DETERMINING SUCCESS: A MULTI-METHOD EXAMINATION OF THIRD PARTY INTERVENTIONS INTO AFRICAN CIVIL WARS

By

AUDREY LYNNE MATTOON

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY
School of Politics, Philosophy and Public Affairs

MAY 2015

©Copyright by AUDREY LYNNE MATTOON, 2015
All Rights Reserved
To the Faculty of Washington State University:

The members of the Committee appointed to examine the dissertation of AUDREY LYNNE MATTOON find it satisfactory and recommend it be accepted.

________________________________
Martha L. Cottam, Ph.D., Chair

________________________________
Amy G. Mazur, Ph.D.

________________________________
Travis N. Ridout, Ph.D.
Civil wars are the most frequent form of warfare in the international system today. Military interventions into civil wars were 140% more common than classic interstate wars in the period between 1960 and 2004. Despite the popularity of military interventions into these conflicts, research has arrived at contradictory conclusions about the utility of interventions. This study applies a relational approach to theorizing about interventions and reconceptualizes intervention success to overcome some of the current research gaps. A special focus is devoted to the relationships between former colonial powers and their colonies to determine the extent to which these relationships in particular contribute to intervention success or failure.

This study employs a multi-method design where broad configurations of conditions were obtained from the application of both csQCA and fsQCA methods, followed by focused, structured comparative cases. I apply QCA methods to a dataset derived from the Correlates of War and augmented with relationship conditions coded through primary and secondary source research.
This study concludes that inter-state relations do play a part in determining intervention success. Intervention dyads that share a colonial legacy, shared language, or salient economic relationships are particularly likely to experience successful interventions. Further, the case study analysis supports the role of institutional learning in reducing operational friction.
Contents

Chapter One: Introduction ........................................................................................................ 1

Who intervenes and how effective is it? .................................................................................. 4

Relationships and Interventions: Colonial History ................................................................. 7

Theory....................................................................................................................................... 10

Methods................................................................................................................................... 13

Chapter 2 – Theory .................................................................................................................. 17

Legibility and Post-Colonial Africa ......................................................................................... 19

Structural.................................................................................................................................. 27

Cultural ..................................................................................................................................... 30

Friction...................................................................................................................................... 42

Goal Creation............................................................................................................................ 45

Intervention Outcome ............................................................................................................. 46

Chapter 3 – Methods ............................................................................................................... 49

Qualitative Comparative Analysis .......................................................................................... 50

Intervention Outcome ............................................................................................................. 55

Crisp-Set QCA .......................................................................................................................... 59

Conditions .................................................................................................................................. 60

Fuzzy-Set QCA .......................................................................................................................... 62
| Conditions | 64 |
| Comparative Case Studies | 70 |
| Case Selection | 71 |
| Case Study Data | 73 |
| Chapter 4 – QCA: Intervention in Africa since 1960 | 78 |
| csQCA – All interventions | 79 |
| Resolving contradictions | 83 |
| Reduced solutions | 87 |
| FsQCA – Colonial Power Interventions | 89 |
| Calibration | 90 |
| Analysis | 95 |
| fsQCA Model | 100 |
| Shared elite cultural networks | 106 |
| Shared “logic of appropriateness” | 107 |
| QCA identified indicators | 109 |
| QCA Conclusions | 111 |
| Chapter 5 – Goals | 113 |
| Sierra Leone | 114 |
| Goals | 117 |
Language and Executive Relations ................................................................. 120

Côte d’Ivoire – First Intervention ................................................................. 122

Goals ............................................................................................................... 128

Language and Executive ............................................................................. 130

Côte d’Ivoire – Second Intervention ............................................................. 132

Goals ............................................................................................................... 134

Language and Executive Relations ............................................................. 135

Mali ............................................................................................................... 135

Goals ............................................................................................................... 138

Language and Executive Relations ............................................................. 140

Connecting Goals to Outcomes ................................................................. 142

Testing Realizable Goals and their relation to outcomes ......................... 148

Conclusions ................................................................................................. 150

Chapter 6 – Operational Friction ................................................................. 153

Sierra Leone ................................................................................................. 153

Institutions and Operations ......................................................................... 157

Language and Executive Relations ............................................................. 159

Côte d’Ivoire – First Intervention ................................................................. 161

Language and Executive Relations ............................................................. 164
Chapter One: Introduction

Civil wars are the most common form of conflict occurring in the world system currently, far outpacing traditional interstate wars. The incidence of civil wars has risen since the end of the Cold War mostly through the steady accumulation of conflicts that have not been resolved (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Civil wars do not just outpace interstate wars; intervention into civil wars are far more common than traditional interstate wars as well. The Correlates of War dataset records 42 internationalized civil wars around the world between 1960 and 2004, quite a significant amount when compared to the number of classic interstate wars in the same period: 30. While civil wars and their attendant interventions remain frequent and controversial in the international system\(^1\), holes in our understanding of their efficacy remain.

The literature on third-party military interventions with boots on the ground in civil wars lacks consideration for the role that interstate relations could possibly play on the success of those interventions. States rarely choose to intervene militarily in a vacuum, and the relationship between states could possibly condition the choice to intervene, the motives of the intervention and the likelihood of success once intervention is chosen. Relationships between states are usually considered at the outset of an intervention as an explanation for the occurrence of intervention, but systematic study of how they may condition success once intervention is underway is missing.

Specifically, this study seeks to explore the role colonial legacy plays in shaping the success of interventions – comparing it to other forms of international relationships and interventions occurring without strong bonds between the states involved. Colonialism, though

\(^1\) The recent debates in the United Kingdom and the United States over intervention in the Syrian civil war are particularly high-profile examples.
neglected, is of particular interest in the study of military interventions. Modern humanitarian-oriented interventions are frequently accused of engaging in imperialism, or compared to imperial ventures of the past (Marten, 2004). Many of the problems of modern interventions are caused, according to some arguments, by lacking precisely the expertise that colonial countries developed and deployed successfully (Stewart and Knaus, 2011). The American intervention in Afghanistan for example, has been plagued by issues arising from a lack of cultural and linguistic knowledge that has made the operating environment especially hostile; “[coalition forces in Afghanistan], by contrast [with the British in India] were so isolated from the reality of Afghan life… that we were hardly even conscious of the depth of our isolation” (Stewart and Knaus, 2011: 25). If the old colonial services had all of the expertise that modern forces, like the United States, engaged in intervention lack, could countries with institutional histories of such developments have retained those advantages, at least when intervening in their former colonies?

Intervention in African civil wars will form the primary unit of analysis. Interventions in Africa were selected for a number of reasons: 1) Africa experiences more civil wars than any other region, accounting for 38% of all civil wars between 1960 and 2007, 2) the vast majority of all interventions into civil wars occurred in Africa – 49% of all interventions, 3) the majority of the direct military interventions by former colonial powers in their former colonies’ civil wars, have occurred in Africa. Focusing geographically on Africa controls unmeasured variation without sacrificing cases – assisting with comparison.

This chapter will first survey the existing literature in the field of international interventions, then it will explore the literature on post-colonial institutions and colonialism to provide a foundation for two analytical models and attendant hypothesis to fill the gap outlined in the literature. The models will be developed in depth in chapter two. The third section will
explain the methodologies that will be used and justify their usefulness to the project. The fourth section will provide an outline of the data sources to be used. The final section will provide a brief chapter outline and summary.

The purpose of this study is to interrogate the role that pre-existing relationships between states have in the outcomes of military interventions into intrastate conflicts, with special attention paid to the history of colonialism. This study will engage in multi-method qualitative research, both qualitative comparative analysis and structured, focused comparison through case studies, to both establish correlation and develop a causal argument focusing on individual overt military interventions in intrastate conflicts.

Considerations about effective interventions are policy relevant – who is best equipped to engage in them, what sorts of interventions are most effective for attaining success – in a world of increasing intrastate conflict, insecurity and globalized economic concerns; internationalized civil wars are 140% more common than interstate wars. Interventions are expensive, both in money, lives, and in the political capital of leaders engaging in them, and frequently controversial. If any of the hypothesis stated below are supported it can directly inform concrete decisions about who is best equipped to use interventions to achieve their policy goals and what sorts of policy goals are most achievable through military interventions.

This study will contribute to the literature in three ways. The first is through constructing the dependent variable, intervention outcomes, in such a way as to take seriously the actual goals and motivations of interveners. Interventions will be evaluated by the intentions of the actors, not our expectations of their moral responsibility. This is a problem in the literature on interventions to date; “As a result of all the research on intervention into civil wars we know next to nothing about the goals of interveners…instead, most of the studies have posited and outcome of interest
and by extension assumed the outcome was the goal” (Regan, 2010: 470). The result of all of these “under-articulated goals” (p. 470) is that the conversation on intervention strategy and conflict management is not particularly well suited either to policy makers or to a value-neutral political science.

Second, this study will apply rigorous multi-method qualitative and cross-national research to a field that lacks both. The application of Qualitative-Comparative Analysis is novel in this particular field, but uniquely suited to the complex causal problems confronted by the literature on international military interventions. The majority of current work in the field focuses on single case studies or, increasingly, on multi-national single method statistical treatments but lacks an integration of multiple research methods (Regan, 2010). This study employs qualitative case studies to engage in focused, structured comparison but it increases the rigor and comparability through the introduction of the QCA analysis.

Third, this study focuses on an aspect of the study of interventions that has been curiously neglected – the role that existing interstate relationships play on intervention success, with a special emphasis on the role of colonialism. It will help fill a hole in the literature and perhaps provide leverage on empirical puzzles – for example, the United States less than successful overall record in this regard, despite holding the title of most frequent overt intervener and being a major world power (See Edwards, Mattoon, and Appleton, 2012).

**Who intervenes and how effective is it?**

The literature on interventions can be broken into two areas of broad concern: (1) who chooses to intervene and why and (2) how successful or effective that intervention is usually in terms of overall conflict duration.
Two strains are discernible in the discipline’s answer to why states intervene: either geopolitical realpolitik concerns predominate, especially when characterizing Cold War era interventions, or as humanitarian responses to “complex emergencies and humanitarian crises”, especially when characterizing post-Cold War era interventions (Regan, 2000, Jakobsen, 1996, and Finnemore, 2003 discuss this). Data suggests that about 40% of interventions come from major powers, of which the United States is the most active (Regan, 2000), while regional neighbors make up the rest (Yoon, 2005 discusses this type of intervention in Africa specifically).

Increasingly the literature about who intervenes and why has come to revolve around peacebuilding operations or multilateral interventions aimed at humanitarian concerns (Bhatia, 2003; Marten, 2004; and Eriksson, 1996 for example). Unsurprisingly this has drawn the field into conflating humanitarian outcomes with “success” even for interventions that are not undertaken by international organizations – a problem to which this research will return. It also can lead to a tendency to miss the role of smaller powers and regional interventions.

By far the most popular focus of the literature, however, is with how interventions affect the duration of civil wars. There are two bodies of results from this research: (1) interventions increase the duration of civil wars (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline, 2000; Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom, 2004; Regan, 2000; and Lacina, 2006) or (2) that interventions are not important in the duration of civil wars. Other factors have been posited as important factors in civil war duration. Ethnicity is a particularly popular variable, which has been found to increase duration and the general intractability of conflicts (Fearon, 2004). Lacina (2006) finds that there is actually a link between ethnic homogeneity and greater intensity during the conflict. However, Regan (2000) does not find significant evidence that such conflicts lead to less successful
interventions. The access to resources both as spoils for capture and as a means of financing continued conflict also may increase the duration of civil wars, regardless of interventions.

The outcomes of intervention that have been of particular interest to scholars are intertwined with implicit assumptions about the goals and purposes of interventions. It is common for third party intervention to be treated as a method of conflict management, which may indicates why U.N. (as well as the E.U. and NATO) involvement has increased (Diehl, Reifschneider, and Hensel, 1996). Regan (2002) argues that “presumably when outside parties intervene in an internal conflict, at the core of their motivation is some form of conflict management” (p. 55). The literature as a whole treats intervention policies as unproblematically designed to “make conflicts less likely, shorter or less violent” (Regan, 2010: 468). The categories created to capture intervention outcomes illustrates the breadth with which this assumption is held: negotiated settlements or military victory for one side (Licklider, 1995; Mason and Fett, 1996).

This assumption is problematic on two fronts: (1) it creates an empirical puzzle that cannot be explained by work that accepts this assumption; specifically statistical work has generally shown that interventions increase the duration of conflicts or had no effect on their length (Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2000; Lindsay and Enterline, 1999; Regan, 1996 and 2002; and Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom, 1999), (2) insufficient systematic work has been done to provide an empirical foundation for this assumption; scholars assume the motivation and goals of actors without scrutiny. The popularity of military interventions to manage conflict despite their record of failure is puzzling only if we accept that most third party interventions are meant serve that purpose.
The literature on interventions, because of a focus on normatively derived definitions of outcome, cannot account for the ongoing “failure” of the majority of interventions in civil wars. As a result, there is a divergence in quantitative work on the actual effect of interventions in regards to civil war duration and almost no cross-national work that focuses on intervention success based on intended goals. It is this failure to properly conceptualize “success” that this project will remedy.

**Relationships and Interventions: Colonial History**

The academic discussion to date lacks investigation into how existing relationships between states may condition the success or failure of their interventions. More common are variables which capture structural aspects of the target state – the presence of lootable resources and the ethnic element of the conflict being the most popular. Sometimes structural considerations about the intervening state are included, like the hegemonic or major power status of the intervener. Characteristics of the intervention dyad are lacking. Interstate relations are generally brought in only to explain the onset of intervention, but rarely its outcome. Absent from the discussion of success by major powers is a recognition that many of these major powers once specialized in colonization in many of the same areas of the world that currently experience the highest incidents of civil wars.

Colonial history has not been used as an explanatory variable in conflict literature on third-party military interventions; however the ongoing relationship between colonizers and their former colonies has been of significant interest to journalists, political polemicists, and
historians. Political science turns its focus to the legacy of colonialism on institutional viability, state strength and ethnic relations. The legacy of colonialism is the basis for a great deal of scholarship, and even lends its name to Post-Colonial studies – an academic discipline in the Humanities.

There is a certain lay belief that interventions by colonial powers are more common, and probably more ethically questionable, than interventions by non-colonial states, but no systematic work has been done to test whether or not those interventions would be more common or more successful. This study is not primarily preoccupied with whether or not colonialism causes intervention, rather our focus is on whether this dynamic leads to successful intervention outcomes.

The experience of colonial rule and the institutional legacy that it left may provide potential interveners with advantages operating within a conflict theater that other actors lack. The British colonial enterprise in Southeast Asia and India had greater country knowledge then Americans fighting in Afghanistan a century later as the result of longer terms of service and education tailored to the individual post that an official was going to fill with a focus on history, geography and anthropology. The colonial apparatus had the appropriate practical wisdom, gained through experience, to leverage its power effectively and build sufficient legitimacy to succeed – precisely what recent interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan lacked (Stewart and Knaus, 2011). Indeed, this knowledge was indispensable for the cooption of indigenous elites to create governance structures in areas were repression could not be exercised by white colonial officers alone. The divide and conquer strategies that were favored by all colonial services in

---

2 Niall Ferguson is a particularly high profile example.
Africa and elsewhere required the development of area specific knowledge to assist; this should not be read as a normative argument for the virtues of colonialism but rather a suggestion that institutional knowledge and practices derived from a historically fraught situation might better equip these types of institutions for modern interventions.

Outside of conflict studies, colonialism has been used more extensively to look at variance in development (Acemoglu et al, 2001), economics (Bertocchi and Canova, 2002; Firmin-Sellers, 2000), domestic institutions both formal and informal (Maclean, 2002; Ekeh, 1975), and regime type (Barro, 1999; Varshney, 1998; Lijphart, 1999). Most scholars focus on the institutions and processes imparted by colonial inheritance, which create path dependence in a variety of arenas. Colonization is undoubtedly an important influence on countries that have experienced it; “Colonialism is to Africa what feudalism is to Europe” (Ekeh, 1975 [1972]).

Differences in colonial legacy can be the result of variations in the “styles” of colonization adopted by colonizing countries; most works compare British and French colonial patterns, especially in Africa (Grier, 1999; Firmin-Sellers, 2000; Maclean, 2002). Britain and France had distinct ways of ruling their colonies: Britain preferred a more indirect approach that integrated existing political institutions, while France looked for complete assimilation and centralization of their colonial infrastructure with their domestic political institutions, at least initially. This simple dichotomization is not without controversy, and it must be acknowledged that forms of colonial governance went through phases characterized by distinct differences in patterns of rule; there are also significant regional differences in the deployment of colonial apparatuses even within the individual spheres of French and British control.

The type of colony – settler vs. extractive – has also been considered of some importance (Acemoglu et al, 2001). The differences in type of colony are result of how suitable the area was
for large scale settlement by people of European origin based on the disease profile of the area which resulted in different permanent populations of white settlers. Settler colonies and extractive colonies left different histories of institutions and interactions between the colonizing country and its colony.

No matter the reason for the different types of institutions, the focus here is largely on the way these institutions were adapted with historical circumstances at the time of independence and through later developments. Millar and Wolchik (1994) make a distinction between the “legacies” of communism and the “aftermath” of communism which is a useful way to structure an understanding of post-colonial states. Legacies are long-lasting inter-generational results of the colonial experience, while aftermaths are the short run effects of the actual transition process to independence. Legacies, both institutional and social, are the theoretical concern of this project. Those legacies are also varied across time and especially geography; to maintain comparability and manageability of the subject under consideration, the post-colonial political history of Africa will be the primary focus of the study.

**Theory**

The focus of this study is on the role of *relationships* between the intervening state and the target of the intervention; structural considerations have to some degree already been explored in the literature on conflict duration. As a result, this study will seek to test whether relationships matter, specifically colonial ones, and how. Colonialism has shaped the political landscape of Africa, and the relationship between African states and the major European powers. The investigation of the role that these historical ties play is an important piece to understanding the effectiveness of interventions.
Most theorizing on interventions focuses on monadic determinants: either the structure of the conflict or target state, or the capacity or politics of the intervening state; this study instead investigates intervention success relationally. The basic theoretical model posits that inter-institutional legibility, that is the ability of states’ institutions to understand one another’s functions and processes, decreases operational friction and increases the likelihood that states will develop achievable goals for their interventions, resulting in greater overall intervention success.

Figure 1 - Basic theoretical model

Since the modern institutions of African states were put in place by colonial powers on their way out the door, institutional development and the extent to which they assist interactions that facilitate successful interventions are a primary focus of the theorizing and research presented here. Institutions are relatively stable collections of rules and practices with embedded resources and structures of meaning that define roles and expectations (March and Olsen, 1984). Institutions are spaces for certain types of interactions and they provide the guide by which actors can match situations to appropriate ideas and behaviors. Institutions provide actors with precedents from which to extrapolate behaviors in different situations; essentially they provide
the “logic of appropriateness” by which actors develop criteria of similarity and congruence to judge what behavior they should employ. As a result, institutional culture as well as the mechanisms and structures of institutions can be important determinates of action.

Institutions require a historical perspective and each institution has its own history (Skowronek, 1995). However, “the very tendency of institutions to persist through time implies that many different rules of legitimate action, many different systems of meaning, will be operative in a polity at any given moment” (Skowronek, 1995: 94). That means that even in states further removed from their original institutional system at the time of independence, relevant features or aspects imparted by the colonial regime may still be operative. Therefore, an institutional argument must address which institutions are of central concern for interventions and what kinds of changes would nullify their power to assist in success.

The literature that focuses specifically on the mechanisms of institutional interaction largely investigates the domestic and the international, intergovernmental organizational level (Oberthür and Gehring, 2006, 2009; Stokke, 2000). Sources of interaction and specifically the causal mechanisms by which international institutions learn from one another are important facets of research (Oberthür and Gehring, 2006, 2009). The domestic pressure that drives the creation of international institutions and regimes is also front and center especially in the creation of security institutions (Velázquez, 2004). Regardless of the substantive area of concern, the literature on international cooperation does not generally involve the areas of specific importance for research focused on civil wars – direct institutional interaction between executive, military, economic and elite institutions.

This theoretical argument develops a conceptualization of institutional interaction that hinges on the amount of “friction” created during the intervention process as a result of
“legibility” of institutions to one another. Institutional interaction does not necessarily 
presuppose cooperation, since states may intervene either for a government or against it.
Institutions with similar identities, standard operating procedures, and roles may interact across 
state boundaries with less friction than institutions that are dissimilar and distant because of the 
increased inter-institutional legibility. Those institutions that have had long relationships may 
also have developed a pool of elites that are socialized to interact with one another, or at least 
within institutions that share similar functions and standard operating procedures.

Increased legibility decreases the cost of institutional interaction. It cuts down on the 
possibility of misunderstanding and makes individual institutional actors' motivations clear.
Colonial powers actively developed the lines of authority, structured institutions and 
“modernized” the apparatus of colonized states. Those states that retained their colonial legacy 
largely intact and maintained the close links developed during colonialism, we could categorize 
these as conservative states, should have an easier time interacting logistically and strategically 
with their former colonial masters; states that broke aggressively with the institutions imparted to 
them at independence, we could classify those as radical states, should have a more difficult 
time.

This theoretical argument must develop lines of causality and identify the institutions 
which are of analytical interest – a task undertaken in the next chapter.

**Methods**

This project does not purport to explain all interventions’ success. The field of 
international military interventions is large; interventions occur on nearly every continent and are 
initiated by major powers and regional neighbors. The cases selected for analysis include only 
interventions by former colonial powers in Africa.
This project will utilize Qualitative Comparative Analysis coupled with analytical, comparative case studies. QCA in particular is useful to this project for a number of reasons: (1) the number of cases is intermediate and not really suitable for many standard statistical methods, (2) while the variable of particular interest is colonial relationship, most interventions are not undertaken by former colonizers and understanding different configurations that may cause success in those interventions is of equal importance to understanding how they fundamentally differ, (3) former colonial powers are successful in interventions in countries other than their former colonies (France in the DRC in 1978 and the recent intervention in Libya, for example) and the different pathways by which they may arrive at this success are also theoretically interesting.

The QCA analysis will provide a guide and framework for a series of comparative case studies. Far from being individual, narrative case studies, these aim to expressly highlight the shared processes through the discussion of similar interventions. The case-studies are selected to highlight distinct causal pathways while retaining a focus on colonialism and institutions. These pathways are derived from the QCA – specifically looking at the interaction of colonial legacy, shared language, and executive relationships. As a result they will compare the British intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000 (COW War #898), the French intervention in Mali in 2013 (no COW war code), and the French intervention in Côte d’Ivoire in 2002 (COW War #39) along the influence of shared language, and the role of executive relations.

**Chapter Outline:**

Chapter 1: Introduction/Literature

Chapter 2: Theory
Chapter 3: Data/Methods

Part One

Chapter 4: Qualitative Configurational Analysis of African Interventions

Part Two

Chapter 5: Case Study – Goals
Chapter 6: Case Study – Operations
Chapter 7: Conclusion

The second chapter will discuss the theoretical concerns brought to bear, focusing on an institutional conceptualization of legibility, including an argument for the necessity of institutional sensitivity in the African context. The theoretical framework developed posits a relationship between dyadic “legibility” and intervention outcomes, connected through a process of friction and goal creation.

The third chapter will outline the qualitative methods used and a justification for the approach. The benefits of a multimethod framework and triangulation cannot be overstated, but they can be clearly outlined especially as they pertain to this field where they are sorely lacking. The second half of chapter two will look at the construction of the data used with a special focus on the construction of the dependent variable – intervention outcomes. The issue of definitions and conceptualizations which is endemic to the study of civil wars and interventions will also be considered when discussing the construction of variables for measurement.

The third chapter will be a Qualitative-Configurational Analysis, applying both crisp-set QCA and fsQCA methods to create an analytical framework for the case studies to follow. The first part of the chapter will outline the configurations of interest, while the second half of the
chapter will interpret them in such a way as to create a broad, comparative analytical framework to guide the subsequent case studies.

The final third of the study will be devoted to analytical and explicitly comparative case studies to bridge the causal gap between legibility and outcomes. The case studies are interventions by former colonial powers with differing levels of shared language and executive relations with the intervention targets. The initial QCA analysis suggested that inter-institutional legibility hinges on shared language and executive relations within the intervention dyad. I have theorized that this legibility increases the likelihood of a successful intervention outcome through the reduction of friction, and by influencing the creation of achievable goals. Each source of legibility, language and executive relations, will be examined separately both in terms of their effect on operational and tactical friction, and on their role in the construction of goals.
Chapter 2 – Theory

An inquiry into the success of interventions into African civil wars requires both a historically informed and institutionally sensitive approach. Colonialism bequeathed a host of institutional, cultural, economic and social practices to Africa – some of which have faded over time and many which scholars believe still constitute the basis for political collapse and state weakness. The institutions of post-colonial Africa are central to the flow of power and as such must be central to a discussion of intervention outcomes.

The argument advanced here focuses on the historical legacy of institutions and the attendant elite networks they maintain in the political sphere as they relate to the creation of “legibility” in intervention dyads. The purpose of the theorizing presented here is to guide an exploration into an area of intervention studies that have not been sufficiently examined to provide ground for concrete deductions. The framework built is meant to be heuristic rather than air-tight.

![Figure 2: Basic chart of theoretical framework: How legibility acts on intervention outcome](image-url)
The basic theoretical framework developed to connect this conceptualization of legitimacy with intervention outcome is illustrated in Figure 1 above. The level of inter-institutional legibility within an intervention dyad, acts on the level of friction, i.e. the cost of the intervention engagement, and the types of goals constructed. The higher the cost and/or the more unrealistic the goals of an intervention, the less likely the intervention will result in success, defined as achieving the intervening state’s goals for the intervention. States which can “see” one another know what is possible, and how to operate the institutional mechanisms that are necessary for the actual process of intervention.

The benefits of legibility are felt at the structural and cultural levels, as illustrated in Figure 2 above. The structural benefits are embedded in a “shared logic of appropriateness” that grows from historical institutional interactions and ongoing relations which shape the situational environment and the norms or rules which are applied within it. The cultural benefits of institutional legibility lie in the people that actually operate the institutions and their relationships. Elite networks, where elite is meant as those people who are in policy-important
positions, create networks of communication and facilitate the ability to communicate on both the tactical and strategic level.

**Legibility and Post-Colonial Africa**

The political history of Africa after colonialism is checkered. Following colonial withdrawal, the form of independence struggle greatly shaped the transition of power. Both the French and the British saw the writing on the wall in many of their colonies and prepared, however poorly, for a transfer of power into the hands of their former colonial subjects (Thomson 2000). The orientation toward elites in Anglophone Africa and Francophone Africa was divergent; anti-western elites generally came to power in Anglophone countries while France maintained close relationships with leaders who were culturally oriented toward France throughout Francophone Africa (Ayittey, 1998; Moss, 2007). Power was generally transferred through negotiation as part of “a dignified retreat from empire”, more or less dignified based on the particular case and the former colonizer, and handed over to hastily assembled institutions of liberal democracy – Young (1996) characterizes this, borrowing from Samuel Huntington, as the “first wave” of democratization in Africa. For the most part, democracy did not last long as its roots were not particularly deep. Portugal was the last and least willing to relinquish power and as a result much of Lusophone Africa experienced significant conflict post-independence, setting up lingering conflicts that are touched on within this study.

The governmental apparatus and even the individual bureaucrats manning the levers of state power remained largely the same after independence. The post-colonial state imported wholesale “the routines, practices and mentalities of the African colonial state” (Young, 2004: 23). The people put in charge of the new post-colonial state, which looked an awful lot like the pre-independence state were “the very element of African society that had been most closely
associated with the colonial state” (Thomson, 2000: 15).

The defining feature of the post-colonial state in Africa is its centralization. The colonial apparatus was bureaucratic and authoritarian with its power centered in urban areas and the majority of its rural infrastructure operated indirectly from coopted “chiefs” (Mamdani, 1996). However, the authoritarian strain remained after independence; since the capture of the central state was seen as the great achievement of independence, faith in the transformative power of the state was high, leading to the development of a premium on centralized statist ideology (Ayittey, 1998).

Statism underpinned all of the significant ideological developments adopted by new leaders in Africa regardless of their flavor. Ayittey (1998) identifies four distinct official ideologies: African socialism, political pragmatism, military nationalism, and Afro-Marxism. Regardless of the rationale that each type of leader espoused, they all saw a determinative role for the state; their vision of that state was highly unified with power concentrated in a powerful executive. Patrimonialism with an emphasis on a strong, charismatic executive sitting at the head of a single party state was for a long time the quintessential post-colonial African governmental system. This points to the importance of the executive which I measure later in relation to intervention success.

State centralization went hand in hand with the weakness of state-society relations in Africa's post-colonial countries. The institution of the modern state imparted from the colonial master is “alien to its core” and lacks a legitimate foundation in civil society in the context of the post-colonial African milieu (Young, 1988: 37). Many were run as one-party or neo-patrimonial

---

3 This is similar to the three ideologies that Young (1982) identifies: Afro-Marxism, Populist Socialism, and African Capitalism.
states where power was derived from cronyism and the pay-off of important but limited sectors of society. Much like the colonial powers before them, modern African leaders exploited, and many continue to, ethnic divisions to maintain power with limited constituencies, even as this undermined the foundations necessary for liberal democracy. They justified this, regardless of ideology, by arguing that economic development was paramount and could only be achieved under unified governments undivided by petty partisan concerns (Ayittey, 1998; Young, 1996).

Prebendalism and the clientalist relationships that underpinned it have become increasingly unfeasible as economic development continued to fail and the Third Wave of democracy following the Cold War made the international climate increasingly unfriendly to traditional patrimonial regimes (Young, 1996). Indeed, some of the modern interventions this study investigates are the result of conflicts based in the efforts of existing leaders to retain power in the face of attempts to institutionalize democracy – the Ivorian conflicts are a particularly good example of this.

Some scholars argue that this crippling of the patrimonial state through hollowing and state collapses means that it is time to close the “historical parentheses around the African post-colonial state” (Young, 2004: 24). Especially since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of support for the myriad varieties of African socialist tendencies, the future of African states has diverged institutionally from one another more than at any other period since independence.

However, institutionalism remains particularly suited to examinations of phenomenon within post-colonial African states since one of the primary political legacies of colonialism was an ideological premium placed on statism, even amongst radical leaders. The capture of the central state was the pinnacle of the independence struggle and remains of primary importance today in many intrastate conflicts; access to the state is a source of wealth and prestige for
leaders, and employment by the government can be significantly more lucrative than private sector work\textsuperscript{4}, resulting in lumbering, though fading, and African leviathans.

The primary challenge to the African post-colonial state was the process of state-making, both in the sense of eliminating functional rivals and in creating a legible sphere of action which allowed government officials to operate. To consider an aspect of the military angle specifically, the major failure of operations to remove functional rivals to the state in the domestic arena, is often in a failure of legibility – the inability of the state to “see” the functional rivals because the landscape both physically and culturally obfuscates. Environments that allow insurgents or counter-state violent actors to operate are privileging the vernacular knowledge that states must laboriously and expensively accumulate. On the other hand, standardized, legible communities and landscapes can be governed and pacified with less effort as the state does not have to invest in specific knowledge accumulation of limited generalizable value.

This conceptualization of legibility derives from Scott (1998). Scott’s original application of legibility references the projects undertaken by the state to develop a synoptic vision of its domain to increase the efficiency of its rule. The state acts to assert a legible order within the domestic context against the illegibility of local custom and practice. These result in homogenization, uniformity, grid-making and social simplification (Scott 1998).

Scott positions legibility as the central problem of statecraft; without the ability to convert “complex, illegible and local social practices” into a standard the state can “read”, the state is essentially blind and cannot act effectively (Scott, 1998: 2). He points to examples such as the regulation of land tenure, the development of last names and urban planning as state

\footnote{As the World Bank points out cash and in-kind benefits in the CFA franc countries is much better than private sector employment (which might be difficult to come by anyway).}
programs of legibility that replace vernacular, local knowledge with standard, generalizable knowledge. It allows the state to “see” people, places and economic transactions more clearly. This capacity for sight provides the state with knowledge, in this case standardized general knowledge which is usually at a disadvantage against vernacular knowledge in illegible situations or communities.

At its core, legibility is about knowledge derived from visibility, which highlights how much Scott has borrowed from Foucault. Legibility confers the ability to exercise power more easily through visibility which allows the accumulation of knowledge. Institutions of power, for Foucault, inscribe legibility on the individual body through partition, standardization and discourse thereby making the application of power to those bodies more efficient. The creation of power flows from knowledge, and the ability to produce increasing amounts of knowledge are a function of power as a process. Foucault (1977) points, for example, to the organization of the floor of a factory which is designed to assess and view each unit, which is an individual laboring body creating knowledge, but power must already have been exercised to enforce the organization of the factory floor.

Moving from the domestic to the international arena theoretically highlights a recent body of work which applies this Foucauldian-derived concept of legibility to the action of interstate organizations (IOs) as they act on member states (Broome and Seabrooke, 2012; Zanotti, 2006). Multilateral organizations and international politico-economic structures such as the European Union increasingly endowed themselves with instruments for knowing, assessing, rewarding or punishing the way states governed their population… UN reform plans endeavored to make state institutions and the local phenomena they governed ‘legible and simplified’ [in the example of stabilization operations in Haiti]. The organization’s measuring, counting, recording, coding, law writing and institutional design purported to make a variety of local practices and overlapping jurisdictions
administrable through a central state administration and legible for international bureaucracies (Zanotti, 2006: 151).

In this case, international organizations seek to “normalize” states, since normal states reduce risk by being legible to international organizations and other member states. The view that IOs obtain from the international arena and its member states structures the decision-making environment and the range of generic policy options that appear appropriate. The “legibility” of the situation greatly affects the outcome of the action undertaken by the IGO (Broome and Seabrooke, 2012).

Essentially, Foucault focuses on inscribing legibility on the individual, while Scott brings legibility to the level of the community – the state makes the practices of local communities and social groupings legible. Individuals can be made legible, the landscape can be made legible and community practices can be made legible. States, or more properly the agents of the state whose identity is created and directed by shared notions of appropriate synoptic knowledge and its application, act on individual citizens within the state’s traditional, domestic sphere to create “legibility”. At an aggregated level, states empower agents through the framework of IOs to act directly on the citizens and institutions of other states to create “legibility” within the international arena as a way to modify risk. States, like all organizations that seek to shape the world and exercise power, are concerned with legibility at all levels.

The combination of the concept of “legibility” and the need for an institutionally sensitive inquiry in post-colonial Africa introduces the concept of “inter-institutional legibility” which focuses on the inherently dyadic nature of international relations. States interact with each other through their institutional apparatuses; often these are highly specialized, as for example the United States’ State Department and complex. For the smooth operation of military
engagements, both members of the dyad must be mutually intelligible.

Inter-institutional legibility is conceptualized as the ease with which one set of institutions, in this particular case the institutions of the state, can “read” another set of institutions, those institutions of another state member of the relevant dyad, and thereby lower the cost of interaction with them. This includes how little extra investment is necessary to understand procedures, identify power-dynamics and hierarchies, and to navigate the institutional culture. This type of legibility goes beyond the superficial and requires deep knowledge about the actual pathways of governance and power within an institution. Legibility is relational, and occurs in this case between institutions. Legibility must be measured within the dyad. An institution in a vacuum has no legibility, since there is no other institution to read it, and no need of legibility, since there is no other institution to read.

Inter-institutional legibility at independence was high as a result of the provision of institutions designed by the colonizing country – either mimicking their own or designed by them to make exploitation and rule easier in the colony. The existing institutions in both halves of the dyad included, for the most part, the same actors within institutions with experience interacting pre-independence. Legibility in the context of independence from colonialism built on the process of simplification, homogenization and grid-making which occurred as a previous historical event. Indeed, the entire process of colonization, especially the later era, could be read as a process of making local, foreign customs more legible to the state – colonial administrators reordered local hierarchies of power, drew maps, moved populations and instituted education programs in the colonial tongue. The increased legibility of colonial subjects and spaces made the application of power to increase exploitation more effective.

Further development of legibility could be undertaken by the post-colonial state in an act
of imitation, but unlike the legibility that Scott discusses, imposition of greater legibility post-independence would be more complicated. The act of intervention could have as a side-effect the imposition of greater legibility and so could a variety of other actions like required structural adjustments, or the maintenance of close international relations within a system of power inequalities. For the most part though, former colonial states have greater restrictions on their ability to impose legibility then the strictly technical ones that face states in Scott’s more limited domestic application of legibility. The former colonial state can cultivate legibility, or keep legibility “fresh” through time, by repeated investment in the dyadic relationship through iterative interaction.

Institutional legibility was developed over the course of the colonial historical experience, climaxing perhaps in the grant of independent institutions at the end of the colonial period. Institutional memory and continued interactions predicated on “special” historical relationships continued the development of legibility over time. It provided the intervening country with important information at a lower cost than may be available to an intervening country that lacks that legibility.

Legibility, in this instance, can work reciprocally within the dyad. Scott (1998) argues that legibility is created by the government to view citizens, and does not consider whether the government could make itself more or less legible to the citizen during the process of heroic simplification of society. Legibility could be reciprocal; the greater investment made by either state strengthens ties that run in both directions. The closer the target state remains to its original institutions, the more legible the colonizing country; after all, the structures of power in the colonizing country strongly determined outcomes within the colonized country.
Structural

The learned logic of colonial influence, has actually created the structures of government currently in place for states; even those states which have moved radically from their original colonial inheritance retain the general institutions of a Western state including the very concept of the modern state itself. Even in states that have modified their institutions, and few states remain fully in stasis, the effect of colonial influence on the culture of institutions and the perception of role parameters within those institutions is still strong. Essentially, a logic of appropriateness transmitted into institutions through the colonial legacy increases legibility.

The logic of appropriateness, as elaborated by March and Olsen (1994; 1998; 2004), argues that people, when confronted with a situation that requires action, ask themselves what people like themselves do in a situation like this. This a norm-based explanation for action as opposed to a more strictly consequentialist approach and as such requires an understanding of the norms that are being drawn on, their relationship to the individual’s identity (people like me) and a mechanism to link them to actual actions.

An individual when faced with a situation ascertains first the type of situation she finds herself in. Where a situation is routine and the environment highly institutionalized, there may be clear rules that can be directly applied. These rules are derived either from prescriptions based on the situation and environment – so dyads that interact extensively will have built up knowledge and institutionalized its application to familiar situations. In these cases there is little need for individual analysis or interpretation beyond the initial identification of the type of situation faced. The rules that are applied, and the categorization of the situation are derived directly from role prototypes. In unclear situations, or situations with low institutionalization as is the case for many African states, there may be more variability in rule application. However, while these
states are weakly institutionalized in a systematic way the culture of patrimonialism and prebendalism creates different role prototypes which still have consistent sets of rules and norm, more informally derived, but still present. Indeed, it is possible that the more informal nature of the institutionalized environment more highly rewards repeated interaction to create prescriptions from a more flexible “logic of appropriateness”.

In institutionalized settings, the logic of appropriateness at work in a situation should be the same as one derived from a similar setting – expected actions should be clear as long as those institutions structuring the rule have not radically diverged from the colonial country, or so long as iterative interactions have created an expectation about the setting and situation. In states that lack institutionalization, frequent interaction as a result of lingering colonial interests may have actively shaped the patrimonial tendencies that developed. Former colonial powers will have legible logics of appropriateness through their highly institutionalized regimes; former colonies have legible logics of appropriateness through the informal but consistent culture of patrimonialism, influenced by their colonial legacy.

Stepping up to the organizational level, organizations create the roles and routines through learning by looking to history (Levitt and March, 1988). Historical experience is translated into routines and processes that outlast personnel turnover which means that the legacy of colonial history can long outlive the initial administrators that were trained by it first-hand. Essentially this is the argument advanced by Stewart and Knaus (2011); former colonial countries maintain the institutional memory of expertise in operating in this specific environments including linguistic skills and deep cultural knowledge. Further the institutional attitude orientation may be colored by this historical interaction. Not just the specific routine but the tenor of the routine and its application have been altered by the long historical context.
Expertise of a particular nature may be more highly prized in a former colonial institution, for example language or regional knowledge, as opposed to institutions like those in the United States, where monolingualism is more common and institutions struggle to attract suitable bilingual candidates.

A connotation of a phrase like “learning” is that institutions that learn should become more efficient over time – this, however, is not the position taken here. Selection processes are not constant and institutions fall into equilibrium relatively easily even when there may be better or more efficient ways of handling a situation (March and Olsen, 1998). This is not meant to suggest that institutions in former colonial states are “better” in any normative sense, or indeed more efficient. The narrow scope of this inquiry only suggests that the ability of these types of institutions to “see” the institutions they helped shape, i.e. post-colonial African states, is greater than unrelated institutions, like those of other major powers.

A corollary non-dyadic institutional argument might also look at the institutional memory of the intervening country. Former colonial powers may retain procedures and prize expertise that was suitable for colonial administration which may also be excellently suited for interventions in those countries that it formerly ruled. Institutional memory as a concept may be more difficult to engage with directly in a quantified sense, highlighting the strength of the methods employed here, and therefore will be expanded on within the case studies.

A key institution of interest is the military. Former colonizing states, particularly the French, frequently maintain close relationships between their military and that of their former colonies. They may provide training, aid and assistance to officers, or engage in joint military operations. On a personal level, the military may share cultural features as a result of colonial history. This could assist logistically in interventions on the ground, or at the elite-level through
bargaining. Chains of command are legible; military culture is familiar. Essentially, close military ties ensure that institutionally the “logic of appropriateness” is shared.

**Hypothesis 1 (H1):** Where institutional interaction within a dyad is high, interventions are more likely to achieve their intended goals.

**Cultural**

Culturally, legibility can be derived from a system of elite networks set up through colonialism and maintained after independence. The colonial experience, with its deep state penetration of society and the development of a class of indigenous elite collaborators who took over the apparatus of the state post-independence, created a series of relationships or a social bridge between the political elite of former colonial countries and their former colonies.

Another key institution is the executive, which is classified below within cultural ties. African rulers have often developed power that is not institutionalized in the sense that it is personal power bought through corruption. It is misleading, then, to characterize executive interaction as institutional in a systematic sense, though it is included in the initial csQCA model along with more traditionally institutional conditions.

Individual level analysis of foreign policy generally focuses on the specific characteristics of the particular person under consideration – their childhood, their personality, their perceptions and cognitive processes (Sullivan, 2002). These often rely heavily on psychological or rational models, but they often do not fully account for the weight of iterative interactions that build networks of relationships between world leaders. These interactions are suffused with historic meaning by the weight of the colonial legacy; further, they are *structured* in channels that
facilitate these ongoing interactions.

Instead, executive relations can be most fully conceptualized within the framework of colonial legacy by borrowing from network analysis. The goal of network analysis is to “identify patterns of relationships…and to link those relations with outcomes of interest” (Hafner-Burton, Kahler and Montgomery, 2009: 261). A social network is a “a set of socially relevant nodes connected by one or more relations” (Marin and Wellman, 2011: 11). These nodes can be individuals or aggregations like institutions, organizations or groups. In this case, the nodes of interest are the executives of states.

The focus on the interaction between chief executives, and to a lesser extent other members of the executive branches, captures the essentially dyadic element of interventions. They form a network through interacting one-on-one, and through established diplomatic channels like intergovernmental organizations. History may also shape the amount of interaction, by facilitating it through the creation of organizations, like La Francophonie or the Commonwealth, or by developing relationships that are more privileged, passed down through turnovers of executives. History may create an expectation of relationships, which executives are obliged to carry through with like the Anglo-American “special relationship”. Network analysis is designed to address precisely these “associations among nodes” rather than the more static “attributes of particular nodes” which is commonplace in conflict research (Hafner-Burton, et al, 2009: 562).

Ties can serve as conduits for information, like actual conditions on the ground which may assist with reducing friction, and they can also serve as conduits for material, like weapons and money (Hafner-Burton, et al, 2009). To a certain extent, if the entire international arena of heads of states and chief executives were imagined, they would make up a network of nodes
some with stronger and others with weaker ties. “The strength of a tie is conceptualized as a combination of the magnitude and frequency of interactions between two nodes” (Hafner-Burton, et al, 2009: 563).

Many African states have overpowered executives as a result of the development of patrimonial and “warlord” politics. Even in strong states, the executive is frequently the most important decision-maker regarding military matters. The informal nature of the executive coupled with its power puts a premium on direct relations between the executive and the intervening state – more traditional diplomatic connections make be ineffectual. The importance of the executive is not strictly an African phenomenon either; in France, the “decision to deploy force in Africa rests exclusively on the President and therefore very much on the President’s personal commitment to Africa.” (Chipman, 1985: 26).

The actors that sit at the levers of power in the post-colonial African state are often the same personnel that worked with in the pre-independence colonial institutions. Even in later periods where personnel turnover has occurred simply as a function of a passage of time, these networks may still be functional. Some former colonial states will have retained and actively developed these linkages. Dense transnational social networks maybe created and sustained between policy-making elite groups in each country through these interactions, reinforcing and developing legibility.

Elites in former colonies frequently receive their education in the former colonizing state, creating and cementing elite ties including the propagation of colonial languages as lingua franca at the level of politics and economics. Shared languages facilitate easier and cheaper communication at all levels - down to the tactical boots-on-the ground level.

Educational exchange, and direct political socialization, as occurred for many of the first generation of post-independence African leaders could also create requisite cultural capital – the
inculcation of European mores and experience with political interaction as practiced by their European colonizers would assist in the development of direct executive to executive ties and the identification of personal or nation interests with those of the former colonizer, increasing legibility through convergence, and incentivizing interactions that reinforce legibility.

The first, and most obvious, indicator of legibility is shared language. What, after all, is the United States’ ongoing linguistic difficulties in Afghanistan if not a failure of legibility? Indeed, the protection of linguistic zones has been a conscious aspect of policy for some states after the end of colonization – both to protect their zones of power and as an example of their cultural strength. Linguistics provide a sense of belonging and help demarcate the boundaries of organizations both informal and formal, like Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie.

The role of language in the effectiveness of military intervention has never been systematically considered – though the data presented in the preceding chapter provides evidence of its importance and support for Hypothesis 2a. As a result, this project tries both to frame the way language can be thought about in the situation of military intervention into civil war, and as a plausibility probe around empirical effects.

Foreign languages are in fact virtually invisible. The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations has no entry at all for languages, foreign languages, translating or interpreting, and one of the newest and most popular Anglophone international relations textbooks has similarly no mention of foreign languages (Footitt, 2006: 1).

To date, much of the direct academic concern has been with the role of translators or interpreters – either trained military personnel who have been chosen for their language skill or, usually, trained specifically in what is concerned a security-sensitive language or civilians recruited for their language skills, whose primary role it is to facility communication between the military and a group of people that do not share its primary language.
Translators do not simply act as “language conduits”; they add a level of mediation during the communicative act which may fundamentally change the tenor of interaction or its meaning (Footitt and Kelly, 2012; Palmer, 2007). The use of translators brings with a host of concerns which may increase friction at the operational and tactical level. In situations where states have not made significant investments in language preparation in the past, two forms of friction will be created: security concerns, and the deployment of insufficiently prepared troops (Footitt and Kelly, 2012).

Translators are themselves a security risk. In a situation where investment has not been made to develop domestic language skills in advance translators must be drawn from a pool of civilians in the theater of operation who may have conflicted loyalties – translators are “suspended between…since neutrality is close to impossible” (Palmer, 2007: 14). Or, where the military is required to rely upon ad-hoc language training that has been undertaken in domestic civilian settings it, soldiers with the necessary skills may be suspect (Baker, 2010). For example in the case of British military personnel who could speak German during World War II and the subsequent occupation, their language skills were often the result some time spent in direct contact with the “enemy”, usually before the war (Footitt and Kelly, 2012). Interpretation requires not just dictionary-style knowledge of words and synonyms, but background information on context and culture which raises the perennial problem of personnel “going native” (Footitt and Kelly, 2012; Palmer, 2007). In this case, then, the actual security risk of interpreters and translators is obscured by their perceived security risk as a result of belonging to

---

Footitt, J. (2009). The problematizing of multilingualism is dependent on the conflict context, as Footitt (2009) points out; in the case of the liberation of Europe, learning to speak or already being able to speak languages of Allies was considered a bonus skill that should be developed and displayed, while during the subsequent occupation of Germany, any kind of contact including linguistic contact with Germans was seriously proscribed.
an “enemy” or because of their narrated proximity to the “enemy” (Baker, 2010).

Where linguistic capacity has not been invested in by militaries, it must be built on the fly, requiring the deployment of insufficiently prepared troops. The speed and quality of language capacities that can be built largely rest on the peculiarities of civilian institutions, like the language departments of universities. Calling upon qualified individuals whose language skills were acquired outside the defense realm may be culturally problematic, as well, even when there is a sizeable population of them present. “Although there is a substantial Arabic-speaking population in the USA, it has been suggested that many of them are unwilling to be involved with US organisations in Iraq, or more largely in the ‘war on terror’” (Palmer, 2007: 16).

The NATO deployment to Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 1990s highlights the path dependency of language investment, and the subsequent friction it creates; an individual generally requires years of instruction to reach competency in a language and sufficient teachers must be trained to impart that knowledge – so the lead time on language investment is extensive. For decades major NATO powers had invested Russian language learning in anticipation of the Cold War entering a hot phase. Serbo-Croatian, the language shared by the Serbian and Croatian people of the former Yugoslavia, was not even a minor concern – it was barely a curiosity in British universities. As a result of decades of neglect, the first truly hot war that NATO engaged in following the abrupt and unforeseen end of the Cold War, was in a region where Russian was not a primary language. Instead, soldiers who had for whatever obscure reason taken courses in Serbo-Croatian during their university years were called up, the scant Serbo-Croatian instructors in Britain were called upon to develop crash courses, and soldiers were deployed as interpreters in the field with only three weeks of training in the language (Footitt and Kelly, 2012). A more recent British example is the time it took the Defence School of Languages to develop its Indo-
Iranian wing where Afghan languages are housed – in 2009 it was two and half years old though British troops had entered Afghanistan as part of the NATO in 2001 (Morrison, 2009).

The results of unreliable translation from insufficient expertise, and an organization which lacks the capacity to monitor translation, are problematic for core functions; hastily employed Arabic translators at Guantanamo Bay have compromised interviews through mistranslation, and outsourced translators, such as those at Titan Corporation, have been accused of incompetence (Palmer, 2007). Both during World War II and during the engagement in Bosnia, it took years before the ad-hoc system was fully professionalized and organized to meet operational needs (Footitt and Kelly, 2012).

From a strategic stand-point, translation in wartime is a high-danger, high-pressure situation which may require putting the rare individuals with important skills in harm’s way. The necessity of using translators rather than the ability to directly communicate with civilians in the conflict environment changes the nature of operations and the balance of personnel required. From a humanitarian standpoint, civilian translators recruited in the conflict zone are at increased risks (Palmer, 2007). For example, Taliban forces recognized the special importance and particular vulnerability of translators in conflict, and chose to exploit it by targeting them resulting in significant personnel attrition for British forces in Afghanistan (Haynes, 2011). This, in turn, effects the calculus of the battlefield both on the part of the intervention force and the civilians and combatants it engages with.

Two linguistic logics are operative in an intervention dyad: (1) the logic which incentives and facilities the learning of the language of the intervener by those situated in the target country, and (2) the logic which incentivizes and facilitates the learning of the languages of the target state by the intervening power. They contextualize the importance of the colonial legacy to language
repertoires, and the other forces that incentive language acquisition.

In the context of a colonial legacy, the first logic is often governed by incentives of economic and social mobility which privilege the expansion an individual’s language repertoire into high status languages – usually those of the former colonial power. To be able to speak French in one of Africa’s ostensibly Francophone countries opens doors and the power of English in the increasingly globalized world is a major economic coup. Individual civilians, bureaucrats and general members of the elite will have gained language skills based on its status value. High-ranking members of the military will often have it for the same reason; lower ranking officers and rank and file soldiers may have gained these language skills from officer exchanges and training programs conducted in these languages by Western powers.

Regardless of the colonial context, the second logic – that of the intervener – is more often driven by considerations of global security and long-term strategy. Currently, in most Western countries including the United States, Great Britain and France, there is a legacy of public under-investment in the languages of many of the world’s trouble spots which has been “fundamentally insufficient” when “applied to the post-cold War world of rapid response” (Footitt and Kelly, 2012: 51). This under-investment was driven by “expectations that military languages needs would consist of large-scale requirements for a few well-rehearsed language” deriving from a “framework for understanding that was grounded in the relative certainties of Cold War contingency planning and intelligence” (Footitt and Kelly, 2012: 51). Fundamentally, the logic of the intervener is a logic determined by past security concerns because the trajectory of strategic language policy is one of heavy path dependence.

At the civilian level, where for the most part the potential pool of recruits who may already speak foreign languages resides during peace time, the logic of language repertoires is
distinctly different from that of a civilian in the target state. Considering just Africa, as this research does, the average African citizen with an interest in being upwardly or globally mobile is incentivized to learn one of the economically-important Western languages. For civilians in those Western states, where they have acquired these languages as first-languages, there is no economic incentive to learn Baoulé the most common indigenous language in the region around Yamoussoukro, the capital of Côte d'Ivoire. There is often a cultural disincentive to learn these languages; there is a close association between language and identity, and multilingualism can be seen as a marker of “foreignness”.

At the institutional level, thinking on the role of foreign languages and the scope of capacity necessary for modern security is changing in Western militaries. The United States Department of Defense acknowledge in the 2005 Defense Language Transformation Roadmap that “conflict against enemies speaking less-commonly-taught languages and thus the need for foreign language capability will not abate” while also admitting that “language skill and regional expertise are not valued as Defense core competencies” even as they are “as important as critical weapon systems” (p.3).

At the Congressional level, Senator Daniel Akaka, in his capacity as the chairman of the Subcommittee on Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, admitted:

We know that proficiency in other languages is critical to ensuring our national security. The inability of law enforcement officers, intelligence officers, scientists, and military personnel to interpret information from foreign sources, as well as interact with foreign nationals, presents a threat to their mission and to the well-being of our Nation. (Lost in translation: A review of the federal government's efforts to develop a foreign language strategy: 2007).

---

6 This is especially true of the American case; for example, see Rafael (2009).
These key language skills have not been included sufficiently in operational planning – a lesson learned in Iraq and Afghanistan. The change from the Cold War to the post-Cold War defense environment has, as the example of Bosnia showed, required modern forces to “interact with foreign populations of diverse languages and cultures” and to be effective in core mission operations forces “must be able to communicate effectively with and gain the support of the local population” (Lost in translation: A review of the federal government's efforts to develop a foreign language strategy: 2007).

While the United States is not a case-study here, it is important to note the overall drift of strategic thinking amongst Western states, especially those particularly active on the African continent. Indeed, the US Navy in 2011 listed two major African languages, Somali and Swahili, at its highest need level, and included others like Wolof, Krio and Fulani as “emerging languages”. The US Air Force also identified Hausa, Igbo, Somali, Swahili, and Yoruba as “strategic stronghold” languages. Dialects of Arabic and languages of the Pakistan-Afghanistan region edge African languages and dialects out in order of importance, but regional African languages are very much on the security radar for future investments. Both the United States and Great Britain have a pay award scheme which provides additional financial bonuses to personnel based on their varying levels of fluency in these languages identified as being high-need.

The British have taken an extensive lesson from the Iraq and Afghanistan experience pinpointing “culture” generally, as the particularly important to future engagements (“The Significance of Culture to the Military”, 2009). The conversation is even framed within the context of a loss of cultural immersion that was part of the British colonial administrative and military apparatus – in a situation which is now reversed “with some of [Britain’s] opponents having significant familiarity and understanding of the West, often having been educated there,
and having read our doctrine and studied our culture” ("The Significance of Culture to the Military”, 2009: 4-1).

Doctrine even explicitly couples culture and language together in a need for greater “synergy”, while recognizing that the two are separate though complimentary (“Linguistic Support to Operations”, 2013). It acknowledges that “cultural understanding is fundamental to the analyses/plan/execute/assess cycle, whereas language enables communication”, but takes the position that “generic cultural capability…is not particularly language-dependent” (“Linguistic Support to Operations, 2013: 1-2). The British military position differs from the academics discussed above by arguing that cultural experts and linguists are separate specialties; that there could be cultural experts who need linguistic support, presumably because of their lack of language skills, and that those linguists acting in support would not be cultural specialists. The official position taken then, is that of translators as communication conduits.

The context of “culture” and the importance of “cultural understanding” at this highest level as separate but complimentary, is not necessarily mirrored down at the individual officer level. Students at the Defence School of Languages framed their training there by conflating the two; one officer remarked, “I think cultural understanding is very important and is something that many soldiers lack and that learning the language is just furthering that cultural understanding” (Morrison, 2009).

However, current doctrine does recognize that language capacity is tied to standing tasks, such as defense intelligence and diplomacy, as well as vital to supporting operations. The role of language capability is to “[enable] understanding and [help] deliver influence” (“Linguistic Support to Operations, 2013: iii); this is the discourse of modern counterinsurgency and small wars. The turn toward recognizing the importance of language in operational success is
embedded in the “increased emphasis on decentralised operations requires greater localised situational understanding to exploit initiative and opportunities” (“Linguistic Support to Operations, 2013: 1-1). 

The underlying incentive to greater language capacity for western militaries is constrained by the financial component. West African alone contains hundreds of languages, training for linguists takes years, and with an emphasis on rapid operations across multiple theaters there is no cheap way to support large reserves of linguistic experts. The solution might be then, precisely as is argued in this research, operations in theaters were languages are already shared and there is not the requirement to develop separate, security-specific linguistic capacity - interventions in former colonial holdings where the investment in teaching the colonial language began a century ago and is paid for in an ongoing fashion by the educational apparatus of the target state. For this reason the shared language will always be that of the intervening state – the colonial tongue. 

Closely related, as the example of la Francophonie illustrates, is the membership in shared organizations that promote values and institutional arrangements considered normatively worthy. It can also include memberships in organizations that promote shared military, economic or developmental goals. These organizations incentivize legibility, and frequently have institutional requirements for entrance that ensure a homogenized field of institutions in a particular area of concern. 

At the strictly dyadic level, the presence of military agreements and the attendant interaction between military institutions indicates the presence of legibility, this further supports Hypothesis 1b, above. Training agreements are actual transmitters of legibility, providing for the direct schooling of one military institution in the techniques and culture of another military
institution. The provision of military equipment also makes legible the operation of the military down to the caliber of its bullets. The penetration of foreign militaries by military trainers and technical advisors can also provide a direct line for intelligence gathering – intelligence being one of the key components for overcoming friction.

Hypothesis 2: Where high elite social network density within a dyad exists, interventions will be more likely to achieve their intended goals.

Hypothesis 2a (H2a): Where executive interaction within a dyad is high, regardless of the level of other institutional interactions, interventions are more likely to achieve their intended goals.

Hypothesis 2b (H2b): Where dyads share a language, regardless of levels of other network relationships, interventions will be more likely to achieve their intended goals.

Hypothesis 2c (H2c): Where dyads share a highly salient overlap in their international organizational membership, regardless of levels of other network relationships, interventions will be more likely to achieve their intended goals.

Hypothesis 2d (H2d): Social network density will be higher in dyads that include a former colonial relationship.

Friction

Legibility, with its implications of visibility and sight, dovetails nicely with the Clausewitzian view of fog – which limits visibility in war – and the friction it entails. Greater legibility naturally makes mapping out the situation into which an intervening force is entering more effective. This is fairly straightforward; the more an actor knows, the better his assessment of the outcomes and the options available to him. More information is better.
Fog is a component of, or sometimes considered a companion to, “friction”, which Clausewitz argues makes war a “resistant medium”; after all "everything is very simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult” and that difficulty sprung from friction is the difference between war on paper and actual war (Clausewitz [1832] 1984, 56). General friction can result in paralysis, impeding even the most basic of functions. Militaries on the march are large complicated organizations, with multiple layers of hierarchy working in environments with spotty or confusing communication that requires on the spot decision making – not unlike the political institutions that send militaries into the field. Battlefields, like all complicated, high-stress environments, are constantly changing, full of uncertainty; even walking down the street can become impossible when there is no way to know who or where the enemy is, where the IEDs have been placed or what is around the corner.

A level of uncertainty, or the reliance on probabilities, is an unchangeable fact of the world, even more so in the case of war. Uncertainty about the conditions and disposition of the enemy can be reduced through efficient intelligence gathering, or the attempt to make “legible” the theater of hostilities and the other actors therein. However, Clausewitz identified the failure of intelligence, both the gathering and the judgment of it, as “one of the most serious sources of friction in war” ([1832] 1984: 117). Rumor about the enemy and his intentions is a serious cause of misjudgment. The power of rumor in the face of a short-fall of real information does not operate strictly in theaters of on-going war but also within the institutions at great remove from battlefields, those that formulate and implement foreign and military policy. The need for intelligence, both during but especially before the beginning of any military operation, is what ties the concept of friction to the concept of legibility outlined above.

Fog inhibits “legibility”, but more so in an intervention into a foreign, and ongoing
conflict than in a traditional interstate war like those Napoleonic campaigns that Clausewitz was
drawing on. The battlefield includes multiple groups of combatants, some that must be
coordinated with, and possibly more than one set of adversaries. Successful interventions often
require more than strictly the application of military force in a physical environment; they may
require relationship building and maneuver in a social environment that is equally shrouded in
friction-creating “fog”.

Clausewitz identifies experience as the chief remedy or “primary lubricant” to reduce
friction’s “abrasion” ([1832] 1984: 121). Experience in fighting, but also experience in operating
in an environment of uncertainty. The mechanisms that indicate and develop legibility outlined
above, a shared logic of appropriateness and shared elite cultural network, provide experience
with the environment in which the intervention would occur and the personnel with whom such
an intervention would require interaction.

The modern solution for fog and friction is ‘dominant battlespace knowledge’ delivered
by technological advances capable of maintaining “real-time, all-weather awareness” and real-
time communications (Owens, 1995: ii). The recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the Israeli
war against Hezbollah in Lebanon, however have illustrated the “unrealistic expectations” that
reliance on purely technologically-derived visibility can have (McMaster, 2008: 23). Operation
Anaconda, a Coalition-forces attack in Shah-i-Kot valley demonstrated that the tactically
relevant intelligence could not be derived from purely technological means (Ibid). Legibility in
the larger sense explicated here is a more meaningful solution for this fog and friction, and
requires relationships rather than strictly technological applications.

Clausewitz was talking about operational experience at the level of the soldier on the
ground, but ‘dominant battlespace knowledge’ operates at the level of the organization – the
concept of friction and the solution to it can easily be applied at the institutional level. Friction is the result of resistance building up between moving parts; institutions moving against each other generate friction, and inexperience interacting and lack of knowledge makes the grinding worse.

Legibility is essentially about visibility created through knowledge; a lack of legibility increases institutional friction. Friction is a measure of the difficulty that an institution has in operating in an environment with another institution, i.e. how easily a military can work in tandem with the military of the host country, or against it.

Goal Creation

Policy makers do not set out to fail, setting aside possible manipulative obfuscation and purposeful actions to mislead. However, policy makers suffer from cognitive limitations and imperfect knowledge as all actors do. This lack of intelligence about the environment, the enemy and his intentions is a primary source of friction, to Clausewitz, and legibility is the solution to poor intelligence. Poor intelligence also hampers the development of an adequate “standard of judgment” to make sense of future intelligence – its “accurate recognition” (Clausewitz [1832] 1984: 117).

Reasonably, if a policy maker desires to transition a country to democracy, but who through application of a reasonable “standard of judgment” determines that outcome is unfeasible, they will not proceed to engage in an intervention to achieve that goal. Instead, they may set a goal that is related to their ultimate desire but that is achievable. Instead of attempting to make a transition to democracy, perhaps the intervention could reasonably result in an executive turnover. To know whether that turnover would be desirable or possible, the policy maker would require knowledge of the alternative candidates, their support and their reasonable
chances of success in the conflict. There are domestic limitations on possibility derived from the risk assessments as well. Potentially a greater range of policy goals can be achieved if more money, man power and effort is invested. The ability to weigh cost against achievable goals requires extensive, sophisticated information.

Theoretically, success as defined below, is about the achievement of policy goals through the application of intervention as an instrument of their attainment. In a world of perfect legibility, interventions would be successful as much as the time as simple probability will allow. In retrospect, it is possible to identify points at which policy goals were developed from faulty assumptions about the people, balance of forces, civilian orientations and attitudes.

Decision-makers with better knowledge will avoid interventions that are weighted for failure before they have begun. A politician looking for peace in the Great Lakes region will not work to install a known war monger as the president of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, if they have sufficient information and interaction with the candidate. Executive relationships built through elite networks is a decisive factor in that scenario. That does not mean that no interventions would fail, but that goals will generally be more realistic and achievable through the application of the instrument of intervention.

**Intervention Outcome**

These goals are directly connected to the issue of intervention outcome. Unlike previous studies, the position taken here is that intervention outcome can only reasonably be conceptualized as it relates to the intentions of the intervener when undertaking it. Too often an understanding of success in interventions in civil wars hinges on whether or not hostilities cease, but this is not often the primary purpose one state chooses to intervene in another. It would be
problematic to hold states to a standard they were not aspiring to at the time of their intervention. Assuming that success is synonymous with ceasing hostilities for the purpose of saving lives also runs the risk of conflating all military intervention with armed peacekeeping animated by humanitarian goals.

To gain leverage on the paradox of military intervention's popularity despite its general failure at ending conflicts or mitigating damage, the currently accepted conceptualization of success is insufficient. Success is meant differently here than has become common elsewhere in the literature; success is defined as the fulfillment of intervening actors’ goals, no matter their normative worth. It is not impossible to imagine a situation where fanning the flames of a conflict regardless of its manageability or who is winning could be useful to certain external actors’ goals. To ensure that success or failure for each case is appropriate, I will explore the primary motivations of the intervening state or coalition in the case of each intervention. These are gathered from primary and secondary sources, and take into consideration factors that extend beyond the publicly stated intentions of the intervener.

This strategy does risk running into two empirical problems: (1) stated goals may mask actual goals and (2) goals may change over time. An intervener may enter a conflict with one purpose and as the conflict evolves new goals may supplant or modify the old ones. Unstated assumptions do not provide a path out of the messy reality of civil wars and interventions – these problems can only be solved by being confronted head on.

The problem of congruence between stated goals and masked, presumably less ethically sound goals, is less of a concern than it at first appears. The humanitarian justification may be just a justification, but it also influences how an intervention must be designed otherwise there is
no purpose to the facade\textsuperscript{7}. Geopolitical goals, especially during the Cold War era, are relatively straightforward especially in major power interventions. In the major democratic powers, like the United States who is the world's most active intervener, many of the decisions to intervene are made in at least a semi-public fashion, subject to political debate and criticism. One way that this study hopes to prove the reliability of the data gathered for interveners' goals is through the use of case studies.

The second problem is also not as intractable as it may appear. For policy makers focused on decision-making at the outset of interventions, the changing goals throughout the evolution of a conflict are difficult to guess. Rarely do primary goals get tossed to the wayside unless they have become impossible to meet – a failure. Changing goals, especially publicly, is usually a matter of trying to rescue the perception of an intervention that cannot succeed on the original terms. New goals are undoubtedly tailored to be easier to meet and therefore are not a good gauge by which to measure success of intervention as a strategy. A policy-relevant analysis must then be useful in helping policy makers before the decision is made, assessing the original intentions of the intervention.

Greater legibility reduces friction, and the amount of friction increases the costs of interaction, hindering the achievement of goals and therefore a successful outcome for an intervention. Legibility provides “total battlespace knowledge” at the institutional level, where decision-making is made to ensure that the intervention is set to reasonable goals. The attainment of those goals is the most meaningful measure of “success” despite the empirical problems its measurement entails.

\textsuperscript{7} This idea is borrowed from Marten, 2004 who argues that humanitarian justifications for imperialism had to affect policy design because domestic audiences demanded it
Chapter 3 – Methods

This project does not purport to explain all interventions' success. The field of international military interventions is large; interventions occur on nearly every continent and are initiated by major powers and regional neighbors. This study is focused on interventions African civil wars since independence (1960). To test the role that pre-existing relationships play in intervention success, interventions by colonizers will be compared to each other, and to interventions by non-colonial states through a variety of conditions which measure structural and cultural inter-institutional legibility.

The selection of Africa is not arbitrary. Focusing on intervention in Africa facilitates comparison, and involves the majority of the possible universe of cases. Africa accounts for 38% of all civil wars between 1960 and 2007, far more than any other single region, and it accounts for 49% of all interventions into civil wars in the same period. Africa also contributes a significant percentage of all civil wars; it accounts for 23% of civil wars in the entire Correlates of War intrastate war dataset, though measurement on the continent only began in 1960 while the first civil war for the dataset is recorded in 1818. When colonial powers intervened in their former colonial possessions’ civil wars they overwhelmingly intervene in Africa; Africa constitutes 71% of interventions by former colonial powers in their former colonies.

While proportionally there have been many interventions in civil wars in Africa, from a statistical standpoint military interventions into civil war are not a sufficiently common occurrence, and the issue of model specification so unreliable, that the meaningful application of statistical methods is difficult. A variable-oriented approach to intervention studies has resulted in a body of work where outcome measurement is not necessarily valid. A strictly case-oriented approach lacks the generalizability necessary for policy relevance. Instead, the combination of
QCA methods, focusing on conjunctions of conditions measured in a qualitative manner, and structured, focused case studies provide both more valid measures and more generalizable conclusions.

The methodological approach used in this study combines iterations of QCA with comparative case studies to act as a funnel; the study begins the most general level, testing the basic proposition outlined in the theoretical model across all cases of intervention into African civil wars from 1960 before testing the relationships and refining the measures on a specific subset of successful intervention cases, former colonial power interventions. Finally, the case studies examine in-depth the relationship conditions identified as important by the iterative application of QCA to modern, policy-relevant cases to further refine the mechanisms by which they produce the outcome.

**Qualitative Comparative Analysis**

This project will utilize Qualitative Comparative Analysis coupled with analytical case studies. QCA is useful in the study of military interventions because of the intermediate number of cases available and their complex nature which makes them unsuitable for meaningful quantification and which contribute to the issue of multi-causality. “Reality will provide us with conditions which are sufficient and necessary only in combination with other conditions (‘conjunctural causation’) or which are only one alternative among others that only apply to some cases but not to others (‘equifinal causation’)” (Wagemann and Schneider, 2007: 4). The complicated interplay of existing conflict dynamics, domestic and international politics all multiply the “moving parts” that research must capture to explicate intervention success.

QCA pairs well with structured, focused comparative case studies because by its very
nature, QCA is iterative. The researcher is encouraged to return to the data throughout the analysis, adding or removing cases and altering the thresholds for the variables. As a result, the move from crisp-set dichotomous, single indicator conditions to fuzzy-set measures constructed from multiple indicators, both of which are deployed in this study, is not necessarily problematic for the analysis since it is based on theoretical and empirical knowledge gained from the initial csQCA (modeled in the next chapter). The creation of the QCA dataset and its analysis builds the framework for the case studies as well as helping to define the universe of appropriate cases from which to choose. Further, the QCA, not entirely unlike traditional statistical methods, cannot provide a detailed explanation of causal pathways – it can, however, point to the pathways that the case studies will further explore.

The first analysis utilizes csQCA on a dataset that includes all interventions in African civil wars from 1960 to 2011. This includes regional, multilateral and former colonial power interventions. This allows the comparison across types of interventions, and relationships, while comparing with the unique pathways to success created by the former colonial relationship. The dichotomization required of csQCA methods risks the loss of information, but increases clarity.

The second analysis utilizes fsQCA on a dataset that includes interventions by former colonial powers and the United States from 1960 to 2013. The French intervention in Mali is included in this second dataset but not in the first because of timing between the actual intervention and the creation of the datasets. The United States is included in this dataset for comparison. There is the possibility that the confounding factor of military capability explains the apparent relationship between colonial status and success. Former colonial powers today are often still capable of fielding professional, full equipped modern militaries in a way that regional powers in Africa may not. An alternative solution would be to include a fuzzy-set score of
national material capacity or a related measure, but these are not necessarily good indications of the ability to project for abroad. Instead, the inclusion of the United States will provide a comparison of a modern, strong military power without the historical connection of colonialism.

Two unique data-sets, designed for crisp-set qualitative comparative analysis and fuzzy-set analysis were created for this study. The base list of conflicts and interventions is drawn from the Correlates of War (COW) Intra-State War dataset version 4.0, with major modifications and additions (Sarkees and Wayman 2010). The COW data was utilized, despite the definitional problems inherent in the project, as discussed below, for a number of reasons. First and foremost, it was selected for the magnitude of its impact and continuing prominence in the quantitative literature, which allows the qualitative analysis provided here to be compared and paired with the traditional quantitative analysis favored by other multistate examinations of civil wars more easily. Second, the COW data is designed to be integrated with a number of other data sources made available both by the COW project, and by other independent researchers. This flexibility makes the addition of necessary information more convenient, both in this study, and for researchers that might seek to utilize the modified data later.

The COW project considers a civil war to be a subcategory of intrastate wars, but for terminological ease, all intrastate wars are included in this project as “civil wars”, since this more closely follows the current literature (Sarkees and Wayman, 2010). A civil war has at least two participants: the government and a non-government armed actor. The newest typology produced by COW allows for civil wars that do not include the central government, but none are included in the data used here for the simple reason that none occurred within the time-frame specified, in Africa and included an intervention. The non-government side must put up an “effective resistance,” measured as a ratio of fatalities to avoid conflating government-sponsored massacres
or politicides with civil wars (Sarkees and Wayman, 2010). The conflict must occur within the boundaries of an internationally recognized state, and external intervention must not take-over the bulk of the fighting.

My unit of observation is a single military intervention in an intrastate conflict in Africa since 1960. A military intervention, for this study, requires the deployment of military personnel authorized to engage in combat, on the ground in the territory of another internationally recognized state. Military interventions that are constituted exclusively by air strikes, like the recent intervention in Libya or the NATO intervention in Kosovo, are not considered in the data. Further, the provision of military material or advice without a combat-active personnel component is not included as an intervention, but maybe captured as part of a military relationship within the independent variables.

Individual conflicts may have multiple interventions, or they may have only one. If an intervention is explicitly multilateral, than the coalition intervention will be counted as an individual intervention for each state which passes the minimum threshold of boots on the ground (1000) or suffers 100+ battle-deaths – drawing on the Correlates of War classification (Sarkees and Wayman, 2010). However, the goals are judged based on the mandate of the multilateral intervention, unless there is compelling evidence that the individual intervener was pursuing a drastically different goal at the time of the intervention; this means that individual interventions may share goals through their shared multilateral mandate. The only cases in the data set where interveners participating in a multilateral intervention were coded with individual goals not necessarily related to the organizational mandate were Nigeria under the auspices of the ECOWAS interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

The definitional dilemmas of how to distinguish intervention from other forms of
influence which are pervasive in the international system have led to some theoretical difficulty
for scholars. For an empirically grounded study such as this one, nonevents are too difficult to
identify; nonintervention as a form of intervention is impossible to delineate from a situation
where no power or state is making a purposive decision not to intervene. How do we know that
the United States believes that nonintervention is an active strategy as opposed to simply being
uninterested in the conflict at hand?

The interventions about which this study is concerned only include military interventions
with boots-on-the-ground for a number of reasons. First, the empirical problem again is
paramount. The measurement of troops on the ground, or active military operations is easier than
attempting to quantify diplomatic pressure, or more subtle forms of economic intervention.
Further, it allows for a recognizable distinction between the interventions herein considered and
influence. Interventions certainly aim to influence the domestic political situation of a state
separate from the one that chooses to intervene, but intervention is marked by its generally
convention breaking nature (Rosenau, 1969), that is that interventions violate the internal
sovereignty of a separate state. Relatedly, it can be thought of as “organized and systematic
activities across recognized boundaries aimed at affecting the political authority structures of the
target” (Young, 1968: 178). Interventions are essentially a challenge to Westphalian sovereignty
in a way that influence, a standard of diplomacy, is not.

The temporal timeframe includes only interventions in civil wars after 1960. The colonial
legacy is of primary theoretical interest so the threshold was relatively easy to set. The majority
of Africa was decolonized around 1960 – though Lusophone Africa was required to wait much
longer. Selecting 1960, however, captures the majority of conflicts in which former colonial
powers would intervene, closest to the point of colonialism, without the confounding
classificatory problem of accounting for anti-colonial wars.

**Intervention Outcome**

The dependent variable, intervention outcome, is measured based on the goals of the intervention, as discussed in the preceding chapter. It is measured dichotomously: success or failure in the case of the csQCA dataset, and along a fuzzy continuum for the fsQCA. To measure success in a meaningful way we take into account the motivations of the intervener in each case. Success here will be measured by the fulfillment of goals. Measuring multiple goals for each case allows us to accommodate the complex policy situation that surrounds interventions and gives rise to multiple goals while dichotomization allows us to simplify the world sufficient for analysis. For each case as many major goals as could be identified were coded. The majority of interventions were coded with one or two goals, and a few had three.

Goals were derived for each conflict from at least three secondary, academic sources or where available, English-language news sources. For many of the earlier conflicts, significant historical and political science work has been done on their causes, complications and actors. However, it is important to keep in mind that books by historians, while useful sources of data for political scientists, are not entirely neutral empty recitations of fact; they are “theory-laden”. That is why multiple sources were triangulated, and claims by one source interrogated against claims made by others. For later conflicts where academic sources are sparser and proximate news accounts are more available, the goals were derived from analysis of news sources and speeches.

To determine success, first the individual goals of each intervention had to be identified and then categorized. Success is measured as the extent to which these goals are achieved. To assist with generalization, goals were categorized inductively in seven ways: humanitarian,
security, economic, ally power maintenance, domestic political, geopolitical, and territorial.

Humanitarian goals are related to the mitigation of damage and destruction or fatalities from the conflict. It could also include interventions to protect the distribution of aid or to secure aid workers in the conflict zone. Peace-keeping missions under United Nations auspices also fall under this category.

Security motivated interventions are for the purpose of controlling the spread of conflict beyond its initial borders to protect regional stability, or as an opportunity to target domestic insurgents or foreign terrorists that may be operating in foreign bases or aided by foreign governments. The main purpose is to increase the security of the intervening state directly.

Economic goals are focused around the control of resources either directly or through gaining investment opportunities/market share. This could also include interventions to protect the supply of resources or stabilize the region from which they come to maintain access. Economic interventions may also be utilized to force repayment of loans or protect the ability to repay overtime.

Geopolitical goals include Cold War proxy fights or interventions to maintain spheres of influence. For regional powers, this often is the desire to create or maintain a regional hegemony, or to prove the ability to “play on a world stage”.

Ally power maintenance include interventions made to prop up or secure friendly regimes. Alternatively, they are undertaken to replace regimes with insurgents who may constitute a more friendly government once they have taken power.

Domestic political interventions are at the behest of domestic political elites for their own purposes – for example, pressure from a politically important diaspora population, or to protect expatriate investments or businesses. Domestic political interventions could also result from the
application of foreign policy campaign promises, or to distract constituents from worsening domestic conditions (wag the dog). Interventions motivated by domestic political pressures could also include those that are demanded by the public.

Territorial goals center on gaining or maintaining territorial control over some portion of the state that is being intervened in. This may be at the behest of irredentist elements within the target state. It may also be undertaken for the simple purpose of gaining increased territory while taking advantage of internal conflicts.

Table 1 - Intervention Goals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intervention Purpose</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
<td>Mitigate destruction/loss of life, protect aid disbursement, rescue or protect expatriates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Increase the security of the intervening state directly by eradicating havens for domestic insurgents, protecting the state from incursion or fear of spill-over effects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Control of resources, stabilize supply of valuable resources, gain market share</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ally Power</td>
<td>Secure friendly regimes, replace existing regime with more friendly insurgents, maintaining puppet government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Political</td>
<td>Behest of domestic political elites for their own purposes – pressure from diasporas or ideological commitments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irredentist</td>
<td>To support secessionist movements, particularly those related to important diaspora or ethnic elements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geopolitical</td>
<td>To balance against other regional/system-wide powers, including Cold War proxy concerns or to create or maintain a regional/system-wide hegemony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial</td>
<td>To gain or maintain territorial control over some area of the state intervened in</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two datasets were developed, both sharing modifications and utilizing as a basis the
COW intra-state war data. The first dataset includes goals and relational conditions for all interventions which occurred within Africa during the specified time period. The second dataset includes goals and more specific relation conditions related to the colonial legacy for interventions by former colonial powers in Africa. The first dataset utilizes dichotomized conditions for a csQCA analysis, while the second one includes multi-value calibrated fuzzy-set membership scores on both the causal conditions and the outcome for a more fine-grained analysis.

The COW dataset uses the conflict as the case; so the first modification was to separate each individual intervention. Since the original dataset is largely utilized in quantitative literature, and used often on questions of conflict duration and onset, there were discrepancies between COW coding of conflicts and the way that these conflicts are handle qualitatively. In these cases, some conflicts were combined and others expanded to take into account the way these conflicts are generally handled as total events in the historical and qualitative literature.

The Cuban and Somali interventions in Ethiopia beginning in 1976 are coded as single interventions. The Correlates of War transforms the first intervention into an interstate war, and then transforms it back into an internationalized civil war. The players and their goals never change and the transformation is the result of reaching and then falling below essentially arbitrary thresholds. The interventions themselves do not cease and then are recommitted so they are coded as a single conflict instead of a Cuban and Somali intervention in two conflicts. The Nigerian intervention in Liberia beginning in also combines two COW cases, as the first intervention is transformed into a state of non-war conflict, after falling below the intensity threshold, and then coded as a second intervention in the same conflict after it passes above the threshold again. Since these are also the same intervention without break in their policy or
deployment it makes more sense to consider them together.

Conversely, the Correlates of War includes the wars and subsequent interventions in Somalia beginning in 1992 as a single case. While this makes sense if the unit of interest is the war itself, it is inadequate when the interventions are of theoretical interest. Instead, interventions have been coded based on the United Nations mandate, separating the UNOSOM I, UNITAF, and UNISOM II interventions and coding them with separate goals and outcomes. This results in two coded interventions for the United States, UNITAF and UNOSOM II, and two for Pakistan, UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II, instead of a single intervention in Somalia for each. The other interveners participated in UNOSOM II, and so their goals and success are based only on the UNOSOM II mandate.

The iterative, exploratory nature of the research methodology applied here overcomes some of the tentative or rough nature of the data that is available for the creation of datasets. It also serves as a curative for the problems of model specification and concept definition that plague the quantitative study of interventions and civil wars without sacrificing rigor, transparency and comparability. The methodological choices outlined here allow for later expansion of the universe of cases, allowing the bounded generalizations that this study will arrive at to be pushed outward at a later date.

**Crisp-Set QCA**

CsQCA is designed for the identification of necessary and sufficient conditions through the application of Boolean algebra. The goal of csQCA (and fsQCA) is to arrive at a parsimonious solution equation which outlines the configuration of sufficient conditions to produce an outcome in the observed cases. This is achieved through Boolean minimization which is “the reduction of a long, complex expression into a shorter, more parsimonious
CsQCA requires the dichotomization of all of the conditions of interest and the outcome. While this allows for simplicity in the calculation of equations and in the interpretation of results, there are serious drawbacks to the significant loss of information that this procedure entails. The accompanying use of fsQCA in this study is meant to remedy some of these deficiencies while still allowing for the use of csQCA to highlight the configurations of interest with effective parsimony.

The truth table is the foundation of the csQCA analysis. It contains as many rows as there are possible configurations of the dependent conditions included in the model. The size of the truth table is dependent on the model specification. It includes rows for all logically possibly configurations of conditions, regardless of whether there are observations that match those configurations. When all cases with the configuration share the outcome value, that row is labeled with that outcome value. When some of the cases in the row share the configuration but have different outcome values it is considered a contradictory configuration. Contradictory configurations are not necessarily a problem for the analysis. They must, however, be resolved to reduce the equation and the manner of their resolution must be theoretically justified and transparent. There are a number of best-practice methods of dealing with contradictions, all of which ultimately require the researcher to return to the cases that are contradictory and find the cause within the case narrative. Not all of these are feasible in every research project; the methods used are explained in the QCA analysis contained in the next chapter.

**Conditions**
The conditions included in the first, larger csQCA dataset include a set of measures to
connect inter-institutional legibility, through ongoing relationships, to intervention outcomes.

The conditions of theoretical interest and their definitions are outlined.

*Table 2 - csQCA condition definitions*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition Name</th>
<th>Condition Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shared Logic of Appropriateness</td>
<td>Military Ties: A dichotomous measure of military interaction between the former colonial state and the target state. If the dyad has engaged in joint military operations, training or officer exchanges within the last decade before the intervention, this will be coded as a 1. Formal military alliances and the provision of military aid within the last decade also will receive a 1. Lack of military interaction, or military interaction that occurred a significant chronological time before the intervention receives a 0.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Ties</td>
<td>A measure of dyadic trade salience derived from Barbieri and Keshk (2012). The formula used to transform the data into a measure of salience is: ( \sqrt{\frac{(Dyadic\ Total/Trade\ Total\ State\ A)\times(Dyadic\ Total/Trade\ Total\ State\ B)}{}} ). The threshold for dichotomization was set at .01993 based on comparison with relatively strong trade relationships in other parts of the world.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite Networks</td>
<td>Executive Ties: This is a dichotomous measure of interaction between the executive branches within the intervention dyad. Extensive personal interaction, or direct endorsement of the executive by the executive branch of the other state would receive a 1. Public censure of the executive by the executive of another state, or the lack of formal diplomatic apparatus would receive a 0.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonial Legacy</td>
<td>Intervener Former Colonial Power: If the intervener is the former colonial power of the state in which the intervention is taking place, then this takes a positive value.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Due to the nature of csQCA, the outcome must be dichotomous, like the conditions. As a result the threshold for success must be set in a meaningful way while taking into account the
natural variation between some success and less success within cases that do not achieve all of their goals. The initial dichotomization was completed by coding those cases where the intervener achieved a majority of their goals as 1 for success, and where they achieved less than half of their goals as 0 for failure. Resolving contradictions within the csQCA involves some refinement and change to the outcome coding and is discussed at length when undertaken in the next chapter.

**Fuzzy-Set QCA**

Fuzzy-set analysis applies the set theoretic logic of the dichotomized csQCA in a manner that allows a more fine-grained analysis of set membership. The dichotomization of relationship conditions and outcomes in the previous analysis, while highlighting areas of theoretical interest, created a number of contradictions that could not be resolved through the crisp-set model (presented in the next chapter). The second analysis is designed to solve some of these problems while zooming in on a subset of successful interventions: interventions by former colonial powers in their colonies.

For this analysis the outcome has been transformed into a fuzzy set membership score. While at first glance this may appear to be simply a transformation akin to the creation of an ordinal-scale or categorical variable it is actually a much more theory-rich procedure. Fuzzy set membership is anchored qualitatively by full membership at one, and full non-membership at zero, with a cross-over anchor at .5. Membership scores are not relative, but related to these anchors by theoretical considerations.

A fuzzy set can be seen as a continuous variable that has been purposefully calibrated to indicate degree of membership in a well-defined set. Such calibration is possible only through the use of theoretical and substantive knowledge, which is essential to the specification of the three qualitative breakpoints (Ragin, 2009: 90).
The average variable utilized in traditional statistical techniques is un-calibrated; these measures show relations and orders between cases but are not directly interpretable against “dependably known standards” (Ragin, 2008: 175). Since QCA employs a set-theoretic approach that more closely aligns with our verbalizations of theories, calibration is set based on distinguishing relevant from irrelevant variation across subsets of a concept. For example, the variation between the GDP of the United States and Sweden may be numerically larger, but if the underlying concept we are concerned with is “wealthy democracies”, the variation is probably irrelevant theoretically and we might assign the two countries the same fuzzy score of 1.

The problem of quantification of the outcome is one of the strongest arguments for qualitative analysis, but it also makes the development of clear-cut seemingly objective criteria for anchoring difficult. However, an understanding of success built on naturalistic language is intuitively satisfying, and can provide, with careful judgment, the necessary anchors. The use of naturalistic language in the anchors is also more useful from a policy conversation standpoint. Policy makers rarely discuss “single-unit changes in X”, or are concerned with minor, non-significant variation.

The anchors for setting the outcome coding are presented in Table 3 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anchors for fsQCA outcomes</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Full membership (1)</td>
<td>The reasonable achievement of all important goals as measured at the outset of intervention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-over Point (.5)</td>
<td>The reasonable achievement of half the goals measured at the outset of intervention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full non-membership (0)</td>
<td>No achievement of important goals at the outset of intervention.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conditions
Composite measures of the theoretically interesting conditions are used for two reasons. The first is largely methodological; while QCA does not have a traditional degrees of freedom problem that plagues statistics there is substantial evidence that there is an appropriate ratio between cases and conditions. If there are too few cases and too many contradictions, then QCA methods can create models out of random data. As the models created here include 11 cases, the use of more than four conditions creates the “significant possibility of finding non-contradictions” which suggests that models could be generated at random (Marx, 2006: 18). The use of a theory and the application of substantive case knowledge is one check on the concern that models are being created at random; however, best practice also suggests that when cases are limited, conditions should be carefully considered and similarly limited. Therefore, the indicators of interest have been combined to decrease the number of theoretically relevant conditions included in the model.

The second reason for composite measures is more directly related to the research at hand. The csQCA models developed at the beginning of this chapter, and deployed in the analysis in the next chapter, suggest that single relationship measures are insufficient to capture the multiple facets and complexity of inter-institutional relationships that may be at work in determining intervention success. The theoretical argument for institutional legibility does not rest on a single indicator, either, and strongly suggests that states must interact across multiple, relevant institutions to develop legibility.

The fuzzy membership scores for the shared “logic of appropriateness” and cultural

---

8 There are 13 coded cases, however the two American interventions in Somalia do not have a membership in any of the conditions or the outcome about .5 and are therefore not included in the truth table analysis.
networks are derived from the average of the fuzzy membership scores for the indicators. While it is certainly true that mechanical scoring, like the use of means, should be avoided without theoretical justification, the scores obtained were carefully compared to the cases to ensure fit. The ability to compare case knowledge with developed indicators is a particular benefit of a small N research design and QCA as a method encourages this sort of iterative engagement between evidence and application. Where available, the scores were compared against other accepted measures of relationships.

The “logic of appropriateness” measure is constructed from four (if the intervener was the colonial power) or three fuzzy indicators: the military relationship, the foreign aid relationship, the economic relationship and the amount of time since independence to capture the steady and natural accumulation of change over time (if the intervener was the former colonial power).

The indicator of military relationship is included in the composite “logic of appropriateness” measure as military interventions are the primary concern of this study, and militaries are the institutions that are most likely to interact directly during an operation. Drawing on the institutional interaction argument around a shared logic of appropriateness built in Chapter 2, a history of interaction lowers the cost of interaction by decreasing friction, military relationships are particularly important for understanding institutional legibility.

The transfer of foreign aid from a donor state to a recipient is a powerful conduit for transmitting institutional norms and structures, which have been hypothesized here to increase legibility. The consensus in the literature is that the provision of aid is often conditioned more by the interests of donor states than by particularly urgent need in the case of recipients (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Maizels and Nissanke, 1984; Younas, 2008). This does not mean that states to not
continue to deploy the motif of development in conjunction with their provision of foreign aid, or even to suggest that it is completely insincere – rather, development is not the dominate concern for the majority of large aid providers. This would suggest that states which share interests will have higher levels of foreign aid; Alesina and Dollar (2000) found that a country with a long colonial history with the donor country could expect about one standard deviation above the mean in levels of aid.

Aid also creates the conditions for greater legibility through the emphasis placed on “institutional development” and “capacity building”. It is an article of faith that aid efficacy and development generally is tied to solid institutions (Moss, Pettersson, and Walle, 2006). The traditional approach to foreign aid is that aid is supposed to help build state capacity, while a modern approach places the effectiveness of aid directly in relation to the quality of institutions. In this case the quality of institutions, the requisite level of “capacity” and their general “goodness” are all measured from how closely those institutions have come to look like the institutions of Western donor states, and therefore their level of legibility.

The fuzzy-set measure for aid is calibrated based on the historical nature, in this case a comparison of levels across five years where available, of the relationship. High and stable levels of aid, in relation to the donor state’s other regional provisions, receives a 1; no aid or negligible amounts of aid receive a 0. The cut-off point of .5 is where the donor state is providing aid but the provision is unstable, trending up or down significantly.

The use of the economic relationship as a measure of a “logic of appropriateness” follows a similar logic to the one outlined above regarding aid. Research has found that levels of trade and foreign direct investment are sensitive to institutional factors that make the environment more predictable and visible to the investor and the state which protects and promotes his
investment; Alesina and Dollar (2000) found that “foreign direct investment is influenced by the enforceability of contracts, rule of law, economic liberty” (p. 41), all of which are the result of institutional “capacity” and are the same institutional effects that investors would expect to find when operating in developed, Western states. Where there is greater investment then, there is an expectation of a “shared logic of appropriateness” that includes respect for property rights and the rule of law, but that are provided by institutions that also have a further complex of “logics” they also create.

The fuzzy-set measure has not been transformed from the crisp-set data. The value remains dichotomous as there was insufficient meaningful variation to be captured in this particular set of cases. Fuzzy-set allows for the addition of dichotomous conditions, so this does not present a methodological problem, and unlike in statistics, the reduction of variation does not threaten the validity of the model.

The cultural network measure is constructed from four fuzzy set indicators: the executive relationship, where the executive was educated, shared linguistics, and the salience of their IGO membership overlap.

The interaction of executives, especially in Africa where the head of the patrimonial state has traditionally been an authoritarian, charismatic leader (often with his own military experience), is of particular importance to cultural legibility and the reduction of friction at the elite level. Foreign policy and military operations are often the exclusive domain of African executives, and intervening states as well. For example, Africa is within the special purview of the French President. Corollary to the fundamental argument of the importance of executive interaction is the fact of executive education. An indicator has been included for the place where the executive received their education; an education in the intervening state would transmit a
host of cultural norms, expectations, and understandings about behavior, interaction and communication.

The executive relationship measure is taken from the same criteria as the crisp-set version, except with the cross-over point at .5 to suggest either negative interactions or a general downward trend or recent change. The executive education indicator comes from the Elgie (2012) dataset for Francophone cases and from the Encyclopedia Britannica for non-francophone cases. Where executives got their final, primary level of education in the other member of the dyad, it is a 1. Where there was ongoing education, some of which occurred in the other dyad member it is a .5 (this includes Mobutu because of his continuing training in journalism in Belgium), or where there was contested executives one of which received his training in the other dyad member and one of which did not (this is the final Côte d’Ivoire case where Gbagbo trained in France and Ouattara trained in the US).

The particular importance of linguistics to legibility cannot be overstated; the development of “national languages” at the expense of regional vernaculars was of particular importance to the process of creating legibility internal to a state (Scott, 1998). Shared linguistics operates as an indicator of tactical legibility, the ability to simply interact with the environment to gather intelligence, coordinate and operate.

At the level of foreign policy, Stewart (2011) argues that the diplomatic institutions of states like the United States and Britain have come to institutionally prize abstract managerial and administrative skills over long personnel postings that develop language and country knowledge. The result has been the creation of diplomatic corps full of non-specialists with no incentive to develop language skills which were previously considered crucial to the practice of diplomacy and intervention. The second of T.E. Lawrence’s (1917) Twenty-Seven Articles.
which he developed after long experience operating with the Bedouin in Arabia, is quite explicit about the necessity of language and the ability to listen to efficient military operations:

Learn all you can about your Ashraf and Bedu. Get to know their families, clans and tribes, friends and enemies, wells, hills and roads. Do all this by listening and by indirect inquiry. Do not ask questions. Get to speak their dialect of Arabic, not yours.

In an institutional environment that no longer strongly encourages education in foreign languages, a language shared by the general populace of both the intervening and the target state would allow for the development of this “crucial deep knowledge” and the maintenance of networks between states.

The linguistic information comes from the Alesina et al. (2003) linguistic portion of their fractionalization measure which in turn comes from the Encyclopedia Britannica. Since there is no way to select years, it is taken for the year available. Since there is no percentage reported because colonial languages are usually second languages, I arrive at a percentage of the population that speak it as a second language by dividing by the population reported in the CIA Factbook. Again, the years do not match exactly so this is a rough percentage; however as this is converted into fuzzy set scores, that is not an empirical problem.

FsQCA uses calibrated scores, rather than measures, so the rough percentage alone does not suffice; language Anchors: 1 – if it is an official language and 20% speak it, .5 – if it is an official language OR 10%, 0 – if there is no significant social role for the language. Since this is dyadic it can be bidirectional, but I assume since these are colonial relationships that it is the colonial tongue which will be widely shared. This is born out in the empirical data.

Shared engagement in IGO’s opens a space for iterative institutional interaction that can create trust, develop legibility and reduce friction through practice cooperating.

A state’s IGO portfolio acts as an instrument for credibly signaling cooperative intent.
The positions of states in the global IGO network – and the micro-level changes they effect in order to alter their positions − reveal strategically valuable information about how those states see themselves in the international system and how they relate to others (Kinne, 2013: 673).

The IGO salience score was calculated in a fashion similar to the original economic equation: square root((Dyadic IGO Membership/IGO Membership State A)*(Dyadic IGO Membership/IGO Membership State B)) and lagged five years. This was transformed into a fuzzy score based on comparison with highly salient dyadic IGO membership overlaps in other areas of the world, and through clustering of the observed values.

**Comparative Case Studies**

The pathways identified by the QCA analysis will form the structure of the inquiry applied to the comparative case studies. The methodological pairing of QCA and case studies will provide a rigorous analytical framework to guide the development of the case analysis. This will create case studies that are more comparative than those produced by more traditional techniques. Further, it will create the possibility of expanding the universe of in-depth case studies by adding cases following a similar analytical framework. In the case of colonial interventions, variance in executive relations and shared language was identified by the QCA presented in the next chapter as instrumental in intervention success − therefore the case selection and the questions applied will revolve around these particular dimensions.

The structured, focused case studies will provide the detailed causal narrative behind the configurations and obtained. They are “structured” in the sense that a set of questions are derived from theory and then asked of each case within the study (George and Bennett, 2005). They are

---

9 Kinne (2013) demonstrates that IGO network convergence has a pacific effect on dyads allowing for a five year lag, and reaches its peak after an eight year lag. This suggests that the dyadic impact of IGO salience across relational interactions becomes measurably effective at five years.
“focused” in the sense that they are concerned only with particular aspects of the case: in the first chapter, goal development; in the second chapter, operations.

The configurations obtained from the QCA analysis will guide process-tracing focusing on:

1. How did colonialism create preconditions for success?
2. How did the intervention capitalize on those preconditions? What types of goals were constructed for the intervention? How did the connections post-independence affect operational friction? To what extent was the intervention accepted as legitimate by the population and the political elites?

**Case Selection**

The QCA presented in the next chapter also identified the unique role that colonial legacies play in intervention success; operating in isolation form the presence of the other conditions it is highly indicative of potential success, and its presence and absence interacts with the other relational conditions. As a result, the case studies focus on interventions by former colonial powers to further focus the analytical power of this study on such an important condition. Interventions by France and Great Britain are selected because, of the former European colonial states, they are the last that remain as major military powers. They are also the most active interveners of the former colonial states. While Belgium and Italy both appear in the dataset, their comparability and modern applicability are lower. The divergent colonial philosophies and histories of Great Britain and France are also well-studied. There is a wealth of primary and secondary sources about both the institutional legacies of their colonialism and their ongoing international relations with their former colonies.
The cases themselves will remain the same in both Chapter 5 and 6, the focus of the questions applied to those cases will shift. There is a benefit to this approach – first it allows for the isolation of confounding factors including the QCA-identified pathways. One of the benefits, or downsides occasionally, to QCA is that it provides solution equations that are not mutually-exclusive. The role of language and the variance of executive relations may be operational on the same case – this is the importance between the difference between general coverage and unique coverage. Unique coverage is the cases that are covered exclusively by the solution. Identifying and isolating the process by which each causally important condition acts on intervention outcome is only possible if both processes are traced in the same case. This will, also, allow a comparison of the types of goals, the level of commitment and the institutional interactions and then hold these constant in both examinations.

The cases selected are the British intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000 (COW War #898), the French intervention in Mali in 2013 (no COW war code), and the French intervention in Côte d’Ivoire in 2002 (COW War #39) and 2011 (no COW war code). These cases are modern, post-Cold War interventions into states in northwestern and western Africa which helps to control issues of temporality and, broadly, geography. Certainly there are still major cultural and sociological differences between Mali and Sierra Leone, for example, but comparability in the real world can only be ascertained so far. They are, also, the types of interventions around which recent policy discussions have hinged – weak states in the 21st century where stability is tied to regional security concerns.

They also vary along the important conditions: executive relations and shared language. The fuzzy-set scores are reported; they are on a scale from 0 to 1, with a cross-over point of maximum ambivalence at .5. These scores are not meant to be considered “concrete” and their
meaning and significance may change through the case-study work. The variance is illustrated in Table 4 below.

*Table 4 - Comparison of cases on relevant conditions*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Study</th>
<th>Executive Relations</th>
<th>Shared Language</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000 (COW War #898)</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French intervention in Côte d’Ivoire in 2002 (COW War #39)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French intervention in Mali in 2013 (no COW war code)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Case Study Data**

The case studies will be focused around “answering” a set of questions rather than developing a detailed narrative. This requires a variety of sources and their unique application. Since the case-studies selected here for this particular analysis are all relatively recent conflicts – the earliest, the British intervention in the decade-long Sierra Leonean civil war, began in 2000.

The result is that there are fewer scholarly analyses, fewer complete memoirs of individual participants to draw on, and many of the most relevant governmental documents are not yet declassified. Perhaps in 30 years a similar analysis of these cases would arrive at slightly different conclusions or a more nuanced measurement of goals and their diffusion or contradiction within state institutions engaged in foreign policy and military policy making, but the theoretical importance is not limited by these standard difficulties of social science generally.

The trade-off is that there is much greater access to electronic sources including news reporting both international and local, recordings of public events, and informal information sources like blogs and organizational websites. An interesting, and often humorous, result of civil wars in the digital age is that even rebel organizations deep in the Malian desert maintain their
own websites complete with picture slideshows.\textsuperscript{10} I have also been able to contact direct observers electronically and in-person\textsuperscript{11}, and access electronic forums and listservs. Where scholarly analysis, usually in the form of journal articles, was available, that was also utilized. Sierra Leone, as the oldest conflict, has greater secondary sources available but as it is still relatively recent many of the scholarly books draw directly on author experience with the conflicts.

The qualitative data was compiled and coded into relevant “nodes” related to each case study using Nvivo Qualitative Analysis Software Version 10. This software allows the researcher to run “queries” on qualitative sources to find associations across and between sources and cases and develop and graph relationships. It can be used to compare, for example, descriptions of an event between primary sources and secondary sources, or across primary sources. In this way it is particularly helpful in interrogating “theory-laden” secondary sources produced by professional historians and political scientists, where sufficient primary sources are also available.

The colonial projects instituted by Great Britain and France also resulted in divergent legacies, allowing us to test whether all colonialism is equal when it comes to the success of interventions. A great deal of scholarly attention has been focused on the divergent principles of French and British colonialism. Are these differences important to legibility for military intervention, or are they strictly superficial in this case?

\textsuperscript{10} The National Movement for the Liberation of Azwad maintains a French and English language site (the French is more up-to-date), though admittedly it is updated and run by associates in Paris and not from Touareg camps in Mali itself.

\textsuperscript{11} I would like to thank Professor Peter Chilson who made himself available to me at Washington State University to discuss his own direct observation and interpretation of events he witnessed directly and avidly follows in Mali and the Ivory Coast.
The basic principle of French colonial administration was “assimilation,” though what that meant in theory and in practice certainly changed over time (Lewis 1962). The purpose of assimilation and its desired scope was never totally clear or without controversy, but it was a French impulse intellectually in keeping with the universalizing impulses of the Revolution. France, unlike Great Britain, for the most part sought to tie its colonies closely both culturally and politically to the metropole. Under different governments, for example, colonies were represented in the national legislature. Some post-independence leaders, like Côte d’Ivoire’s Félix Houphouët-Boigny, served in France’s parliament in Paris or as governmental ministers.

The French divided their colonies into cantons ignoring, in some cases deliberately, existing political boundaries, and created a colonial administration basically from scratch. “The political institutions established by the French displaced pre-colonial institutions of chieftaincy, emphasizing a direct connection between the state and individuals, in particular the head of the nuclear family household” (Maclean, 2002).

Echoing its centralizing tendency at home, France tried to create a uniform colonial apparatus that was roughly similar in form and function in each of its far-flung colonies. France was not up to the task of complete assimilation, and eventually it abandoned assimilation as a policy for one of politique d’association. The name may have changed but the intent remained the same—civilizing; the colonial administration retained the desire to eventually create French citizens out of colonial subjects, education remained in the French-style and colonial administration remained centralized (Crowder, 1964).

The over-seas colonies were intended to become like département and in trying to style them as such the French subordinated or removed traditional leaders. “Chiefs” were not advisors of colonial political officers with positions that they held as a result of local traditions, but rather
they were “mere agent[s] of the central colonial government with clearly defined duties and powers. [The chief] did not head a local government unit, nor did the area which he administered on behalf of the government necessarily correspond to a pre-colonial political unit” (Crowder 1964).

Great Britain, on the other hand, moved away from centralization in Africa as a result of lessons learned during the colonization of India, preferring to develop a system of indirect rule (Mamdani, 1996). This led to a system of rule through “customary” chiefs appointed by the colonial administration for the purpose of institutional segregation. Institutional segregation was premised on the idea that the best form of rule for native Africans was through their own native customs. Of course, what constituted customary rule was highly constructed by the British colonial apparatus and circumscribed by a limit on what “civilized” people might find “repugnant” (Mamdani, 1996).

This institutional segregation resulted in a dichotomy between citizens - white settlers, and subjects - native Africans subject to colonial control. African middlemen were a necessity for the management of colonial power in the periphery, but unlike the French, there was little role for them within the colonial apparatus in the metropole. Britain was also the only African colonial power to voluntarily consider withdrawal from their African colonies. As a result, Britain generally attempted on the eve of independence to put in place institutions of rule that resembled the Westminster system it had successfully exported elsewhere in the Commonwealth.

Britain and France also varied in the degree to which they required colonial officers to develop deep-knowledge of their host societies; the British often promoted learning the vernacular and engaged in longer postings then the French, who because of their particular cultural philosophy preferred to engage with elites in the French language. However, the French
had a much higher ratio French administrators to Africa population in their colonies then the British did – so each administrator spent less time at their posting, but there were more French people serving in these areas (Manning, 1998). The direct impact on later intervention success by these differences may be mitigated by the lack of ongoing relationships the British maintained with former colonies after independence – while the French rotated out administrators and had little interest in vernaculars, they did retain a deep system of influence in many former colonies.

*Table 5 - Length of colonial rule, in years, for each case*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Length of Colonialism (in years)</th>
<th>Mali</th>
<th>Côte d’Ivoire</th>
<th>Sierra Leone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>70</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>174 (Freetown), 65 (Protectorate)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 4 – QCA: Intervention in Africa since 1960

The concept of legibility presumes that over time and through investment, states can increase their understanding of dyadic partners – allowing them to “see” the political and military landscape more clearly. Legibility increases as the amount and salience of interaction between states increases and colonial relationships are long-standing, salient and often the basis of ongoing relations. Since theoretically, I expect that higher legibility decreases friction and helps a state choose intervention with goals which are more achievable; states in those dyads that have more relationship interactions should have a higher likelihood of a positive intervention outcome, in the sense that their goals are met.

The purpose of the QCA analysis is to probe the connection between the relationship measures, a proxy for legibility at the network and institutional levels, and intervention outcome. This is undertaken in two phases using different methodologies. First, the general proposition is explored using a csQCA analysis on all interventions in African civil wars since 1960, including both colonial and non-colonial interveners. Second, the finds are refined through an fsQCA analysis on just interventions by major powers, which in this case includes the colonial powers Great Britain, France, Italy and Belgium, and the non-colonial power the United States. The refinement from the colonial power fsQCA is brought back around full-circle to be tested against the entire dataset of African civil wars using fsQCA and modifications of the original coding.

This iterative research design is a particular benefit of the QCA enterprise at an epistemological level. Every method can be brought to bear repeatedly on the same problem in slightly different ways, but the research philosophy of QCA strongly encourages its iterative use as a dialogue with the cases and theory. Finally, the results will be discussed in relation to a general framework to guide the subsequent structured, focused case studies.
The dataset developed for interventions in Africa includes 44 total interventions in 17 individual civil wars, with an average of 2.5 interventions per internationalized civil war from 1960 to 2011. The rate of intervention in African civil wars is not constant, though an average alone obscures this fact; 72% of interventions have occurred after the end of the Cold War. This is undoubtedly at least partially accounted for by dramatic increase in civil wars since the end of the Cold War, increasing the opportunity for intervention. The average number of interveners also doubles in the post-Cold War era; from 1.7 per conflict from 1960-1990 to 3.2 after 1990.

Regional interveners were the most common; 59% of interventions from 1960 to 2011 were by states that were in the same recognized geographical area. Over time regional interventions make up an increasing percentage of interveners; before the end of the Cold War, they made up 41.7% of all interventions undertaken, but after the portion rose to 65.6%.

The data, as described, is consistent with research on recent conflicts that stresses their increasingly international nature; Gersovitz and Kriger’s (2013) “regional war complexes” is a prominent example of the way that the literature is evolving around the increasingly regionalized, international character of modern civil wars in Africa.

csQCA – All interventions

Truth tables are the foundation of all QCA methods. While it looks like a data table utilized in more traditional techniques, there are key differences. Most importantly, each row is not an individual case; rather each row of a truth table is a configuration of conditions which may be shared by multiple cases. It contains as many rows as there is possible configurations of the dependent conditions included in the model. The size of the truth table is dependent on the model specification. It includes rows for all logically possibly configurations of conditions,
regardless of whether there are observations that match those configurations. Those conditions which are logically possible but do not have observations – a common problem of limited diversity in the social sciences – are labelled with an R in the truth table.

When all cases with the configuration share the outcome value, that row is labelled with that outcome value – either a 1 for success, or a 0 for failure. When some of the cases in the row share the configuration but have different outcome values it is considered a *contradictory* configuration and labelled in the truth table with a C. Unlike statistical methods, QCA does not disregard these contradictory results as outliers and instead requires their resolution through causal explanation.

The initial csQCA model focuses on the role of institutional interactions to test Hypothesis 1 and its attendant sub-hypotheses.

*Table 6: Raw Truth Table*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Row #</th>
<th>Colonial Intervener</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Executive</th>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>R</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This is the raw truth table produced from the initial calibration and coding. Alternatively, the data can be represented graphically. This is illustrated in Figure 1 below. The size of the area is not related to the number of cases included in each configuration. The white areas include no cases – these are the logical remainders. Each row of the truth table corresponds to a space within the visualization.

There are several important points to take from it. The majority of cases are contained within contradictory configurations which, by itself, is not surprising or problematic. Also, there are five configurations which produce successful outcomes without contradiction. Of greatest theoretical importance are the cases included in the configuration:
This provides support to *Hypothesis 1* and its attendant sub-hypotheses. Intervention dyads where *all* of the institutional variables are present including an economic relationship measure, interventions are more likely to be successful. These cases speak directly to institutional interaction and legibility.

They are: the French intervention in Chad from 1968-1971 (COW #771), the Belgian intervention in Zaire in 1978 (COW #811), and the two French interventions in Côte d’Ivoire in 2002 (COW #925) and 2011 (this case has no COW number as the most recent dataset is not updated this far). The presence of all the relationship conditions is a sufficient causal pathway to success – this suggests, at least initially, that some component of dyadic relations affects the intervention outcome.

Of all of the initial non-contradictory configurations, this one also has the greatest frequency with four cases. With a QCA analysis, the frequency of cases contained within a configuration are not necessarily measures of the importance of that configuration theoretically; however, considerations of coverage can assist with judging model fitness. No argument is made here about the theoretical significance of frequency except to point out that 9% of the cases exhibit all of the causally relevant conditions included in this model, and display the outcome of interest: successful military intervention.

Those cases at the bottom of the truth table with an outcome value of R, are logical remainders or those combination of conditions which are logically possible but not observed in

---

12 CsQCA utilizes Boolean notation. Thus the upper-case conditions are those that are *present* in the current configuration, and the lower-case conditions are those which are *absent* in the current configuration. Multiplication is the logical AND, while addition is the logical OR.
the empirical world. While these logical remainders are not observed, their judicious use can be employed in the pursuit of parsimony – a process outlined below.

In an effort to develop parsimonious causal pathways from the data, some transformation and recalibration was undertaken to help resolve contradictions. Since this is the first of several analyses, the simplest method is applied; the contradictions are assessed first on their consistency – the degree to which the cases form a subset of the theoretically important outcome: intervention success. This runs the risk of discounting outliers, a weakness often employed in criticisms of statistical methods, but the combination of iterative analyses and case studies ensures that these cases are not permanently ignored. A particular strength of all QCA techniques is the ability to engage iteratively with the cases and the data. Such re-analysis and recalibration is not considered a failure, but rather a normal part of the analytical process accepting, as a result, that all generalizations are conditional on the recalibration technique.

**Resolving contradictions**
Of the configurations that are contradictory, intcolonial*MILITARY*EXECUTIVE*economic [row 2] is the most consistent. Nine cases are covered by this row, seven of them are successful interventions and two are unsuccessful. The two cases that are contradictory here, understandably, cannot be captured by the relationship variables utilized in this particular analysis: the United States as part of UNOSOM II in Somalia (COW #870), and Zimbabwe in Africa’s World War in the DRC (COW #905). The former is probably more fully explained through the dynamics of international organizations and the process of mission-creep. The latter is most certainly related to the “hollow leviathan” phenomenon and state collapse. These issues illustrate the huge complexity of international and
domestic issues that act on interventions and demonstrate why there are been such difficulty in
the field finding consistency through the use of probabilistic methods.

The non-contradictory cases support Hypothesis 2a and 1b, though this configuration
suggests that each of the hypotheses might create their own possible pathways to success, as
Hypothesis 1c is not supported for these particular cases. For the purposes of solution reduction,
this line of the truth table has been recoded to 1, to replace the contradictory result while bearing
in mind that this has a trade-off of essentially discarding these cases from the final solution.

Solving the other contradictions is not as straight forward. Row 1 includes sixteen total
cases, of which nine are successes and seven are failures. These are cases with no relationship
conditions, and therefore cases that our hypotheses do not provide us with predictions about.
However, we would expect them to be less likely to be successful. This contradiction points to an
under specification of the model. The addition of several conditions drawn from the existing
theoretical literature, including the presence of the Cold War, the intervener and the target states’
Polity scores, and the presence of lootable resources, did not resolve contradictions or derive
unique solutions so they have not been reported in the model presented here. They were not used
for simplification for model specification reasons (see Marx 2006).

The dichotomization of the relationship measures required by the csQCA method has
included greater variation within each category than is necessarily helpful, especially in a
category measuring the absence of the interaction. Further, the design of the measures captures
only positive interactions, which may necessarily exclude states that interact negatively. Whether
or not that negative interaction influences legibility is therefore excluded from this analysis.

For the purpose of solution reduction, this line has been recoded 0 – since the consistency
score is significantly lower than the previous configuration. This has the effect of treating these
cases as “unclear” and removes the configuration from use in minimization. Of these failures, four are related to UN operations in Somalia. Again, this suggests that interactions between coalition members, and possibly only coalition members in UN operations, affect intervention outcomes. However, a great exploration of this possibility is outside the scope of this inquiry.

The two other failures shine a light on some of the weaknesses of the crisp-set relationship conditions coding: the Somali intervention in Ethiopia’s Second Ogaden war (COW #805/808)\textsuperscript{13} and the South African intervention in Angola’s civil war (COW # 804). It would be wrong to suggest that in the decade preceding these interventions that neither Somalia and Ethiopia, nor South Africa and Angola interacted. Their relationships, however, were marked with antagonism, low-level military conflict and diplomatic dust-ups. The relationship conditions are 0 because these states made conscious decisions to break off the formal relations the conditions indicate or could not establish them because of conflict. Interestingly, these are also interventions between contiguous states which ought to have resulted in some amount of legibility. Single indicators of relations, disaggregated into categories, may simply not be equipped to capture these type of relations between antagonistic states. The fsQCA analysis incorporates this lesson by developing the relationship conditions around multiple indicators.

The final failure in this contradictory configuration is a difficult case thanks to external Cold War-related geopolitical concerns: the Cuban intervention in the Eritrean war (COW #798). The Cubans flipped their support on the Eritrean independence question after the deposition of the Ethiopian Emperor (an American client) through a military coup which set up a Marxist

\textsuperscript{13} These two wars were combined in the dataset used for the analysis though COW treats them separately, because conflict 805 never ended, it was transformed, and then transformed back into conflict 808 without changing actors or having a significant chronological break.
military junta. Many ELF and ELPF members were trained in Cuba before this flip. In a case with as fuzzy political landscape as this, my initial theorizing expects failure as legibility is seriously reduced by non-institutional factors. In fact, Hypothesis 2 suggests that dense social networks increase legibility, but as these networks are deliberately complicated their capacity for legibility production may be reversed.

They also, more importantly, suggest that relational issues of international relations are important to intervention success, the underlying logic of the hypotheses generated here – contradicting the nearly exclusive emphasis on conflict structure variables that are central to the current literature on intervention. It suggests that international interactions can be the missing piece of the puzzle for intervention success, but that it may simply be too complicated to capture in solution equations – a problem that will be remedied through the use of comparative case studies. These relationships may also not be the ones captured by the theory employed here; a more specific typology of interventions could be derived from this work to further refine later research.

Resolving row 3 is similarly difficult. Four of the nine cases covered by this configuration are successes, while the other five are failures. The Angolan successes (COW #895, 897 and 905), and the Guinean intervention in Guinea-Bissau (COW #902) are contradictory partially as the result of the rounding system used to take a multivalue outcome and dichotomize it. An analysis was run using a more conservative rounding system, but it resulted in similar contradictions as the result of borderline or unclear cases. These are marginal cases of success (coded originally as partial success) so they are removed from the analysis to resolve the contradiction as well. These marginal cases are treated with greater nuance in the fuzzy-set QCA.
Reduced solutions
Once these illuminating contradictions have been resolved the following solutions are
obtained without the use of logical remainders:\[14\] INTCOLONIAL*MILITARY*EXECUTIVE + MILITARY*EXECUTIVE*econ + intcolonial*military*EXECUTIVE*ECON + INTCOLONIAL*military*executive*econ \(\rightarrow\) SUCCESS.

To arrive at a more parsimonious solution equation logical remainders, can be included in
the Boolean minimization process. Essentially the software (Cronqvist, 2011), makes
assumptions about the outcomes of cases if they existed within those empty spaces. The six
logical remainders used are reported in Appendix A. The three causal pathways obtained by this
procedure are: intcolonial * ECON + INTCOLONIAL * military + MILITARY * EXECUTIVE \(\rightarrow\) SUCCESS.

The first causal pathway is the absence of a colonial intervener and the presence of a
strong economic relationship leads to successful intervention [Row 5]. This supports Hypothesis
1c – emphasizing the role of colonial relationships, and provides general support to the more
general Hypothesis 1 – that institutional interaction generally increases intervention success. This
covers two of the cases of success: Zimbabwe in Mozambique’s civil war (COW #818) and
Nigeria leading the ECOMOG intervention in Sierra Leone (COW #898). One is an example of a
unilateral intervention into a conflict that attracted multiple unilateral interventions, and the
second is an example of a multilateral intervention under the auspices of a regional IGO.

Of these reduced pathways, the presence of military relations in conjunction with

\[14\] This means that the solution equation has not been reduced using the logic space for which there are no
observations in the empirical world. The result is less parsimonious solutions, but without the possibly
problematic assumptions underpinning reduction with remainders.
executive relations covers the most cases. It includes row 2 and row 4, keeping in mind that two of the cases in row 2 were essentially dropped to resolve the contradiction. This solution equation directly supports Hypothesis 2a and 1b. The management of military forces is the domain of the executive in most regimes, and in African states which tend toward patrimonialism and highly personalized executives, this may be more the case than in other regions. This set of cases represents the achievement of each of the goal categories except for economic. There is no dominant goal that appears more likely to be undertaken or achieved by cases sharing this configuration. Humanitarian motives and ally power maintenance are the most common. There is surprisingly few security-related interventions (only two) included in these rows, despite their high frequency in the over-all data set and the fact that 62% of security interventions are successful.

This relationship is further strengthened by the solutions obtained for the non-successful outcomes; the only non-contradictory rows of negative outcome are row 9 and row 7, which obtains the reduced solution MILITARY * executive → success. Where military relations are present without executive relations, interventions will be unsuccessful.

The other two configurations point to the importance of economic and former colonial in the success of interventions. Economic relationships were not pinpointed as of particular interest in the African context, but they occupy a great deal of scholarly interest in the realm of dyadic interactions generally. In the absence of a colonial relationship, economic relationships can lead to successful interventions. This points to the possibility that economic relationships between former colonial states and their colonies are different, causally, than those between non-colonial power partners. Further exploration is necessary, but the dependent economic relationship, or the flow of primary commodities may help account for this. The second pathway,
former colonial relationship and the absence of military relations, is more difficult to explain. It does, however, point again to the importance of military relationships in mediating the effect of other relational variables, and to the role that former colonial relationships play as Hypotheses 1c predicted.

This initial csQCA suggests that institutional relationships are not the only factors which condition intervention success. However, it provides initial support for Hypothesis 1 and its sub-hypotheses. There is a clear impact on intervention success as a result of institutional dyadic interaction. Most importantly however, with the exception of the Italian intervention into Somalia under UNOSOM II, interventions by former colonial powers make up a subset of all successful interventions. This is the subset with which this study is primarily interested, and the subset which the fsQCA examines.

This initial analysis, while not wholly conclusive, is useful moving forward on several counts: it points to the problem with dichotomization for marginal cases, and highlights that the relationship conditions are not sufficiently nuanced; instead of the use of single indicators multiple indicators included on a scale and analyzed through fuzzy sets is more suitable. It also suggests that some of these relational variables may be operating independently of the colonial relationship.

FsQCA – Colonial Power Interventions

The dataset including just colonial power interventions and the United States covers the period between 1960 and 2013 with a total of 13 interventions in nine civil wars. While all of the interveners are former colonial powers, or the United States, about 61.5% (8) of the interventions are targeted at their former colonies. France, by far, engaged in the most interventions; it accounts for 53.85% (7) of the total. The next most frequent intervener is the United States with
23% (3), of which two are interventions into the Somali conflict begun in 1992, the first under the UNITAF mandate and the second in UNOSOM II. Italy, Belgium and the United Kingdom each engaged in a single intervention, though Italy’s intervention is as part of UNOSOM II. Belgium intervened in the DRC in 1978 in tandem, though not necessarily in a coalition with, the French. The United Kingdom’s intervention is in Sierra Leone in 2000 in support of the United Nations’ mission, but not as a part of it.

**Calibration**

The conditions used in the fuzzy-set analysis tests the theoretical conversation developed in the preceding chapters by analyzing the proximity of dyads’ logics of appropriateness and cultural network (see theoretical discussion above) by assigning fuzzy membership scores. These membership scores are on a scale from 1, full membership as anchored by qualitative theoretical criteria, and 0, full non-membership. The scores only make sense insofar as the interpreter can relate the scores back to these qualitative, theoretically-derived criteria – that is, the scores are calibrated to particular anchor points which provide the scores with meaning.
Table 7 - The shared "logics of appropriateness" and cultural networks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID #</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Intervener</th>
<th>War Name</th>
<th>Start Year</th>
<th>Former colonial power?</th>
<th>Shared Logic of Appropriateness</th>
<th>Elite cultural networks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>First Chad (FROLINAT) Rebellion</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Fourth DRC (Shaba)</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Fourth DRC (Shaba)</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Second Chad (Habre Revolt)</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Second Somalia</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Second Somalia</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Second Somalia</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Second Somalia</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Second Sierra Leone</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire Military</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Third Somalia</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>CDI Election Crisis</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Northern Mali Conflict</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.625</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The consistency of the relationship measures with the underlying concept is high. The case of the French intervention into Chad in 1968 (Intervention ID #44) is illustrative. The shared “logic of appropriateness” score of 1, indicates that the Chad/France dyad is an unequivocal member of the set of countries which share mutually legible “logics of appropriateness” in their institutional structures.

Chad gained independence in 1960, so by the 1968 intervention they had a very short history of autonomous political rule. Their institutions were still largely the remnants of their colonial infrastructure and there was little time for significant historical drift to occur. Power remained centralized in the South, where French penetration had been most complete.

Military, aid and economic ties to France remained strong. The dyad did not have an Assistance Militaire Technique (AMT) accord signed until 1976. However, “freedom of action is one of the vital principles of France’s Africa policy”, so formal military agreements are not necessarily a measure of French commitment or investment (Chipman, 1985: 28), “The existence of a broad network of military agreements with African states has therefore create an implied commitment to African security which is often unaffected by the precise terms of these agreements” [emphasis mine] (Chipman, 1985: 29). While the military relationship between France and Chad was not formalized in an AMT until 1976, it was slightly more than implied in the decades preceding the intervention. In the 1960’s there was a principal base (a base were elements of all three branches of the French armed forces were stationed) at Fort Lamy (Ndjamena), Chad’s capital. France also maintained 156 military advisors in Chad in 1965 (Luckham, 1982).

Chad was hardly France’s primary African economic partner, or greatest beneficiary of French aid largesse, however, the level of aid and trade remained steady and strong throughout
the period preceding the intervention. Chad’s position in this regard was less a function of politics than economic realities; Chad was poor and with limited economic/development prospects, unlike Francophone Côte d’Ivoire where much French aid and economic trade was funneled.

While the fuzzy score for shared “logic of appropriateness” is quite high, the cultural network score is significantly lower: .31. This indicates that the dyad of France and Chad are more out than in the set of countries with close cultural network ties. Chad’s cultural landscape is highly regional, split between a sparsely populated northern region where France engaged in little educational investment during the colonial period and a more densely populated southern region where missionary and education penetration was greater.

Around 22.6% of Chadians speak French as a lingua franca. It is also an official language. The actual use of French is difficult to determine; Arabic is also an official language and is more popularly used as a trade language. There is little indication, however, of how widely spoken Arabic is as a first language amongst Chadians either especially considering the extreme linguistic fractionalization of the country. While Arabic is a relatively large minority language in France, speakers are usually economically marginalized recent immigrants rather than government officials.

At the time of the 1968 intervention, Chad was under the dictatorial rule of François (N’Garta) Tombalbaye, who had been educated in Francophone Africa and later served as an elected official in the colonial apparatus who was eventually fired for his nationalist politics. On an executive level, Chad and France were not particularly close. Though Tombalbaye called directly on de Gaulle to intervene, he was intensely suspicious of the man. He also engaged in “cultural revolutionary” Africanizing efforts, including renaming the capital. This rhetoric may
have been more about domestic power consolidation than an actual turn away from the colonial legacy for an authentic pre-colonial foundation. This “African” turn has been characterized as “superficial”, but nevertheless colored executive relations (Azevedo, 1998).

IGO salience is also quite low. In 1965 (there was insufficient data for a five year lag as detailed above), France and Chad shared membership in only 16 intergovernmental organizations. That year, France individually belonged to 85 total intergovernmental organizations.

By 1968, Chad, which had never experienced significant wide-spread French cultural penetration outside of particular elite groups in the south, was moving socially away from France. The President was a nationalist that even if only superficially, professed a radical “Africanizing” ideology in a country that was highly culturally fractionalized. Unsurprisingly then, their shared elite cultural networks score is much lower than their shared “logic of appropriateness” score.

There does not appear to be a pattern of relationship between the values in each category. It is possible to have low values in both the shared logic of appropriateness and the shared elite cultural networks, or a high value in just one category, or a high value in both. Figure 3, below, plots the scores against one another for visual comparison. This suggests a certain independence of the composite conditions\textsuperscript{15}, which suggests that the colonial legacy is not uniform across cases and is highly dependent on historical and cultural processes at work during and after the colonial period.

\textsuperscript{15} The independence of the conditions is not a methodological requirement in QCA to the degree that it is for traditional statistical methods.
Analysis

The csQCA suggested several interesting directions which can be further explored through the fsQCA analysis. It highlighted specifically the role of executive interaction, economic and military relationships predating the intervention – supporting Hypothesis 1. The executive condition included in the csQCA has been used as an indicator for the condition: shared elite cultural networks. The condition for military relationship and economic relationship has been included in the condition: shared “logic of appropriateness”.

Unlike csQCA, the conditions in a fuzzy-set analysis are not dichotomized. This requires
a different approach to determining set-theoretic relationships than is available with dichotomous conditions and outcomes. Two primary analyses can be undertaken through fsQCA: identification of subset relations, and the fuzzy-truth table.

Subset relations are a manner of evaluating necessity and sufficiency of conditions, by identifying whether those conditions form some subset of the outcome, or whether the outcome forms a subset of those conditions.

The evaluation of sufficiency can be seen as a test of whether the cases displaying the causal conditions form a subset of the cases displaying the outcome… In order to argue that a cause or causal combination is a sufficient for the outcome, the fuzzy membership scores in cause have to be less than or equal to the fuzzy membership in the outcome (Ragin, 2008).

The mechanical application of mathematical formulas to derive sufficiency or necessity are useless without theoretical justification as “neither necessity nor sufficiency exists independently of theories that propose causes” (Ragin, 2008). Two steps are undertaken here to establish sufficiency: first, a basic exploration of the subset relationships between the theoretically interesting conditions and the outcome, before developing a fuzzy-set truth table and subsequent solution equation. The fuzzy-set truth table essentially calculates subset relations and then, like in csQCA, reduces the complexity of the solution equation through Boolean algebra.

In a graphical representation of subset relations, a condition is sufficient for the outcome if the majority of the cases lie in the upper triangle, indicating that membership score in the cause is lower than or equal to membership in the outcome. A numerical consistency and coverage score can also be generated which provides a more precise evaluation than simple visual judgment. The consistency and coverage scores are mechanically the same as those provided in the truth-table equation.
Consistency is the degree to which one set is contained within another set. Higher consistency means that more of the set is contained within the second set; essentially higher consistency points to the closer to sufficiency of the condition. Since fuzzy-sets do not include dichotomized outcome conditions, a case can be more or less contained within the set of “successful interventions”. As a result, consistency scores range on a scale from 0 to 1, where a large penalty is prescribed for “large inconsistencies but small penalties for near misses” (Ragin, 2009: 108).

Coverage can be understood in two forms: raw coverage and unique coverage. Raw coverage is the proportion of cases displaying the positive outcome that are covered by the condition or the term in the solution equation. Unique coverage the proportion of cases that are covered by that condition or term in the equation and no other. Often, when consistency goes up, coverage goes down. The more specific the explanation, the fewer cases it can explain. At the most extreme end, this results in unique explanations for each individual case which forecloses on the possibility of generalization.

Figure 4 below represents the subset relationship between intervention success and shared cultural networks.

---

16 The software calculates the consistency score, but the equation it employs is: Consistency (Xi ≤ Yi) = Σ(min(Xi, Yi))/Σ(Xi)
Dyads with strong shared cultural networks are a subset of successful intervention with a consistency of .882 and a raw coverage of .696. There is some support for sufficiency here; unsurprisingly however, cultural networks alone cannot explain successful interventions. There are a number of cases that are contained in the lower triangle. QCA methods are not probabilistic, and unlike statistics, they cannot simply ignore these outlying cases as mathematically acceptable “error”. These contradictory cases will be examined below.

Figure 5 below represents the subset relationship between intervention success and
shared “logics of appropriateness”.

Figure 7 - Visual representation of the sufficiency of shared "logic of appropriateness"

The consistency of the subset relationship between success interventions and a shared “logic of appropriateness” is much lower than for shared cultural networks with .794. Scores below .8 display substantial inconsistency and this is the threshold used in the fuzzy-set truth table analysis. This suggests that the composite condition for a shared “logic of appropriateness” is not sufficient. However, the raw coverage score is similar (.684), suggesting that there is substantial overlap between cases covered by these conditions. The consistency is even worse when we
consider the condition “colonial intervener”: .750. This initial fsQCA model does not support Hypothesis 1c – that a colonial legacy alone increases the likelihood of intervention success.

This cursory consideration of the individual, theoretically interesting conditions highlights the greater explanatory power of shared cultural networks over a shared “logic of appropriateness” when considered individually. Separately, Hypothesis 2 finds greater empirical support from the initial subset relationships than does Hypothesis 1. Further analysis will derive solution equations, and then unpack the various indicators of each composite condition to zoom further in on the causal processes at work on intervention success.

**fsQCA Model**

First, a model was fitted for all of the cases including the conditions: shared cultural networks, shared “logic of appropriateness”, and whether the intervener was the former colonial power. This is the first and most general test of the theoretical framework of institutional legibility developed in the previous chapters as it relates specifically to colonial power interventions.

The fuzzy-set truth table is a representation of multidimensional vector space with \(2^K\) rows where \(K\) is the number of conditions in the model. “There is a one-to-one correspondence between causal combinations, truth table rows, and vector space” (Ragin 2009, 104). Since fuzzy-set memberships are not dichotomous, a case is considered a member of the configuration if the membership score in the configuration is greater than .5, it is considered more in than out of the configuration which places the case in that row of the truth table.

Again, the higher consistency score, the greater the degree to which the configuration contains a set which is a subset of the outcome: successful intervention. “It is important to point
out, however, that some cases displaying the outcome may be found among configurations with low consistency”; these are conceptually equivalent to the contradictory configurations in csQCA and require the same careful consideration (Ragin 2009, 109). There are also three logical remainders where there are no observed cases.

The next step is to eliminate empty rows and assign the outcome based on the consistency scores. There is a significant gap between .8124 and .7076, and that is where the threshold is placed. The last column, labelled “Outcome”, represents the dichotomous coding based on the degree to which each case is more in then out of the outcome condition applied to develop the solution equations which will be reported later.

Table 8 - Raw fuzzy truth table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shared “logic of appropriateness”</th>
<th>Shared cultural networks</th>
<th>Colonial Intervener</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Raw Consistency</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.9367</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.7076</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.9275</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.3648</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.8124</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>L</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>L</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>L</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are eight rows to the truth table with five rows containing observations. Of those, three of the rows have a consistency score high enough to code as a successful intervention. Since the coding of all of the conditions in fsQCA is not dichotomous, and a single case is on a continuum of more/less in or out of the set of “successful interventions” there is not a straightforward way to assign an outcome useful for minimization. Instead, consistency scores closer to 1 suggest that the group of cases together is “in” the set of “successful interventions” and are
coded with a 1 outcome. What this means is that some of these groups coded as 1 may include interventions with a variation of “success”. While this procedure may seem straightforward, it does obscure some interesting contradictions if it is applied mechanically – however, the analysis does not treat these rows as black boxes so variation does not necessarily hinder the validity of the analysis.

There are two rows of the raw truth table which are particularly interesting at this stage in the analysis: row 1 and row 2. Row 1 represents the configuration where all of the conditions are present; that is, these are the cases where we might expect to observe the greatest amount of legibility. Four cases, the largest N for any of the configurations, are covered under this condition with a raw consistency of .9367. This consistency is nearly perfect, suggesting that there are no “contradictions” within the configuration. One of the cases is a full success: the 2011 French intervention in the Côte d’Ivoire election crisis. Three of the cases are more in than out of the set of successful interventions with fuzzy outcome scores of .75; this includes the 1978 Belgian intervention in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire), the 2002 French intervention in Côte d’Ivoire’s civil war and the French intervention in Chad to counter Libyan influence in 1983.

Row 2 illustrates the weakness of ties that are solely institutional in nature, weakening Hypothesis 1, even when they are present in a context of a historic colonial legacy. This conclusion should be considered tentatively, however, especially in light of the cases contained within the configuration. The two cases contained within this configuration have polar opposite outcomes: the first French intervention in Chad in 1968 was a success, while the Italian intervention as part of UNOSOM II in Somalia in 1993 was a failure. This is analogous to a “contradiction” in csQCA. The issue of the UNOSOM II mission in Somalia, and the
confounding problem of international organizational politics has been briefly dealt with above. Bracketing the issue of Somalia does suggest that institutional relations alone can possibly lead to successful interventions, but the total number of cases to back up this assertion is quite low (N=1), and therefore not particularly convincing even with the small size of the dataset.

The configuration in Row 3, the presence of shared elite cultural networks and a historic colonial relationship without a shared “logic of appropriateness”, has the second highest consistency though it covers fewer cases than Row 1. This cases support Hypothesis 1c and Hypothesis 2 generally. This includes the most recent French intervention in Mali (2013), and the only British intervention contained in the datasets – their 2000 intervention in Sierra Leone, both of which are later explored through the structured, focused comparative case studies.

The final row (Row 5) before the logical remainders, includes a single case: the French intervention, alongside Belgium, in Zaire (DRC) in 1978. This row in particular highlights the role of shared elite cultural networks – Hypothesis 2. La Francophonie reports that as of 2010\(^{17}\) 46% of the DRC speaks French. The numbers they reported in 2005 are a little lower, 40% total with 10% proficient, but the proficiency is going to be in the educated, administrative stratum – the elites. Kinshasa is the second largest French speaking city in the world after Paris, a status it has long enjoyed, and in terms of absolute numbers the DRC is the second largest French speaking country in the world, and has been since independence.

On the elite level, French president Giscard d'Estaing cultivated “unusual personal influence over” Zairian president Mobutu Sese Seko (Young, 1978: 181). This close elite relationship translated into long-term investment in the relationship with Zaire (DRC) which

\(^{17}\) Keep in mind the intervention is in 1978.
“which confirmed France’s ability [and intent] totally to replace Belgian influence in her ex-colonies” (Chipman, 1985: 27). In a scenario such as this, it is not difficult to see how institutional interaction would have been of little use; the ultimate consequence of long years of rule under Mobutu was the deinstitutionalization of Zaire and the creation of a “lame leviathan” which would have afforded little opportunity for the creation of meaningful legibility through institutional interaction but which developed an environment ripe for elite ties to shape the dyadic state relations.

Setting aside for the moment the contradiction of the Italian intervention in Somalia and therefore using the outcomes provided in the initial raw truth table above, the truth table reduces to create both a complex and a parsimonious solution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>RAW COVERAGE</th>
<th>UNIQUE COVERAGE</th>
<th>CONSISTENCY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CULTURAL*~LOGIC</td>
<td>.405</td>
<td>.101250</td>
<td>.895770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTOCOLONIAL*CULTURAL</td>
<td>.594375</td>
<td>.290625</td>
<td>.894638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOLUTION COVERAGE</td>
<td>.695628</td>
<td>.881654</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOLUTION CONSISTENCY</td>
<td>.881654</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The unique coverage for both of the complex solutions are low as they explain many of the same cases between them.

This is not a surprise as there are nine cases in the dataset which were coded as successes using the truth table displayed above; these overlapping complex solutions, however, point out the different pathways and causal interactions that may be at work even within a single case. Interventions and civil wars, even in isolation, are incredibly complex phenomenon, but when combined the layers of analysis grow nearly exponentially.

The first solution is the presence of shared elite cultural networks combined with the
absence of corresponding shared institutional connections. The only case uniquely covered under this solution term is the French intervention in the DRC in 1978; the other two cases are also covered under the second term in the equation, but are some of the most recent interventions: the British intervention in Sierra Leone and the French intervention in Mali in 2013. The lack of institutional connection is not an independent fact, but intimately connected to the question of colonialism, in the case of the French intervention in the DRC, and partially the result of the temporal component of the institution measure, in the case of the French intervention in Mali – over time the institutional connection has drifted and not been renewed. The case studies in following chapters will return to this lack of independence on the part of the conditions.\(^{18}\)

The second term in the solution equation is the presence of a colonial legacy and the presence of shared elite cultural networks. In addition to the British intervention and the French intervention in Mali, which was also covered above, this includes the second French intervention in Chad in 1983, the two French interventions in Côte d’Ivoire, and the sole Belgian intervention in Zaire in 1968. For these cases, the cultural networking is a direct result of the colonial legacy; the shared language, the proprietary relationships with executives, are all related to the special domain created by the former colonial relationship. However, as the solution equation above points out, this can and does occur without the intervention of colonial history in some cases.

When the solution is reduced using Boolean algebra the final parsimonious equation is:

\[\text{Table 10 - Parsimonious solution equation}\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>RAW COVERAGE</th>
<th>UNIQUE COVERAGE</th>
<th>CONSISTENCY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CULTURAL</td>
<td>.695625</td>
<td>.695625</td>
<td>.881654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOLUTION</td>
<td>.695625</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{18}\) This is another reason why standard statistical analysis is not used here, as a fundamental assumption which would be untenable for this study, is that all of the independent variables are varying independently of one another.
Identifying the role of shared elite cultural networks plays is in line with the earlier QCA finding that executive interaction is important for determining success across interventions in the larger dataset. It also lends support to the concept of “friction” as developed in the previous chapter – shared language, for example, reduces the costs of action. To further develop this, and provide a framework for the ensuing comparative case studies, the individual conditions that make up the composite “shared cultural networks” will be unpacked.

**Shared elite cultural networks**

The composite condition “shared elite cultural networks” has four constituent elements included, to test Hypothesis 2 and its attendant sub-hypotheses: a measure of the salience of shared IGO membership, drawing on recent international relations network research; a measure of dyadic executive relations, highlighted by the csQCA models developed at the beginning of this chapter; a measure of shared language, informed by American experience on the ground in recent military ventures; and a dichotomous measure of whether the executive was educated in the intervening country, to capture enculturation.

These four conditions may interact with one another, determine each other, or work at cross-purposes. The initial fsQCA suggests that something about this particular condition is important for determining intervention success. Setting aside the other theoretically interesting conditions, there are sufficient cases to ensure reasonable model specification if just these four conditions are included.
Consistently, with or without the inclusion of the problematic multi-lateral intervention in Somalia in 1992, the analysis highlights the role of shared language over and above the other measures of cultural networking. The parsimonious solution equation obtained, including Somalia, is displayed below in Table 6.

*Table 11 - Parsimonious solution equation for cultural indicators*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>RAW COVERAGE</th>
<th>UNIQUE COVERAGE</th>
<th>CONSISTENCY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SHARED LANGUAGE</strong></td>
<td>0.78125</td>
<td>0.78125</td>
<td>0.892857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SOLUTION COVERAGE</strong></td>
<td>0.78125</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SOLUTION CONSISTENCY</strong></td>
<td>0.892857</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Shared “logic of appropriateness”**

As a measure of institutional interaction, the composite shared “logic of appropriateness” is composed of three main indicators: a measure of military relationship, a measure of aid relationship, and a measure of the salience of the dyadic trade relationship. The fourth indicator is only included in cases where the intervening state is the former colonial power: time since independence.

When the 1992 multilateral intervention in Somalia is removed from the fsQCA model, the presence of a shared “logic of appropriateness” coupled with a colonial legacy is a pathway to success generated in the intermediate solution equation. This suggests that the absence of the institutional interaction condition in the full model may be the result of particular features of the Somali case, including the extremely deinstitutionalized nature of the utterly collapsed Somali state in 1992. The theory developed in this study does not require that interveners enter the conflict on the side of the existing government for these factors to increase the chance of
success⁹, but all of the institutions and personnel a state could have invested in developing a relationship with were completely defunct by the launch of the UNOSOM II mission. Military infrastructure was dismantled, aid was decentralized and being syphoned by warlord factions, and there was no way to engage in meaningful trade to reproduce norms. This suggests that unpacking the indicators of shared “logic of appropriateness” could yield conditions of causal importance for other less atypical cases.

Unlike the shared elite cultural networks condition, the parsimonious solution obtained by unpacking the shared “logic of appropriateness” is inconsistent enough to be basically meaningless. The dichotomous indicator of economic relationship salience is the single term in the parsimonious solution but with a consistency of 0.700000. Economic relationships do little on their own to explain intervention success; the csQCA analysis did point to the importance of economic relationships in the absence of colonial history, so the low explanatory power here may be an artifact of case selection. For interventions by major powers in Africa, especially those that share a colonial legacy with the other member of the intervention dyad, economics are simply not important.

The intermediate solution, Table 7 below, produced by this model is has marginally greater explanatory power.

Table 12 - Intermediate solution equation for logic of appropriateness indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MILITARY * ECONOMIC * AID</th>
<th>RAW COVERAGE</th>
<th>UNIQUE COVERAGE</th>
<th>CONSISTENCY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MILITARY * ECONOMIC * AID</td>
<td>0.406250</td>
<td>0.406250</td>
<td>0.764706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOLUTION COVERAGE</td>
<td>0.406250</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹⁹ Though in the case of the former colonial interventions, all of the states *do* intervene on behalf of the legally recognized government at the time of intervention onset.
The presence of all of the constituent elements of the shared “logic of appropriateness” composite can be a viable pathway to success with a consistency of 0.764706. This is borderline, but it does indicate that the removal of the chronological element (time since independence) does not increase the explanatory power of the other indicators. The shared logic score trends downward over time as states move further from the point of independence, but the power of those institutional interactions amongst former colonial dyads does not increase if that element is removed. This suggests that Hypothesis 1 does not hold.

**QCA identified indicators**

Unpacking both theoretical composite conditions has yielded an indication about the importance of particular individual measures. A further narrowing of focus will develop the final framework that will guide the comparative case studies that make up the second half of this study. The fsQCA analysis suggests that the driving force behind the importance of shared elite cultural networks is the presence of shared language. The language shared is always the language of the intervener, as the colonial powers invested a great deal of energy and effort into spreading their mother tongues, and it is consistently a lingua franca. The role this plays at the elite level, and at the tactical level, will be traced in the case studies.

The csQCA also pointed to the role of executive relations, one that makes particular sense in light of the unique role of the executive in foreign policy for most states, and the unique personalized role of the executive in African states. The shared language component may be acting on the importance of executive relations, as well; dyads where communication can be more informal, direct or copious because of shared linguistic mediums may gain increased
legibility through their executive interactions. Former colonial relationship also plays an interactive role between these other conditions in both models – amongst all interventions, and amongst major power interventions.

Developing a model that is focused specifically on these conditions of importance once again highlights the role of language. Both the complex and parsimonious solutions point to the role of shared language alone and in combination with former colonial relationships. The importance of the combination is undoubtedly an artifact of the American cases included. To control for this issue, this model is run on the larger dataset including all interventions in Africa.²⁰

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>RAW COVERAGE</th>
<th>UNIQUE COVERAGE</th>
<th>CONSISTENCY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SHARED LANGUAGE*~EXECUTIVE RELATIONS</td>
<td>0.222069</td>
<td>0.139655</td>
<td>0.848485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>~COLONIAL LEGACY * SALIENT ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP</td>
<td>.068966</td>
<td>.068966</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLONIAL LEGACY * SHARED LANGUAGE</td>
<td>.187931</td>
<td>.105517</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOLUTION COVERAGE</td>
<td>0.396552</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOLUTION CONSISTENCY</td>
<td>0.909091</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As in the first csQCA analysis, economic relationships are important in the absence of a shared colonial legacy – the coverage is quite low, however, as this is explaining a very small number of cases. This may be capturing a particular class of regional interventions. Shared language is

²⁰ The conditions have been turned into fuzzy-set measures in the larger dataset, but the outcome measure used is still dichotomous, which is different from the analysis done on the smaller set of cases.
important for two configurations: shared language in the absence of executive relationships, and shared language combined with a shared colonial legacy.

Imagine the theoretical framework graphically depicted in Chapter 2. The boxes are the causal conditions, and the QCA has allowed those boxes to be placed roughly in relation to one another. The content of the arrows connecting those boxes is the causal chain which the structured, focused comparative case studies will provide.

**QCA Conclusions**

Both in the entire universe of cases, all military interventions into African civil wars since 1960, and in the subset of cases specifically looking at colonial power interventions, language stands out consistently in the solution equations. To return to the theoretical framework, shared language is the most direct and obvious indicator of legibility. It directly allows the actor to gather information about the social environment by making the environment intelligible without additional investment. This ought to decrease friction “on-the-ground” at the tactical level by facilitating direct interaction with civilians and other military’s personnel in the conflict environment. The potential effect of language operates at the strategic, operational and tactical level within an intervention - the case studies will explore whether that is the case, or whether one particular level or pathway is determinative.

Executive relations, both their presence and absence, also features prominently in the solutions obtained. In the final analysis, shared language with the absence of executive relations is a relatively consistent pathway to intervention success. In the African post-colonial state, historically the executive has been the central institutional, though not highly institutionalized, feature. Foreign policy in the former colonial powers, specifically France and Great Britain, is
often the domain of the executive – the case of France, foreign policy especially in Africa is the purview of the President.

Executive relations and language are both markers of legibility, and their relationship to friction is fairly straightforward. They increase the ability to communicate and to act effectively in the field, removing a source of fog – lack of adequate knowledge or experience. The second connection between legibility and intervention outcome, the formulation of intervention goals, has not been explored to this point.
Chapter 5 – Goals

Identifying intervention goals has been a challenge for comparative, cross-national conflict research which is why it so often ignored in dataset construction or in conversations around intervention “success”. However, it is vital to judge success by the intentions of the military actors to avoid making assumptions that deeply undermine the validity of conclusions. I have hypothesized that goals are a link between dyadic interaction and intervention success. Those intervention dyads with deeper relationships will experience interventions with more realizable goals. The preceding QCA analysis narrowed down the constituent elements that act on intervention success to shared language and executive interaction.

The cases analyzed are the British intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000 (COW War #898), the French intervention in Mali in 2013 (no COW war code), and the French intervention in Côte d’Ivoire in 2002 (COW War #39) and 2011 (no COW war code). The cases were selected for their comparability and policy relevance. They are all cases of interventions by former colonial powers and they are proximate in time and space to one another, which naturally controls for some of the unmeasurable variation across cases. They also vary along the elements of “shared logic of appropriateness” and elite networks that the QCA identified as particularly important: executive relations and shared language. Further, as the cases involves both major former-colonial powers, France and Great Britain, the selection of these cases allows for the interrogation of differences in colonial legacies.

For each case, the goals will be outlined and the role, if any, of language and executive relations will be highlighted to establish what role they play in the creation of goals. After the goals for the individual cases have been established, goals in general across all interventions
since 1960 will be considered to provide a basis for judging whether or not some goals are more likely to be realized by intervention than others on the basis of their general categories.

**Sierra Leone**

In the case of Sierra Leone, the British military intervention followed years of diplomatic wrangling, pressure on the United Nations and scandals at home, including the Arms to Africa affair. The Lomé peace accord’s spectacular failure, followed by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) engaging in a series of kidnappings of UN personnel finally drew Great Britain into putting boots on the ground. This highlights the reactionary nature of the British intervention, which will be revisited later.

Great Britain’s colonial and post-colonial relationship to Sierra Leone is significantly divergent from the French experience with Côte d’Ivoire. In the first years of independence, Sierra Leone and its capital Freetown were considered the ‘Athens of West Africa’. It shares the catastrophic fall from grace arc with another of the case studies presented here, and a fellow West African state – Côte d’Ivoire, France’s “Jewel of West Africa”. Sierra Leone’s decline began much earlier, and it decayed much longer, than in the case of Côte d’Ivoire.

Socially, Sierra Leone’s primary division was between the Krio-speaking Creole elite in Freetown, descendants of freed slaves settled by the British who currently make up roughly 10% of the population, and the autochthonous people of the interior (Dorman, 2009). Starting in 1787, Britain began resettling their “Black Poor”, slaves freed by Lord Mansfield declaration in 1772 but who lacked independent means to provide for themselves, on the coast of Sierra Leone (Kargbo, 2006). Up to that point Sierra Leone had largely served as a trading post and provisioning station. The new settlement was first under the administration of a chartered
company, the Sierra Leone Company founded in 1791, but was declared a British Crown Colony when the Company was dissolved in 1808. Those who lived in the colony, the Creoles of Freetown, “considered themselves superior to the ‘natives’ of the hinterlands by virtue of their association with Europeans, their Western-style education and their citizenship in the Crown Colony of Sierra Leone, which made them British subjects” (Kargbo, 2006).

It was not until 1896, in response to fears of French expansion that the British government claimed the hinterland of Sierra Leone as a protectorate. This status set it apart from the colony of Sierra Leone, and the differences in administration of the two would have long consequences for the independence process and later politics in the country. The protectorate was ruled indirectly through paramount chiefs who were supported by European administrators. The colony was ruled directly, allowing later for some limited electoral participation for colony citizens as Britain attempted to prepare for eventual independence.

Sierra Leone had opted for a gradualist approach following independence, avoiding the more revolutionary and abrupt tactics undertaken by their neighbors in Guinea. Though poor, Sierra Leone was not necessarily destined for the state collapse that followed; political mismanagement and corruption first under Siaka Stevens, who built Sierra Leone’s patronage system and dismantled the foundations for institutionalized governance, and later under his hand-picked successor Major-General Joseph Momoh, were instrumental in hollowing out the state and sinking the economy. Stevens and Momoh transformed Sierra Leone into a single party state, where the mismanagement of resources resulted in shortages so severe that the country routinely went without electricity because of an inability to import oil. Indeed, by the time of the British intervention in 2000, Sierra Leone was the least developed country in the world according to United Nations’ indices (Dorman, 2009). Mismanagement and political corruption alone cannot
explain the violence that eventually engulfed the country; Kargbo (2006) points out that it had been the central feature of Sierra Leonean politics for decades before the RUF invasion and “patrimonialism could in fact be a stabilizing factor” (p. 31). However, the state weakness that resulted from this long decline certainly helped result in the long duration of the civil war.

The Sierra Leone civil war kicked off on March 23, 1991 when the RUF led by Foday Sankoh, a Charles Taylor protégé, invaded from Liberia which was then experiencing its own brutal civil war. The force was Liberian-supported and made up of Burkinabe mercenaries and Sierra Leoneans trained in Libya (Gberie, 2005). Their supposed aim was to engage in a ‘people’s struggle’ to overthrow the Momoh regime. Major-General Joseph Momoh was the hand-picked successor of long-time Sierra Leonean President Siaka Stevens.

The Sierra Leonean Army with Guinean support fought the rebels to a stalemate. After going a significant amount of time at the front without timely pay or what they perceived as adequate financial support for material, abandoned the eastern front and seized the State House, enacting a successful coup. President Momoh fled to Guinea and the soldiers announced that the junta, the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), was now led by Captain Valentine Strasser. The overthrow of President Momoh did not end the civil war though - it continued for another ten years.

In March, 1996 Ahmed Tejan Kabbah was elected president. The RUF engaged in a campaign to frighten voters away from the polls but the process was widely accepted in the international community as legitimate. The conflict continued. The Lomè peace accord, signed in July 1999, was meant to bring the RUF into the government to finally end the decade long war. The Lomè peace accord created a space in the elected government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah for RUF leader Foday Sankoh as Vice-President and added the management of Sierra
Leone’s lucrative gold, diamonds and “other resources that [were] deemed to be of strategic importance for national security” to his ministerial portfolio (Gberie, 2005). Further, it provided amnesty to all the members of the RUF and was supposed to lead to a process of their disarmament and reintegration into Sierra Leonean society. The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was deployed to supervise the transition to peace and to take over for the Nigerian-led ECOMOG troops, 3,000 of which stayed on under UN command.

The disarmament process never got off the ground; by May 2000 UNAMSIL reported they had collected 10,840 weapons from 24,042 combatants, representing only about half of the estimated total of RUF and various militia fighters. In the end, ironically, the United Nations contingent ended up being a source of weapons, as the RUF promptly began kidnapping and disarming peacekeepers (Dorman, 2009). The UN mission finally appeared in danger of collapse after 500 Zambians were detained and disarmed on their way to rescue other UN hostages; the RUF subsequently dressed in their uniforms as cover to assault other UNAMSIL units (Gberie, 2005). The Indian contingent, from which the first commander of the mission was drawn, were at odds with the Nigerians who made up the bulk of the force. The mission entered a “tailspin” (Gberie, 2005). This was the point at which Great Britain intervened.

**Goals**

The goals of the intervention were, in many ways, created on the ground after the intervention force was sent. Initially, Operation Palliser was an evacuation mission in the face of the RUF’s advance on Freetown. One thousand British paratroopers were dropped into Sierra Leone to evacuate “entitled personnel” which included British, EU and American nationals as well as “unrepresented commonwealth nationals” and any other non-Sierra Leoneans if there was
space available (Cook, 2000; Dorman, 2009). The formal directive from the Chief of the Defense Staff regarding the evacuations only arrived after the evacuation was complete (Dorman, 2009). The operation was presented to the House of Commons as a measure taken “to ensure that [Britain was] best placed to respond quickly to safeguard the security of British nationals” (Cook, 2000). Even at that juncture, though, the mission lacked firm boundaries at the policy level; for example, securing Lungi airport in Freetown was undertaken not just for its “immediate utility for the evacuation” but also because of its value “in allowing the UN forces to continue to build up” (Cook, 2000).

One of the largest British naval flotillas deployed since the liberation of the Falklands was used to evacuate 353 people, the bulk of whom were British and European nationals. The initial goal of evacuating British nationals was a success. Quickly the objectives expanded to include security, stabilization and logistics for UNAMSIL, hinted at in the decision to secure the airport (Kampfner, 2003). This move to expand the role on the ground was actually taken by the force Commander David Richard. Indeed, “at the Ministry of Defence and Foreign Office nobody was clear what the remit actually was” (Kampfner, 2003: 70).

The reality would be that the British government system was incapable of fully identifying what it wanted its armed forces to do and it was effectively left to the commander on the ground in conjunction with the new British High commissioner to decide policy (Dorman, 2009: 68).

At the ministerial level, as the situation in Sierra Leone came into focus Clare Short, Secretary of State for International Development, told Prime Minister Tony Blair that “it would be disgraceful to pull them [the troops] out now”, to which he replied “let them stay” (quoted in Kampfner, 2003: 71). This was part of an overall policy direction explicitly outlined by New Labour. An “ethical” foreign policy “was an extension of New Labour’s attempt at incorporating
the ‘third way’ into foreign policy, especially in its interactions with poorer nations” (Kargbo, 2006: 267). This ‘third way’ was self-consciously progressive and focused on social justice. Essentially, the British signed on to an open-ended, undefined commitment to Sierra Leone based on a concern for humanitarianism that was deeply embedded in the explicit “liberal international code of ethics” that New Labour set out to infuse in all of its foreign policy (Kargbo, 2006: 268). That commitment occurred after the commander on the ground set the specific goals of the intervention.

Rescuing the United Nations’ mission which was rapidly crumbling before the intervention and prone to kidnapping was also a priority:

In Sierra Leone Britain, a firm believer in the concept of collective security and in the need for the UN to succeed in its traditional peacekeeping activities, saw the future credibility of the organization at stake. As a permanent member of the Security Council, Britain was very concerned about the UN’s ability to effectively implement resolutions that the British government helped to push through…Defending the role of British forces in Sierra Leone, Robin Cook stated that as a leading member of the UN, committed to UN peacekeeping, Britain had to ensure that the mission in Sierra Leone did not falter (Kargbo, 2006).

Maintaining the credibility of United Nation’s peacekeeping efforts protected British international credibility, and future multilateral interventions. It was also a key linchpin of the liberal internationalist ethic that was guiding Blair’s course in Africa generally and Sierra Leone in particular.

Following the evacuation in May 2000, British forces cleared the RUF from the Okra hills, secured the Masiaka route from Freetown to the provinces, and their assistance in capturing Fodah Sankoh stopped another coup (Kampfner, 2003). The kidnapping of eleven soldiers of the Royal Irish Regiment by notorious splinter RUF forces fighting under the name the West Side Boys set off a second phase to the intervention: Operation Barras. Members of the SAS and 150
paratroopers assaulted the jungle camp of the West Side Boys on the morning of September 10; they rescued all but one soldier and permanently broke the back of one of the remaining powerful militia forces. “It was a demonstration of power that greatly impressed the RUF and certainly helped change its mind about starting another round of fighting” (Gberie, 2005: 174).

It is difficult to suggest that goals were truly “set”, in the sense that coherent policy was decided on in the foreign policy apparatus, and then used to guide the deployment of troops through the operation. Instead, British troops were deployed into a country where there was a generalized sense of responsibility following the legacy of colonialism, and where it appeared that they could, with little effort, provide stability thereby scoring a point for New Labour foreign policy. An ethic of humanitarianism acted as a heuristic guide for action. A set of goals may be outlined, but only in analytical retrospect: first, the evacuation of nationals for which Britain had consular responsibility; second and more vaguely assisting the UNAMSIL force with security and stability, primarily to stave off another invasion of Freetown like the apocalyptic one undertaken in January 1999. These goals were set during the intervention itself, however, and not at the outset as the result of any active policy-making (Kampfner, 2003).

**Language and Executive Relations**

Language itself also had little direct impact on goal creation as goals were created on the fly by personnel on the ground. Explicitly, the historical and cultural ties that extended from colonialism placed Great Britain in the role of responsible party in the eyes of the international community, even forty years after independence (Kargbo, 2006). The ability to communicate in
English was not vital to this step of the intervention, but it was part of the identification of a community of responsibility connecting Anglophone Africa to Great Britain.

The UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, together with the French and United States’ Ambassadors, made it clear that the situation was rapidly deteriorating and they all felt that Britain, as the former colonial power, had the ultimate responsibility to intervene and rescue the situation and indicated that Britain’s reliance solely on the international community to respond via the United Nations was no longer an option. They expected the British government to act to resolve the growing crisis quickly and this message was urgently conveyed back to London. In other words Sierra Leone had now become a British problem in the eyes of the United Nations and international community and the British government was expected to quickly resolve the situation on behalf of the United Nations (Dorman, 2009: 58).

The diplomatic investment before the intervention, and the engagement in “mission creep” following the intervention were the result of executive branch principles in Great Britain; however there was almost no interpersonal interaction between Prime Minister Blair and President Kabbah. The role of executives in goal making for the intervention into Sierra Leone is less in their interaction than it is in the individual politics of British Prime Minister Tony Blair. The foreign policy direction under Blair’s Labour Party government aimed at ethicality, at least in its rhetoric. It would be wrong, however, to overemphasize the amount of knowledge or interest Blair had in Africa, or Sierra Leone, before the war. When Blair was advised that deposed Sierra Leonean President Kabbah “was just his kind of moderniser…he committed himself in principle to bringing him back to power (emphasis added)” (Kampfner, 2003: 66).

Taking a theoretical step back, the legacy of colonialism bounded a community of responsibility, which Great Britain was obligated to engage with on the terms of New Labour’s “ethical foreign policy”. These factors strongly shaped the impetus for intervention and the willingness to engage in a more open-ended commitment. The European Union and the United States viewed Great Britain as the responsible party while the situation in Sierra Leone
deteriorated and the weakness of the UN mission became obvious (Kargbo, 2006). Further, domestic political concerns within the executive branch, namely the creation and framing of a rhetoric of ethical foreign policy, made Sierra Leone’s humanitarian crisis particularly difficult to walk away from once intervention began.

Côte d’Ivoire – First Intervention

France intervened in Côte d’Ivoire twice in relatively short succession which sets these cases apart as an iterative set of interventions by the same intervener into the same intervention target within a decade. France first intervened in 2002 and then again at the beginning of 2011. The conflicts in which French troops engaged were closely related, as were the interventions, but this analysis will examine the goals of each intervention separately as far as this is possible.

Côte d’Ivoire, of all the cases included in this study and perhaps of all of the post-colonial countries of Africa, was the neo-colonial regime par excellence. For three decades under the leadership of Félix Houphouët-Boigny, a doctor, cocoa planter and member at one time of the French Constituent Assembly, Côte d’Ivoire was the crown jewel of Françafrique. Indeed, Houphouët-Boigny coined the phrase which came to represent the whole of France’s tight and often clandestine ties to francophone Africa.

During the three decades of [Houphouët-Boigny’s] rule … co-managed with Jacques Foccart, the Gaullist “African hand” of similar longevity (1960-1996), what the French anthropologist Jean-Pierre Dozon has more aptly called the postcolonial “Franco-African state”: an intricate web of institutionalized interdependence based on elite connivance between Paris and the capitals of francophone Africa (Smith, 2013).

The role of the French, in light of this long and close post-colonial history, first in the conflict with the rebel Forces Nouvelle and in the violent upheaval that followed the election of
Alassane Ouattara is of particular importance to this study when tracing the role of colonial legacy in determining military intervention success.

Where Britain was largely uninterested for most of Sierra Leone’s post-independence history and Mali had generally rejected close ties with the French neo-colonial network, Côte d’Ivoire consciously and intentionally cultivated close ties to their former colonial master. The relative economic prosperity in comparison to many of its African neighbors goes a long way toward explaining reciprocal French interest. Today, despite a loss of market-share that first became apparent with the failure of Houpouët-Boigny’s “Cocoa War” in 1987, Côte d’Ivoire is the world’s largest producer of cocoa; in 2006 Côte d’Ivoire produced 40% of the world’s cocoa, worth around $1.4 billion USD (Global Witness, 2007; McGovern, 2011).

Cocoa is deeply intertwined with the Ivorian colonial history, internal colonialism and the question of Ivoirité or what it constitutes an authentic member of the Ivorian polity. The necessities of large-scale cocoa plantation agriculture created the tensions that fueled conflict and the revenues which helped finance it (Global Witness, 2007; McGovern, 2011). The French during the colonial period encouraged cocoa production for export as a cash crop, and forced laborers from Upper Volta, today Burkina Faso, to work the Ivorian plantations. Cocoa cultivation is labor intensive but the long growth time for the trees puts a premium on land-ownership rather than lease. In fact, roughly 25% of the Ivorian population directly participate in the production of cocoa (Global Witness, 2007). The result was large external, and after independence to a greater degree, internal migration into previously sparsely populated cocoa
growing regions; *autochthones* often sold or lost land as the plantation system grew, creating resentment against “strangers” and “foreigners”.

The forest of western Côte d’Ivoire is mostly gone and all of the land that can be put to productive cocoa plantation largely has been; *autochthones*21, largely Bété, Dida, Attié and Guéré (Wè), feel pushed off their historical land mostly by Baule and Jula internal migrants employing Burkinabé labor, for little share in the “Ivorian Miracle” (McGovern, 2011). This resentment has taken on an intergenerational aspect as young educated Ivorians who have failed to capture opportunity in the shrinking patrimonial networks of Abidjan return to their home villages and find that their “patrimony” has been sold out from under them.

Today, 26% of Côte d’Ivoire’s population are immigrants, with the largest share being Burkinabé making up 50% of that total. There is a significant population of Malians (20%) and Guineans (6%) as well (McGovern, 2011). Félix Houphouët-Boigny rose to political prominence by sponsoring the bill in the French Constituent Assembly which finally outlawed forced labor in the colonies (Smith, 2013). The influx of Burkinabe and Malian laborers did not stop once the impetus was more economic and less violent; today, there is a semi-permanent class of “immigrant” laborers that lack significant ties to Burkina Faso and Mali, but are incapable of becoming “Ivorian” and subsequently the target of a great deal of violence and resentment. During Houphouët-Boigny’s long regime, he acted as the “advocate of strangers”, sponsoring a liberal immigration policy to ensure the flow of labor into the intensive cocoa market; with his

---

21 An original inhabitant of the area. In this case, generally descendants of people who owned land in the area at the time of French colonialism.
death, space was opened for a counter-hegemonic nationalist discourse which framed these “strangers” as detrimental the welfare of true Ivorians to capture politics (Cutolo, 2010).

The roots of the modern conflicts date to this original structure of cocoa agriculture first instituted by the French colonial government and later encouraged by the Houphouët-Boigny regime; the advent of multi-party democracy and its electoral logic into this framework after the death of Houphouët-Boigny created the impetus for the development of the concept of Ivoirité, the proximate cause of the 2002 and 2011 conflicts.

In a sense, from the 1999 coup d’état until possibly sometime after the arrest of former President Gbagbo, Côte d’Ivoire has been in a state of conflict, the intensity of which has varied geographically and temporally, but without a cut-off point which would indicate an immediate and complete resolution. The 2002 conflict technically ended in 2004, but the country remained geographically divided north to south. Elections were postponed repeatedly until they were finally held in 2010, precipitating another crisis. The underlying rhetoric and actors have remained the same across the temporal dimension while the consequences of one period of conflict have directly caused the next period.

Long-service President Houphouët-Boigny, the great father of modern Côte d’Ivoire and possible architect of catastrophe, died in 1993 and was succeed by Henri Konan Bédié who was then the President of the National Assembly. The stage was set for the resulting civil wars, the economy, already in decline continued to worsen under Bédié. Partially, to protect his position from electoral competition on the part of his rival, Prime Minister Alassane Outtara, he also began the development of the Ivoirité principle.

Ivoirité has both an instrumental and affective role in modern Ivorian politics. It is a “meta-physical and pseudo-intellectual justification to an instrumentalised xenophobia whose
main object was keeping Outtara and his RDR [Rassemblements des Républicains] out of politics” and an expression of resentment linked to a rhetoric of ‘reclamation’ and ‘liberation’ in the face of shrinking economic prospects for young western autochthones (McGovern, 2011). Both General Robert Guéï, who came to power in Côte d’Ivoire’s first coup, and Laurent Gbagbo, used this sentiment to exclude Outtara, first resulting in Gbagbo’s electoral victory and later resulting in a violent crisis following his electoral success over Gbagbo. The government contended that both of Outtara’s parents were from Burkina Faso and that he once held a passport from Burkina Faso while he worked for the International Monetary Fund. He was cast as legally and, to some degree, morally incapable of being President. The resentment inherent in the political deployment of Ivoirité also carries an anti-French flavor, as the benefit of the close neo-colonial relationship tightly built by Houphouët-Boigny and series of French African hands had begun to unravel in the face of economic contraction and the weight of corruption.

Bédié’s exploitation of the tenuous legal position of a large portion of the Ivorian population was not a strategy that made him universally popular, though it was one his next two successors would exploit. On Christmas Eve 1999, Côte d’Ivoire experienced its first military coup, placing General Robert Guéï in power. The coup was the outgrowth of a mutiny about soldiers’ pay and living conditions (“Troops overthrow Ivory Coast Government”, 1999). Despite promising to hold elections and return civilians to power General Guéï engaged in serious corruption of the 2000 election, culminating in his dissolution of the Electoral Commission so that he could declare himself the winner (Onishi, 2000a). In the lead up to the election Outtara was once again barred from running, this time by an amendment to Article 35 of
the Constitution that required that both parents of a presidential candidate be Ivorian – leaving again the question of the nationality of Outtara’s father to eliminate him.

In this limited electoral environment Gbagbo won by a considerable margin over Guéï and there was massive popular response to Guéï’s theft of the election. Tens of thousands demonstrated in the streets, clashing with government security forces resulting in a number of deaths before they gathered sufficient moment to force the General to flee (Onishi, 2000b). Despite calls for a new election by supporters of Outtara, Gbagbo assumed the Presidency amidst continuing violence.

The civil war truly started two years later, on September 19, 2002 with a mutiny and failed coup by troops from the north which became a full-scale uprising. Soldier mutinies had become common since Guéï’s coup but this one stuck. Former President Guéï was killed during the attack on Abidjan, and by the next day, the mutineers had control over the northern half of the country (Genocide Watch, 2012). The basis of the rift lay in ivoirité which did not just electorally disenfranchise Outtara and many of his potential supporters, but subjected ordinary northerners to “daily harassment from the authorities, including the police and military” while being removed from positions of power in the security forces, or shunted aside” (Onishi, 2002).
Discrimination by security forces against people with northern-sounding or foreign names was common and wide-spread (McGovern, 2011).

Shortly after the uprising which would eventually consolidated under the banner of the Forces Nouvelles de Côte d'Ivoire, more than 2,000 troops including Legionnaires and paratroopers entered Côte d’Ivoire as Operation Licorne.

**Goals**

The initial French intervention was partially triggered by the Ivorian government’s request for help under pseudo-secret defense agreements dating from independence (Mehler, 2012). These agreements, which France signed with most of its former colonies, obligated France to protect Côte d'Ivoire from external aggression; the Ivorian government claimed the uprising was actually an operation spearheaded by Burkina Faso. France disagreed, and its initial response was lukewarm. The specter of neocolonialism concerned the French government and a multilateral solution was immediately sought while French troops acted to “secure French and other Europeans nationals” (Mehler, 2012: 207). This way troops were deployed, but not necessarily committed unilaterally to protecting the government.

The protection of French nationals was particularly important to French interests considering the number that lived and worked in Côte d’Ivoire – there were still 20,000 in the country in December, 2002 three months after the intervention began (Sciolino, 2002). By September 27, 2002, five days after the first 100 French reinforcements were flown in from Libreville to reinforce the battalion that was already stationed in the country, French troops
rescued 2,200 foreign nationals from the rebel-held town of Bouka and engaged in a joint
operation with American soldiers to rescue 370 more from the rebel-held town of Korhogo.

The initial deployment was not to secure peace but to rescue French nationals; patrolling
a cease-fire line, and maintaining peace and stability in the country was only a goal after the
October 28, 2002 dispatch of troops which followed a ceasefire agreement signed in Paris and
negotiated by ECOWAS (Mehler, 2012). France’s role in maintaining the cease-fire was a result
of Gbagbo’s choices after French troops were on the ground; “Gbagbo, by accepting the cease-
fire agreement under pressure, had called for such a role [for] the French troops” (Mehler, 2012:
207).

Like the British intervention into Sierra Leone, France entered Côte d’Ivoire in a limited
fashion and expanded the goals of its commitment after forces were already on the ground.
Interactions between armed forces on the ground also effected the calculus of response and the
ongoing formulation of goals. By 2004, President Gbagbo had authorized air strikes across the
north; his justification was a fear rebels were preparing to reignite the conflict (Polgreen, 2004).
In the process Ivorian Air Force bombed a French position, killing nine soldiers. The French
retaliated under direct orders from President Chirac and flattened the Ivorian Air Force. The
French government justified the intensity of their response with Michael Barnier, the Foreign
Minister, declaring: “we have thought and we have said that this was a deliberate attack on the
part of Ivoirian fighter jets” (Polgreen, 2004). The response touched off anti-French mob
violence, effectively scaring off many of the remaining French expatriates (McGovern, 2011).
French troops guarded the airport during the exodus. The goal of the response was certainly intended to protect French peacekeepers from further air attacks.

**Language and Executive**

President Chirac himself was an old françafrique hand (Chafer, 2005). However, the Ivorian civil war erupted in a period of domestic transition on the African policy arena, one that was seeing the unilateral power of the President within a reserved sphere greatly eroded by cohabitation (Chafer, 2005). Gbagbo had a long history with France, Regardless, Chirac and Gbagbo did not see eye to eye, a result of decades on opposite side of the French political spectrum.

Gbagbo himself had been closely linked to the Socialist Party in France, and lived in France during his exile in the 1980s. Given France’s ‘cohabitation’ government, with the Socialists holding the Prime Minister’s office, and the Gaullist Rassemblement pour la République (RPR) holding the presidency, relations between France and Gbagbo were potentially complicated (Human Rights Watch, 2001: 64).

It was partially this political animosity that led to the original lukewarm reception of requests for assistance, leading to an intervention that was initially limited to rescuing foreign nationals. Gbagbo’s long history with France, however, did make the intervention more flexible and France more willing to engage in a more open-ended commitment. There was a long relationship which created ties of responsibility.

The role of language directly in the Ivorian case is also complicated by the long history of Franco-African relations that grew out of independence, but which is heavily delineated by the shared French language. France has jealously guarded a francophone domain in Africa, and actively promoted the language’s use against Anglophone encroachment. The conception of French language as a universal language and the only appropriate vehicle for the process of
civilizing is deeply engrained in French culture. As Harzig noted: “…the French have an innate conviction in the superiority of their language.” (as quoted in Wardhaugh, 1987: 141). That sense of superiority has led some to claim that the expansion of the French language is a natural outgrowth of the:

…privileged characteristics of this language. Recall them: clarity, beauty, perfection; whence at different levels, stability (a perfect language may evolve without harm); utility (as an international language, in comparison with other less well-endowed languages); simplicity (a transparent language, more than another, facilitates learning) (Reboullet 1976 as quoted in Wardaugh, 1987: 141).

This sense that French was the only language suited to express the noblest of human sentiments coupled with the Enlightenment-flavored belief that everyone was capable of progress, led to the development of a theory of colonialism and attendant educational policies often referred to as “assimilationist”. African colonial peoples could be lifted to the level of Frenchmen through the provision of French language and culture – they could be made French. In this emphasis on strictly French language education, the government was extending a domestic policy that had served to consolidate centralized power in continental France since the 16th century (Bokamba, 1991).

However, the language itself had little direct role in development of goals – there was no linguistic conflict and while the language was shared within the dyad especially at the highest levels, its impact was as a piece of a larger historical relationship tying France to Côte d’Ivoire. France could not afford to do nothing while its African crown jewel continued to deteriorate and
the international community saw France as the best equipped actor in the region to assist with United Nations’ goals.

**Côte d’Ivoire – Second Intervention**

Disarmament deadlines were set and missed by government militias and rebels who maintained control over the north of the country after the “conclusion” of the civil war. Presidential elections scheduled for 2005 were postponed, leaving President Gbagbo in power. However, the 2007 Ouagadougou Agreement forced Gbagbo to share power with Guillaume Soro, leader of the Forces Nouvelles (FN), as the prime minister. Presidential elections were delayed at least six times; the last occurred in 2009 when the Independent Electoral Commission cited difficulty with the compilation of provisional voters’ lists (Agence France-Presse, 2009; Nossiter, 2010b).

Here the civil war, never fully resolved, bled into the next, shorter and more decisive war in Côte d'Ivoire – the conflict following the long-awaited 2010 presidential election. Part of the peace process rolled back the requirement that Presidential candidates’ have two Ivorian parents, opening the way for Outtara to finally run. After a first round where no candidate gained a sufficient share of the vote to win, a coalition including former President Bédié and his PDCI party threw their weight behind Outtara and the RDR in an “anyone but Gbagbo” strategy which helped net an electoral win in an election that international observers considered generally free and fair.

Gbagbo, like Bédié and Guéï before him, had rested his constituency and rhetoric on a fierce strain of resentful xenophobia, a loss to a northern “foreigner” was not acceptable. The later introduction of French forces touched off a flurry of anti-French, anti-imperialist rhetoric
which was animated by the same principles. The potential for violence was apparent even before voting had begun; Gbagbo complained that the voter rolls included too many “foreigners”, continued to employ xenophobic rhetoric in campaign rallies that included tens of thousands, and was supported by Young Patriots\textsuperscript{22} leader Blé Goudé who was under UN sanction for leading street violence (Nossiter, 2010b). Newspaper sources also identified the possibility of “popular rage” on the other side if electoral results were seen to be manipulated (Nossiter, 2010b).

On live television, an electoral commission member and supporter of Gbagbo stopped the reading of the election results and physically tore up sheets of voting results when the outcome, a victory for Outtara, became obvious (Nossiter, 2010a). The President claimed there was widespread electoral fraud in the north, a claim that was not backed up by election observers but which served to stoke xenophobic anger, already primed, in Gbagbo’s supporters. The next day the Electoral Commission declared Outtara the winner with 55% of the second round vote, though Gbagbo refused to accept the results or step down (Nossiter, 2010c). The borders were almost immediately closed and foreign television stations blocked, amidst an upsurge in violence by Gbagbo supporters (Nossiter, 2010c).

Gbagbo re-entrenched himself as President, holding an elaborate inauguration and accusing France of trying to set up a dupe as President for neocolonial purposes. International pressure ramped up. By December it included American and European Union travel bans against Gbagbo and his family and a warning from the United Nations about his potential culpability in

\textsuperscript{22} The Young Patriots is an umbrella (not unlike the Forces Nouvelle) for youth movements/militias that supported Gbagbo and were intensely xenophobic and anti-French.

Goals

The second intervention’s goals were essentially an extension of the previous mission: to protect French and foreign civilians, and to enforce a UN mandate. There was a focus this time on protection of Ivorian civilians as an outgrowth of the UN mandate. There was a priority placed on the protecting and evacuation of French citizens, of which far fewer remained than at the beginning of the 2002 civil war.

Foreign Minister Alain Juppè deployed four general categories of justification when discussing the purpose of intervention: the need to assist to the UN mission, Licorne’s “natural role” in assisting the UN and civilians, the responsibility for French nationals in Côte d’Ivoire and, as the president emphasized repeatedly, the French respect for democracy (Simonen, 2012). UN Security Council resolution 1975/2011 called for an end to the use of heavy weapons after Gbagbo’s forces used them against civilians and the UN Secretary-General requested that French forces help enforce that mandate (Erlanger, 2011). The protection of civilians aspect of the goal-defining rhetoric is ultimately what bounded the second intervention – the original French
intention of protecting French citizens was expanded by UN influence to include the protection of Ivorian civilians (Nossiter, Sayare, and Bilefsky, 2011).

**Language and Executive Relations**

The process of goal making for the second intervention revolved more around the forces that had already been committed and the role France had already taken on. Language and the historical package of which it was a part had helped to precipitate the original intervention, and in that way shaped the space of decision-making for the second intervention.

At the executive level, France had seen a turn-over with President Nicolas Sarkozy replacing President Chirac. Sarkozy broke, rhetorically at least, strongly with the past over African policy.

… Mr Sarkozy's attitude towards sub-Saharan countries is radically different from that of his predecessors. For Mr Mitterrand and Mr Chirac… France and Africa were bound by profound historical links. "For them Africa was not a matter a matter of foreign policy: it was part of greater France," [Antoine Glaser, a French journalist] told the BBC News website. Furthermore, their close friendship with African leaders made French presidents reluctant to denounce corruption and abuses. "Africa is not ready for democracy," Mr Chirac once said. Mr Sarkozy, on the other hand, has no personal connection with a continent he seeks above all to keep at arm’s length. During the campaign, he mentioned Africa only as a potential source of uncontrolled immigration (Astier, 2007).

Sarkozy may have communicated with Outtara directly before the operation that arrested Gbagbo, but the primary impetus for the intervention and the general goals appeared to be dynamics at the international-level including the Security Council resolution.

**Mali**

If the French interventions in Côte d'Ivoire were strongly reminiscent of françafrique, the intervention in Mali was more indicative of a new direction in French foreign military policy.
France entered Mali to fight a little piece of the global “War on Terror” and to protect an African democracy from dismemberment by jihadists flooding out of the newly destabilized Libya.

Mali’s history as a state, in many ways, predates the French colonial period by centuries. The name itself is derived from the ancient Malian Empire which at its height ruled a vast tract of West Africa and controlled a lucrative portion of the trans-Saharan trade from 1230 to 1600 CE (Stewart, 2013). Despite this long history of state-building, the north of Mali was the stronghold of nomadic Tuareg people – who spearheaded resistance to the French and finally, the modern Malian state.

Under colonialism which began in 1890 Mali, then called French Sudan, was incorporated into French West Africa. The area was administered by a Lieutenant Governor who answered to a Governor based in Dakara, Senegal; that Governor answered directly to Paris (Stewart, 2013). Colonial power had difficulty penetrating the relatively inhospitable terrain of Mali and it was actively resisted by Tuareg tribesmen who could never be fully assimilated. Christian religion and the French language, as a result, were adopted by far fewer people in Mali than in Côte d’Ivoire. The post-independence relationship was, likewise, weaker.

Following independence and the creation of a singular Mali, its political history can be divided into three republics with varying levels of violence. The first relatively short-lived under the first elected president, Modibo Keïta, who served from 1960 to 1968 when he was overthrown in a military coup by Lieutenant Moussa Traoré. The second republic under Traoré had significant longevity despite intermittent political upheaval, but it too fell in a military coup
in 1991 led by Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré who is affectionately known in Mali as ATT (Skattum, 2008).

It was ATT’s actions stepping down after a brief transitional phase and the subsequent electoral stability that made Mali’s reputation as a dark horse of African democracy. “Like Cincinnatus, the Roman farmer who took up arms and then returned to his fields, Touré kept his word, surprising many of his fellow Malians” (Pringle, 2006). The elections in 1992 following Touré’s graceful exit represented the first change in government Mali had experienced in the post-colonial era by means other than a military coup (Stewart, 2013). He would later return to run for president a decade later in multi-party elections which he subsequently won.

Though the question of international jihadism sets the most recent conflict apart from previous instances of Tuareg insurrection, Islam is not specific to the Tuaregs; around 90% of Mali’s total population is Muslim and its great cities like Timbuktu have been centers of Islamic learning for centuries. The radicalization of the conflict in northern Mali stems largely from the conflict in Libya that unseated Qaddafi, and in this it shares a Libyan connection with the Sierra Leone case. Qaddafi trained and equipped thousands of disaffected Tuareg fighters to fight as mercenaries, and after his fall they came flooding back into northern Mali, complete with their connections to an international jihad (Bøås and Torheim, 2013).

What had previously been a localized conflict about ethnic autonomy became a larger more destabilizing insurgency, fueled by international weapons and money. The conflict system in northern Mali fractured the Tuaregs, resulting in a number of armed actors, including the underwhelming Malian military. On March 21, 2012, troops stationed in Kati mutinied and stormed the state television state and presidential palace in Bamako (Whitehouse, 2012). The mutineers were mostly enlisted men, with a few lower ranking officers, who believed that higher
ranking officers and politicians had withheld equipment and support from their counter-insurgency operation in the north.

A junta was installed led by a “charismatic” American-trained Army captain, Amadou Sanogo (Whitehouse, 2012). The entire coup may even have been an accident; some reports suggested that the mutineers simply wanted to confront President Touré, who fled his office with his guards at their approach, essentially ceding control to unwitting coup-makers. By this time, the cities of Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu had already fallen to rebel forces. April 6, 2012 the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (NMLA) declared the independence of the Azawad region. This was just one of the main combatant organizations often working at cross purposes in Mali’s north – the NMLA argued it was fighting for a secular homeland for the Tuareg, but the uprising in the north included less secular elements like al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Ansar Dine. By December, Burkina Faso mediated a ceasefire between the Malian government and the two largest Touareg groups. It lasted roughly a month before Ansar Dine unilaterally suspended it and resumed hostility. The insurgents’ advance threatened Bamako. Within a week the President of Mali requested French assistance (Brylonek, 2013).

January 11, 2013, 800 French troops are deployed in Operation Serval accompanied by airstrikes.

**Goals**

Unlike the interventions previously discussed in this chapter, the French intervention into Mali was not primarily about traditional humanitarian concerns like protecting expatriates; rather, the intervention was prompted by and revolved around much broader geopolitics. The concerns that Mali raised were couched in a rhetoric of resistance to global jihad and an
international war on Islamic terror. Mali could be “conquered by terrorists” and France had to “eradicate any Islamist zone of control or influence” (Perry, Boswell, Crumley, et al, 2013). Terms like “Jihadist”, ‘Islamist’, and ‘terrorist’ [were] often being used interchangeably” and the “aims of the war” were often shifting from “‘Malian sovereignty’, ‘repelling armed Islamists and Jihadists’, [to] ‘eradicating terrorism’” which suggests a lack of clearly defined vocabulary but an overall concern with repelling actors linked to international terrorism and stabilizing the country (Marchal, 2013a: 490).

The boots-on-the-ground intervention proceeded after France had already engaged in a strategy to avoid actual troop deployment that had failed. “As late as 11 October, François Hollande was insisting that there would be "no men on the ground, no engagement by French troops" and that France would only provide material support to Mali 's armed forces” (Zajec, 2013). By the 19th of January, President Hollande's approach had reversed when he declared that France would remain in Mali “for as long as is necessary to ensure victory over terrorism” (quoted in Zajec, 2013). Like the other interventions discussed here, troop deployment was not necessarily preceded by concrete goal development. The French intervened in a decidedly reactionary fashion, launching Operation Serval only when rebel forces appeared poised to roll into Bamako (Perry et al, 2013).

The subsequent intervention had two phases of goals: securing Bamako and pushing Islamist forces back, and then the “restoration of territorial integrity, along with an emphasis on
the fight against terrorism” (Heisbourg, 2013). A concern about regional destabilization and the danger that Islamists in Mali posed to Europe were never far from the conversation.

**Language and Executive Relations**

Shared language was not of particular importance to the decision-making process around the intervention in Mali. Like the other interventions discussed, language was a component of a wider historical interaction which imbued France with a special responsibility toward Mali. The legitimacy of the intervention was explicitly discussed in the news media based on this historical relationship; for example: “In terms of legitimacy, unlike the unjustified war in Afghanistan, France’s involvement in maintaining the stability of Africa is based on *solid arguments, those of linguistic, cultural and geographical closeness* (emphasis added)” (Zajec, 2013). The United States, as mentioned earlier, specifically has a linguistic problem in its Afghanistan operations.

More than in the other cases discussed here, executive interactions played a major role in the decision to intervene and its scope. However, the important interactions were not entirely dyadic but in some cases regional in nature; the Presidents of Niger, Senegal and Guinea all supported French intervention out of fear of conflict contagion (Marchal, 2013). “Mali’s interim president Dioncounda Traoré appealed to French President François Hollande for military assistance, warning him that the entire country was in danger of falling to the rebels” (Hammer, 2013).

These were not long lasting relationships, however; Hollande and Traoré were both relatively new to their positions. Further, Mali, unlike Côte d’Ivoire, had consciously moved out of the French sphere of political influence since independence. Both Mali and Côte d’Ivoire gained independence from France in 1960, though the impact of colonialism and the intimacy of
the post-colonial relationship with their former master diverged. Mali, with its low population density and distance from the ocean, experienced less lasting colonial penetration. Culturally, Christianity had made fewer inroads in a predominantly Muslim region, and French elite interest was lower. As a result, its resulting post-colonial relationship with France was weaker and more distant than Côte d’Ivoire (Stewart, 2013).

The source of French goals in Mali were geopolitical and less about traditional francafrique networks of iterative elite interaction or deeply held linguistic convictions. Islamic terrorists at the doorstep to Europe triggered modern anxieties partially derived from conflicts occurring halfway across the globe. As in the case of the other interventions, international pressure on France was considerable; France was seen as the appropriate leader with a natural responsibility to the country and region tied to the colonial legacy. This sense of responsibility
was communicated and drawn upon by African Presidents when they called on President Hollande to intervene.

**Connecting Goals to Outcomes**

For intervention outcomes to be measured with validity, they must take into account the original intentions of the interveners. Once the goals are understood, they provide a benchmark against which an intervention’s success can subsequently be judged.

*Table 14: Intervention Goals for Case Studies*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intervention</th>
<th>Goals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sierra Leone (British)</strong></td>
<td>o Evacuation of foreign nationals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o Stabilization and security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o Rescuing the United Nations Mission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o Validation of New Labour Foreign Policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Côte d’Ivoire I (French)</strong></td>
<td>o Evacuation of foreign nationals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o Patrolling cease-fire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Côte d’Ivoire II (French)</strong></td>
<td>o Evacuation of foreign nationals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o Protection of civilians, specifically against heavy weapons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mali</strong></td>
<td>o Securing Bamako against insurgents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o Defeating jihadists in Mali’s north.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Interventions as a policy instrument cannot, in every environment and under every set of circumstances, achieve every type of goal. Policy makers must then weigh carefully, based on knowledge and their synoptic view of the situation, the cost of intervention against the probability of achieving a particular goal. The greater the knowledge and legibility, the more accurate the prediction.

As this is one of the first systematic attempts to connect actual identifiable goals with intervention outcomes, there is useful information that can be derived from a basic survey of the larger dataset which here includes all military interventions into Africa civil wars since 1960, and combining it with the more focused case studies. In this study success is defined as achieving the interveners’ goals. Goals are often under-theorized and assumed. The earlier argument that it is problematic to assume conflict mitigation is the primary purpose of intervention, as is so often done in the literature, is bolstered by the data. While humanitarian
Interventions are fairly common, they make up only a fraction of the total and their share of total interventions has changed over time.

As illustrated in chart 1, the goal most often sought with military interventions is security; 36% (N = 16) cases serve some security purpose. Humanitarian goals are a close second with 34% (N=15). Since each intervention could serve multiple goals, many interventions are not just coded in a single category. Unsurprisingly perhaps, no intervention was undertaken with the shared goals of bolstering domestic security and engaging in humanitarianism. These categories are mutually exclusive. However, states engaged in security interventions most often pair this goal with ally power maintenance. Key allies may be considered fundamental to maintaining security long-term.

Typical of a security-seeking intervention is Angola’s intervention in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 1997 (COW 895). Angola’s primary concern was the role that the
Congo played as a rear base for the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). The government of Angola was controlled by the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) which had emerged from the independence struggle with control of the state. UNITA, first formed to fight for Angolan independence, turned on the MPLA in a long civil war for the central government which remained the MPLA’s primary concern when engaging in foreign policy.

“[Angola joined the 1996-97 war in the DRC]…to defend itself against Jonas Savimbi’s National Union for the Total Independence of Angola. Although Angola sided with Laurent-Desire Kabila…sympathy for Kabila and his regime was at best a secondary factor” (Turner, 2002: 75). What sympathy there was for Kabila’s insurgency against Mobutu was based solely on the hope that “the follow-up regime to Mobutu would be less inclined to allow UNITA such ready access to its territory” (Turner, 2002: 81). Since the end of the Cold War, Savimbi had been required to find new patrons to assist his fight against the Angolan government and Mobutu had become his last lifeline (Stearn, 2011). Crushing UNITA was at the forefront of all of the interventions undertaken by Angola during the period under analysis.

Humanitarian interventions and security interventions have both increased as a percentage of total interventions since the end of the Cold War. The Cold War actually saw a greater diversity of goals to which interventions were set. During the Cold War 16.7% of interventions were humanitarian in nature, and 25% were security related. After the Cold War, both goals make up 40% of interventions respectively.

The majority of humanitarian interventions are undertaken as multilateral interventions involving a mandate from an intergovernmental organization (IGO). This can partially be accounted for by the number of participants in the Somali intervention, but the United Nations is
not the only IGO operating in Africa – the other multilateral interventions are under the Economic Community of West African States military arm the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). Those humanitarian interventions that were not multilateral were undertaken by former colonial powers, France and Belgium specifically. This suggests that colonial powers, influenced by regional and international opinion as the case studies have illustrated., feel obligated to their former colonies. This is backed up by the case studies. All three cases involved some amount of international pressure for former colonial powers to “take responsibility”.

The dataset including just colonial power interventions and the United States covers the period between 1960 and 2013 with a total of 13 interventions in nine civil wars. When former colonial powers intervene in their former colonies, they overwhelmingly intervene (85.7%) in what might be considered “classic” civil wars – wars for central control of the government. When colonial powers intervened in their former colonial possessions, they almost always (71% of the time) intervene on the side of the existing central government. Humanitarian interventions make up a far larger percentage of interventions engaged in by these actors (77%). Security is less directly important; this is unsurprising as these types of state are projecting power over a great geographic distance, many of the targets are weak and far away. Humanitarian goals are
most often combined with domestic political goals, though only 30% of humanitarian interventions also include a domestic political component.

![Chart 2 - Colonial powers’ (and US) goals by frequency](image)

The majority of interventions occurred following the end of the Cold War (69%), mirroring the general trend found in the larger data. The popularity of humanitarian interventions has increased from 50% during the Cold War, to 89% after. This is commensurate with the earlier finding that interventions were put to a greater variety of policy uses during the Cold War. The average number of interveners is smaller than that for the larger dataset; there are an average of 1.4 interventions per civil war. If the large multilateral intervention in Somalia is removed, the average drops to 1.12. Colonial powers are more likely to intervene unilaterally or outside an IGO mandate.

While all of the interveners are former colonial powers, or the United States, about 61.5% (8) of the interventions are targeted at their former colonies. France, by far, engaged in the most
interventions; it accounts for 53.85% (7) of the total. The next most frequent intervener is the United States with 23% (3), of which two are interventions into the Somali conflict begun in 1992, the first under the UNITAF mandate and the second in UNOSOM II. Italy, Belgium and the United Kingdom each engaged in a single intervention, though Italy’s intervention is as part of UNOSOM II. Belgium intervened in the DRC in 1978 in tandem, though not necessarily in a coalition with, the French. The United Kingdom’s intervention is in Sierra Leone in 2000 in support of the United Nations mission, but not as a part of it.

This suggests that humanitarianism and security are an increasing concern for states engaging in intervention, though it is true that humanitarianism is major preoccupation of former colonial powers. The pattern is visible in the interventions discussed at length in this chapter: France and Great Britain sought to evacuate civilians and stabilize countries. In the second Côte d’Ivoire intervention France specifically sought to protect Ivorian civilians from heavy weapons under a United Nations mandate – a traditionally humanitarian goal. In Mali, the French pushed back jihadist elements because of concerns over international terrorism and proximity to Europe – a modern security goal.

**Testing Realizable Goals and their relation to outcomes**

Curiously, when intervention goals are compared to intervention success using cross-tabulation; those goals most associated with success are geopolitical and domestic political. In fact, none of the geopolitical or domestic political interventions were entirely unsuccessfultly; some of the interventions were only partially successful but none failed entirely. There is,
however, no relationship between the strength of linguistic and executive relations and the likelihood that an intervention will be undertaken for domestic political, or geopolitical reasons.

Further research is required on the process of goal making in interventions, but there is a multiplicity of factors that would act on intervention goals, as the case studies illustrated. International pressure is a major shaper of interventions for former colonial powers – especially pushing toward humanitarianism. Rather than thinking of goal creation as a strictly domestic, or dyadic process, instead it should be conceptualized as occurring within overlapping international communities of responsibility and pressure acting on interveners.

Table 15 - Cross-Tab: Domestic Political Goal and Outcome

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domestic Political</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 16 - Cross-Tab: Geopolitical and Outcome

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geopolitical</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Interestingly, the outcome of humanitarian and security interventions, the most common goals, are a significantly more mixed bag. 43% (N=7) of all humanitarian interventions are complete failures; they do not achieve any significant portion of their intended goals. For security motivated interventions, 37.5% (N=6) ended in failure. For less common intervention goals, the failure rate is even higher though the number of cases is much smaller and therefore
harder to make conclusions about. For economically motivated and territorially motivated interventions, 50% (N = 1 and 2 respectively) end in complete failure; no territorially motivated interventions amounted to a complete success, unsurprising considering the strange durability of Africa’s borders. It is clear that some goals are generally more achievable than others.

The cases discussed here are summarized by their goals and outcomes in Table 4 below:

Table 17 - Goals and Outcomes for Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Goals</th>
<th>Outcome (QCA)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Humanitarian Geopolitical</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Geopolitical Domestic Political</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire I</td>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
<td>.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire II</td>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Humanitarian Geopolitical</td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conclusions

Goals are under-theorized, and generally under-investigated in cross-national research into military interventions into civil wars. Previously, I had hypothesized that the two condition, shared language and iterative executive relations, would act on the likelihood of intervention success through two paths: more achievable goal creation and by reducing operational friction. The second path will be examined in the next chapter. The examination of the goal creation process and the conflict dynamics that surrounded them in the cases of the two French interventions in Côte d’Ivoire, the French intervention in Mali and the British intervention in Sierra Leone have highlighted some new processes that the earlier QCA could not.

The legacy of colonialism as a general historical condition impacts the way that actors view certain state’s obligation to intervene both domestically and internationally. This pressure
effects both the choice to intervene, and the goals that are selected once intervention has been undertaken. The legacy of colonialism results in concrete conditions that act on goal creation as the role of the semi-secret defense agreements between France and Côte d’Ivoire illustrated; France signed similar agreements with most of Francophone Africa following independence, and in the case of Côte d’Ivoire was reluctant to intervene on this basis. The result was a lukewarm intervention initially focused on protecting foreign nationals, but once the force was in place on the ground, its role continued to evolve reactively.

This segues into the second point illuminated by this analysis: interventions are often undertaken with limited or undefined goals and then expand reactively to the situation as those intervention forces become parties to the conflict. The British intervention in Sierra Leone began before there was a meaningful goal, and continued based on a general principle rather than on defined desired outcomes. Once a force is on the ground, a goal to save civilians may be superseded by force defense, in the case of the 2004 French retaliation for the Ivorian Air Force bombing of French Licorne troops (Mehler, 2012).

The path by which goals are created, and evaluated before their implementation, is not directly impacted by shared language. Rather, the presumed cause of a shared language, a legacy of colonialism, is often more directly active on goal creation than language itself. Similarly, executive relations are often secondary to more reactive concerns like changing conditions on the ground and international pressures from multilateral institutions or major partners.

The selection of those goals most likely to succeed in the broader dataset, does not appear to have a relationship to linguistic or executive ties. Those goals most likely to be achieved are also not the most popular goals to which interventions are put. Humanitarianism, a popular though not singular goal, for interventions is surprisingly unsuccessful except in the cases
examined in depth in this chapter. These recent interventions by former colonial powers have
double the average success rate of humanitarian interventions by all actors since independence.
Chapter 6 – Operational Friction

The cases, the British intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000 (COW War #898), the French intervention in Mali in 2013 (no COW war code), and the French intervention in Côte d’Ivoire in 2002 (COW War #39) and 2011 (no COW war code), revealed some interesting refinements of the QCA conclusions in the last chapter. The decision to intervene and the forces that shaped the goals in the case studies, or the open-ended lack thereof, were less influenced by shared language or ongoing executive interaction than by international pressures and the specter of colonial responsibility.

Operations are complicated, difficult to research and difficult to generalize from. They are effected not just by factors that can be identified and controlled for, but also by the vagaries of weather and chance. These interventions are also so recent that information remains classified or, as yet, unavailable. This initial analysis, however, outlines the broad lines of the interventions operationally, and highlights the role played by executive relations, language and institutional history broadly.

Sierra Leone

The military portion of the British intervention was a rapid, littoral operation heavily supported by naval resources. It proceeded in multiple stages; the first part was Operation Palliser. Immediately following the renewal of RUF's offensive and the collapse of the Lomé peace accord, the United Nations Security Council held an emergency meeting on May 4th where “the US delegation and the UN Secretary-General made it clear that they expected the United Kingdom to resolve the situation” (Dorman, 2007: 188). The statement released by the
President of the Security Council called “upon all States in a position to do so to assist the Mission” in “attempting to bring this situation under control” (United Nations Security Council, 2000). An Operational Reconnaissance and Liaison Team (ORLT) was dispatched on May 6th – a sign of how quickly the situation on the ground was moving, and how seriously the United Kingdom took the recent developments.

The ORLT was comprised of military staff officers from the Permanent Joint Headquarters. The role of the ORLT was, in tandem with the new British High Commissioner, to provide an assessment of the current situation. Within a day, it had been retasked as “the forward headquarters for the British deployment and began to expand utilizing staff officers then on exercise in nearby Ghana and also reinforcements from the United Kingdom” (Dorman, 2009: 77). Following massive rioting on May 8th, the British High Commissioner asked Brigadier General David Richards for an evacuation of entitled personnel. British paratroopers were already en route to Dakar, Senegal and they were sent directly on to Freetown to secure Lungi airport. Lungi airport was to serve as a forward operating base (FOB) for the evacuation of entitled personnel. Securing the airport further stabilized the UNAMSIL mission by allowing its use for supply and reinforcement. The speed of the deployment was such that paratroopers were dropped into Lungi without their full rucksacks. At the time of insertion, the situation on the ground at Lungi was unknown so “taking no risks, the company ‘completed the first operational TALO [tactical air-land operation] for many years, much to the surprise of the Nigerian and UN forces at Lungi’” (Fowler, 2004: 82).

The actual evacuation occurred rapidly; within two days all of the entitled personnel that desired to leave Sierra Leone were safely removed. “In all, 353 people were evacuated, mostly British and European nationals” (Penfold, 2012). The arrival of British personnel stabilized the
situation to the degree that some people who had previously intended to evacuate did not actually decide to leave the country (Dorman, 2009). In addition with the paratroopers, and the “largest, regular [British] Special Forces deployment since Operation Granby in the first Gulf War”, there was a major deployment of naval power (Fowler, 2004: 81). “Twenty-nine RAF Hercules and four Tristar aircraft were deployed along with HMS Ocean and her ten helicopters. HMS Ocean was later joined by the aircraft carrier HMS Illustrious, with her thirteen Harrier jets and five helicopters, and five more Royal Navy ships. It was one of the largest British naval flotillas deployed since the liberation of the Falklands back in 1982” (Penfold, 2012). The naval deployment was particularly important to operational success; it provided offshore basing that minimized the expeditionary forces’ ground footprint and increased its firepower (Dorman, 2007).

Following the successful evacuation and stabilization performed rapidly under Operation Palliser, the British transitioned to Operation Basilica, which was tasked with assisting the restructuring and training of the official Sierra Leone Army and to serve as an over-the-horizon reserve force. Officially led by the International Military Advisory Training Team – Sierra Leone (IMATT-SL) first made up of short term training teams “intended to place competent…soldiers quickly into the field” (Roberson, 2007: 69). The longer term training strategy operated under a “train the trainer” methodology so that the Sierra Leone Army could develop its own officer corps and training capacity. While not considered a combat deployment, British troops in Operation Basilica were authorized to defend themselves (Fowler, 2004).

For a short time the presence of British troops helped calm the situation. However, the practice of hostage-taking by insurgent forces in Sierra Leone would precipitate another phase of intervention. The third and final phase of the intervention was to be as rapid and decisive as the
first. Operation Barras, also called the “Gun Fight at Rorkel Creek”, was a Special Forces-led hostage rescue operation (Evoe, 2008). On August 25th, eleven soldiers of the Royal Irish Regiment went missing after visiting Jordanian peacekeepers. They were ambushed and held hostage by the West Side Boys (WSB). An armed militia group, the WSB had “professed loyalty to Johnny-Paul Koroma - the former army leader who’s Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) ousted President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah” but was mostly engaged in banditry rather than politically-motivated violence (BBC News, 2000a).

A military solution was not the immediate British response; first they attempted to engage in negotiation. A number of factors generally hindered effective hostage negotiation though. The leaders of the WSB were largely erratic, due in no small part to drug use. The international publicity thrown on the group by the high-profile hostage-taking drove the group into “making a mixture of unrealistic high-flown political demands and drawing up a shopping list of how much they could grab as a ransom payments” (Fowler, 2004: 113). Even as negotiations were undertaken, SAS teams had been inserted to place eyes on the camp where the Royal Irish Regiment was being held.

Ultimately the West Side Boy’s own hubris helped the operation’s planners. They had requested and received a satellite phone, which allowed the British military to pinpoint their exact location. The SAS forces which had infiltrated the periphery of the camp were providing a “steady stream of high-grade intelligence” (Fowler, 2004: 121). When negotiations were abandoned and a military direction was decided on “Squadron D of the 22nd SAS and 150 paras from the 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment who had previously served in Operation Palliser that summer were assigned to the rescue mission” (Evoe, 2008: 74).

Operation Barras was even shorter then Operation Palliser; the attack began at 06.40
hours Sunday, September 10, and by 09.20 hours the Ministry of Defense in London was receiving confirmation that all of the hostages were rescued safely (Fowler, 2007). The British sustained minimal loses, with a single soldier killed during the action. It was the last true combat operation of the Sierra Leone intervention, though the British remained in Sierra Leone to continue the military training program and to help facilitate the next Presidential election.

**Institutions and Operations**

The kinetic portion of the operation, including securing the Lungi airport, or the Special Forces firefight which made up Operation Barras, were more strongly influenced by recent British military experience.

In the absence of guidance to the contrary, soldiers tend to follow the norms of conduct that they have either learnt in training or draw on their own recent operational experience. The danger of this occurs when the context is different and has not been fully taken into account. In the case of Sierra Leone, this was not a problem; but in Iraq in 2004, when Britain sent the Black Watch battle-group to Camp Dogwood to relieve a US Marine Force, it was assumed that the standard approach then being used in and around Basra would apply equally in the US sector (Dorman, 2007: 192).

The case of British forces in Sierra Leone illustrates the cycle of institutional memory. For better and for worse, forces in Britain relied on more recent experiences, significantly in Northern Ireland, which superseded older experience in Africa or Sierra Leone in particular. Forces were deployed without adequate malaria protection; the Ministry of Defence ran out of the standard malaria drug, Mefloquine, and was forced to use a less effective drug (BBC News, 2000). While malaria is a commonly understood complication of simply existing in West Africa, the MoD had not sufficiently prepared for troop deployment in this region despite “considerable experience … acquired during the days of Empire about operating around the globe”. Instead, as British security became more European focused “the armed forces lost a good deal of knowledge
of how to operate militarily in tropical climates” (Dorman, 2007: 197).

This short institutional memory netted positive results as well. Troops were aware of non-violent conflict resolution strategies that had been deployed successfully in Ireland; they were trained, and most importantly, comfortable with using these techniques in the field and subsequently helped to avoid violent escalation (Fowler, 2004). Institutional memories are short, not unlike individual memories and have a bias toward more proximate experiences. This does not necessarily suggest that longer history does not have a part to play, just that its impact is mediated through more recent applications.

The rules of engagement in Northern Ireland which most directly impacted British forces' default behavior were themselves a product of the underlying military culture that had been built through long historical processes (Thornton, 2004). British military culture emphasizes minimum force, counter-insurgency and flexible pragmatism (Egnell, 2006). In a sense, the British military developed as a small wars army;

...The British military culture was formed out of working towards political goals in the colonies. That military culture emerged out of a combination of pragmatic lessons from colonial policing, including the importance of working closely with the civilian administration, operating close to the population in smaller units to gain information and trust (Egnell, 2006: 1065).

The colonial legacy of imperial expansion and maintenance set the framework from which the British military in Sierra Leone would operate, even as the specific lessons of malaria, for example, were lost through shortened cycles of institutional memory. Indeed, the shortness of the institutional memory at the MoD was a result of the adaptive and pragmatic British “way of war”; individual commanders were granted immense leeway to operate as they saw fit in far-flung imperial postings and the end result was that no specific and institutionalized doctrine developed – just guiding principles (Egnell, 2006).
Language and Executive Relations

It is in the operational context that shared language is expected to have the greatest effect on intervention success. The operational role of language is to facilitate interactions between military personnel in the dyad, and between intervention forces and locals who provide intelligence, assistance and can act as a hindrance. The speed of Operation Palliser and Operation Barras, the military phases of the British involvement in the Sierra Leone civil war, to some degree nullified the power of language to determine success. These were operations that relied on speed in a non-traditional counter-insurgency environment. In those interactions which were not strictly kinetic, which made up the bulk of time that British forces were on the ground in Sierra Leone there was a benefit of shared language. Troops could interact with forces, develop and distribute literature to civilians, and they could even directly understand and communicate with their kidnappers.

Sierra Leone is an interesting linguistic case in this context as English is an official language, and the next most common language is a creole deriving 80% of its vocabulary from English, Krio. English is the sole language of instruction, it is the political language of all parliamentary proceedings and it functions as a “gatekeeper to all forms of access in Sierra Leone” (Francis and Kamanda, 2001: 230).

There are three points at which shared language could have acted to reduce operational friction in the case of the British intervention into Sierra Leone: interaction between British intervention forces and the local populace, most specifically in and around Freetown; interaction between British military trainers assisting the development of the Sierra Leone Army during Operation Basilica and generally during assistance missions carried out before and after the main intervention; and interactions between British military hostages and hostile militia forces.
detaining them. These are the points where interactions were most vital to success for forces and where difficulties could not simply be overcome by technology, or increased force presence – natural advantages that Great Britain possesses in an environment like Sierra Leone.

The initial intervention occurred while Freetown was in danger and the situation had been destabilized by RUF advance. After securing the Lungi Airport, the operational scope grew to include support for the UNAMSIL mission; average Sierra Leoneans reacted positively to the presence of British troops and even strongly resisted the removal of British combat forces at the end of Operation Palliser (Fowler, 2004). As the operation wound down, British troops distributed leaflets that explained how the British had helped achieve stabilization and would continue to support UN and Sierra Leone Army efforts to maintain security. The creation of leaflets and the ability to engage in effective ground patrols in an urban environment were partially products of a shared medium of communication which did not require the time-consuming process of building secondary language capacity or the recruitment of native translators.

In the case of the British, executive power must be analyzed at a lower level. Independence of decision-making, with the assistance of political advisers connected to London, is a common feature of the British military culture, and the speed with which troops were deployed into Sierra Leone placed an enormous amount of decision and policy-making power in the hands of Brigadier General David Richards, the military commander leading Operation Palliser (Egnell, 2006). It makes sense in light of this particularity to consider the role that this level of executive power, interacting with executive and other operational leaders within the Sierra Leonean context, had on the outcome of the intervention.

Richards first visited Sierra Leone in January, 1999, where he “made it [his] business to
try to meet as many of the key players as possible” (Richards, 2014). It was during this initial visit that he befriended President Kabbah. He also visited the commander of ECOMOG and the Sierra Leonean Deputy Defense Minister. This was indicative of the way that Richards would handle the situation as he became further involved; he made a point to become acquainted with every decision-maker he could find, including a meeting with former coup-leader and ostensible head of the West Side Boys, Johnny Paul Koroma (Dorman, 2009).

Over eighteen months, Richards visited Sierra Leone four times, including the last extended stay where he commanded Operation Palliser (Richards, 2014). This was a level of engagement with both the President and the country directly preceding the intervention that provided Richards with “a growing understanding of what made African wars tick” and a “determination not to let Sierra Leone revert to the horrors” that he had witnessed on previous visits (Richards, 2014). Richards personal feelings for Kabbah, and his compassion for Sierra Leone as a whole affected the execution of the intervention in two ways: first, Richards was remarkably willing to interpret his mandate in an extremely liberal way even in the face of political concerns by his superiors and second, he was able to engage in tactics that were successful.

*Côte d’Ivoire – First Intervention*

The French intervention in Côte d’Ivoire during the civil war was the largest French deployment in Africa in twenty years, including Legionnaires, Special Forces and regular troops. It lasted, officially, from late 2002 to late 2004 – spanning roughly four stages. Periodization in an intervention as complex as the French engagement with Côte d’Ivoire can be tricky, but Operation Licorne extended over a number of years which saw a several major changes in its
role, and the circumstances of the conflict.

The first stage covers approximately September 2002 to December 2002, when France was the only major foreign military actor in Côte d’Ivoire (Dobbins et al, 2008). In late September, France reinforced the permanent 500-member garrison, out of concern for French citizens (“French evacuation force sent to Ivory Coast amid fighting”, 2002). By December 2002, there were around 2,500 French troops include the French Foreign Legion and accompanied by helicopters and light tanks (Sciolino, 2002).

Even during this early stage, anti-French sentiment amongst the population was high. Almost immediately France was accused by both the government and the rebels of taking sides, which resulted in the mobilization of anti-French mobs as political weapons (Dobbins et al, 2008). French soldiers used “tear gas and riot-control stun grenades” against civilian protestors in Abidjan (“Angry at the accord”, 2003). Strangely the Francophobia was paralleled by a pro-American feeling, summed up succinctly by one Ivorian: “We are tired of the French people…we need a new partnership. We want Bush involved in our case” (quoted in Sengupta, 2003).

The second stage, from January 2003 to May 2003, was marked by the introduction of other international armed actors into the conflict and the Lomé peace accord. ECOWAS troops were insufficient, and to compensate the French increased Operation Licorne troops to 4,000 by July 2003 (Dobbins et al, 2008). While forces were growing, the French pursued an aggressive diplomatic track. French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin visited Côte d’Ivoire several times including twice in five weeks, meeting with President Gbagbo and rebel leaders and brokering peace efforts (Sciolino, 2003).

The third stage of the conflict, from June 2003 to October 2004, saw deepening anti-French sentiment including accusations from the Ivorian government that French were trying to
overthrow the President by siding with the rebels (Dobbins et al, 2008). The conflict, and intervention, were further transformed by UN Security Council Resolution 1528 in February 2004, which authorized French forces to support the newly created UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire. While this brought the French mandate ostensibly in-line with the United Nations peacekeeping operations, the French retained their independence of action which occasionally led to them working at cross purposes.

The final stage was kicked off in November 2004, when Ivorian President Gbagbo ordered air strikes as part of a renewed offensive against rebels, which destroyed a French position and killed nine French troops. In response to the Ivorian attack, French President Jacques Chirac personally ordered the destruction of the Ivorian Air Force which included only two Russian-made Sukhoi 25 warplanes and five helicopters (Meldrum and Henley, 2004).

The Ivorian government escalated by whipping up more anti-French mob violence – a tool that they had used before. It came to a head November 8, 2004 when French troops were accused of attempting to attack the presidential palace while they were securing the Hotel Ivoire as part of a possible evacuation of French nationals. “Ivorian state radio claimed that the French army planned an assault on the president and urged residents to come out on the streets to protect their head of state” (Meldrum and Henley, 2004). Ivorian security forces accused the French of firing on civilian demonstrators (Dobbins et al, 2008).

French and UNOCI forces shifted their focus toward disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR) as violence decreased—incidence of violence continued in the relatively peaceful interim, though the civil war was hardly resolved (Dobbins et al, 2008). This same troops would be engaged in the second intervention following the long-delayed Presidential election in 2010.
Language and Executive Relations

Linguistically, French language use and fluency is more concentrated in urban areas, specifically around Abidjan. To indirectly measure the effect of language on operational success, French forces should be more successful in and around Abidjan, and similar urban centers, then they are in the countryside where French language use is less widespread.

Fatalities are not the only measure of operational success, but in this case it can serve as an analytic proxy for this brief analysis. As the British mission in Sierra Leone suggests, in environments in which standard operating procedures can be applied, fatalities can be reduced or avoided. Further, a larger fatality count indicates that the conflict event was of a more intense and possibly longer duration. Fatalities are not the only measure of operational success, but in this case it can serve as an analytic proxy to test whether or not there is a difference in operations between areas where French language usage is higher than areas where French language usage is lower.

Of the 32 conflict events that are identified in the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset Version 4 during the civil war in Côte d’Ivoire, only 11 (32%) involved recorded fatalities for either side (Raleigh, Linke, Hegre, and Karlsen, 2010). The majority of the conflicts occurred in and around urban centers, including 12 events in Abidjan. Fatalities are similarly clustered around urban areas where contact with the enemy is higher and where the French tend to target the acquisition of airfields.

23 "Political violence is understood as the use of force by a group with a political purpose or motivation. ACLED defines political violence through its constituent events, the intent of which is to produce a comprehensive overview of all forms of political conflict within and across states. A politically violent event is a single altercation where often force is used by one or more groups for a political end, although some instances – including protests and non-violent activity - are included in the dataset to capture the potential precursors or critical junctures of a conflict" (Raleigh, Linke and Dowd, 2014: 6).
The majority of events occurred around population and market centers and all of the events that resulted in major fatalities occurred around larger towns. The most intense event resulted in 30 fatalities and occurred January 6, 2003 in the western market center of Guiglo (population roughly 60,000). Events with greater than five fatalities also occurred in Abidjan, Logouale and Bouake.

There is no relationship between population size and fatalities directly in the data, and there was insufficient conflict events outside of major centers to pinpoint any patterns. French forces operated in and around towns and airports, in areas where French language use would be expected to be high and there is a variable pattern of fatalities within those areas. Several factors
confound the interpretation of this analysis, and it should be taken only as a plausibility probe: the deployment of French forces was not random or even across the country or linguistic zones and the majority of conflict contact occurred in Abidjan which has the highest density of French usage.

The interaction of executives across all three French interventions allows for a comparison with an intervener that shares the same institutional apparatus and long historical relationship with the intervention target, but with different executives. President Jacques Chirac, an old Africa hand, occupied the Élysée during the first French intervention in Côte d’Ivoire. His successor, Nicolas Sarkozy oversaw the intervention in Côte d’Ivoire following the Presidential election, making both the French and Ivorian executives different from the original intervention. The French intervention in Mali was undertaken by Sarkozy’s successor, François Hollande. Three consecutive French presidents undertook three different interventions with various levels of preexisting executive relations, within a little more than a decade.

Africa has long been considered the particular domain of the French President, though the period of cohabitation between President Chirac, and Socialist Prime Minister Lionel Jospin hobbled his ability to act uncontested in Africa at the outset of the Ivorian civil war. As mentioned in the preceding chapter, French President Chirac and Ivorian President Gbagbo were at opposite ends of the French political spectrum. Their antagonistic relationship complicated the role of the French intervention. Ostensibly, the intervention began with an intention of neutrality. French nationals were to be protected in the deteriorating security conditions, and mediated cease-fires were to be maintained. Almost immediately, anti-French sentiment was employed by official media, used to incite civilian protests against French actions Gbagbo found threatening. He accused French troops of imperialist tendencies and of being engaged in a recolonization of
Côte d’Ivoire. Concerns about French troops and their role in Ivorian politics were not new for President Gbagbo, though; not long after he was sworn in as President he signaled his intention to place a “redefinition” of French-Ivorian defense relations at the top of the agenda (Michaud, 2000). He was upset by the lack of support French troops garrisoned in Côte d’Ivoire had shown during the conflict with General Guei, and feared that they might even be used against him on behalf of Alassane Outtara (which they were, in fact, years later during the Presidential election crisis). The vein of rhetoric was in keeping with the French domestic political divide across which Gbagbo and Chirac had sat for decades.

The veracity of the accusations is not particularly important here; rather, the important point is the element of friction that these accusations and their subsequent actions caused hindered French operations. A scandal resulted from French forces’ use of force on protesting civilians that besieged French forces in Abidjan after rumors they were trying to overthrow President Gbagbo were broadcast on official state media. “Many of the Ivoireans killed in November 2004 died outside the Hotel Ivoire. The statue of the colonial governor across the street is now a monument to the slain. ‘Unicorn, Get Out’ say words scrawled in white paint on the T-shirt's back and front. On the statue's side, another red banner says: ‘Never forget those who fell by the bullets of the French army’” (Pitman, 2005). When French military officials attended an Ivorian military public exercise, thousands of protestors showed up to express their displeasure.

In this case the length of the executive relationship was actually detrimental; Gbagbo had a language of anti-imperialism that he deployed effectively against President Chirac because of Chirac’s long relationship with Gbagbo and other African heads of state. Indeed, some of the concern about the corrupting influence of the Françafrique network on Chirac was born out;
President Chirac, and his Minister of Foreign Affairs Dominique de Villepin, were accused of accepting millions of francs to fund political campaigns from African heads of state, including President Gbagbo (Samuels, 2011). The legacy of colonialism added the content of the rhetoric and emotional weight to its appeal.

Côte d’Ivoire – Second Intervention

The second French intervention in Côte d’Ivoire followed directly from the commitments made during the first. French troops never fully disengaged from the country, and a French presence remained throughout the relative lull in the conflict that preceded the presidential election. The pattern of violence that overtook the country was deeply reflective of the violence that had split the country during the civil war:

The patterns of political violence in the first four months of the post-electoral crisis demonstrate strong continuities with pre-existing, albeit somewhat dormant, patterns of violence in Côte d’Ivoire. They also speak to an essential continuity on the part of pro-Gbagbo forces to employ repressive violence to maintain power (Straus, 2011: 482).

The majority of international attention was focused on the fight, literally, for the Presidential Palace where roughly 2,000 of newly elected President Ouattara’s supporters fought almost 1,000 Gbagbo loyalists armed with heavy artillery (Nossiter and Sayare, 2011). The pattern of urban conflict in which French troops were operating was marked largely by pro-Gbagbo violence aimed at civilians to “disrupt and prevent public political protest” and pro-Ouattara urban uprising (Straus, 2011: 483; Banegas, 2011). “The post-election conflict became a real urban war, with territorialized violence, conducted by political militias taking control of whole neighbourhoods, developing into a form of ethno-political cleansing” (Banegas, 2011: 464).

The French force reached 1,400 troops by early April, 2011 as fighting continued. The
additional forces were used, in coordination with the United Nations forces still in the country, to take over the Abidjan airport to allow foreign civilians who had taken shelter at the French military camp to be evacuated (Erlanger, 2011). However, the most direct offensive action of the intervention was undertaken largely in the air using helicopters rather than through direct ground engagement. This sets the intervention apart from the others that are discussed here – and African interventions historically. The troop component played a defensive role, and the offense was airborne.

Conscious of the rhetoric of “colonialism” employed by Gbagbo and his supporters, French troops avoided direct engagement with Gbagbo forces protecting the ex-President in the palace. Instead, they made use of attack helicopters to strike at heavy artillery and armored vehicles stationed at the Presidential residence and offices to protect civilians that had come under artillery fire (Nossiter and Bilefsky, 2011). France engaged closely with the United Nations and the international community throughout the conflict; operating in tandem and support with United Nations forces and engaging in efforts to assist other countries in securing their foreign nationals (Sayare and Nossiter, 2011).

The end of the post-election conflict came on April 11, 2011 when Ivorian forces, reportedly without any French troops, stormed the Presidential residence and arrested Gbagbo. The final assault was made possible by French missile attacks which destroyed the artillery protecting the building and damaged the outer walls of the building.

The bulk of French intervention in the post-election conflict then was to bring overwhelming firepower from the air, and to back it up with a largely defensive ground troop position providing additional protection for civilians. This, not unlike the fast-moving littoral operation that the British employed in Sierra Leone, required less direct interaction on the
Language and Executive Relations

As was the case with the first Ivorian conflict, the majority of the second intervention revolved around events in the urban center of Abidjan – a high French language usage zone. This does not allow for a systematic comparison across French usage and non-French usage zones. Also, like the British intervention in Sierra Leone, the second French intervention in Côte d’Ivoire was a rapid affair that relied on non-ground forces. Indeed, the majority of the intervention’s impact came from helicopters and their coordination occurred largely in tandem with a multi-lingual United Nations’ force. In conflict environment such as this, shared language is less useful for mitigating friction than, for example, more conventional forms of surveillance intelligence to pinpoint heavy weapons’ locations.

Between the first and second Ivorian intervention, French President and old African hand Jacques Chirac was replaced by Nicolas Sarkozy in the Élysée. Sarkozy’s opinion on the Ivorian election that precipitated the conflict, and the French role in peace maintenance was not positive:

President Sarkozy's pessimistic remarks in Libreville on the holding of the Ivorian presidential election on 29 November 2009 and the Ivorian prime minister's retort on Saturday indicate that something is awry between Paris and Abidjan, despite the apparent rapprochement. Moreover, this is not the first time that the French authorities at the highest level have expressed reservations about Côte d’Ivoire's election. As early as March 2009, through its foreign affairs minister, Bernard Kouchner, France expressed serious doubts about a presidential election being held in Côte d’Ivoire in 2009 (L'Inter, 2009).

Executive relations between the incoming Ivorian president Ouattara and Sarkozy were not particularly close, and Sarkozy’s opinion on the French role in Côte d’Ivoire was ambivalent.

Though Sarkozy issued a public ultimatum to Gbagbo to end the election crisis and step down, he left it to “other West African countries, the African Union and the European Union to lead the push for the incumbent’s departure” (Hall, 2010). Diplomatically, Gbagbo stopped
taking Sarkozy’s calls. The relatively restrained operational approach of the French second
intervention in the Ivory Coast owed no small amount to the tactics employed by President
Gbagbo during the first; Sarkozy was particularly sensitive to avoiding actions that might allow
“Gbagbo to manipulate the situation so he could claim he was hanging on to power in the name
of resisting French ‘colonialism’” (Hall, 2010).

The focus on assaulting heavy weapons from the air, coordinating closely with the United
Nations and the conspicuous absence of French forces during Gbagbo’s arrest were the result of
Sarkozy’s general shift away from a posture of Françafrique – a monadic executive effect. The
context of Gbagbo’s anti-French, anti-imperialist rhetoric during the first conflict, and Sarkozy’s
aversion to the veneer of traditional French-African relations, was the dyadic executive effect. In
this way, executive relations shaped the boundaries of the actual French operations.

Mali

The French intervention in Mali is the most recent intervention examined here, kicking off
in January 2013. Operation Serval, which is the focus of the analysis here, transitioned to
Operation Barkhane July 14, 2014 (Barluet, 2014). This new operation, headquartered in Chad,
is meant to extend French focus to fighting jihadists throughout the wider Sahel. President
Hollande closed Operation Serval by claiming at as a success: “a mission that was perfectly
accomplished” (quoted in Barluet, 2014)\(^\text{24}\).

Ansar Dine unilaterally suspended the cease fire with the government January 4, 2013. A
week later on January 11, 800 French troops were deployed with airstrikes in Operational Serval.
Only four days later they engaged in their first military operation, working jointly with the Mali

\(^{24}\) Original French: “C'est une mission qui a été parfaitement accomplie”.

171
military. This was the first of 95 conflict events recorded by ACLED, significantly more than the other cases under analysis here (Raleigh et al., 2010).

Through the end of January, French and Malian forces retook a series of major towns starting with Diabaly and Douentza, before Gao and finally Timbuktu. In coordination with the Chadian intervention force, the French captured and secured the Kidal airport. The institutional weakness of the Malian Army made French gains difficult to solidify; it resulted, for example, in a surprise MUJAO attack on Gao in the French rear.

Not unlike the second intervention in Côte d’Ivoire, the French were concerned about the implications of colonialism and eager to include international and regional actors to lend legitimacy to the action. “The French dilemma … was summarized neatly by Vincent Giret in the newspaper Libération. If the French remain on the front line they will look, "sooner or later, like white neocolonialists," he wrote, and any bad event can turn public opinion quickly sour” (Erlanger, 2013a).

The pattern of French advance was heavily integrated across services and with international forces:

The rapid advance followed a three-tiered pattern: special operations forces and airborne units seized key airfields and then were joined by French and Malian ground troops, which were in turn relieved by units of the United Nations Stabilization Mission for Mali (Mission des Nations Unies de Stabilisation au Mali, known as MINUSMA) on their previous positions. Logistical support had to follow quickly over hundreds of kilometers, making secured airfields key objectives for air resupply. Communications and information systems were strained to their limits on these unusually large distances (Tramond and Seigneur, 2014: 89).

French emphasis on air power unwittingly exposed operational weaknesses in their capacity; the French lacked sufficient surveillance drones to maintain intelligence capacities across Mali’s vast, under-populated environs, and they were required to rely on NATO for their lack of
adequate air refueling capabilities (Erlanger, 2013b). On the ground, the French experienced traditional counter-insurgency challenges. Insurgents learned to counter French airstrikes by blending into civilian communities and then finally, by escaping in Mali’s vast, under-populated mountainous, desert regions. They abandoned cities in the face of rapid French advance, fanning operational fears that “...given the fighters' deep familiarity of the vast, forbidding territory between this city and the borders of Algeria and Mauritania… the Islamist groups [would] simply regroup” (Polgreen, 2013)

By March 6, French President Hollande was already preparing to draw down French troops, but the withdrawal timetable was delayed by a resurgence in violence; 3,200 French troops remained in Mali as late as November. At the end of April, the UN Security Council authorized a stabilization mission to assist with security operations in Mali.

The French acted in tandem with the Malian Army, Chadian troops, the United Nations and American logistic support. Additionally, they engaged in traditional counter-insurgency operations in urban areas with camouflaged guerrilla fighters representing multiple sides of complex intercommunal divisions. The potential points of operational friction in this case were numerous.

**Institutions and Operations**

The proximate French goal of protecting the Malian capital of Bamako from being overrun by Jihadists pushing south was largely achieved by the rapidity of the French deployment; the first Special Forces attack on Islamist columns occurred within five hours of the Presidential announcement of the beginning of the operation (Shurkin, 2014). The capacity to project expeditionary force into Mali on short notice was the result of the long-standing French
relationship with Francophone Africa. Forces were deployed to Mali from Chad, Côte d’Ivoire (including forces that had been part of Operation Licorne) and Senegal. The continuing French security commitments in the region, along with France’s changing force posture toward rapid reaction capabilities like the Guépard alert system, allowed the French to deploy both ground and air assets to Bamako (Shurkin, 2014; Tramond and Seigneur, 2014).

The legacy of colonialism further brought the assistance of long-time Francophone African partner Chad, which deployed 2,300 troops under French auspices rather than with the United Nations mission (Shurkin, 2014). Chadian forces were particularly useful to the operation in Mali as they have decades of experience fighting in desert climates including during their numerous civil wars and a border war with Libya (Haddad, 2013). This web of relationships allowed France to not only advocate for an African-led solution to the crisis, but to actively recruit and field African allies with whom it had extensive operational experience.

Within the French armed forces institutional learning and memory were brought to bear on Mali along two different currents. The first was recent, a significant contingent of French troops had previously served in Afghanistan, where they gained direct experience with guerilla warfare in difficult, desert terrains. Indeed, they even drew direct parallels between AQIM fighters in northern Mali along the Algerian border and Taliban fighters faced in Afghanistan (Shurkin, 2014). Lessons learned from French combat experience in Afghanistan were vital:

The French losses in Mali remained low because of their high tactical proficiency and the quality of their body armor and helmets, themselves a legacy of lessons learned in Afghanistan. Medical support also maintained operational standards developed in Afghanistan, from individual kits to forward lifesaving surgery modules, treating Chadian and French wounded in large numbers as well as noncombat injuries due to dehydration or fractures (Tramond and Seigneur, 2014: 84).

These were lessons similar to those the British acquired in Northern Ireland and applied in Sierra
Leone.

A more distant historical lesson draws on the colonial legacy left in the French expeditionary armed forces; “all French Army units rotate through Africa on four-month “short-duration missions.” France’s expeditionary brigades, moreover, contain a disproportionate number of marine and Foreign Legion regiments, which historically have focused on colonial operations” (Shurkin, 2014: 31). The French do not have to “scramble to get up to speed” in Francophone Africa.

French officers drew a distinction between the French and American way of war, which they experienced in Afghanistan, and which can be illustrative of the larger inquiry about what may predispose certain states toward greater success in interventions. Americans engage in “fire maneuver” where infantry forces work closely with drones, satellites and air support – relying on technology and overwhelming firepower at distance from the enemy. The French way of war is faster, cheaper and arguably more risky – but it is the result of both colonial and post-colonial expeditionary engagements in Africa (Shurkin, 2014). Their Marines and Foreign Legion are accustomed to small scale, limitedly resourced deployments in Africa – indeed, they pride themselves on this as their particular specialty. The approach employed is “explicitly…’colonial’” which employs a “‘global approach’ that involves not just tactics but mixing in with the population and understanding the entire context in which open is operating” (Shurkin, 2014: 41).

**Language and Executive Relations**

Malian forces worked with French liaisons, and engaged in joint operations with French troops. French forces always worked closely with the United Nation mission. The importance of the French language as a shared medium of communication across these multi-national forces
was highlighted by complaints from the Nigerian Chief of Army Staff, Lt-Gen Azubuike Ihejirika that a lack of French language capability was what denied Nigeria command of the MINUSMA (Iroegbu, 2013). The prominent role for Chadian forces working directly with French forces was also, at least incidentally, the result of shared operational language.

However, Mali of all of the cases discussed here, has the lowest French language penetration, and is by far the largest geographical theater of conflict. The use of French language has always been limited to urban areas, especially in the south. Despite its status as an official language of Mali, it is not spoken with particular fluency amongst the general population outside of market centers. Instead, the French, as part of their strategic alliance with certain moderate Tuareg factions have been able to leverage them as guides, scouts and interpreters, especially during the advance in the Kel Adagh Tuareg heartland which was of particular strategic importance (Shurkin 2014).

There was an added frictional factor: the requirement that interpreters be used, and the fact that, in this case, those interpreters were provided by forces that were not completely trustworthy. The Tuareg assistance placed the French in a difficult and precarious position within the multiple factions vying for control of the weakened Malian state. Not all Tuaregs were pro-French (many of them were not), and those Tuaregs working with the French were not necessarily pro-government.

The dimension of executive interaction in the case of the French intervention in Mali is different from the previous French cases; it involves yet a different French President, Socialist

---

25 The Nigerian military has recognized that its position surrounded by Francophone countries with whom it wants to cooperate necessitates the development of greater French language capabilities, and is now developing a bilingual officer corps.

26 These forces are often reported in the press simply as “Malian soldiers” (Shurkin, 2014).
François Hollande, and a state that lacked the same continuity of executive interaction and political proximity post-independence that France shared with Côte d’Ivoire. Mali’s interim President Dioncounda Traoré personally requested help from French President Hollande (Hammer, 2013). Hollande and top national security officials visited Mali to directly meet with Traoré and both French and Malian forces in Timbuktu. However, French expeditionary doctrine retains a large arena for operational action for individual commanders and the executive concern was aimed at a higher, more political level – Mali’s place in the international War on Terror, consolidating democracy in Mali, and the vision for a post-conflict Mali.

**Connecting Operations to Outcomes**

The four cases discussed here have varying degrees of success, though all achieved more success than failure. Their outcomes are summarized in Table 1 below:

*Table 18 - Cases and Outcomes*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Outcome (QCA)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire I</td>
<td>.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire II</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Operationally the two cases that achieved complete success shared a number of key features: they were rapid, limited, and relied heavily on assets other than ground forces – the Sierra Leonean case was littoral while the second Ivorian case largely made use of air strikes from attack helicopters. Both the first Ivorian case and the Malian intervention also used air strikes, so the use of air or naval assets alone cannot open the way for complete success.
Importantly, the operational tempo of the Malian intervention was also quite rapid – so speed alone is not sufficient either. However, the first Ivorian intervention and the Malian intervention involved large forces with the expectation of ongoing commitment – the first Ivorian intervention was to stabilize the entire country and patrol a ceasefire, while the Malian intervention was to close a front in the War on Terror.

The role of shared language in assisting in intervention success is complicated by the two Ivorian cases. They are close in proximity, involve the same intervener and some of the same conflict actors, and there was no change in language usage but their outcomes are different. There is less French-language use in Mali, but the outcome is more successful than the first Ivorian intervention where French-language usage is significantly higher.

All four of the cases achieved some level of success and there are patterns apparent in all of them that may help to account for this outcome. The legacy of colonialism provided the interveners in all of the cases with resources that would not otherwise have been available to them throughout the course of their interventions. Most directly, for example, the inclusion of thousands of French-trained Chadian troops to support the French intervention in Mali. The role of shared language in Sierra Leone which created an environment that allowed iterative interactions between commanders and the Leonean executive. The resources obtained are not all uniform, but the context of the colonial legacy is how they were made available.

The first Ivorian intervention illustrates an unexpected negative source of friction caused by the executive interaction variable. Gbagbo’s relationship to French political opposition, his enmity toward French President Chirac, and Chirac’s long history with Françafrique networks provided ammunition for effective mobilization against French forces which helped to hobble
operations in Abidjan. This suggests that H2a\textsuperscript{27} may not be as straightforward as the earlier theorizing would suggest. Executive interaction provides pathways for success, but also, pathways for attack.

There is another surprising outcome from the analysis of the operations: a dyadic focus operationally obscures the possibility that there is a regional component to H1\textsuperscript{28} - that is that institutional interactions between the intervener and regional neighbors or potential allies may contribute to success. Greater focus on the Chadian role in Mali should be undertaken to further explore this promising avenue.

Institutional learning was also highlighted as a particularly determinative feature. While the focus of the theorizing here has been on learning from the colonial legacy, the interventions in Sierra Leone and Mali suggest that the institutional memory of a military may be far shorter than that – the British in Sierra Leone were heavily influenced by their more recent deployments in Northern Ireland, and the French operations in Mali were informed by direct combat experience in Afghanistan. Further, interventions often are assisted by previous military interactions, but they also lay the foundation for later military interactions, often explicitly; a component of the British intervention in Sierra Leone was to train the Sierra Leone Army. Future interventions into Sierra Leone should be assisted by these investment.

\textsuperscript{27} **Hypothesis 2a (H2a):** Where executive interaction within a dyad is high, regardless of the level of other institutional interactions, interventions are more likely to achieve their intended goals.

\textsuperscript{28} **Hypothesis 1 (H1):** Where institutional interaction within a dyad is high, interventions are more likely to achieve their intended goals.
Chapter 7 – Conclusion

This study undertook to fill a gap in the existing literature on military interventions into civil wars by focusing on pre-existing relationships between intervention dyads, specifically by considering the effect of colonial legacy on those interventions’ outcomes. The theoretical framework developed for this study posits that greater inter-institutional legibility, the result of iterative and long-term dyadic interactions between elites and shared institutional logics of appropriateness, leads to more successful intervention outcomes by informing more achievable intervention goals and reducing operational friction once the intervention is undertaken. In this way states are equipped to overcome friction through legibility. Knowledge of the institutions and environment in which an intervention will occur can act as a helpful corrective to unrealistic goals, and allow for better operation building, equipment of troops and selection of appropriate forces and skills. Institutional interaction can also ease the interaction between cooperating forces, or provide intelligence on opposing forces.

The study was also novel in the development of the outcome of interest: intervention success. Rather than using a measure of civil war duration, or the cessation of hostilities, this study conceptualized success as the achievement of intervention goals. The conclusions drawn here have greater validity and are of more practical use to policy makers because of this view of success. Considerations about who is best equipped to engage in an intervention, and what uses an intervention may successfully be put to occur within the context of intervener’s goals, and not necessarily about the absolute length of the civil war.

Two broad hypotheses were developed from this theoretical conversation:

Hypothesis 1 (H1): Where institutional interaction within a dyad is high, interventions are more likely to achieve their intended goals.
**Hypothesis 2:** Where high elite social network density within a dyad exists, interventions will be more likely to achieve their intended goals.

To test I employed both a crisp-set and fuzzy-set QCA, and a set of focused, structured case studies.

**QCA Results**

A dataset including third-party military interventions into African civil wars from 1960 to 2013 was constructed, with the theoretical outcome of interesting being “success”. A second subset of the data, just those interventions by major powers was used in the fsQCA analysis. Success was defined by the achievement of the intervener’s goals. For the crisp-set QCA, the outcome was binary, success or not success based on the achievement of most of the intervener’s goals. For the fuzzy-set analysis, the cross-over point for set membership was at the “reasonable achievement of half the goals measured at the outset of the intervention”.

There are several important takeaways from the analysis:

- Institutional interaction is a viable pathway to intervention success; the four cases in the dataset where all the institutional conditions were present were also successful interventions. These cases also were not strictly time dependent and included interventions in relatively close to independence (the French intervention in Chad from 1968-1971), and more recent interventions (the most recent French intervention into Côte d’Ivoire in 2011).

- The analysis supports the hypotheses that military interaction and executive interaction amongst intervention dyads lead to greater goal achievement during a military intervention. The relationship between the executive and military forces may account for
this. The importance of executive interaction across the entire dataset is further supported by the fsQCA in the case of major power interventions.

- When the indicators are disaggregated to their constituent elements across all of the cases in the larger dataset colonial legacy, shared language, and salient economic relationships are particularly important for success.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>RAW COVERAGE</th>
<th>UNIQUE COVERAGE</th>
<th>CONSISTENCY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SHARED LANGUAGE*~EXECUTIVE RELATIONS</td>
<td>0.222069</td>
<td>0.139655</td>
<td>0.848485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>~COLONIAL LEGACY * SALIENT ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP</td>
<td>0.068966</td>
<td>0.068966</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLONIAL LEGACY * SHARED LANGUAGE</td>
<td>0.187931</td>
<td>0.105517</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOLUTION COVERAGE</td>
<td>0.396552</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOLUTION CONSISTENCY</td>
<td>0.909091</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The QCA analysis does support both Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, though not without some caveats. The relationships are obviously not straightforward, and unlike in a statistical analysis there is no suggestion of independence between the conditions – colonial legacy is a major source of shared language, for example. Their interactions are complex, as the iteration of models suggests. Some conditions will lead to success in the absence of other conditions that have been hypothesized to be important. So, for example, economic relationships are important when there is not a context of colonial legacy.

**Goals**

One of the most important findings is the discovery of the nature of goals in military
interventions into African civil wars. The field as a whole has under-theorized goals, and taken for granted the idea that interventions are designed to reduce the length of conflicts. While this is certainly true of a number of cases, the goals to which interventions have been put are significantly more varied and have changed over time. Humanitarian interventions have increased as a percentage of total interventions since the end of the Cold War. This mirrors the broader literature’s understanding on the change within the international arena after the Cold War. Security-related interventions have also risen since the end of the Cold War. This suggests that humanitarianism and security are increasing concerns for states that engage in interventions.

Interventions are put to fewer uses then they were previously, but throughout the time under investigation here (post-Independence), a significant majority of cases involved interventions that were not primarily concerned with ending the civil war intervened in, or were only interested as a secondary goal. This questions the validity of a great deal of research that relies on conflict duration or closure to center a discussion of interventions.

The problem of changing goals over time is not solved by this research. The case studies suggest that many interventions begin without clear, measurable metrics for success and that goals and intention develop over the course of the intervention. For the most part, the cases in the focused, structured comparison began as limited evacuations for humanitarian purposes before they expanded their scope. It is possible that in the domestic arena that limited interventions may be easier to undertake, possibly for domestic political reasons, and that once troops are committed there is greater leeway for action. The question remains: do interventions create their own goals? Under certain circumstances it does appear that, within a bounded area of action, interventions may create the goals that they ostensibly are meant to serve. This only reinforces the need for further theoretical and empirical work around the goal creation process for
interventions – an area this study could only scratch the initial surface of.

The research presented here also suggests that, at least, at the goal-making stage of an intervention international relations plays a major role in modern interventions. Especially in the context of former colonial powers, there is a greater sense of responsibility both on the part of the intervener and on the part of the international community that is interested in the conflict. When organizations like the United Nations have ascertained that an action is necessary, they will often look to the former colonial power to act as a responsible party – no always in the application of force specifically, but also in conflict mediation and diplomacy.

Colonial legacy also creates a sense of responsibility bilaterally. President Kabbah looked to Great Britain for assistance and the deep role that High Commissioner Penfold played in cultivating that relationship was the result of a long, historical relationship between those two countries. Côte d’Ivoire was once the jewel of Francophone Africa, and remained a cultural and economic partner throughout independence.

The historical relationships built around the colonial legacy were not simply, straightforwardly positive. The rhetoric used to whip up street violence against the French in Côte d’Ivoire was heavily reliant on colonialism and subsequent French neo-colonialism. This does suggests, however, that no military intervention between dyads of this nature (former colonial powers, and their former colonies) can be meaningfully understood without reference to the historical context in which the intervention takes place.

Interventions are undertaken within the context of regional and national organizations that may also be intervening, or setting the boundaries or guidelines within which interventions are taking place. The United Nations was involved with all of the interventions examined in the case studies; for example, France intervened in tandem with a United Nations force in Côte
d’Ivoire and there were ECOWAS forces at work in Sierra Leone along with the British. Even interventions that are not just humanitarian in nature\(^{29}\) are shaped by international mandates and requests.

**Operations**

The type of operation engaged in can influence the attainment of success – mitigating or mediating the role of other elements, such as a shared logic of appropriateness, or elite networking. The decisive element for the British intervention in Sierra Leone was not in the shared language or the historical relationship with the President, but rather in the speed of the operation and its littoral element, allowing for the support of heavy naval elements and off-shore basing. Similarly, the second French intervention in Côte d’Ivoire was heavily supported by the Air Force, which effectively crippled the heavy weapons that were the primary aim of the intervention; French ground forces largely acted to secure airports and civilians. The less successful two French interventions were longer engagements that required more emphasis on ground-level forces – the first French intervention in Côte d’Ivoire and the French intervention in land-locked Mali both of which engaged in more traditional counter-insurgency.

The legacy of colonialism also provide resources on which interveners could draw throughout the course of the intervention – the resources are not uniform but range from material, like the assistance of Chadian troops in Mali, to the relational, like the assistance that the shared English language provided in the development of relationships with the Sierra Leonean president.

\(^{29}\) Interventions in the dataset could potentially be coded with multiple categories of goals. So an intervention that had a humanitarian goal could also have a domestic political goal, like the British intervention in Sierra Leone.
The case studies established the role that institutional learning played in operations; while the general institutional memory was generally shorter than hypothesized, military institutions do apply recent operational experience to new situations, especially in cases where there are not new, clear guidelines. The British, for example, drew on their experience in Northern Ireland during the Sierra Leonean operation, as they were deployed too quickly for a significant amount of pre-operation briefing. The institutional memory for French forces is slightly longer by design; French army units rotate on four-month, short duration missions through Africa. The expeditionary focus of the French military in Africa further lead it to explicitly reject the operational model that they had used alongside the United States in the more recent Afghanistan conflict, but they still retained lessons about tactical proficiency and modern medical support.

The importance of executive relations and elite networking is more difficult to pinpoint in the operational context. Executive interactions often facilitate the justification for intervention – President’s ask each other for help – but the operations themselves are undertaken at a lower level and within a particular institutional context for modern, professional Western militaries. The prominence of executive relations in the QCA configurations may be partially an artifact of close, post-Independence relationships that are shaping interventions through other pathways.

**Future Research**

Hypothesis 1 derived considerable support from the QCA and the case studies. Institutional interaction amongst intervention dyads, and within regional networks does increase
the likelihood of intervention success. Hypothesis 2a and Hypothesis 2b also found general support though the research presented here does not provide strong conclusions about the causal connection. However, these conclusions are bounded both by time and geography – the interventions considered were all undertaken in Africa since 1960.

Future research should expand the geographic scope to determine whether the effects of colonial legacy, institutional interaction, executive interaction and shared language holds in other areas. Certainly the history of colonialism is not uniform both in length or effect and the part it plays in intervention success may likewise be variable from region to region.

International and regional influences play a major role in the development of goals and the definition of intervention missions. These same factors are important for the development and spread of internal conflicts into regional conflict systems. In the case of the interventions studied here, the international level was reciprocally effected by the history and relationship within the conflict dyad. Future research should take into account both the dyadic and international level when investigating military interventions into internal conflicts.

Future, especially large scale, research on interventions into civil wars should avoid leaving goals under-theorized. As the research here suggests, there are a variety of uses to which such interventions are put, and the prevalence of these goals change over time probably related to the international environment. Current research mostly focuses on duration of conflict as a proxy for intervention success but the categorization undertaken here suggests that even humanitarian

---

30 **Hypothesis 2a (H2a):** Where executive interaction within a dyad is high, regardless of the level of other institutional interactions, interventions are more likely to achieve their intended goals.

31 **Hypothesis 2b (H2b):** Where dyads share a language, regardless of levels of other network relationships, interventions will be more likely to achieve their intended goals.
goals are not always or primarily interested in simply ending conflicts – a common humanitarian goal is the evacuation of foreign nationals. Despite the prevalence of humanitarian goals in modern, post-Cold War world, they are not the only interventions still undertaken. States may also undertake to end a conflict or mitigate its human toll in conjunction with other goals, and the priority and balance amongst them may change throughout the course of the intervention.

Final Conclusions

This study has both major theoretical and policy implications. Theoretically it has called into question the validity of studies that rely on measures of conflict duration and conflict resolution as a method of measuring intervention outcomes. Only a fraction of the cases under consideration here are broadly humanitarian, and those that have humanitarian goals are often significantly more limited in what they hope to achieve. In light of this, the fact that studies arrive at divergent conclusions as to the effect of interventions on conflict duration makes significantly more sense; states are not regularly engaging in intervention for the primary purpose of ending civil wars. Indeed, military interventions are unlikely to be a particularly useful instrument in isolation for this purpose; civil wars are deeply politically complicated.

Further, this study has highlighted the importance of dyadic features for helping to explain intervention success. The importance of relational measures like shared language seem obvious on their face, but have been largely absent from the main body of literature on conflict and intervention. Of both theoretical and policy importance is the fact that a dyadic view of intervention strongly suggests that not all interveners are the same. Not all states are appropriately equipped to intervene in all civil wars and that is not simply a function of defense spending on materials.

The importance of colonial legacy, in particular, suggests that there is no quick solution to
preparing a state for intervention. Colonialism was a long historical process, one that continued to shape and condition the development of relationships long after its termination. A state like the United States cannot simply by this depth of interaction and knowledge. However, particular constituent elements could be reasonably undertaken; for example, language capacity can be developed in military training programs. Similarly, the integration of human terrain as central to the pre-deployment regime could result in greater success in areas where these legacies are absent. Particular to the United States though, its suggests that even major power status is not enough; the United States’ policy goals may be better served in some situations by relying on partners who are uniquely equipped for intervention into the conflict in question.
APPENDIX A: Simplifying Assumptions for Boolean Minimization of csQCA

Simplifying Assumptions:

- $\text{IntColonial} \{0\} \text{Military} \{0\} \text{Executive} \{0\} \text{EconR} \{1\} +$
- $\text{IntColonial} \{0\} \text{Military} \{1\} \text{Executive} \{0\} \text{EconR} \{1\} +$
- $\text{IntColonial} \{0\} \text{Military} \{1\} \text{Executive} \{1\} \text{EconR} \{1\} +$
- $\text{IntColonial} \{1\} \text{Military} \{0\} \text{Executive} \{0\} \text{EconR} \{1\} +$
- $\text{IntColonial} \{1\} \text{Military} \{0\} \text{Executive} \{1\} \text{EconR} \{0\} +$
- $\text{IntColonial} \{1\} \text{Military} \{0\} \text{Executive} \{1\} \text{EconR} \{1\}$

Number of Simplifying Assumptions: 6
## APPENDIX B: Sources for QCA Coding by Case

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intervention #</th>
<th>COW War #</th>
<th>Intervener</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>805/808</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>811</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>811</td>
<td>France</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>818</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>818</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Page</td>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>870 (II)</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>895</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>895</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>895</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>897</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Clark, J. (2001).** *Foreign policy making in Central Africa: The imperative of regime security in a new context.* In G. Khadiagal, and T. Lyons (Eds.),
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Column 1</th>
<th>Column 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>898</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>898</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>898</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>898</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Column 1</th>
<th>Column 2</th>
<th>Column 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Page</td>
<td>905</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>References</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page</td>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**References**


doi:http://link.springer.com/journal/volumesAndIssues/10887


207


Lawrence, T. E. (1917, August 20). Twenty-seven articles. *The Arab Bulletin,


L'Inter. (2009, June 24). Cote d'Ivoire: Soro reacts to Sarkozy's doubts about election obeying schedule. *BBC Monitoring Africa*


Samuel, H. (2011, September 11). Jacques Chirac 'regularly received cash from African leaders'. *The Telegraph*


Sierra Leone: House of Commons, Debate 08 May (2000).


