings are usually 503
attended by English-speaking CPAB members, other residents, 504
neighborhood activists, business owners, and an ever-rotating cast 505
of guests and speakers. Members are mostly older black resi- 506
dents, a very small contingency of middle-aged Latino residents 507
with typically limited English abilities, and several local business 508
owners (black, Korean, South Asian, and Latino). Division Cap- 509
tains and Senior Lead Officers take a direct hand in shaping the 510

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content of CPAB meetings. Agendas sometimes incorporate pre- 511
sentations from outside organizations, but more frequently high- 512
light the work of special police units. Detectives from Vice discuss 513
prostitution, juvenile kidnapping/smuggling, *casitas* (houses of 514
prostitution and gambling), and abatement issues. One detective 515
came to discuss domestic violence, but ended up explaining the 516
realities of DNA evidence collection and processing compared to 517
popular depictions. Gang Unit officers also sometimes present. 518
These informative police presentations incorporate a certain level 519
of marketing and attendees are directed to take their new knowl- 520
edge back to their neighbors. Residents walk away with sharable 521
information about the LAPD shaped by ~~the~~ presentations from 522
affable officials. 523

South Division's official CPAB meeting, conducted entirely in 524
English, serves to give a voice to middle-aged and elderly black 525
middle and working class residents. Many are local property 526
owners who see a place for police in the ordering of their neigh- 527
borhoods and simply want to engage in that process, regardless 528
of their past or present ~~neighborhood~~ activism. Some members 529
are strongly loyal to LAPD and are unaware of challenges to 530
police hegemony. This group lends police legitimacy within and 531
outside of South LA, serves the two-way information transmission 532
function by communicating messages from police to their neigh- 533
bors, and provides a source for disorder complaints. These com- 534
plaints are frequently lodged against illegal vending and day 535
laboring, issues that impact the Latino community directly. Some- 536
times called "English CPAB," the meeting is loosely parliamentary 537
with a resident co-chair and the Division Captain as permanent 538
chair.[4] 539

The rising Latino majority in South Division also has a voice, 540
but one that differs sharply from that of the English CPAB. The 541
few Latino attendees at the English meeting are tokenized and 542
largely excluded from collective discussions. Rather than hosting 543
a single meeting invested with translation services or fashioning a 544
systematic method of representation, police have opted to hold a 545
separate Spanish-speaking meeting. Originally called "Spanish 546
CPAB," in 2009 Captain Patton determined that there could be 547
only one CPAB per Division, and the meeting became the 548
ungainly "Spanish Speaking Community-Police Meeting," divest- 549
ing it of official CPAB status. In 2010, under Captain Saitou, the 550
meeting morphed into "Hispanic Outreach," where it has 551

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[4] The resident co-chair and Division Captain positions changed twice and thrice respectively over the five-year observation period. Although co-chairs are nominally in charge, I have never witnessed a co-chair successfully introduce action contrary to police directive.

remained, going from a loose partnership meeting style to a 552
more presentation-oriented style heavily regulated by police 553
administrators. Hispanic Outreach is led by Hector Mendoza, an 554
infrequent English meeting attendee, who exerts more direct 555
control over the content and flow of his meeting than the resi- 556
dent co-chair does over CPAB. Moreover, in deference to the 557
undocumented status of some of it attendees, the Spanish lan- 558
guage meeting is largely anonymous, as opposed to the English 559
meeting, which features background checks, membership badges, 560
and fingerprinting for its members. 561

The two-meeting dynamic, coupled with the constant reshuf- 562
fling of the Spanish meeting, provides insight into the interlock- 563
ing issues of race, language, and citizenship underlying CPAB's 564
community representation. Spanish-speaking Latinos are out- 565
siders to CPAB in terms of language, but this outsider status car- 566
ries over into the entire ethnic category as well. Latino residents 567
not only lack leadership in the "official" CPAB meeting, but those 568
who do attend are seldom consulted or speak up. Much of this is 569
a byproduct of the LAPD's strategic move to maximize Latino 570
leadership talent in the name of outreach. Those Latino leaders 571
responsibilized through this structure have all been used outside 572
the formal structure of CPAB to increase turnout at Hispanic 573
Outreach—which in turn lacks the status of the English CPAB 574
meeting. As of 2013, no Latino resident had ever been appointed 575
to any parliamentary position within the English meeting. 576

The roles of Latino and black residents within their respec- 577
tive meetings are defined differently. Black CPAB members are 578
an important part of police image maintenance in the post-1992 579
era. In a world where gangs, violence, and crime are seen as pri- 580
marily "black problems," the 1992 uprisings were seen largely as 581
a black phenomenon, and black citizens remain outspoken critics 582
of police brutality, it is symbolically important that the CPAB 583
community of South LA remain primarily a body of black resi- 584
dents. Black CPAB members are agentive and legally aware indi- 585
viduals who can officially lay claim to a full set of citizenship 586
rights. Although they share information and discuss with their 587
neighbors, members seldom declare that they are speaking for 588
the larger community, but rather that they are a part of a deliber- 589
ative community body. They tend to arrive with the expectation 590
of active participation in the CPAB process. As in any organiza- 591
tion, there is a range of participation, but black residents stand 592
ready to volunteer and make their presence known in an official 593
capacity. They do not bring, for example, their children or other 594
family members, since meeting time is devoted to official public 595
business rather than the private realm of parenting. Having visi- 596
ble support from black residents remains crucial for maintaining 597

police legitimacy after 1992; this, together with official markers 598
such as background checks, contribute to elevating the commu- 599
nity status of black CPAB members. 600

The increasing immigrant Latino majority in South Division, 601
however, means that outreach is required in a way unnecessary 602
for a population composed primarily of American citizens. The 603
normative understanding of citizenship implies the ability to 604
manipulate legal and civic process. Noncitizens have a harder 605
time, and bringing Latinos "out from the shadows" (a commonly 606
heard phrase), is a different process than placating citizens 607
demanding their rights. Latino residents attend Hispanic Out- 608
reach because of the direct benefits of learning about services, 609
civic process, and immigration and to complain about crime and 610
disorder, rather than because of any belief in the efficacy of the 611
body itself. Hispanic Outreach, ~~thus,~~ encourages the broadest 612
possible participation, including family members and holding a 613
potluck supper afterward. Attendees at this meeting seem mainly 614
uninterested in the business of cogovernance, no doubt because 615
of the precarious relationship with citizenship that many experi- 616
ence. This is not to suggest that South Division's Latino popula- 617
tion has no inclination to public service, but only that it may not 618
be possible to express such an inclination within the police 619
institution. 620

Consequently, Captains can shift the status of the Spanish lan- 621
guage meeting without regard, because the population the meet- 622
ings represent has no stake in the meeting as an institution. 623
Although the idea of merging meetings is broached periodically, 624
absorbing Latinos directly in the English meeting structure is 625
functionally impossible, due to the different orientations, proc- 626
esses, and membership requirements. The function of Latino 627
leaders like Mendoza is not to deliberate police engagement strat- 628
egies, disseminate information to residents, or even to perpetuate 629
the meeting itself, but to advise police on how best to encourage 630
Latino governmental cooperation in ways that are accessible to 631
immigrant families. In 2009, Mendoza had a private list of 300 632
names of prior meeting attendees, which comprised a strong por- 633
tion of his value to police. Mendoza remains a power broker in a 634
way that English co-chairs are not, but this status is just as precar- 635
ious as the residents in whose name he advocates. 636

On the surface, the arrangements of CPAB and Hispanic 637
Outreach suggest that black residents are feted by police for their 638
image control potential, while Latino residents are largely margi- 639
nalized. Yet the story is more complicated than this. The next 640
section nuances the analysis by analyzing meeting content, 641
engagement with community officers (SLOs), and the enforce- 642
ment strategies discussed at CPAB. In hearing complaints of each 643

group, police can pick and choose among the claims made in the 644
name of community, retaining the ultimate authority in determin- 645
ing the demographic contents of their territory. These next sec- 646
tions demonstrate the fluid and relational nature of community 647
and the ways in which the anticommunity is a product of racial 648
perceptions and economic forces. 649

Regulating Latinos: Illegal Vendors and Day Labor 650

Hot button issues for the English meeting include vending, 651
which is illegal in the City of Los Angeles, and the congregation 652
of day laborers. Throughout English meetings, black residents 653
use these issues to demarcate what they see as a growing Latino 654
anticommunity. Although blacks and Latinos in South Division 655
sell all kinds of things on the streets (e.g., counterfeit jerseys, 656
bootlegged movies, clothes), discussions of illegal street vending 657
refer almost exclusively to immigrant Latinos selling cooked and 658
uncooked food items. Moreover, while there are some independ- 659
ent food carts, many vendors are franchisees of centralized 660
organizations—vending is big, under-the-table business. Police 661
expend little effort investigating the layers of capital investment 662
involved in producing the thousands of food carts located around 663
the city. Instead, the vendors themselves, the most visible expo- 664
nents, bear the brunt of legal attention. 665

Street vendors' customers include many day laborers, and carts 666
often orient around day laborer sites for customer convenience. 667
Day laborers congregate in visible places, often near home 668
improvement warehouses or parks, waiting for hourly employ- 669
ment. As well as attracting vendors, this creates nuisances and con- 670
gestion for passersby, due to the large groups of Spanish-speaking 671
men who engage in loud conversation, games, and gambling to 672
pass the time between jobs. Food consumption and waste manage- 673
ment become concerns. Many black residents see this as both a 674
nuisance and a double standard, insofar as police do not hesitate 675
to enforce anti-loitering ordinances at laundromats and other 676
semi-public locations against black youth they presume to be 677
unemployed. Day laborers are cited more commonly for their 678
actual behavior rather than simply their presence. 679

The general feeling of the English CPAB is that illegal vend- 680
ing is a health hazard as well as a nuisance for traffic and noise. 681
The disgust with vending is not just a feature of the practices 682
themselves, but relates to the presence of Latino vendors in pub- 683
lic space who serve as visible reminders of the changing face of 684
the community. Vending becomes the entre for complaints about 685
Latinos' labor market position more generally, as criticisms of 686
vending's illegality are looped into the perceived legal and 687

citizenship status of vendors. As Ms. Carter, a prominent CPAB member in her 80s, commented: "It really bothers me when they come down the street ringing that bell. This is illegal, they are felons just by being here." ~~Apart from the health concerns and nuisance complaints, the~~ issue is framed at the nexus of political economy and racial community politics:

> After the meeting breaks up, I talk to co-chair Vera Fisher for a bit. She is still furious about the vending issue—or perhaps just venting about Latinos in general, it's hard to tell. Her main concern, she says, is that they don't pay taxes. Of course they pay sales taxes on their own purchases, which is a conversation she has apparently had with Linda and Hector Mendoza of Spanish CPAB, but there are taxes that legitimate businesses have to pay too.
>
> Vera has a huge problem with remittances. She describes the local economy as a circle, with money circulating through consumers to local businesses to employees who become, or somehow pass on that money back to, consumers. Major corporations like Walgreens and El Pollo Loco centrally process their earnings and don't really put much money back into the community either, but Vera somehow manages to agree with that statement and make it support her argument as well. Remittances, in her eyes, are sucking money right out of the community and putting it into the places they [the vendors] came from.
>
> (Roussell, fieldnotes, 2/11/10)

Vending comes to stand in for the labor market shift in South LA since the 1970s (Costa Vargas 2006; Sides 2003). Local small businesses, many of them black-owned, are seen to suffer as ~~the~~ result of the transitioning market and the degradation of black labor, while the proceeds of illegitimate businesses are funneled back to Mexico and Central America. Because vending is seen as ubiquitous (even police sometimes patronize mobile *taquerías*), Vera Fisher sees illegal vending as extracting money from the black community to support foreign economies, even as the labor market for black American citizens deteriorates. Cynthia Stacy, a former professor and vocal CPAB member, describes the difficulty in watching opportunities for black youth dwindle:

> [The janitors] became unionized and then have been undermined by the Latino workers and there is tension there—it's economic. Now our kids—there are no Black kids working at McDonalds or even many younger kids, high school age kids working in the service industry, in the food industry, around

> our area because the adults [Latinos] who are more obtain- 732
> able, are more employable. And they are working in fast 733
> food, so our kids have fewer opportunities for employment…. 734
> I could go down the street [when I was younger] and there 735
> were my classmates working at the store, the drug store, the 736
> grocery store, whatever, it doesn't happen anymore. 737

738
The police response to vending complaints is enforcement, 739
education, and accommodation. In keeping with the ethos of the 740
territorial imperative, enforcement is a method favored by SLOs. 741
Their enthusiasm is diminished only by the frustration over coor- 742
dinating with the county Health Department in disposing of the 743
carts. Ticketing is seen by vendors as "the cost of doing business" 744
and many SLOs issue citations infrequently due to their lack of 745
impact. The realities of time constraints, interagency organizing, 746
and more pressing crime issues limit the frequency and scope of 747
these sweeps. Perhaps recognizing these limitations, Captains and 748
other LAPD administrators have begun to look toward education 749
and accommodation. SLOs hand out flyers in Spanish to vendors 750
before returning and those who speak Spanish sometimes warn 751
vendors about upcoming sweeps. This makes some officers 752
unhappy but is largely accepted with only minor grumbling. 753
Alongside the enforcement and grudging education by SLOs 754
on specific issues are significant efforts to make Latino immi- 755
grants feel supported. In wrestling with the issues of vending and 756
day labor, Captains have investigated different methods of com- 757
promise. One Captain publically supported creating a centralized 758
farmer's market for vendors in South Division, while another 759
Captain began efforts to collaborate in the building of a day 760
laborer shelter with waste management facilities at ~~the~~ local home 761
improvement retailer. More generally, police-sponsored presenta- 762
tions and events held through the U.S. Center for Immigration 763
Services, the nonenforcement arm of federal immigration law, 764
allow for information exchange and the beginnings of the citizen- 765
ship application process for residents—another method of popu- 766
lation regulation. 767
Police administrators argue this approach is necessary to 768
engage immigrant Latinos in the criminal legal reporting process 769
as witnesses and victims. LA is considered a "sanctuary city" due 770
to Special Order 40 (enacted in 1979), which specifies that police 771
ignore citizenship status in the performance of their duties, 772
except in circumstances of serious felony law violation. During 773
this fieldwork, police held or participated in several public discus- 774
sions and explanations of immigration law and Special Order 40 775
(several in concert with the consulates of Mexico, Guatemala, El 776
Salvador, and Honduras) to put noncitizen Latinos at ease in 777

interacting with police. Despite this, many Latino residents con- 778
tinue to be skittish of police contact and their concerns are not 779
groundless. Operations such as mid-day DUI checkpoints are sus- 780
pected of camouflaging racist motives. Indeed, undocumented 781
status is a tool that officers can use when convenient: 782

> As the SLO reports wind down, Captain Patton mentions that 783
> he has gotten recent complaints from local businesses about 784
> illegal vending. The SLOs all attempt to address this simulta- 785
> neously by speaking over one another, which is chaotic to 786
> record, but ultimately produces the following points: SLOs 787
> have made many arrests using bike cops, sweeping several 788
> areas, and turning all the names of "illegals" over to ICE 789
> [Immigration and Customs Enforcement]. Previously, only fel- 790
> ons and gang members warranted a tip off to ICE, but they 791
> made an exception this time. Patton jumps in to justify this 792
> based on its effectiveness, although he says there was an 793
> uproar from members of the Latino community. 794

> "Often though," Patton continues thoughtfully, "vendors are 795
> victims too, so maybe this is part of a broader issue." 796

> (Roussell, fieldnotes, 4/9/2009) 797

798
Notably, although ICE was called in this case—illegally, under 799
Special Order 40—the Latino community resisted this move and 800
Captain Patton was induced to see vendors as victims, paving the 801
way for the farmer's market and day labor facility initiatives that 802
followed. 803

Indeed, after the violent beating of protestors at a May Day 804
immigration rally in 2007, Latino participation at community 805
policing events in South Division declined precipitously. Perhaps 806
in part because of this loss of political potency in the Latino 807
community, police administration—including South Division 808
Captains, Chief Charlie Beck, and the LA Police Commission— 809
has urged the reconciliation and accommodation that undergird 810
South Division's efforts with Latinos. In sum, black CPAB mem- 811
bers are partially successful in invoking their claims to commu- 812
nity by denouncing the Latino-driven underground economy. 813
Although these claims are grounded around the declining econ- 814
omy for black labor, this seems like a rearguard action in light 815
of LA's structural adjustments. Enforcement, supported by the 816
black CPAB community, is indeed used to regulate Latinos, but 817
despite the lesser status of their community meeting, they are 818
encouraged as the rising community. This enables Captain Pat- 819
ton to expand his definition of community to include vending 820
Latinos as victims—and, thus, part of the larger Latino labor 821
force. 822

Black Banishment: *Pandillas, Drogas*, and the *Lumpenproletariat*   823

If the attitude of police toward disorder crimes by Latinos 824
can be characterized as grudgingly accommodating, the treat- 825
ment of South Division's black population is not similarly ambigu- 826
ous. Police use tips, information, and complaints from Latinos to 827
connect gangs and drugs to South LA's black population, but in 828
truth they do not need these things to continue such a campaign. 829
Enforcement against gangs, drugs, and other offences continues 830
apace—the problems that community policing was supposed to 831
help ameliorate. Latinos stress blacks as a dangerous and disor- 832
dered anticommunity, while reinforcing their own claims to com- 833
munity by defending vendors and day laborers as resourceful 834
people who just want to work hard and earn an honest living. 835
But the punishing of prostitution, homelessness, and those on 836
parole and probation closely connects to the much larger tradi- 837
tion of punishing blacks in South LA. 838

Davis (1993a, 2006) describes various racist LAPD initiatives 839
including Operation Hammer, where law enforcement mass- 840
arrested black and Latino youth based on nothing more than their 841
presence, and the LA Battering Ram, an armored tank used to 842
break into the homes of suspected drug dealers. Costa Vargas (2006) 843
describes the continuing indignities and beatings suffered by impov- 844
erished black men and women in South LA by police and other 845
municipal authorities. The massive expansion in the scale of these 846
control methods can be linked to the beginnings of LA's post- 847
Fordism of the 1970s where black labor became seen as increasingly 848
redundant and was shed in LA's structural readjustment (Sides 849
2003; Soja 2014). More recently, the subprime mortgage and fore- 850
closure crisis of 2008 made a portion of LA's black population even 851
more vulnerable by swelling the ranks of the homeless (Stuart 2011). 852

There are tens of thousands of gang members in Los 853
Angeles, although estimates vary depending on definition and 854
motivation.[5] In South Division, there are black gangs, Latino 855
gangs, and gangs without ethnoracial preference; some gangs are 856
territorial, some sell drugs, and some participate in other types of 857
crime, or fail to come to the attention of law enforcement at all. 858
In Spanish, the word *pandilla* means simply "gang." Among the 859
Hispanic Outreach attendees, however, *pandilla* stands in directly 860
for black gangs and the gang violence and drug selling commit- 861
ted by black gangs. Supporting stereotypical narratives of black 862
men as criminal, Latino attendees position themselves as crime 863

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[5] CalGangs, the California system of recording gang affiliation, is not publicly avail-
able. Names are difficult to purge and the definitions of a gang member are somewhat loose.
The Guardian puts the number of gang members in LA around 120,000 and this is general
consistent with the LAPD's public presentations (Harris 2007).

victims and black *pandilleros* (gang members) that sell *drogas* 864
(drugs) as the major source of fear in their communities. 865

Whereas black residents typically couch their concerns in dis- 866
cussions of language and legal status, Latinos tend to identify the 867
objects of their complaints by race directly. *Afro-Americano* is used 868
when speaking formally, but *moreno* and *negro* can be heard in 869
side conversations, sometimes during Hispanic Outreach sessions, 870
and in interviews. Latino residents describe both as impolite 871
depending on the audience (i.e., acceptable around other Lat- 872
inos, not around blacks). In general, Latino residents live and 873
work alongside black residents (as well as the handful of white 874
and Asian residents) and often maintain friendships and working 875
relationships with them. Antipathy in meetings comes out most 876
strongly in generalized references to gangs, gang members, and 877
drug activity, nearly all of which are directed explicitly or implic- 878
itly at blacks as a group. Latino gangs are almost never the focus 879
(even within the English CPAB). Below, Hector Mendoza guides 880
Sgt. Sanchez, a temporary meeting host, and Tomás De La Garza 881
in a stereotypical description of *pandilla* activity: 882

Sgt. Sanchez throws out the statement that most crime is 883
gang-related and that the rest is mainly domestic disputes of 884
some kind or other. Gangs, he reminds us, operate through 885
fear. They attempt to intimidate the community by writing on 886
walls, getting tattoos on their necks, and forcing street ven- 887
dors to pay "rent" or protection money. Somewhat contradic- 888
torily, he pushes us to "get involved" if we see a gang 889
member engaging in these behaviors. Gangs pick on those 890
who are afraid, he says, those who don't call the police. 891

In the wake of this, Hector Mendoza reminds everyone of the 892
taco venders on Culver and Jeffery St. who actually have little 893
stickers given to them by the local gangs to advertise the fact 894
that they pay rent. Angry at this protection scheme, Mendoza 895
reminds us that "These people want to work!" Vendors have 896
to fear the *pandilleros* as well as the police. Because the work 897
is not strictly legal, vendors don't report the intimidation—so 898
there is double fear for these people, he says, of both gangs 899
and of arrest. If people come together and come forward, 900
there would be more ability to move against gang intimida- 901
tion. Tomás De La Garza takes the opportunity to speak as 902
well, strongly and clearly informing us that gangs comprise 903
morenos, and, as an afterthought, Latinos, who extort money 904
from the community and sell drugs. 905

(Roussell, fieldnotes, 6/25/10) 906

South Division's transitioning demography ensures that local 907 908
schools are strongly Latino—Vernon High School, where Abril 909

Solis works, is more than 80 percent Latino. Although the 910
school's constituency overlaps the territory of several gangs, both 911
black and Latino, in discussing ethnoracial tension, Solis explains 912
black *pandilleros* as directly responsible for school violence and 913
the consequent dress code shift that enabled the identification 914
and expulsion of black students: 915

> Interviewer: The two get along well? The two groups? [Lat- 916
> inos and blacks] 917
>
> Solis: There's been a lot of change, I don't know. 918
>
> Interviewer: How was it before? 919
>
> Solis: Well, we had a lot of fights because we had a lot of 920
> African American gangs. 921
>
> Interviewer: And now that you have changed to uniforms, 922
> has this helped? 923
>
> Solis: It's helped a lot because students can be identified … 924
> before it looked like it might be a student but was not. 925
>
> Interviewer: And they come in to do what? To sell drugs or 926
> start stuff? 927
>
> Solis: Sometimes they came in grabbing and assaulting people, 928
> walking around with little bags [of drugs]… 929

While vending, for black residents, gathers together many cul- 930 931
tural and labor market complaints against Latinos, Latino residents 932
see the issue quite differently. For Latino residents, the illegal 933
nature of vending is an issue only because it deters the reporting 934
of other crimes. Vendors are understood as people attempting to 935
earn a living through hard work rather than nuisances and threats 936
to public safety. Vending easily slides into fear of labor market 937
redundancy for black residents, while drugs and gangs stand in for 938
Latinos' fear of blacks and crime, a fear that dovetails with the 939
larger white polity. The outcome is a generalized fear of blacks, 940
particular young black men, within neighborhoods that have only 941
recently achieved majority Latino representation. Latino residents, 942
although skittish of official engagement, decry black criminality as 943
an anticommunity opposed to their own hardworking ethos. 944

Black Deterritorialization, Latino In-Migration 945

Both meetings operate around community/anticommunity 946
demarcations, but as territorial enforcers police retain the ulti- 947
mate prerogative in deploying the rhetoric of community. The 948
meetings provide a space for the venting of complaints and the 949
consolidation of community, but officers are under no obligation 950

to adopt directly the perspectives of the attendees. Instead, they 951
filter the complaints through institutional mandates and their 952
own prejudices in regulating their territories. Observations sug- 953
gest that, in the reverse of the accommodation of vending and 954
day laboring, police support and even encourage Latino charac- 955
terizations of blacks as a criminalized anticommunity. Working 956
within the territorial imperative, officers deploy community rhet- 957
oric to deterritorialize what they see as black anticommunities. 958

Because concerns regarding *pandillas y drogas* are so ubiqui- 959
tous and characterized as violent and dangerous, the ameliorating 960
push for education and accommodation that tempers vending 961
and day labor enforcement gains no traction. SLOs, the commu- 962
nity policing officers-*cum*-mountain lions of the territorial impera- 963
tive, play a strong role in organizing the deterritorialization of 964
blacks within their territory. On ridealongs, SLOs spend most of 965
their enforcement time targeting blacks, while openly lionizing 966
the Latino work ethic. Black residents also comprise the general 967
face of anti-police sentiment: 968

After driving past [Section 8 housing unit], SLO Liz Fairbanks 969
slows, stops, and points to what she calls a "rude house," full 970
of Black folks who don't respect the police. They are not 971
"police friendly." Worse, they teach their kids not to talk to 972
police and that they are the enemy. "Hispanics," she says, 973
aren't hostile like that. There are three people in plain sight 974
as we roll by and they hold stock still and fix the car with a 975
stare until we depart. Liz announces that she is offended by 976
the fact that they don't wave to her. 977

(Roussell, fieldnotes, 7/28/11) 978

979
Given a relatively free hand in determining the content of 980
community within the borders of her BCA, Fairbanks uses the 981
discretion granted to her under the auspices of community pro- 982
tection to play the role of "watchman" as specified under Wilson 983
and Kelling's (1982) broken windows paradigm. The authors 984
imagine their archetypical Officer Kelly like so: 985

Sometimes what Kelly did could be described as "enforcing the 986
law," but just as often it involved taking informal or extralegal 987
steps to help protect what the neighborhood had decided was 988
the appropriate level of public order. Some of the things he 989
did probably would not withstand a legal challenge. 990

(Wilson and Kelling 1982: 2) 991

992
Like Officer Kelly, Fairbanks appropriates the mantle of com- 993
munity in challenging those she thinks do not belong by "ped 994

stopping" them, all of whom, over the course of this same obser-
vation period, are black.

> SLO Fairbanks tells me several times that we can pull over
> and or "ped stop" anyone that I'd like. I'm fairly horrified by
> this and politely refuse several times. For example, we pass
> by a Black male youth casually riding a bicycle. She interprets
> his look—which I miss completely—as furtive, and seriously
> considers turning around and stopping him. I ask her why
> she would do this and she refers to her "spidey sense," saying
> that he looked "shifty-eyed." I gently push back without
> actually using the words "probable cause," but she baldly
> brings it up anyway. With a good knowledge of the rules of
> search and seizure and probable cause, she says, if she feels
> someone is suspicious, she can pull them over for any rea-
> son—biking on the wrong side of the road in this case—and
> having done that, she can then do whatever she wants.
>
> (Roussell, fieldnotes, 7/28/11)

Although Fairbanks gripes about vending throughout the day,
over the course of that observation period, we "ped stop" three
more people, all of them black and either homeless or appearing
so, and have aggressive conversations with several more. This is not
an unusual observation period. The constant refrain from SLOs in
these instances is that they are simply enforcing community norms.
Just before forcing an 18-year-old black woman out of his BCA for
suspected prostitution, SLO Phil Hackett tells her this directly:

> SLO Hackett fixes her with a stare and says "Why am I
> unhappy?"
>
> "Because I'm not paying taxes?" she offers.
>
> "No," he says, "it's because you're on my street and the kids
> and parents around here don't want to see this."
>
> He finally allows her to leave Jeffrey Avenue and head down a side
> street. In turning around, we pass her again, and he stops her
> again and quizzes her on where she's going—her uncle's house,
> which he ascertains is outside of his BCA. We speed away.
>
> (Roussell, fieldnotes, 4/19/11)

Many white and Latino SLOs display clear anti-black attitudes
or more subtle degradations toward black individuals seen as per-
petrating disorder. Moreover, the dynamic is institutional: offi-
cers, for example, publicly answer simple questions like how best
to capture the visual identity of a criminal suspect by illustrating
through a generalized black subject.

Homeless individuals, prostitutes, and probationers/parolees especially are vulnerable to territorial policing. In revitalizing the Basic Car Plan and the territorial imperative, the LAPD built the NIMBY ("Not In My Back Yard") ethos right into its policing plan. On one level, this means that LAPD Divisions compete for crime decreases. On another level, individual SLOs acquire the incentive to chivvy their problems off onto other BCAs, particularly those in other Divisions. As Officer Hackett demonstrates, the presence of prostitutes can be addressed by physically relocating them outside of a BCA or Division boundary. Arrest is not uncommon, but the hassle of paperwork and processing time for a few nights in jail is often too much compared with the ease of ordering them one block over. Community improvement takes on the feel of a zero-sum game.

Further, while community members with jobs and property can be victims—indeed, this is officially constituted through typical CPAB complaints (Roussell and Gascón 2014)—the idea of the anticommunity itself is incommensurate with the idea of victimhood. Prostitutes were the targets of South LA's Grim Sleeper serial killer (active 1985–2007), but police made clear that, despite their residence and official victim status, they were not to be considered part of the community. The excerpt below depicts this dynamic in a freeform information session organized to collect resident knowledge for the Grim Sleeper investigation. Tensions run high, fear is palpable, and police hold the meeting because they are frustrated by a lack of investigative progress:

> The next question comes from a black man in his mid-30s. His voice is a little high, as though he is a little frightened or perhaps a bit hostile. "There are a lot of people here—old, young—what message do you want us to take back to the community? Some people maybe are thinking about vigilante squads ... we've got to protect the sisters, because we're on edge. There's a lot of fear."

> A cool answer comes from the officer in charge of the investigation. "No disrespect to the vics or their families, but the majority have been in compromising positions. Somebody knows something ... but no, no vigilante squads." I am taken aback by the callousness of this response. Some of the victims' family members are in the audience, have made themselves known, and are visibly distraught by the casual victim-blaming.

> (Roussell, fieldnotes, 10/9/08)

The automatic response of the resident above is to fold the murder victims into a broad conception of the community, particularly given the presence of their family members. Yet the officer

evinces disbelief that the community should be frightened, because 1083
the Sleeper only kills those found in "compromising positions." 1084
The community, in other words, cannot contain prostitutes. 1085

Homeless individuals are also deterritorialized and discur- 1086
sively separated from the community, although as with vending 1087
these task forces must coordinate with the Health Department to 1088
dispose of possessions and encampments. Unlike vending, how- 1089
ever, attempts at accommodation of the homeless by the English 1090
CPAB are met with stiff police resistance. Rather, Captain Patton 1091
induces CPAB to aid in deterritorialization by denying homeless 1092
people—or "cockroaches" in the parlance of one SLO—food and 1093
clothing in the hopes that they will migrate out of South Division, 1094
despite the co-chair's public observation that many are "from the 1095
neighborhood" and "just want to get it together." To foreclose 1096
community solidarity, Patton reminds the group of their class dif- 1097
ferences, emphasizing that "transients" enjoy their predicament 1098
and cannot thus be part of a partnership premised on normative 1099
community ideals. He refers to the police approach to homeless- 1100
ness, which comprises some service linkage together with con- 1101
scripted labor, confinement, or banishment, as "tough love" (see 1102
also Beckett and Herbert 2009; Stuart 2011). 1103

The LAPD's anti-black deterritorialization occurs not only 1104
under the purview of enforcement, but also as a direct function 1105
of their role as community expert and arbiter of territorial con- 1106
tent. Incarceration is an obvious element of LA's black outmigra- 1107
tion in the 1980s and 1990s (Costa Vargas 2006) and these trends 1108
continue; however, in the community policing era, police have 1109
the opportunity to play a larger role in composing community 1110
infrastructure. Within the territorial imperative, SLOs become 1111
experts to be consulted when larger governance issues impact 1112
their BCA. Officer Hackett outlines how his professional involve- 1113
ment in a municipal planning matter enabled him to operational- 1114
ize a racial hierarchy of desirability: 1115

SLO Phil Hackett laughs as we drive past where the new 1116
school is being built. "This," he says, pointing towards a dilap- 1117
idated housing complex, "is where the 'I Hate Phil Hackett 1118
Club' lives." Due to his long tenure in his BCA, Hackett tells 1119
me that city planners consulted him on where they ought to 1120
put the new middle school. Since they were going to 1121
"eminent domain" the site and the housing therein regardless 1122
of location, they asked him which of three locations would 1123
have the best impact on crime. Hackett didn't hesitate to pick 1124
the multidwelling, low-income, predominantly Black housing 1125
complex. The city has since razed it, relocated many of the 1126
residents to the dilapidated complex that we drive past, and 1127
is building the school, as well as some new housing, where 1128

> "many Mexicans have moved in," which he likes. The people 1129
> he helped displace, however, aren't fond of him, he chuckles. 1130
>
> As if to illustrate his dislike of Black people by comparison, 1131
> we immediately drive past another housing complex, which 1132
> he informs me is home to a 23-year-old Latina immigrant of 1133
> his acquaintance who owns her own hamburger stand and 1134
> just opened another one. He uses this opportunity to com- 1135
> pare Black people generally with the specific woman in the 1136
> house—or, as he puts it, "200 years of oppression" vs. "one 1137
> generation over the border." 1138
>
> (Roussell, fieldnotes, 4/19/2011) 1139

Hackett's view, while blunt, is hardly rare. The discourse over 1140 1141
Latino in-immigration constructs Latinos as victims of black 1142
crime, as deserving and hard workers (regardless of the legality 1143
of their work), and as necessary for the maintenance of LA's 1144
restructured economy. This leads to negotiations over how to 1145
"practice tolerance" toward the new arrivals—that is, how to reg- 1146
ulate rather than banish. Latinos in South Division are seen as 1147
comprising a distinct group of laborers whose purpose is clear 1148
and necessary, if often unruly and sometimes necessitating sharp 1149
rebuke and selective deportation. Moreover, officers' racial biases 1150
regarding divergent Latino and black work ethics and crime pro- 1151
pensities translate directly into accommodation or expulsion. 1152

Black residents, on the other hand, span the sharp division 1153
between the poles of community and anticommunity. CPAB mem- 1154
bers—mainly elderly, middle-class politically moderate activists— 1155
are feted for their political symbolism, consulted regarding disor- 1156
der, and responsibilized to carry official messages to their neigh- 1157
borhoods. By articulating community standards within this 1158
governance framework, black CPAB members can induce certain 1159
forms of this anticommunity regulation against Latino disorder 1160
nuisances and confirm themselves as community. Police use this 1161
discourse to help shape a regulatory framework for Latino labor. 1162
Meanwhile, South LA's declining black population, disenfranchised 1163
in many arenas including employment and housing, constitute the 1164
main anticommunity. The unfolding logic of the territorial impera- 1165
tive allows the deterritorialization of black residents left behind by 1166
political economic restructuring and workplace discrimination. 1167

Conclusion: Political Economy, Race, and Urban 1168
Governance 1169

The past few decades have been characterized not only by 1170
the rise of mass incarceration, but also the expansion of its 1171

enabling processes—the increased surveillance, regulation, polic-1172
ing, and demarcation of urban space and impoverished black and 1173
brown populations. During that same period, urban governance 1174
has become dominated by themes of community partnership. 1175
Precisely because these trends seem antithetical, this article has 1176
attempted to explicate this relationship through the Los Angeles 1177
Police Department's community policing efforts in South LA. 1178
Policing is increasingly recognized as an important interlocutor 1179
within the framework of urban governance. Debates over how 1180
precisely to consider police within this matrix swirl between 1181
police as agents of the state and police action on the ground 1182
(Herbert 2006; Stuart 2011; Yarwood 2007). The purpose here is 1183
not to settle these debates, but rather to highlight the role of 1184
police in the urban demographic and social transformations 1185
required by the LA post-Fordist economy. Further, it is to situate 1186
the use of community rhetoric within such governance efforts as 1187
an important—and counterintuitive—means by which this occurs. 1188

To make sense of the LAPD's community policing efforts, 1189
they must be emplaced within the broader economic and demo-1190
graphic trajectory of South LA. The past three decades of South 1191
LA's black-to-Latino demographic changes relate to LA's shift 1192
from a national manufacturing powerhouse to a bifurcated labor 1193
market. This move valorizes entertainment and technology indus-1194
tries on the one hand and on the other requires tractable undo-1195
cumented immigrant labor. Black citizens, the last hired and first 1196
fired in LA's postwar boom, have seen unemployment rates reach 1197
30–40 percent in the areas examined here (Marcelli, Pastor, and 1198
Jossart 1999; Sides 2003; Soja 2014; Soja, Morales, and Wolff 1199
1983). Such economic alterations have historically produced state 1200
welfare rescue for poor white populations (Katznelson 2006), but 1201
here have produced deterritorialization and replacement. To 1202
think about the policing of race and labor market position is to 1203
see police as helping to process these economic shifts by encour-1204
aging and effectuating black-to-Latino demographic shift in South 1205
LA. 1206

Community policing, the same initiative recommended to 1207
ease the racial tensions of LA's post-uprising era, is an important 1208
mechanism by which this occurs. Feelings of nostalgia and 1209
empowerment produced by the word "community" cover over a 1210
racial and economic project of control and exclusion extending 1211
from the larger neoliberal architecture of urban renewal, gentrifi-1212
cation, and the staffing of a restructured economy. The violence 1213
of 1991–1992 may have laid the groundwork for such a gover-1214
nance shift, but the efforts of the state to restructure urban space 1215
have been the story of the past several decades irrespective of 1216
urban pacification (Lynch et al. 2013; Smith 1996). As numerous 1217

scholars have suggested, the drawing of community boundaries is 1218 a political act bound up in racial preference and concern for the 1219 needs of capital (Beckett and Herbert 2009; Davis 2006; Herbert 1220 and Brown 2006; Stuart 2014). Indeed, although Rose (1996) 1221 sees community as a vehicle for disinvestment, LA instead seems 1222 to be experiencing a shift in control mechanisms. 1223

It is clear that we must consider urban economic utility and 1224 racial preference in discussing how threats to society are conceived 1225 and disposed of. As Brown (2010) has argued, the crucial question 1226 of who can be allowed to comprise "society"—or "community"— 1227 has animated these efforts toward reconfiguring urban space. The 1228 LAPD's decision to construct its community policing ethos around 1229 the socially Darwinistic territorial imperative seems entirely con- 1230 gruent with these dynamics. The operationalization of the territo- 1231 rial imperative in a partnership framework describes an 1232 informational process whereby residents in community meetings 1233 learn what police want and transmit that information back to 1234 them. In creating community partnership with residents, police 1235 retain the prerogative to regulate and expel in the name of com- 1236 munity, picking and choosing among the complaints registered by 1237 black and Latino meeting attendees. Community is constituted in 1238 these meetings in a narrow sense, but is also relegated to these 1239 spaces when it comes to police deterritorialization of the anticom- 1240 munity. Captains can thus consider reserving urban space for a lit- 1241 eral market for Latino day labor while SLOs simultaneously 1242 authorize the razing of affordable housing units occupied predom- 1243 inantly by black residents—the result of which is to construct a 1244 public school attended mainly by the children of the Latino work- 1245 ing poor. Community rhetoric, rather than a unifying force of 1246 resistance, identity, or creativity, contributes to demographic shift, 1247 not simply by accommodating Latino in-migration, but through 1248 black exclusion and removal. Community—reformulated through 1249 the territorial imperative—becomes a tool of governance corre- 1250 sponding to economies of race and labor desirability. 1251

Although the role of community in state governance is an 1252 expanding subfield (Edwards and Hughes 2002; Herbert 2005; 1253 Rose 1996), it is important not to read these trends as entirely 1254 novel, but rather as a historical iteration of exploiting Latin 1255 American migrants and erasing black community self- 1256 determination (Ibarra and Carlos 2015; Muhammad 2010; Wil- 1257 derson 2003). The focus on LA's economy here should not be 1258 taken as a challenge to more culturalist analyses of race, but 1259 rather as a supplement to them. The anti-blackness behind the 1260 civil death of the black subject, as Wilderson (2003) suggests, is 1261 "vital to civil society's political economy: s/he kick-starts capital at 1262 its genesis and rescues it from its over-accumulation crisis at its 1263

end" (238). Racial demographic shift has surely been a foundational part of LA's rescue from postindustrial crisis, accommodating Latino concerns, however grudgingly, at the expense of black residents. South LA's black residents, interpreted as unsuitable for a restructured service economy predicated on subpoverty wages and informal employment, are an anticommunity removed to make room for a vulnerable Latino proletariat. Deterritorialization is consistent with anti-black racism, while Ibarra and Carlos (2015) remind us that the exploitation of Latino labor made desperate by U.S. trade and investment policy is an old story. Put another way, governmental rhetoric on community is made necessary by structural adjustment, but made possible by degrading urban black populations as the ultimate anticommunity.

The literature interrogating the logic of urban police governmentality is growing at precisely a moment when it is needed to provide insight on policing operations within poor neighborhoods of color. The strengths of the present analysis include its long-term duration, its naturalistic setting, and its location at the nexus of community discourse, racialized political economy, and law enforcement practice. Its limitations, including the localized scope and lack of black SLOs in the analysis, suggest directions for future research, as researchers address calls to diversify police forces and for national policing strategies (indeed, the isolation and scorn directed toward black SLOs only underlines some of these findings). While an impoverished section of Los Angeles is not universally generalizable, every geopolitical unit is vulnerable to the externalities of capital movement and its labor requirements, and these things are shaped by racial preference. Rising Latino labor power in cities beyond LA suggest that the social control mechanisms examined here may be worth considering in other urban locations as well. Empirical, on-the-ground examinations of the ways in which these structural shifts manifest themselves in different geographic settings can help frame and inform public debates on the uses, history, and present application of the law and its enforcement.

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Aaron Roussell is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Criminal Justice & Criminology at Washington State University. His research focuses on conceptions of race, class, and social danger, specifically with respect to community policing, disorder, and drug law. He is also interested in problems of method and how they fit into a larger discourse on law and science.

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